



United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
and Department of Field Support



# Civil Affairs Handbook



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The *UN DPKO/DFS Civil Affairs Handbook* has been developed jointly by the Policy and Best Practices Service of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support and the Training for Peace Programme at the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), with support from the Governments of Australia and Norway. It was approved by the Under-Secretary-Generals of DPKO and DFS as official guidance on 12 March 2012.

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The *UN DPKO/DFS Civil Affairs Handbook* has been edited by Joanna Harvey, Cedric de Coning and Lillah Fearnley. Design and layout by Immins Naudé and Michelle Lee.

All photographs have been provided by serving Civil Affairs Officers in UN peacekeeping missions unless otherwise indicated.

This is the first edition of the Handbook. It is intended as a platform on which to build and refine future guidance for civil affairs work, and is complemented by the Civil Affairs Network – an online community where practitioners can exchange ideas and experiences in real time. The Handbook will be regularly updated based on input from this and other sources. All comments and suggestions about content for future editions are welcome and can be forwarded to [dpko-civilaffairsnetwork@un.org](mailto:dpko-civilaffairsnetwork@un.org).

The Handbook can be found online at [www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/civil](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/civil).



## Acknowledgements

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There are many people that should be recognized, and by listing some we risk leaving out others, but we feel that we should at least specifically recognize the people in DPKO and ACCORD that have been deeply involved in various stages of this process. The project was conceived by Joanna Harvey of DPKO and Cedric de Coning of ACCORD and co-managed by them, together with Lillah Fearnley of DPKO. The core team included ACCORD's Gustavo de Carvalho and DPKO's Marco Donati and Lisa Moore. Sam Barnes, a former Principal Civil Affairs Officer in southern Sudan for the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), supported the project through a consultancy with ACCORD. The core team was supported by Karishma Rajoo, Zinurine Alghali and Lamii Kromah from the Training for Peace team at ACCORD, and Michelle Lee, Maria Agnese Giordano and Niels Nagelhus Schia during their time with the Policy and Best Practices Service of DPKO. Liam Mahony and Roger Nash from Fieldview Solutions, who have supported the development of skills training for civil affairs, also provided valuable input.

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Lastly, a special word of thanks to the Governments of Australia and Norway, for their belief in, and support to, the work of the United Nations in general, and civil affairs in particular.



## Preface

UN Photo/Olivier Chassot



*Civil Affairs Officers play a key role in peacekeeping operations, and are an essential part of our “peacekeeping toolkit”, as we work with local communities and authorities to bring stability and help them build the foundations for lasting peace.*

*I am very pleased to introduce this Handbook, which for the first time*

*brings together the elements of the work of United Nations Civil Affairs Officers in a way that captures the lessons of a wide range of experience and will help our efforts to continually improve our peacekeeping work.*

*Just as I am struck by the diversity of challenges that peacekeeping is required to address, and the range of mandates we must fulfil, Civil Affairs Officers’ roles can vary greatly from mission to mission. Even in one mission, the role of Civil Affairs Officers can change significantly during different phases after the conflict. However, the fundamentals remain at the core of success for peacekeeping missions: building relationships with local actors at the community level; listening to, liaising with and supporting local efforts at stabilization, conflict resolution and peacebuilding; and supporting and building local capacity at the community level in order to strengthen the reach and authority of the state.*

*When the conflict ends and the peace agreement is completed, the media spotlight will focus on the capital and the high-level political processes. But it is local communities and their leaders who must perform the difficult daily work of securing and building the peace. And this is where our Civil Affairs Officers are found, living in regional and rural communities far from families and friends, often in the most austere conditions. These officers quietly work to support local efforts, by listening and assisting local communities every day to work towards lasting peace. I wish to express my sincere gratitude for your tireless efforts in the service of peace and to assure you of the tremendous respect that your work commands.*

*Just as peacekeeping is a global partnership, I would like to commend the partnership with the Training for Peace Programme at the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) with our UN Peacekeeping Policy and Best Practices Service in the development of this book, and the Governments of Australia and Norway for their support. Together we are strengthening the capacity of peacekeeping to meet the hopes for peace of millions of people around the world.*

