Presence, Capacity and Legitimacy: Implementing Extension of State Authority Mandates in Peacekeeping

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Executive Summary

The extension of state authority is a concept that has not been clearly defined by either the Security Council or the Secretariat. Mandates on extension of state authority tend to be vague and the Secretariat has to date not produced guidance to peacekeeping missions on the meaning of the concept or what it entails. Examples from the ground have shown that the extension of state authority is predicated on three components—presence, capacity and legitimacy. In order for sustainable peace to endure and to avoid relapse into conflict, peacekeepers must support fragile states to build presence throughout the territory, have the capacity to provide quality services and public goods, represent the normative and legal order, and earn legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the population. These three components of extension of state authority are interlinked and mutually reinforcing.

This study notes that while the three components of the extension of state authority are significant and mutually reinforcing, support to efforts aimed at cultivating legitimacy are often overlooked. It proposes that the extension of state authority is not merely a technical exercise but is an inherently political endeavour. While building the technical and operational capacities of state institutions remains important, peacekeepers must ensure that their work contributes to a sustainable political settlement. Furthermore, peacekeepers have a clear comparative advantage in the area of political settlements because of their international mandate and good offices role. They do, however, often lack the skills, time and resources required to engage in more technical exercises required to build or reform the state's institutional capacity. Indeed, it is in contexts where peacekeepers are present that the absence of legitimacy is a key conflict driver.

This study therefore proposes a number of recommendations that centre on the need to focus on all three components of the extension of state authority while prioritizing legitimacy. The study recommends that peacekeepers conduct political analysis including an analysis of the state to drive planning and implementation of extension of state authority activities. Peacekeepers operate in environments that are fraught with political complexity and contestations. It is imperative that planning and implementing extension

of state authority initiatives is informed by a clear understanding of the political and economic elements underpinning the situation on the ground.

This report proposes that the extension of state authority be integrated into mission plans as well as broader development planning while ensuring the inclusion of national, local and international actors in the planning and implementation process. Also of importance is the need to ensure that initiatives regarding the extension of state authority focus on gaining national buy-in and promoting inclusive national ownership of extension of state authority initiatives. The study makes a call for peacekeepers to ensure that initiatives supporting the extension of state authority are sustainable and that impact assessments are conducted to ensure that their interventions are successful.

By calling for a holistic approach and placing an emphasis on the political aspects of the extension of state authority, this study suggests that initiatives in support of the extension of state authority can contribute to sustaining peace.

1.

Introduction

For over two decades, the Security Council has mandated United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions to support the restoration, re-establishment and/or extension of state authority (ESA). The concept, however, has not been formally clarified by either the UN Secretariat or the Security Council. Furthermore, the vision and end state of successful ESA is also unclear.

Various Security Council resolutions have formulated ESA mandates in different terms, and the Secretariat has not developed detailed guidance on the implementation of ESA tasks. Missions have focused on supporting the presence of the state, developing its capacity, and, to a lesser extent and more indirectly, strengthening the state's legitimacy in the eyes of the population.

The closest the Secretariat has come to providing a definition is in the

Department of Peacekeeping Operation's (DPKO) 2008 Capstone Doctrine which articulated the restoration and extension of state authority as a process to enable the state to "exert control over its national territory...to generate revenues and provide basic services."[1] The Capstone Doctrine framed the ultimate objective of this support as enabling the state to take responsibility for mediating, addressing and resolving violent conflict. The Capstone Doctrine also recognized the political dimension of restoring and extending state authority, noting that peacekeeping may also support "efforts to develop political participation."

However, to date, there has been no overarching strategy to guide peacekeeping missions' efforts to support ESA. Although peacekeepers are heavily involved in assisting countries with the organization of elections and implementation of political agreements, these activities are often not implemented under the framework of supporting ESA. With regards to ESA, peacekeeping missions have tended to focus on support to building state institutions, particularly in the justice and security sectors.

These technically-driven statebuilding efforts sometimes neglect political realities. While an efficient state may have, in theory, the capacity to address some of the symptoms of conflict, it may not necessarily be able or willing to address conflict drivers such as inequality, marginalization, or discrimination. Furthermore, state strengthening efforts can have negative consequences. For example, some state institutions may commit human rights violations or increase local tensions by providing services in discriminatory ways or by excluding certain groups or regions within a country.

Ultimately, there is a lack of conceptual clarity on the end state of peacekeeping support to ESA and limited examination of the risks to be addressed in supporting ESA in conflict-ridden contexts. This is particularly important to consider when the UN acts in contexts in which an agreement has not been reached between parties. The UN risks being perceived as strengthening contested political regimes when acting in these settings.

1.1. Purpose and outline of study

This study explores the implementation of mandates to establish and/or extend state authority by focusing on how it has been understood in peacekeeping operations; how it has been operationalized; and how it fits into the evolving peacekeeping context. This paper argues that supporting ESA should be understood as part of an effort and specific set of tools in support of a broader strategy to sustain peace. Furthermore, this study acknowledges that peacekeeping missions are one of the many actors engaged in activities aimed at extending state authority, and that its efforts to support ESA must take place as part of a coordinated effort, together with relevant UN agencies, international financial institutions, bilateral partners and member states.

The paper is divided into three parts. The first section discusses the ESA concept. It considers how state authority is predicated on three components: presence, legitimacy and capacity. This part of the report emphasizes the importance of legitimacy and the need for increased focus on activities that enhance state legitimacy. This section also focuses on the temporal evolution of ESA through various Security Council resolutions by analysing Security Council mandates that mention ESA and activities related to it. It finally analyses key UN policy documents that inform understanding of ESA.

The second section focuses on field-level implementation of ESA mandates. It provides examples of implementation of the ESA mandate and highlights key factors to consider in order to improve the effectiveness of such activities.

The third section frames ESA as part of longer term initiatives for sustainable peace, recommending that: planning for ESA be driven by political and conflict analysis; peacekeepers integrate ESA efforts into mission planning; mission leadership provide visible support; peacekeepers include impact assessment and adjust approaches accordingly; and peacekeepers engage national and international partners. Statebuilding must be inclusive to build peace, and is most likely to succeed when "home-grown." This section equally recognizes the challenges and limits of institution-building.

1.2. Methodology

The methodology used for this paper consisted of desk review of various UN policy documents, academic articles and lessons learned from various peacekeeping missions notably Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Timor Leste. Field visits were undertaken to the Central African Republic (CAR), the DRC and Mali. Furthermore, telephone interviews were conducted with peacekeepers in Côte d'Ivoire, CAR, the DRC and Mali. Discussions with UN staff at Headquarters were also held.

1 United Nations "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines" (United Nations Publication, 2008) p. 27

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2.

Part One: Conceptualizing the Extension of State Authority

2.1. The three components of the extension of state authority

Activities aimed at supporting ESA fall under one of the three categories: presence, capacity and legitimacy. In this study, presence of the state refers to the physical presence of central state institutions, associated agencies and personnel across the territory of the given country. A state's physical presence alone is, however, insufficient to bring about transformational change.

Extending state authority in terms of "presence" involves, for peacekeepers, supporting the deployment of local authorities and other state agents, such as law enforcement and security forces, across the territory of a country as well as ensuring that a minimum physical infrastructure exists to support that presence. The goal in such contexts

is to ensure that the state is physically present throughout the territory through state infrastructures such as police stations, prisons, court houses, schools, healthcare centres and more. Environments in which the presence of the state needs to be extended are often underdeveloped with only rudimentary arrangements of formal government, or where formal government structures are non-existent. Areas where the state is absent do not remain ungoverned, but instead become spaces where armed groups, rebels and other non-state actors exercise a level of control and establish an order different from one established by the state. As demonstrated in the examples below, extending the state's presence is fundamental and often a necessary precursor to building state capacity.

Capacity, on the other hand, refers to the "ability of institutions to carry out their core functions efficiently and effectively. When states lack this capacity, they cannot mitigate stresses that might induce organized violence."[2] The state's administrative capacity can be described as its "ability to produce and deliver public goods and services, and the ability to regulate commercial activity."[3] Capacity focuses on a range of aspects that enable state institutions to function. In particular, a functioning state should also have capacity aimed at raising revenue and coercive capacity that allows it to monopolize the legitimate use of force.[4]

In this study, capacity is understood as being comprised of multiple aspects including: 1) leadership which refers to vision, policy and strategy; 2) programming which refers to aspects such as planning and programmes; 3) resources which include human as well as financial resources; and, 4) partnerships which include international and local partners with whom officials/ administrators can collaborate.

Peacekeepers have engaged in various activities intended to build state capacities. These include activities such as:

1. Basic capacity and needs assessment;
2. Supporting training to local authorities, magistrates and police, among others;
3. Providing technical expertise to local authorities in areas of planning, budgeting and financial management;
4. Assisting in policy and procedural developments for institutions; and,
5. Providing logistical support.

In countries where the state has been chronically underperforming in the provision of social public services this space has often been occupied by non-state actors ranging from humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to parallel authorities (e.g. traditional, community-based). Often, there is not necessarily an expectation that the state should occupy this space. In the case of Haiti, for instance, between 70% to 90% of the education and health sector is provided by non-state actors, and there is little expectation in the near to medium term that the state will have the resources to provide those services. But there is an expectation that it should play a regulatory function and guarantee that the services provided meet basic quality requirements. Supporting national counterparts and international partners in determining capacity needs should be addressed not only in terms of functionality, but also in terms of popular expectations.

For the purposes of this study, legitimacy is defined as "popular acceptance of a governing authority's right to exercise that authority. It is a subjective concept and it is context-dependent. There are multiple sources of legitimacy and their importance varies from society to society."[5] Legitimacy is also based on a state's ability to provide political goods, namely political rights, personal security and the rule of law.[6] As such, "when states provide these goods, they build of stocks of credibility, demonstrating that they can fulfil their most basic duties."[7] However, the provision of goods alone is not sufficient to build legitimacy. Legitimacy is the most complex component of ESA and will receive substantial focus in this study. It is in essence "an endorsement of the state by citizens at a moral or normative level."[8]

2 The World Bank World Development Report (2011) p. xvi Available from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf
3 Jonathan K. Hanson and Rachel Sigman "Leviathan's Latent Dimension: Measuring State Capacity for Comparative Political Research (2013) p. 4 Available from http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/johanson/papers/hanson_sigman13.pdf
4 Ibid
5 Institute for Human Security, "Building Legitimacy in Conflict-affected and Fragile States" Policy Brief Series. 1 No. 1 (June 2016) p. 1
6 Danielle Carter (2011) "Sources of State Legitimacy in Contemporary South Africa: A Theory of Political Goods." Working Paper No. 134 Afrobarometer
7 Ibid p. 7
8 Bruce Gillay, (2006) "The meaning and measure of state legitimacy: Results for 72 countries" European Journal of Political Research Vol. 45 (2006) p. 502

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States that "lack legitimacy devote more resources to maintaining their rule and less to effective governance, which reduces support and makes them vulnerable to overthrow or collapse."[9] Legitimacy concerns the fundamental relationship between a state and its population. It is "a complex set of beliefs, values and institutions (endogenous and exogenous) about the social compact governing state-society relations."[10]

However, this relationship is not unidirectional: state and society shape each other. As noted in the forthcoming study on state-society relations by DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS), "...neither the state nor societies are a clearly delineated or internally homogenous entity. They cannot be understood as rigidly distinct from each other."[11] There is often conflict between state and society, two socially-constructed entities, when the dynamic between the two grows tense. Furthermore, the state is not merely an administrative entity, providing goods and services. Rather, it is also a political entity with vested interests and relationships. Treating the state merely as government misses the point that the state has a broader meaning. It contains multiple aspects such as, "control of land, population, natural resources, and ethnicity."[12]

Legitimacy is enhanced as a result of multiple factors. The Institute for Human Security notes that "legitimacy is accrued not from a single source but rather a combination."[13] Process legitimacy is shaped through dialogue and other political processes that create space for political participation and in turn create space for a state's legitimacy and credibility. This allows the population to perceive the state as legitimate if it believes the state has created space for its inclusion and that the state represents its interests. Therefore, legitimacy is a matter of political inclusion and the extent to which society views the state as representing its values. On the other hand, performance legitimacy is also measured by the state's performance and its ability to organise itself in a way that allows it to provide political goods as well as deliver public goods such as security, justice and economic opportunities to the population. Without such provisions, populations can be resentful and tensions between the state and society often lead to conflict.

Effective delivery of goods and services can be a way for a state to build legitimacy when this is driven by needs and priorities identified by those that benefit from those services. It is not only the fact that a state delivers services that gives it legitimacy, but even more importantly it is also how the services are delivered that often is at the crux of performance legitimacy. High levels of corruption, human rights violations, lack of transparency and low accountability mechanisms, often lead to a perception among local populations that the state security and justice apparatus, for example, is predatory and not a vehicle for service delivery. Recent research highlights that it is not so much the provision of services that improves perception of state legitimacy; it is instead the quality of services as well as the "inclusion of citizens in the decisions about service delivery, and well-functioning complaint mechanism."[14] Meeting communities' expectations provides legitimacy: understanding those expectations and helping to channel them into national processes is a critical role that peacekeeping can play to support state authority. Supporting ESA and the state's ability to provide services should be carefully tailored to the local priorities, needs and expectations expressed by local constituencies.

Not only is legitimacy accrued from different sources, it also manifests itself differently at the national level compared to the sub-national level. There are many institutions, including traditional and customary institutions that are perceived as legitimate beyond the state. Furthermore, "when customary economic, social and political arrangements are working effectively, they are capable of delivering security, representation and welfare to people and, in many places, are the only sources of such goods."[15] A shortcoming of peacekeeping approaches is that traditional institutions are not always taken into account when implementing

9 Bruce Gilley (2006) p.499
10 Kevin Clements "Note on building effective, legitimate and resilient state institutions" Headline Seminar on Deteriorating Governance. 8 April 2009. p. 1 available from: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/511777-1224016350914/5474500-1257529177557/Notes_Clements_Institution_Building_HS_Apr8_09.pdf
11 DPKO-DFS "Peacekeeping's Role in Promoting State-Society Relations to Sustain Peace" forthcoming 2017
12 Jieli Li, "State Fragmentation: Toward a Theoretical Understanding of the Territorial Power of the State" Sociological Theory 2002 Vol. 20 Issue 2 p. 141
13 Institute for Human Security "Building Legitimacy in Conflict-affected and Fragile States" Policy Brief (June 2016) Series 1 No. 1 p. 2
14 Institute for Human Security "Building Legitimacy in Conflict-affected and Fragile States" Policy Brief (June 2016) Series 1 No. 1
15 Kevin Clements "Note on building effective, legitimate and resilient state institutions" Headline Seminar on Deteriorating Governance. (8 April 2009). p. 13. Available from: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/511777-1224016350914/5474500-1257529177557/Notes_Clements_Institution_Building_HS_Apr8_09.pdf

ESA projects. UNMIL, for example, did not prioritize engagement with the customary justice system until almost five years into the mission's existence. Yet, the majority of the population, around 80%, refer to the customary system in Liberia instead of to the formal justice system. In such instances, the idea of joint systems can be useful in order to reinforce already effective customary systems by attaching them to formal processes.

Post-conflict environments are often laden with sentiments of frustration and grievance felt by large sectors of the population towards the state. These issues are at the heart of peace processes and political settlements, and remain a major impediment to legitimacy until inclusive peace agreements are achieved. Peacekeepers have at times found themselves mandated to promote the extension of state authority in contexts where the legitimacy of the state has yet to be restored. The question of state legitimacy can therefore be a challenging and extremely sensitive issue for peacekeeping operations, particularly where there is still no "peace to keep." Ultimately, building legitimacy is a process linked to the nature of the political settlement as well as the performance of the state and support from external actors is only effective if these processes are nationally-owned.

2.2. Extension of state authority in Security Council mandates

The conceptual foundation for peacekeeping mission mandates on ESA is based on the legal recognition that the nation state is the foundation of international order, with sovereign responsibility for the security and development of its population. Successful exit strategies of peacekeeping missions are usually seen to depend on the negotiated end of violent conflict between armed parties involved, and on the establishment of a legitimate national authority able to occupy and govern across a territory.

This end goal is, however, not clearly reflected in Security Council mandates with regards to ESA. In fact, the Security Council's terminology on re-establishing and extending state authority is often ambiguous. The Security Council has framed such mandates in terms of "restoration", "reestablishment", "assertion", "strengthening" and "consolidation." These different terms have different meanings, and are often context-specific (see Annex B). The common denominator driving these terms has been the notion that extending the physical presence and the legal, coercive and moral authority of the state across its territory is necessary and can be achieved with the support of the international community and peacekeeping missions in particular. The diversity in terminology – also used by DPKO - reflects the perspectives of different member states regarding the role that the state should play, and what peacekeeping operations should and should not do.[16]

The extension of state authority is usually characterized in Security Council mandates as linked to state presence, order and the monopoly of the use of force. Since 2001, missions in Sierra Leone, the DRC, Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Mali, and CAR have been tasked to support ESA with varying levels of scope and detail.

The first Security Council mandate authorizing a UN peacekeeping operation to support ESA was the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The Security Council, through resolution 1313 (2000), authorized UNAMSIL to, "assist through its presence and within the framework of its mandate, the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend state authority, restore law and order and further stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country."[17] In this mandate, ESA was concomitant to efforts by the Government of Sierra Leone to restore law and order, and to stabilize the security situation in particular.

In 2001, through Security Council resolution 1346, UNAMSIL was mandated to renew its efforts to support ESA, "further strengthening... the military component of UNAMSIL for the completion of the planned concept of operations to fulfil the overall objective of assisting the Government of Sierra Leone to re-establish its authority throughout the country."[18] The language in this resolution more explicitly linked

16 References to "restoring" state authority are problematic for several reasons. It implies that the state should be brought back to ideal conditions of historic performance that in many cases never existed. Large parts of some countries affected by conflict have had little or no presence of formal state institutions, often for decades or never in these countries' histories. It also neglects the possibility that the state in the past was a cause of the conflict, or at the very least unable to channel it peacefully. As such, this study does not to refer to the "restoration" of state authority.

17 S/RES/1313 (2000)

18 S/RES/1346 (2001)

ESA to security and law enforcement, and to the state's physical presence throughout the territory. While the first mandate pointed to the connection between ESA and restoration of law and order, the second mandate mentioned "re-establish[ing]" state authority.

The majority of subsequent Security Council resolutions focus on extension of the state's physical presence. For example, language in Security Council resolution 1509 (2003) for the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) refers to the "reestablishment of national authority throughout the country."[19] Another example is the language in Security Council resolution 2039 (2013) for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) which states, "to extend and re-establish state administration throughout the country."[20] Such language does not clarify whether the mere presence of the state's administration equates to authority; or which specific components of the state's administration are to be prioritized.

The extension of state authority is also often associated with law and order. An example is Security Council resolution 1925 (2010) for the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) which states, "consolidation of state authority by the Congolese Government throughout the territory, through the deployment of Congolese civil administration, in particular the police, territorial administration and rule of law institutions in areas freed from armed groups."[21] This language is rather detailed compared to other resolutions and lists the different components of the state that need to be deployed with the stated end goal of occupying territory freed from armed groups.

Some resolutions associate ESA with capacity and institution-building endeavours. For example, the Security Council through resolution 1542 (2004) mandated the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to "assist the Transitional Government in extending state authority throughout Haiti and support good governance at local levels."[22] In this mandate, supporting good governance at the local level is linked to ESA. The reference to good governance also alludes to the importance of the accountability of state institutions. Security Council resolution 1739 (2007) for the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) states, "the re-establishment by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire of the authority of the State throughout Côte d'Ivoire and of the institutions and public services essential for the social and economic recovery of the country."[23] This resolution associates ESA with public services as well as social and economic recovery. Clearly, presence and capacity – the objectives of each - are understood in a variety of ways in different mandates.