**Hervé Ladsous**

Under-Secretary-General, Department of Peacekeeping Operations

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# Introduction

This Handbook is intended as practical guidance for Civil Affairs Officers on the ground, as well as an orientation for people preparing for civil affairs work. It is divided into three parts and includes key concepts, current practice, lessons learned and tips. It can either be read as a whole or in individual stand-alone sections. **Part I** aims to familiarize users with the context of civil affairs work and UN peacekeeping, including key trends, reforms and cross-cutting themes. **Part II** discusses the guiding principles, skills and attitudes required for civil affairs work, and provides tips and tools on analysis, planning and managing civil affairs components in field missions. **Part III** focuses on the implementation of the three core civil affairs roles: cross-mission liaison, monitoring and facilitation at the local level; confidence-building, conflict management and support to the development of political space; and support to the restoration and extension of state authority. It also provides tips and good practices on implementing Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).

## ***Part I: Understanding the context for civil affairs work***

**Chapter 1** provides an introduction to UN peacekeeping, including guiding principles such as consent, impartiality and the non-use of force. This is followed by a brief history of UN peacekeeping, a description of what happens at UN headquarters in New York and a discussion of recent key trends and reforms in the world of peacekeeping.

**Chapter 2** provides an overview of the role of civil affairs in UN peacekeeping. It introduces the three core civil affairs roles and discusses how the work of this component evolves over the life cycle of a mission. The chapter includes information and statistics on current civil affairs deployments and discusses the future direction of this “core” component of peacekeeping.

**Chapter 3** describes key structures and actors within UN peacekeeping missions, discusses integrated missions, the UN Country Team and non-UN partners, and looks at coordination and cooperation between these stakeholders.

**Chapter 4** introduces peacebuilding and the protection of civilians, which are two important cross-cutting themes in civil affairs work. The chapter considers the role of Civil Affairs Officers as local peacebuilders and discusses the evolving engagement of UN peacekeeping in efforts to protect civilians.

## ***Part II: Preparing for and overseeing civil affairs work***

**Chapter 5** looks at how the principles of consent and impartiality, introduced in chapter 1, both guide and can be reinforced by the work of civil affairs at the local level. It discusses gender and diversity issues, local ownership, “Do No Harm” and conflict-sensitive approaches in civil affairs work. The chapter also considers some of the challenges of putting these principles into operation in complex post-conflict contexts.

**Chapter 6** looks at the skills, attitudes and experience required to be a Civil Affairs Officer and at the conditions of work. The chapter aims to provide introductory guidance to help Civil Affairs Officers prepare for work in the field, cope with stress



and manage expectations. The final section of this chapter discusses the importance of conduct and attitude for peacekeepers, including Civil Affairs Officers – both professionally and privately.

**Chapter 7** considers the role of civil affairs managers, from heads of component to team leaders. It discusses some of the challenges of undertaking a management role in complex peacekeeping environments. The chapter looks at some key areas of management, including communicating vision, managing information and staff management.

**Chapter 8** discusses the importance of analysis and planning for every aspect of civil affairs work, and gives an overview of the tools and processes relevant for analysis and planning in UN Field Missions. It provides basic models for conducting both analysis and planning exercises that can be adapted to the needs of Civil Affairs Officers and components.

### ***Part III: Implementing the civil affairs roles***

**Chapter 9** outlines the activities conducted by civil affairs components as part of the first core role: cross-mission representation, monitoring and facilitation at the local level. This includes liaison and representation on behalf of the mission, coordination and facilitation activities, information-gathering and monitoring. The chapter provides tips, examples and good practices in the implementation of this core role.

**Chapter 10** considers the key concepts, activities and challenges in implementing the second core civil affairs role: confidence-building, conflict management and support to the development of political space. The chapter outlines the work of civil affairs in facilitating dialogue, addressing conflict drivers, local-level conflict management and working with civil society. It includes tips, examples and good practices in the implementation of this core role.

**Chapter 11** addresses the key concepts, activities and challenges in relation to the third civil affairs core role: support to the restoration and extension of state authority. The chapter introduces some different models of government, discusses the approach taken by civil affairs in supporting state institutions, outlines activities undertaken as part of this role and provides tips, examples and good practices.