ESA mandates do not, however, regularly refer to the legitimacy dimensions of state authority. Security Council resolutions do request missions to assist in fostering legitimacy by mandating support to political dialogue, elections, reconciliation and social cohesion efforts, among others. However, the link between these mandated tasks, aimed at encouraging an overall framework for the foundation of state and political order, and ESA mandates is not explicit in Security Council resolutions.

2.3. UN policy and guidance frameworks that inform an understanding of the extension of state authority

Extending state authority in fragile settings has led the international community to focus more on the functions of the state rather than the quality of its authority. The peace and security agenda borrowed the approach of the development agenda that prioritized statebuilding as a solution to poverty and inequality. As a result, the political and conflict dimension of state formation were initially neglected. In recent years however, there has progressively been a shift towards making a stronger link between security and development. By associating statebuilding to peacebuilding – as done in the New Deal, for example – this has generated a discussion on the characteristics of a state that is most effective in preventing a relapse into conflict. In the last two decades, there has been a shift in the organization's approach to peacebuilding, from a technical approach focused on state and institution-building to a more holistic approach that increasingly understands peacebuilding as a political and comprehensive process.

19 S/RES/1509 (2003)
20 S/RES/2039 (2012)
21 S/RES/1925 (2010) and S/RES/2053 (2012)
22 S/RES/1542 (2004)
23 S/RES/1739 (2007)

This shift, culminating in the 2016 twin resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on "sustaining peace," is significant and provides some guidance as to how ESA might be approached by peacekeepers.

Although ESA is not addressed in detail in UN policy documents, initial references to the role that peacekeeping may play in this realm can be traced back to the 1992 *An Agenda for Peace* report by then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In the report, the Secretary-General stressed the need to link peacekeeping to peacebuilding in post-conflict environments. The report stated that "peace-making and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful...must...include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people."[24] The report further notes that these may include a number of processes including "reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal process of political participation."[25]

The 2000 *Brahimi Report*, did not make reference to aspects of ESA but it described the link between peacekeeping and peacebuilding as one of complementarity stating that the peacekeepers' task was to create a secure environment for peacebuilders to support political, social and economic changes.[26] Recognition of the complementarity between the two is significant because ESA is one of the key connectors between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The same year that the Brahimi Report was issued, for the first time, the Security Council mandated a peacekeeping mission, in Sierra Leone, to support the extension of state authority.

In 2004, the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change recommended that the Security Council establish a peacebuilding commission in order for the United Nations system to have a structure "designed to avoid state collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace."[27] A focus on avoiding state collapse signalled the importance of strengthened states, and in 2005, the Peacebuilding Commission was established. By this time five peacekeeping missions were mandated to support the extension of state authority. It was evident by then that peacekeepers were not only expected to maintain a space for peacebuilders to act, but to become part of peacebuilding efforts.

Inherent in these milestone documents and others, and made explicit in An Agenda for Peace are two ideas: i) that peace and security are inextricably linked to progress on development; and ii) that legitimate and capable states are better suited and able to preserve peace and deliver development. In one of the few formal references to ESA mandates, the 2008 *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* or "Capstone Doctrine," articulated what constituted ESA and in its description it combined elements that addressed state presence, capacity and legitimacy:

> Multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations may support the restoration and extension of state authority by creating an enabling security environment, providing political leadership or coordinating the efforts of other international actors [and] may include efforts to develop political participation, as well as operational support to the immediate activities of state institutions. Where relevant, it may also include small-scale capacity-building or support larger processes of constitutional or institutional restructuring.[28]

The 2009 *Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of Conflict* identified five priority peacebuilding areas including basic safety and security, inclusive political processes, the provision of basic services, the restoration of core government functions and economic revitalisation. The DPKO/DFS 2011 guidance *Contribution of United Nations Peacekeeping to Early Peacebuilding: A DPKO/DFS Strategy for Peacekeepers* highlighted the political rather than technical nature of peacebuilding in conflict affected settings:

> ...peacekeepers must frame early peacebuilding initiatives within a peacekeeping operation's overall priorities, such as supporting the political process and national reconciliation, creating a secure environment, and helping extend the authority of state institutions while avoiding the

24 A/47/277
25 Ibid
26 A/55/305-S/2000/809
27 United Nations (2004) A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. P. 83. Available from http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf. Accessed 27 January 2017.
28 United Nations (2008) p. 186

> strengthening of an inappropriate institutional status quo…these are fundamentally political tasks; mission components must see their role as primarily political, rather than technical.[29]

The importance of this document is that it roots ESA in the political realm and steers away from considering it as a technical exercise or separate from the overall objectives of a peacekeeping mission. The guidance also recognizes that the type of state is a factor in promoting or undermining peace and stability and that peacekeepers should consider the impact of capacity-building support on the prospects for political settlements and peace and security. The 2012 *Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding in the aftermath of Conflict* went a step further and cautioned against international support to institution-building without fully considering their political and social dimension. The report stated that, "[i]nstitutional support and capacity development are not a quick fix. When pursued too quickly and without national ownership, or prematurely by authorities that lack legitimacy, reforms can prove detrimental.[30]

At the same time that peace and security actors were reflecting on peacebuilding, development actors were also pondering questions regarding the sustainability of development in fragile states. Many of their reflections are informative for ESA. Various documents, including the New Deal[31] and those produced by UNDP such as the 2014 Restore and Reform and the 2012 *Governance for Peace: Securing the Social Contract* reports as well as the World Bank made a clear reference to the importance of political processes and legitimate institutions. The 2011 World Development Report noted the importance of the connection between state institutions and legitimacy. It noted that:

> …**institutional legitimacy is the key to stability.** When state institutions do not adequately protect citizens, guard against corruption, or provide access to justice; when markets do not provide job opportunities; or when communities have lost social cohesion—the likelihood of violent conflict increases. At the earliest stages, **countries often need to restore public confidence in basic collective action even before rudimentary institutions can be transformed.** Early wins—actions that can generate quick, tangible results—are critical.

Furthermore, the Sustainable Development Goals adopted in 2015 are a comprehensive set of goals that integrate inclusivity into the development equation. The goals are premised on an understanding that ending poverty and hunger, combatting inequality, building peaceful, just and inclusive societies, protecting human rights and promoting gender equality among others will lead to and ensure sustainable development.

The 2015 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture by the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE), *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, and resulting twin resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council (2016) took this approach even further by proposing the concept of sustaining peace. According to the two resolutions, sustaining peace is recognized as a:

> …goal and a process to build a **common vision of a society,** ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population are taken into account, which encompasses activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation, and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development, and emphasizing that sustaining peace is a shared task and responsibility that needs to be fulfilled by the **Government and other national stakeholders.**[33]

Although these various documents provide some level of guidance for understanding ESA, a full understanding of the meaning requires a closer look at its implementation on the ground.

29 DPKO/DFS The contribution of United nations Peacekeeping to early peacebuilding: A DPKO/DFS Strategy for Peacekeepers (2011) available from: http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6797~v~The_Contribution_of_United_Nations_Peacekeeping_to_Early_Peacebuilding___a_DPKO_DFS_Strategy_for_Peacekeepers.pdf

30 S/2012/746

31 International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State-building (2011) "A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States." http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/07/69/07692de0-3557-494e-918e-18df00e9ef73/the_new_deal.pdf.

32 The World Bank Group (2011) p. xi-xii

33 A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282 (2016)

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3.

Part Two: Extension of State Authority in Practice: Examples from the Field

Peacekeepers have implemented mandates to support ESA in a variety of ways. To varying degrees, they have sought to address the three dimensions of ESA — presence, capacity and legitimacy although the linkages between the three components are not always explicitly sequenced or assessed.

3.1. Presence

MINUSCA: Deploying local authorities to the periphery

MINUSCA has engaged in a number of activities aimed at extending state authority in CAR, including the deployment of local authorities and the rehabilitation of infrastructure. The implementation of the ESA mandate in CAR is being undertaken in close collaboration with UNDP and UNICEF, supporting the deployment of local administrators, teachers,

police and gendarmerie. The mission is working with the Ministry of Territorial Administration for the design of a deployment strategy, the deployment (where necessary and requested by the Government) of all prefects, sub-prefects and mayors, their basic training, the urgent rehabilitation of key administrative buildings and equipment through Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), and the provision of technical advice and coaching.

There are substantial obstacles to extending state authority in CAR. In October 2016, the police station in Paoua, in the north east region, for example, had only three police officers due to the fact that it was challenging to identify qualified police officers who were adequately trained. Not only were three police officers insufficient for the town, but they were also unable to make any arrests or patrols because they lacked weapons or vehicles. Rather than actively projecting the authority of the state, they were merely an expression of the helplessness of the state. A key concern in the deployment of police officers is to ensure that those deployed are not only professional and adequately trained, but that they also do not engage in abuse, thereby undermining efforts aimed at extending the state's authority.

Although MINUSCA had provided assistance to the successful rehabilitation of courts in Paoua, prisons had yet to be built. When courts sentenced individuals to incarceration, there was no prison in which to place convicted individuals. Furthermore, in areas where prisons do exist, the main concern is that they often lack qualified staff and in some instances this has resulted in prison breaks. These two scenarios highlight the importance of careful planning and sequencing in support of ESA. This requires a mission plan and strategy that is coordinated with national authorities and considers the combination and sequencing of deployment and functioning of security, administrative, judicial and correction services together with social services and economic recovery.

MINUSMA: Extending state presence

In the case of northern Mali, efforts by MINUSMA to support the presence of state representatives there have been marred by tensions between armed groups present in the North - the Coordination of Azawad Movement (CMA) and Platform group - over the regional capital, Kidal. Tensions persist despite a political compromise that was reached in which the June 2015 peace agreement established interim authorities composed of equal numbers of representatives from the Malian Government, the CMA and the Platform. The CMA continues to exercise control over Kidal in the absence of Malian state authorities and the situation is hampering the delivery of services and hence rendering it difficult for the mission to implement parts of its mandate, particularly its ESA mandate to rehabilitate infrastructure.

The situation is different in areas where the situation is less contentious. The mission has used QIPs in Menaka to rehabilitate the prefecture, the official residence of the prefect, the local tribunal, a police station and a National Guard post. In addition, QIPs were used to rehabilitate public schools in Timbuktu and Gao. Furthermore, in Timbuktu a Centre for Access to Law and Justice, funded by UNDP, was established.

UNMIL: The Gbargna justice and security hub

Liberia provides an example of extending the presence of the state through security and rule of law institutions. In late 2010, UNDP, in collaboration with UNMIL and support from the PBF, partnered with the Liberian Government to launch the "justice and security hubs" project, seeking to enhance the decentralization of justice and security service delivery. The Government first launched the hub in Gbargna, central Liberia, in March 2013 after considerable delays. The project had five primary objectives: 1) establish five justice and security hubs across the country; 2) extend delivery of justice and security services into the districts of Liberia; 3) provide an avenue for a balanced strengthening of justice and security institutions; 4) enhance linkages between these institutions; and, 4) develop strong relationships among the institutions and with the communities they serve.

An assessment conducted by UNMIL in 2014 on the Gbargna hub revealed continued logistical challenges, including insufficient accommodation, work apparel, communication devices, documentation and a decrease in the Government of Liberia's national budget for recurring costs. This led to many services being either insufficiently performed or not performed at all. In addition, petty corruption was prevalent,[34] and the distance between the Gbarnga hub and city centre made it difficult for people to travel to appear in court. Budgetary constraints, particularly with regards to low salaries,

34 Marina Caparini "Extending State Authority in Liberia: The Gbargna Justice and Security Hub" Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (2014) p.4

also limited the police from performing their duties on occasion, thereby raising questions about the sustainability of the initiative.

One of the concerns with the first hub was that it was heavily focused on infrastructure and therefore service delivery was delayed and only possible after the infrastructure was in place. Considering the delays that resulted in service delivery in Gbargna hub, the second and third hubs in Harper and Zwedru were launched with a stronger focus on service delivery rather than building new infrastructure for the hubs. To date, hubs four and five have yet to be launched. A key concern with the hubs projects is that the Government of Liberia has shown little support for the initiative particularly because it believed the hubs would be fully funded by the international community. Efforts in support of ESA have the potential to face challenges when there are national budgetary constraints. The justice and security hubs example in Liberia demonstrates that ESA should be implemented in a way that ensures its sustainability and that has buy-in and ownership of the government.

3.2. Capacity

MINUSTAH: Activities aimed at institution-building

MINUSTAH has been mandated on numerous occasions to engage in institution-building activities. Resolutions 1892 (2009), 2012 (2011), 2070 (2012), 2119 (2013), 2018 (2014) encouraged MINUSTAH to support local governance programmes in Haiti, seeking to extend state authority throughout the country.

MINUSTAH regularly conducted assessments of state institutions and identified a plethora of weaknesses. These ranged from a lack of effective financial and administrative management systems to a poor local taxation system. The assessments also found a high municipal dependency on central government subvention, weak coordination mechanisms, substandard working conditions and environments lacking office equipment, lack of effective communication channels between central and local government, alleged abuse of authority and corruption of mayors.

Responding to these deficits, MINUSTAH supported an array of projects providing capacity-building support to institutions by embedding National Professional Officers (NPOs) with a public administration background in the directorate of local government within the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Planning. MINUSTAH also trained municipal personnel in public finance, local taxation, local development, project management and monitoring and evaluation. However, this led to limited improvements in the performance of these institutions in delivering services or creating feedback loops between local authorities and their constituencies. The presence of NPOs in the ministries was largely used to substitute underperforming civil servants, providing little added value in terms of capacity development. Most significantly, efforts to promote effective municipal administrations and to foster a process of decentralisation were done with little consideration of the lack of political will at the executive or legislative level to support the significant reforms that this would require. MINUSTAH's efforts in Haiti provide a cautionary tale of how a technical approach to supporting ESA, centred on institution-building and capacity development is unlikely to reach its objectives without national authorities' leadership and active engagement.

UNOCI: Training and supporting sub-prefects

UNOCI engaged in a number of activities aimed at extending the state's authority. It progressively developed partnerships with the Ivoirian administration to enhance the capacity of state actors and to promote national ownership of the reconciliation effort. A key element in UNOCI's efforts was to build a close partnership with the Directorate General for Territorial Administration (DGAT), which coordinates and oversees the work of all prefects and sub-prefects (primary administrators and representatives of the Government at the sub-national level).

From 2009 to 2010, UNOCI focused on providing technical and logistical support to the National Administration Redeployment Steering Committee of Côte d'Ivoire in the implementation of the national programme to restore state authority and public services, including in areas formerly under rebel control. In this regard, UNOCI assisted the DGAT in establishing and updating the database of administrative staff to be deployed. UNOCI also encouraged government workers to return to their workplace and ensured their safety. UNOCI monitored the rehabilitation of administrative buildings and equipment of six prefectures, 17 sub-prefectures, three police stations and four gendarmerie brigades in pilot zones as part of a project funded by the PBF in the west of the country.

Another example of capacity-building was conducted from 2014 to 2016. UNOCI, in collaboration with UNDP and the United Nations Population Fund

(UNFPA), provided technical support to the DGAT through a nationwide project aimed at strengthening the capacity of local authorities in preventing and managing local conflicts. UNOCI developed a conflict-analysis matrix with the Ministry of Interior. The DGAT gradually used the tool to facilitate its collection, collation and analysis of all conflict-related information, with coverage down to the village level.

Approximately 617 prefectural authorities (prefects, sub-prefects, and other administrative staff members) from all 31 administrative regions of Côte d'Ivoire were provided with the matrix. As a result, the DGAT, as well as prefectural authorities, had the possibility of obtaining early information about potential conflicts. UNOCI also developed five training modules for local authorities on how to use the conflict-analysis matrix, procedures for dispute resolution at village level, strategies for an inclusive participation of all communities and management of communal projects. The DGAT, with UNOCI's technical support and UNDP's financial backing, organized thirteen regional workshops for local authorities, using the developed training modules.

Implementation of the ESA mandate in Côte d'Ivoire was considered to be successful. This was mainly due to the fact that Côte d'Ivoire was a functional state prior to conflict that had a history of performance and therefore enjoyed relatively high levels of confidence among the population.

MONUSCO: The prosecution support cell programme

Due to the pervasive culture of impunity in eastern DRC, MONUSCO was mandated through Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010) to "support national and international efforts to bring justice, including by establishing Prosecution Support Cells to assist the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) military justice authorities in prosecuting persons arrested by the FARDC."[35] The resolution mandated MONUSCO to provide assistance to the Government in strengthening military judicial capacity. As a result, MONUSCO established prosecution support cells (PSCs) in five towns including Goma in North Kivu, Bukavu in South Kivu, Bunia in Orientale, Kindu in Maniema and Kalemie in Katanga. The mission and the Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which stipulated that the PSC would not initiate, conduct or lead any investigation or prosecution of such crimes.

The PSC has assisted the Congolese military justice system by providing technical advice, monitoring, mentoring and logistical support, including transport for magistrates and a daily subsistence allowance. In a 2015 lessons learned report on the PSCs, the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in DPKO recognized that the cells had notable success and impact. For instance, formal requests for support by the cells increased between 2013 and 2016 and mid to senior level officers were prosecuted based on command responsibility for crimes against humanity. Despite these successes, some challenges have been faced. For instance, the PSCs received high amounts of requests for logistical and financial support at the expense of technical support. Moreover the technical expertise mainly focused on direct support to the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes and not on training, guidance on the prosecution, investigation and adjudication of international crimes. The case of the PSCs in MONUSCO is demonstrative of the importance of regularly assessing and evaluating the impact of programmes put in place to support the strengthening of national institutions and adjust plans accordingly.

3.3. Legitimacy

UNMIT's democratic governance fora

Timor-Leste offers a positive example of successful efforts to support the promotion of state legitimacy. UNMIT launched the democratic governance forum (DGF) in 2007, aiming to provide leaders and citizens alike with a space to openly discuss key issues related to principles of democracy. The initiative began in the capital Dili but soon expanded to districts and sub-districts throughout the rest of the country, encouraging members of parliament to visit their districts and engage constituents in discussion.

By 2012, UNMIT had organized 174 DGF events with almost 12,000 participants. National TV stations, local community radios and newspapers reported on the discussions, bringing the content to a wider audience. This dialogue played a key role in Timor-Leste's relatively stable transition from conflict. While such an undertaking clearly needs to be part of a joint venture with the government – and therefore requires national political will

35 S/RES/1925 (2010)

to be pursued – it provides an example of an area of work that contributes directly to strengthening relations between the state and society.

MINUSTAH: Promoting legitimacy through institutional cooperation with local actors

MINUSTAH facilitated a series of participatory discussion events aimed at cultivating state legitimacy, focusing in particular on security and rule of law issues. The mission facilitated meetings between local civilian, judicial and police authorities and their constituents, facilitating dialogue on effective responses to security risks, human rights abuses and prolonged pre-trial detention. The mission was represented through its different components (military, police, civil affairs, justice and human rights) and this provided an avenue to coordinate mission activities through the years. While a number of mayors took it upon themselves to institutionalise these meetings without the support of MINUSTAH, many others were discontinued once the support and resources were no longer available. By 2012, when most municipal administrations were replaced by the Government in the absence of new local elections, many of these initiatives ceased and the level of participation, the quality of engagement and outcomes varied substantially by location in Haiti.

UNOCI: Promoting state-society dialogue

In Côte d'Ivoire, the opposition considered many sub-prefects to be close to the Government and therefore not trustworthy, particularly when UNOCI was heavily focused on the deployment of local authorities to the peripheries from 2009 to 2010. UNOCI leveraged QIPs to initiate dialogue between the local authority and the population. Meetings were widely attended by the sub-prefects and various groups representing the population such as groups of women, traditional leaders and others. Together the different groups discussed concerns regarding their communities and country as a whole while reflecting on the support they believed was needed. UNOCI provided each group with up to two QIPs to implement after completion of the dialogue sessions. These discussions played a crucial role in fostering a more positive relationship between the Ivorian state and society, addressing past grievances and building popular perceptions of legitimacy of the state. The local authorities were perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the population through an inclusive dialogue and as a result of the projects they were perceived as responsive to the material needs of the population.

MONUSCO: Participatory approaches to identifying peacebuilding priorities

The complex socio-political, economic and cultural history of DRC has posed a constant challenge to UN peacekeepers' attempts to support peace and stability. One example of this has been MONUSCO's efforts to initiate stabilisation strategies in identified vulnerable areas of the country. The first phase of MONUSCO's International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) was deemed ineffective by a 2012 report by Oxfam. The report noted that the strategy had not delivered tangible improvements particularly with regards to armed groups and that its operations had not solved the problem of a lack in social cohesion.[36] Consequently, a critical review of the strategy was undertaken, which led to the development of the 2013-2017 ISSSS. The new strategy focuses on changing governance dynamics by prioritising democratic dialogue at different levels, particularly at the community and provincial levels in order to move towards greater transparency, inclusiveness and accountability. It puts an emphasis on the political dimension of the stabilisation process, the restoration of peace and the rebuilding of trust in institutions. It also puts local communities at the centre of the process of change. The dialogue intends to assist in building a new relationship between the authorities and citizens based on greater listening, openness and accountability.

The 2013-2017 strategy aims to support the: 1) re-engagement of high-level government and international support for stabilization; 2) development of complementary mechanisms to create an inclusive process; and 3) re-orientation of the pillars towards local community-based solutions to produce visible impact for the population on the ground. This has led to a framework on critical priorities for stabilization by establishing, for example, the Provincial Stabilization Strategy and Action Plan (SPS and PAPS). Activities under this strategy include the holding of a series of workshops intended to allow participants to engage in discussions on drivers of conflicts and possible solutions that would encourage stabilization.

36 Oxfam "Pour moi mais sans moi, c'est contre moi : Pourquoi les Tentatives de Stabilisation de la République Démocratique du Congo sont Infructueuses" (July 2012) Available from : https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/oxfam-doc-info-rdc-congo-juillet-2012-resumefr.pdf

A 2015 report by USAID and International Alert noted that civil society was poorly represented in the ISSSS in the various steering committees that had been assigned to coordinate the stabilization strategy.[37] In response to these initial observations, changes were made to the ISSSS programme structures to include strategic committees that comprise of community leaders. Community leaders and civil society play a larger role as a result of this revised structure and approach.

Despite improvements to the strategy, the mission still faces challenges particularly with regards to working with a state and its actors that are not only perceived as not providing political space for the population's engagement, but that are also deemed by the population as corrupt. Against this backdrop, it is inevitable that in the DRC, the local population remains highly suspicious and distrustful of local authorities.

3.4. Combining presence, capacity and legitimacy

The various initiatives described here are linked by their common objective of extending state authority. Although they are implemented in different contexts and through different activities, they nonetheless offer a number of lessons. First, the examples above demonstrate that a state's mere presence is insufficient to extend its authority effectively if that presence is not perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the population. This point is particularly significant because peacekeepers run the risk of promoting the presence of state authorities that are directly involved with abuses against civilian population when the question of state legitimacy is not taken into account. Indeed, support to enhancing state legitimacy is only feasible when peacekeepers have a robust understanding of the political context in which they operate. This understanding can be attained through an analysis of the political and socio-economic landscape. Furthermore, understanding the dynamics of state legitimacy also hinges upon an understanding of the perceptions the population has of current institutions within a given state. Legitimacy is important, not only for effective state authority, but also to ensure the success of peacekeeping's overall mandate and goals as well as to ensure the sustainability of peace after the mission has departed.

Second, ESA activities can contribute to sustaining peace and strengthening the perceived legitimacy of the state; however, their full impact will depend on the extent to which they address the needs and priorities identified by the different segments of the population, especially at the local level. Peacekeepers can have a better understanding of the needs and priorities of different groups by conducting capacity and needs assessments in a consultative and participatory manner.

Third, experience from the ground shows that peacekeepers often miss an opportunity to successfully extend the state's authority when they do not fully engage with local or customary forms of legitimacy. These forms of legitimacy are often perceived as hurdles rather than as sources of opportunities to be leveraged. Engaging with these local forms of legitimacy undoubtedly requires a robust understanding of these systems, and the cultural and traditional norms that resonate in the communities they serve. These institutions are often service providers with high levels of legitimacy. For example, religious groups and sectors including the Haitian voodoo sector often provide conflict resolution assistance. Engagement with key local and cultural institutions provides the mission with important insights into the core challenges and provides an avenue though which sustainable solutions can be sought. Academics as well as practitioners have reiterated the significance of external actors not imposing institutions and blueprints from the outside, and instead building on what is already there. They propose focusing engagement in fragile states on accompanying and facilitating domestic processes, leveraging local capacities, and complementing, rather than crowding out, domestic initiatives and actions.[38]

Fourth, a key point revealed from experience on the ground is the significance of peacekeepers working closely with national authorities to ensure that processes intended to extend the authority of the state have political buy-in and are nationally-owned. Buy-in and inclusive national ownership are key factors required for the sustainability of ESA initiatives. In Mali and CAR, the governments are supportive of efforts to extend their authority. However in both contexts, the buy-in of the government is insufficient due to the absence of a broader political settlement and buy-in of political and

37 USAID and International Alert "Beyond Stabilization: Understanding the Conflict Dynamics in North and South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo" (London: International Alert, 2015) p. 40

38 Alina Rocha Menocol. "State-building for Peace: A new Paradigm for International Engagement in Post Conflict fragile states?" EUI Working Papers: Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies RSCAS (2010/34) available at http://erd.eui.eu/media/2010/RSCAS_2010_34.pdf p. 16

social actors. In other cases, such as Haiti, the government was not politically invested in making the extension of state authority effective and sustainable. In these instances, peacekeepers should endeavour to ensure the inclusion and buy-in of a broader set of stake-holders, including civil society, private sector and local communities to leverage the collaboration of national authorities.

Fifth, activities implemented in order to extend state authority require significant resources that are not readily available to missions. Upon deployment and in the absence of alternative partners, peacekeeping missions have had to make use of available resources including QIPs and programmatic financing to support state presence where this constitutes an opportunity to deliver peace dividends and promote a political settlement. This notwithstanding, more structured and long-term efforts are needed and some can be developed jointly with partners that can mobilise and manage more substantial resources such as PBF, UNDP and the World Bank. The technical and financial resources provided through bilateral agreements also play an important role and accessing these resources depends on efforts of peacekeepers to engagement with member states and donors to ensure a common vision and strategic plan of action. Encouraging examples of partnerships between missions and other key actors such as the UNDP, PBF and the World Bank in support of ESA have been witnessed in Côte d'Ivoire, DRC and more recently in CAR, among others.

Finally, considering that successfully extending a state's authority depends on an understanding of political dimensions, the discussion above reveals that it also requires a deep understanding of the mechanisms and functions of the state itself. Relevant expertise are more frequently found in countries with similar cultural and socio-economic backgrounds and that have successfully adapted aspirational state models to local realities. South-South cooperation and opportunities to engage Government Provided Personnel (GPP) to supply these expertise have been explored by external actors to meet this need.

4.

Part Three: Recommendations for Operationalizing Extension of State Authority Mandates

As the above examples demonstrate, there is no standard approach to operationalize ESA mandates or to assess the impact of ESA support efforts. This is in part, as the above has argued, because the concept is not always clearly understood. This section of the paper proposes nine recommendations to more successfully operationalize the concept by focusing on key aspects to take into consideration during the analysis, planning and implementation phases.

4.1. Analysis

Ensure that prior to initiating planning and implementation of ESA activities, a thorough analysis of the state and overall political and socio-economic landscape of the country is conducted

In order to be fully effective, prior to planning and implementing

extension of state authority mandates, peacekeepers should ensure to conduct thorough and concrete political and socio-economic analysis of the country in which they are operating. Analysis should consider the status of the state, its legitimacy, and the various political and economic elements that contributed to the unravelling of the situation on the ground. It should focus on whether a peace agreement has been reached and identify the factors impeding a peace agreement. It should include an analysis of where, geographically, support or opposition to the state is most prevalent and whether this support or lack thereof is delineated along ethnic, religious and political lines. With regards to understanding the socio-economic landscape, the analysis should explore, among others, the goods and services expected of the state by the population, what goods are already being delivered and whether there is relevant infrastructure connecting the regions to the capital.

Considering that conflict is never one-sided and instead involves multiple parties, when supporting ESA, peacekeepers should work towards reconciling and addressing different interests and grievances. An analysis of these interests is a pivotal aspect of planning and implementation of activities. This analysis would be incomplete if only based on the perspectives of political elites. Analysis, therefore, needs to reflect a broader spectrum of perspectives and sensibilities, especially in rural and underrepresented areas of the country. It should also focus on the power dynamics that generate exclusion and marginalisation and the extent to which the state counters or sanctions these dynamics.

Conducting political and socio-economic analysis is not only significant for the peacekeepers knowledge and awareness of the context in which they operating, but it will also enable peacekeepers to determine the objectives of their engagement. Furthermore, these objectives, should be identified in collaboration with key partners particularly the government and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT). The objectives should be the basis for planning of activities aimed at supporting the extension of state authority.

4.2. Planning

Planning for ESA should be fully integrated into mission planning

Extension of state authority mandates and activities should be an integral part – wherever mandated – of the Mission Concept and subsequent implementation plans and tools including at the component, section and field offices levels. Systematic integration of ESA into mission planning will ensure a balance between top-down and bottom-up approaches. The extension of state authority mandates should not be approached as a standalone activity that concerns only a handful of sections, but it should instead be a mainstreamed and mission-wide effort to support a sustainable political settlement.

The extension of state authority should also be linked specifically to transition planning. There should be a clear linkage and sequencing between ESA activities and other stabilization interventions. It is critical that all mission components understand the strategic goals that are being pursued in extending state authority and avoid situations where, for instance, mission support offices lack the information to fully appreciate the nature and significance of ESA activities for the overall performance of the mission. Furthermore, the various entities of the UN working on ESA should strengthen concerted efforts.

Peacekeepers should develop a shared vision with partners including national, local, international actors and donors

Since missions are only one actor among many that work toward supporting ESA, it is critical that objectives set by the mission are defined and shared with multiple stakeholders. Peacekeepers should therefore endeavour to develop a shared vision with partners including national authorities, relevant donors, relevant UN agencies such as UNDP and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) as well as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). But they also need to include non-state stakeholders, including civil society actors and local communities. More importantly, objectives set by the mission should align with national goals.

Partnerships should be developed at an early stage among actors. It should be based on a clear understanding of respective advantages and potential for synergy based, for example, on an analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT analysis). Partnerships should be founded on joint strategic plans, such as Integrated Strategic Frameworks (ISF) with the UNCT, and should leverage the technical expertise of partner such as UNDP and the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). In some contexts, however, there are no viable partners. In northern Mali, for example, peacekeepers are the only international actors present. This makes strong partnerships challenging.

Photo credit: © Logan Abassi

Ensure that planning for ESA takes into account factors that will ensure the sustainability of activities

Planning for activities aimed at extending the authority of the state should take into account the resources required to ensure the sustainability of such activities, particularly projects that are long-term in nature. This requires identifying factors that will contribute to the sustainability of activities including state revenues to support activities in the future.

Peacekeepers should prioritize the importance of political buy-in by national actors

Peacekeepers should endeavour to gain political buy-in from national actors of the activities and approach to ESA adopted by missions. This can be done through early engagement and joint planning along a shared understanding of realistic objectives and priorities. In instances where political buy-in is absent, peacekeepers should work towards addressing this through regular communication with key actors and engaging in other activities that foster political buy-in. Without buy-in from national actors, projects and initiatives are unlikely to be sustainable in the long run.

4.3. Implementation

ESA activities should be implemented in a coordinated manner with relevant partners including national, local and international actors

Peacekeeping operations should implement ESA activities with a clear plan to transition responsibility to local and national actors, with the support of various international partners and donors. Implementation of ESA activities should therefore be carried out in a coordinated manner with various partners. Local and national actors should own the process from the start to ensure the best possible outcomes and sustainability. This requires a diverse array of partners including state actors but also civil society actors, with particular attention to underrepresented constituencies such as women, youth, and minorities.

Furthermore, when implementing ESA activities with relevant national and local partners, peacekeepers should consider implementing joint systems that reinforce activities already in place and being implemented by national and local actors. Some activities implemented by national and local actors promote customary institutions that often resonate with the population.

Missions can lead in convening and facilitating partnerships. For instance, through coordinated efforts, the PBF can sustain support to strengthen government institutions, particularly given that it has recently extended its scope to the full sustaining peace spectrum (from conflict prevention to post-conflict recovery). For its part, the World Bank is developing a more realistic approach to supporting public administration that takes into account both technical and political aspects thereby reinforcing the trend towards a more nuanced and comprehensive approach to statebuilding in conflict-affected settings.

Leadership should be fully engaged and demonstrate active support to ESA activities

Mission leadership should champion ESA activities by advocating for them through launching programmes, speaking with local and national authorities where possible, and accompanying the redeployment of key local authorities. Mission leadership engagement is particularly significant in demonstrating to local populations that ESA activities are a priority of the mission and through the implementation of QIPs projects and the participation of mission leadership in these projects, the mission can also gain the confidence of the local population.

Peacekeepers should ensure that adequate resources are available for ESA activities as well as the relevant skills required to implement activities of a technical nature not only for effectiveness but also for sustainability of efforts

Peacekeepers are tasked to implement activities linked to the extension of state authority; however, there is, in some cases, a lack of sufficient resources for these tasks to be undertaken or completed. Peacekeepers use QIPs, programmatic funding and engage in activities linked to PBF funded projects in support of ESA. Although peacekeepers should ensure to continue working with these resources, they should also encourage a broadening of funds and building of relationship between governments and donors.

In addition, peacekeepers, together with other partners such as the UNCT, should support government initiatives aimed at identifying expertise outside of peacekeeping for technical support in areas where peacekeepers are unable to provide such support. An example is through the encouragement of South-South cooperation. Peacekeepers should be realistic about their lack of technical expertise in some areas, and should therefore refrain from embarking on systemic reform activities. They should instead privilege well-sequenced interventions that contribute to strengthening the viability of political settlements.

Impact assessments should be an integral aspect of the ESA implementation lifecycle

Rigorous and regular assessment of the impact of ESA activities ensures that missions are contributing to peace, rather than jeopardising it. In worst case scenarios, a mission may find itself enabling the deployment of predatory state actors who, by abusing the population, undermine the very notion of legitimate state authority. While the risk is naturally higher for national security and defence services, the deployment of a political authority that is perceived as biased in favour of one local group may lead a marginalized group to settle conflicts and seek justice through informal and violent channels.

Missions should therefore engage in rigorous impact assessment and employ a variety of tools including recourse to perception surveys either funded directly by the missions (as it has been the case in MONUSCO and will possibly be soon in MINUSCA) or relying on external sources and data (e.g. the Afrobarometer where available). Impact assessments will be effective if results are used to reinforce or readapt approaches used by missions in efforts aimed at extending the state's authority.

Conclusion

In more than 30 different resolutions, the United Nations Security Council has mandated peacekeeping operations to support ESA. Mandates on ESA have the potential of propelling a country onto a path of sustainable peace when implemented effectively. Although ESA mandates are important, there is not a shared understanding of what the concept actually entails. To explore the meaning of ESA, this study examined ways in which ESA has been referenced in Security Council mandates. Security Council mandates seem to focus on extending the state's physical presence, to a lesser degree on increasing the state's capacity and to an even lesser extent, supporting the cultivation of state legitimacy. This study also noted the dearth of policy guidance specifically addressing ESA. In order to attain any level of guidance on the subject, peacekeepers and practitioners have had to rely on UN guidance and documents in other subjects closely linked to ESA, particularly peacebuilding. Consequently, peacekeepers have ended up interpreting the meaning of ESA while implementing it, instead of prior to implementation.

Drawing from experience on the ground, this study calls for a holistic approach to ESA by placing an emphasis on the importance of taking into account all three components of ESA—presence, capacity and legitimacy. This study proposes that the most important, and yet often neglected component of ESA is legitimacy. More focus is required in supporting exercises that create legitimacy particularly as it pertains to inclusive political participation. The longstanding practice of focusing on the technical aspects of ESA has overshadowed the importance of addressing political elements. Without a focus on the political domain and its relation to ESA, peacekeepers miss an important ingredient required to ensure the sustainability of ESA activities.

As a way forward, this study underscores the importance of political analysis prior to conducting ESA activities to ensure that political elements are an integral consideration for all planning and implementation. It calls for the integration of ESA activities into mission plans, broader development plans as well as for mission leadership to play a proactive role in championing these activities. It calls for concerted and coordinated efforts with partners—local, nation and international—to ensure a shared vision not only of the implementation process but also, and perhaps more importantly, of the after-mission period. This study calls for peacekeepers to conduct impact assessments to ensure that activities do not do harm but that instead bring about the intended results.

Extension of state authority mandates are far from easy to plan for or implement. The study attempted to initiate a much needed discussion within the peacekeeping community on the meaning of ESA, the ways its implementation can be improved and how it can be made more effective in the current peacekeeping environment.

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List of Acronyms

AGE	Advisory Group of Experts
BIN	Bureau of Immigration of Naturalization
CAR	Central African Republic
CMA	Coordination of Azawad Movement
DGF	Democratic governance forum
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DGAT	Directorate General for Territorial Administration
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
DSRSG/RC/HC	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator
ESA	Extension of State Authority
EVD	Ebola Virus Disease
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
HIPPO	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISF	Integrated Strategic Framework
ISSSS	International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
LNP	Liberian National Police
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSF	Malian Security Forces
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
PSC	Prosecution Support Cell
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
QIPs	Quick Impact Projects
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
WB	World Bank

Annex A. Checklist: analysis, planning and implementing extension of state authority mandates in peacekeeping

Analysis

Questions to pose prior to initiating ESA planning and implementation

- Understanding local and national political context: examining legitimacy
- What was the role of the state before and during conflict?
- Has an agreement been reached between the parties?
    - Is this perceived to be a viable political settlement?
    - Does it address causes of marginalisation and exclusion?
    - Is it a power sharing arrangement between warring parties?
    - Is the agreement perceived as broadly inclusive?
- Is the state perceived as legitimate?
    - If so by which groups? If not, why?
    - Are there state institutions that are considered more or less legitimate than others?
    - What are the context-specific, culturally sensitive, sources of perceived state's legitimacy? E.g. Performance or process legitimacy
- Is support or opposition to the state geographically defined?
    - Does opposition overlap with territory under rebel/ opposition control?
    - What segments of the population (ethnic/religious/ political groups/women/youth) are partial to/supportive of the government? Who has influence over these groups?
    - What segments of the population (ethnic/religious/ political groups/women/youth) are partial to/supportive of rebels/opposition? Who has influence over these groups?
- Understanding the social and economic landscape: examining presence and capacity
- What services/goods are expected of the state?
- Does the state deliver goods/ services and where?
- What goods and services are/are not being delivered?
- Is the delivery of services equitable?
- What groups are marginalized or excluded from receiving goods and services?
- What are the legitimate, customary and non-state institutions providing goods and services? E.g. the Church, NGOs etc.
- What parts of the territory are lacking infrastructure?
- What infrastructure is lacking?
- Where are state authorities/ institutions not present?
- What type of state presence is lacking?

Planning

Steps to take during the planning process; analysis should feed into planning

- Based on the mandate and an analysis of conflict and power dynamics - cognizant of their regional, national and local dimensions – define key governance priorities to promote an environment conducive to sustainable and legitimate exercise of authority by the state
- Ensure that ESA is integrated into mission planning
- Map out components that will be directly or indirectly involved in the implementation of ESA activities
- Consult with government officials and other stakeholders and partners involved in ESA activities to agree on a shared vision of ESA priorities and envisaged end-state on a medium to long term
- Ensure that ESA planning is line with broader development plans
- In case of disagreement, provide support to ESA activities only if designed to strengthen the sustainability of a political settlement
- Ensure to refrain from embarking on systemic reform activities in support of ESA that they are incapable of supporting due to lack of sufficient capacities and resources. Instead, privilege well sequenced interventions that contribute to strengthening the viability of the political settlement and improve the perception of legitimacy of the state

- Identify activities already underway by different actors to avoid duplication and to avoid undermining local and customary institutions that are effectively delivering services
- Identify factors that will ensure or hinder the sustainability of activities
- Identify experts to assist with technical aspects of ESA initiatives when peacekeepers do not have such expertise
- Identify factors that could compromise the perception of the Mission's impartiality and undermine its ability to implement the mandate

Implementation

Four main areas to focus on in order to ensure effective implementation

- Implementation with partners
- Consider joint systems where necessary, e.g. When justice services are provided by customary institutions, attempt to combine formal/state structures and customary institutions instead of undermining customary institutions by supporting separate formal structures
- Ensure political buy-in of national authorities of ESA activities and take necessary measures to address impediments to full collaboration with national authorities
- Gaining the confidence of the population
- Use QIPs to gain the local population's confidence in the mission and the ESA implementation process
- Ensure that mission leadership participates in a number of events launching activities for ESA to demonstrate to the government and the local population that ESA is a priority
- Impact assessments/evaluation
- Hold regular meetings with government counterparts and other local and international stakeholders to monitor progress and adjust plans as needed to address identified priorities and meet objectives
- Conduct periodic perception surveys to gauge impact of activities
- Adjust plan, vision and activities according to results of assessments
- Conduct lessons learned studies and/or evaluations
- Leadership engagement
- Ensure mission leadership is informed on a monthly basis of ESA implementation progress
- Identify areas in which leadership can champion ESA implementation e.g. Launching of QIPs project on dialogue, infrastructure rehabilitation, and deployment of local authorities

Annex B. Overview of mandate language on the restoration and extension of state authority

Year	Country	Mission	RESA mandate language	Reference
2000	Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL	"assist through its presence and within the framework of its mandate, the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend state authority, restore law and order and further stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country."	S/RES/1313
2002	Timor Leste	UNTAET	"provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor"	
2003	Liberia	UNMIL	"assist the transitional Government, in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international partners, in reestablishment of national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both the national and local levels." "assist the transitional Government in restoring proper administration of natural resources."	
2004	Côte d'Ivoire	UNOCI	"facilitate, in cooperation with ECOWAS and other international partners, the re-establishment by the Government of National Reconciliation of the authority of the State throughout Côte d'Ivoire."	
2004	Haiti	MINUSTAH	"assist the Transitional Government in extending State authority throughout Haiti and support good governance at local levels."	
2004	Côte d'Ivoire	UNOCI	(Support for the implementation of the peace process) "facilitate, in cooperation with ECOWAS and other international partners, the re-establishment by the Government of National Reconciliation of the authority of the State throughout Côte d'Ivoire." (Law and order) "facilitate, with the assistance of the African Union, ECOWAS and other international partners, the re-establishment by the Government of National Reconciliation of the authority of the State throughout Côte d'Ivoire which is essential for the social and economic recovery of the country." "assist the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international organizations in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout Côte d'Ivoire."	S/RES/1528
2004	Haiti	MINUSTAH	"assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti through the provision inter alia of operational support to the Haitian National Police and the Haitian Coast Guard, as well as with their institutional strengthening, including the re-establishment of the corrections system." "assist the Transitional Government in extending State authority throughout Haiti and support good governance at local levels."	S/RES/1542
2004	Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL	"monitor progress towards consolidation of State authority throughout the country";	S/RES/1562
2005	Côte d'Ivoire	UNOCI	Support for the redeployment of State administration (p) To facilitate, with the assistance of the African Union, ECOWAS and other international partners, the re-establishment by the Government of National Reconciliation of the authority of the State throughout Côte d'Ivoire which is essential for the social and economic recovery of the country	S/RES/1609

Year	Country	Mission	RESA mandate language	Reference
2006	Timor Leste	UNMIT	"To assist, in cooperation and coordination with other partners, in further building the capacity of State and Government institutions in areas where specialized expertise is required, such as in the justice sector, and to promote a "compact" between Timor-Leste and the international community for coordinating Government, United Nations and other multilateral and bilateral contributors to priority programmes; To support the Government and relevant institutions, with a view to consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance, and facilitating political dialogue among Timorese stakeholders, in their efforts to bring about a process of national reconciliation and to foster social cohesion."	S/RES/1704
2007	Côte d'Ivoire	UNOCI	"Support for the redeployment of State administration To facilitate, with the assistance of the African Union, ECOWAS and other international partners, the re-establishment by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire of the authority of the State throughout Côte d'Ivoire and of the institutions and public services essential for the social and economic recovery of the country."	S/RES/1739
2007	DRC	MONUC	to support the strengthening of democratic institutions and the rule of law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, to that end, to: (a) Provide advice to strengthen democratic institutions and processes at the national, provincial, regional and local levels; (b) Promote national reconciliation and internal political dialogue, including through the provision of good offices, and support the strengthening of civil society; (e) Assist in the establishment of a secure and peaceful environment for the holding of free and transparent elections; (f) Contribute to the promotion of good governance and respect for the principle of accountability;	S/RES/1756

Year	Country	Mission	RESA mandate language	Reference
2010	DRC	MONUSCO	Stabilization and peace consolidation (l) Taking fully into account the leading role of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, support, in close cooperation with other international partners, the efforts of the Congolese authorities to strengthen and reform security and judicial institutions; (m) In line with the relevant legislation on the reform of the FARDC and the Army Reform Plan presented in January 2010, assist the Government, along with international and bilateral partners, in strengthening its military capacity, including military justice and military police, in particular by harmonizing efforts and facilitating exchanges of information and lessons learned and, as the Government requests it, assist in the training of FARDC and military police battalions, support military justice institutions and mobilize donors to provide equipment and other required resources; (p) Support, in close cooperation with other international partners, the efforts by the Congolese Government to consolidate State authority in the territory freed from armed groups through the deployment of trained PNC, and to develop rule of law institutions and territorial administration, with respect to the Government's Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan (STAREC) and the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS); (q) Provide technical and logistical support for the organization of national and local elections, upon explicit request from the Congolese authorities and within the limits of its capacities and resources; (r) With respect to the urgent need to fight illegal exploitation and trade of, natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, support the Government's efforts and enhance its capabilities, along with international partners and neighbouring countries, to prevent the provision of support to armed groups, in particular support derived from illicit economic activities and illicit trade in natural resources, and consolidate and assess, jointly with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the pilot project of bringing together all State services in five trading counters in North and South Kivu in order to improve the traceability of mineral products; (s) Assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in enhancing its demining capacity; (t) Monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 1896 (2009), in cooperation, as appropriate, with the Governments concerned and with the Group of Experts established by resolution 1533 (2004), seize or collect any arms or related materiel whose presence in Democratic Republic of the Congo violates the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 1896 (2009) and dispose of them as appropriate, and provide assistance to the competent customs authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in implementing the provisions of paragraph 9 of resolution 1896 (2009); Congo in implementing the provisions of paragraph 9 of resolution 1896 (2009);	S/RES/1925

Year	Country	Mission	RESA mandate language	Reference
2011	South Sudan	UNMISS	Decides that the mandate of UNMISS shall be to consolidate peace and security, and to help establish the conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations with its neighbours, and accordingly authorizes UNMISS to perform the following tasks; (a) Support for peace consolidation and thereby fostering longer-term state-building and economic development, through: (i) Providing good offices, advice, and support to the Government of the Republic of South Sudan on political transition, governance, and establishment of state authority, including formulation of national policies in this regard; (c) Support the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, in accordance with the principles of national ownership, and in cooperation with the UN Country Team and other international partners, in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish rule of law, and to strengthen the security and justice sectors through: (i) Supporting the development of strategies for security sector reform, rule of law, and justice sector development, including human rights capacities and institutions; (iii) Strengthening the capacity of the Republic of South Sudan Police Services through advice on policy, planning, and legislative development, as well as training and mentoring in key areas;	S/RES/1996
2011	Côte d'Ivoire	UNOCI	"support the Ivorian authorities to extend and re-establish effective State administration and strengthen public administration in key areas throughout the country, at the national and local levels, as well as the implementation of the unfinished aspects of the Ouagadougou Agreements as they relate to the reunification of the country."	S/RES/2000
2012	DRC	MONUSCO	Reiterates that future reconfigurations of MONUSCO should be determined on the basis of the evolution of the situation on the ground and on the achievement of the following objectives to be pursued by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with the support of the United Nations Mission: (c) The consolidation of State authority by the Congolese Government throughout the territory, through the deployment of Congolese civil administration, in particular the police, territorial administration and rule of law institutions in areas freed from armed groups;	S/RES/2053

Year	Country	Mission	RESA mandate language	Reference
2013	DRC	MONUSCO	Authorizes MONUSCO, through its civilian component, to contribute, in coordination with the UNCT and in support of national mechanisms to implement the PSC Framework, to the following tasks: (e) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC, in close cooperation with other international partners, to build on the Government's STAREC and revised ISSSS to support the establishment of a minimum level of sustainable state authority and control in conflict-affected areas in eastern DRC, including through area-based efforts to improve security, state authority and enable the commencement of sustainable socio-economic recovery;	S/RES/2098
2013	Mali	MINUSMA	(a) Stabilization of key population centres and support for the reestablishment of State authority throughout the country (i) In support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stabilize the key population centres, especially in the north of Mali and, in this context, to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas; (ii) To support the transitional authorities of Mali to extend and re-establish State administration throughout the country; (b) Support for the implementation of the transitional road map, including the national political dialogue and the electoral process (i) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali to implement swiftly the transitional road map towards the full restoration of constitutional order, democratic governance and national unity in Mali;	S/RES/2100

Year	Country	Mission	RESA mandate language	Reference
2014	DRC	MONUSCO	5. AuthorizesMONUSCO, in support of the Congolese authorities and their efforts to deliver the reforms called by the PSC Framework and stabilisation in eastern DRC, to contribute to the following tasks, in coordination with the UNCT and other actors, including through the SRSG's good offices; (a) Encourage and accelerate national ownership of Security Sector Reform (SSR) by the DRC authorities, including through the urgent finalisation and implementation of a national strategy for the establishment of effective, inclusive and accountable security and justice institutions by the DRC and play a leading role in coordinating the support for SSR provided by international and bilateral partners and the UN system; (b) Promote peace consolidation and inclusive and transparent political dialogue among all Congolese stakeholders with a view to furthering reconciliation and democratization and encourage the organization of credible and transparent elections in line with the electoral cycle and the constitution; (c) Encourage the consolidation of an effective national civilian structure to control key mining activities and to manage in an equitable manner the extraction and trade of natural resources in eastern DRC; (d) Monitor, report and follow-up on human rights violations and abuses, including in the context of elections, and support the UN system in-country to ensure that any support provided by the United Nations shall be consistent with international humanitarian law and human rights law and refugee law as applicable; (e) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC to enable the development and finalisation of a clear and comprehensive SSR implementation roadmap including benchmarks and timelines to establish effective and accountable security institutions, including vetting mechanisms; (h) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC, in close cooperation with other international partners, to build on the Government's STAREC and revised ISSSS to support the establishment of a minimum level of sustainable state authority and control in conflict-affected areas in eastern DRC, including through area-based efforts to improve security, state authority and enable the commencement of sustainable socio-economic recovery	S/RES/2147
2014	CAR	MINUSCA	(b) Support for the implementation of the transition process, including efforts in favor of the extension of State authority and preservation of territorial integrity (vi) To promote and support the rapid extension of state authority;	S/RES/2149

Year	Country	Mission	RESA mandate language	Reference
2014		UNOCI	(c) Address remaining security threats and border-related challenges • To support, within its existing authorities, capabilities, and its areas of deployment, the national authorities in stabilizing the security situation in the country, with a special attention to providing support for the provision of security through the October 2015 presidential election; • To monitor and deter the activities of militias, mercenaries and other illegal armed groups and to support the Government in addressing border security challenges consistent with its existing mandate to protect civilians, including cross-border security and other challenges in the border areas, notably with Liberia, and to this end, to coordinate closely with UNMIL in order to further inter-mission cooperation, such as through undertaking coordinated patrols and contingency planning where appropriate and within their existing mandates and capabilities; (d) Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (DDR) and collection of weapons • To assist the Government, in close coordination with other bilateral and international partners, in implementing without further delay the national programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and dismantling of militias and self-defence groups, taking into account the rights and needs of the distinct categories of persons to be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated, including children and women; (e) Reconstitution and reform of security institutions • To support the Government in providing effective, transparent and harmonized coordination of assistance, including the promotion of a clear division of tasks and responsibilities, by international partners to the security sector reform (SSR) process;	S/RES/2162

Year	Country	Mission	RESA mandate language	Reference
2014	Mali	MINUSMA	(c) Support to the re-establishment of State authority throughout the country, the rebuilding of the Malian security sector, the promotion and protection of human rights and the support for humanitarian assistance (i) To support the Malian authorities to extend and re-establish State administration throughout the country, especially in the North of Mali, in line with the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement and the ceasefire agreement of 23 May 2014; (ii) To support national, and to coordinate international, efforts towards rebuilding the Malian security sector, especially the police and gendarmerie through technical assistance, capacity-building, co-location and mentoring programmes, as well as the rule of law and justice sectors, within its capacities and in close collaboration with other bilateral partners, donors and international organizations, including the EU, engaged in these fields, including through enhancing information sharing and joint strategic planning among all actors; (iii) To assist the Malian authorities, through training and other support, for the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices and weapons and ammunition management;	S/RES/2164
2014	Liberia	UNMIL	(c) Reform of Justice and Security Institutions (i) To assist the Government of Liberia in developing and implementing, as soon as possible and in close coordination with bilateral and multilateral partners, its national strategy on Security Sector Reform (SSR); (ii) To advise the Government of Liberia on SSR and the organization of the LNP and BIN to provide technical assistance, co-location and mentoring programs for the LNP and BIN, with a particular focus on developing the leadership and internal management systems of the LNP and BIN, as well as for justice and corrections; (iii) To assist the Government of Liberia in extending national justice and security sector services throughout the country through capacity-building and training; (iv) To assist the Government of Liberia to coordinate these efforts with all partners, including bilateral and multilateral donors;	S/RES/2190

Year	Country	Mission	RESA mandate language	Reference
2015	DRC	MONUSCO	Stabilization 13. Authorizes MONUSCO, in support of the Congolese authorities and their efforts to stabilize eastern DRC, to contribute to the following tasks, including through the SRSG's good offices; (a) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of DRC to ensure actions against armed groups are supported by civilian and police components as part of consolidated planning which provides a comprehensive response to area-based stabilization efforts; 15. Authorizes MONUSCO, in support of the Congolese authorities and their efforts to deliver the reforms called by the PSC Framework and stabilisation in eastern DRC, to contribute to the following tasks, in coordination with the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and other actors, including through the SRSG's good offices; (a) Promote peace consolidation and inclusive and transparent political dialogue among all Congolese stakeholders with a view to furthering reconciliation and democratization, while ensuring the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights, paving the way for the holding of elections, consistent with the provisions of paragraph 19 below; (b) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC to encourage and accelerate national ownership of security sector reform by the Government of the DRC, including through developing a national strategy for the establishment of effective and accountable security institutions, as well as the development of a clear and comprehensive SSR implementation roadmap including benchmarks and timelines, and play a leading role in coordinating the support for SSR provided by international and bilateral partners and the United Nations system; (c) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC, in compliance with the HRDDP, for army reform that would enhance its accountability, efficiency, self-sustainability and effectiveness, including, the support of a vetted, well-trained and adequately equipped "Rapid Reaction Force "within the FARDC which should form the nucleus for a professional, accountable, well-sustained and effective national defence force, while noting that any support provided by the United Nations, including in the form of rations and fuel, should be subject to appropriate oversight and scrutiny	S/RES/2211
2015	CAR	MINUSCA	(b) Support for the implementation of the transition process, the extension of state authority and the preservation of territorial integrity. (vii) To promote and support the rapid extension of State authority over the entire territory of the CAR, including by supporting the redeployment of the administration; (viii) To actively seize, confiscate and destroy, as appropriate, the weapons and ammunitions of armed elements, including all militias and non-state armed groups, who refuse or fail to lay down their arms;	S/RES/2217

Year	Country	Mission	RESA mandate language	Reference
2015	Côte d'Ivoire	UNOCI	(e) Reconstitution and reform of security institutions • To assist the Government in implementing, without delay and in close coordination with other international partners, its comprehensive national security strategy; • To support the Government in providing effective, transparent and harmonized coordination of assistance, including the promotion of a clear division of tasks and responsibilities, by international partners to the security sector reform (SSR) process; • To advise the Government, as appropriate, on SSR and the organization of the future national army, to facilitate the provision of training, within its current resources and as requested by the Government and in close coordination with other international partners, in human rights, child protection and protection from sexual and gender-based violence to the security and law enforcement institutions, as well as capacity-building support by providing technical assistance, co-location and mentoring programmes for the police and gendarmerie and to contribute to restoring their presence throughout Côte d'Ivoire and to promote trust and confidence within and between the security and law enforcement agencies and to offer support to the development of a sustainable vetting mechanism for personnel that will be absorbed into security sector institutions;	S/RES/2226
2015	Mali	MINUSMA	(b) Support to the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (i) To support the implementation of the political and institutional reforms provided for by the Agreement, especially in its Part II; (ii) To support the implementation of the defence and security measures of the Agreement, notably to support, monitor and supervise the ceasefire, to support the cantonment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups, as well as the progressive redeployment of the Malian Defence and Security Forces especially in the North of Mali, taking into account the security conditions, and to coordinate international efforts, in close collaboration with other bilateral partners, donors and international organizations, including the European Union, engaged in these fields, to rebuild the Malian security sector, within the framework set out by the Agreement, especially its Part III and Annex 2; (iii) To support the implementation of the reconciliation and justice measures of the Agreement, especially in its Part V, notably the establishment of an international commission of inquiry, in consultation with the parties; (iv) To support, within its resources and areas of deployment, the conduct of inclusive, free, fair and transparent local elections, including through the provision of appropriate logistical and technical assistance and effective security arrangements, consistent with the provisions of the Agreement;	S/RES/2227

United Nations Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support
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