**Chapter 12** provides practical guidance for Civil Affairs Officers and staff from other mission components who are working as project focal points on Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). The chapter provides tips, tools and examples on each aspect of the project cycle based on experience from the field. This chapter is not aimed at QIP Programme Managers, for whom guidance is available in the DPKO/DFS Guidelines on QIPs.

## PART I:

### Understanding the context for civil affairs work



## Chapter 1 | Brief introduction to UN peacekeeping



Peacekeepers patrolling the roads of Ituri, DRC

*This chapter provides an introduction to UN peacekeeping, including guiding principles such as consent, impartiality and the non-use of force. This is followed by a brief history of UN peacekeeping, a description of what happens at UN headquarters in New York and a discussion of recent key trends and reforms in the world of peacekeeping.*

### 1.1. Peacekeeping and the UN

With over 120,000 personnel worldwide, UN peacekeeping is helping countries torn by conflict to create lasting peace. From strengthening government ministries in South Sudan to supporting elections in Haiti, from protecting civilians in Eastern Congo to maintaining ceasefire lines along the Golan Heights, military, police and civilian staff are working in 16 missions around the world to assist the governments and people of our host countries to prevent a recurrence of conflict.

The United Nations (UN) itself was founded in 1945 in the aftermath of a devastating world war. Since its inception, the UN has been called upon to maintain international

peace and security, and to support the establishment of environments in which peace processes can be consolidated. 1948 saw the deployment of the first UN field mission to support peace. With over 60 years of experience, today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations work closely with UN agencies, funds and programmes to deliver a joint UN response to conflict worldwide.

According to the UN Charter, the Security Council holds primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security. Even though it is not specifically enshrined in the Charter, the legal basis for peacekeeping can be found between the traditional methods for the "peaceful settlement of disputes" under Chapter VI and the more forceful action mandated under Chapter VII.

Formally established as a department of the UN Secretariat in 1992, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has nearly 122,000 personnel, with 118 countries contributing military and police to 16 different DPKO-led missions around the world.<sup>1</sup> Even with all of these operations deployed globally, the authorized budget for peacekeeping was USD 7.06 billion for 2012, which is less than 0.5 per cent of the world's military spending.

The Member States of the UN authorize specific peacekeeping operations through Security Council resolutions. Mandates are usually negotiated by the Council in response to analysis and recommendations provided in reports of the Secretary-General about the situation in the country. As detailed in the next chapter, civil affairs components may be responsible for the implementation of specific mandated tasks, or, more generally, for providing support to the implementation of the mandate as a whole. Security Council mandates are renewed at regular intervals, and revised as necessary, until such time as a decision is taken to withdraw the mission.



The current Security Council programme and membership, as well as all previous resolutions and reports of the Secretary-General, can be found at: <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/>.

Member States also play a critical role in the support and maintenance of peacekeeping missions through the General Assembly. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which reports to the General Assembly through the Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization), meets annually in New York to negotiate a report that provides a context for the work of UN peacekeeping and sets broad policy parameters for it. This committee – mainly consisting of past

<sup>1</sup> This includes 15 peacekeeping operations and 1 special political mission supported by DPKO. Figures from March 2012. Regularly updated statistics can be found at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping>.

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or current troop or police contributors to peacekeeping operations – is colloquially known as “the C34” as it was initially made up of 34 Member States, although the current membership is 144.

Significantly for civil affairs, in 2011, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations agreed on language formally referencing the civil affairs function for the first time in a legislative report (A/65/19), recognizing:

[...] the important role of Civil Affairs Officers in United Nations peacekeeping operations, including through cross mission representation, monitoring and facilitation at the local level, support to confidence building, conflict management and reconciliation and support to restoration and extension of state authority. The Special Committee notes that successful implementation of many peacekeeping mandates requires consistent engagement with the local government and population and stresses that the inclusion of local staff in civil affairs components has been important.

UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe



Meeting of the C34, February 2010, chaired by Ambassador Joy U. Ogwu of Nigeria

Budgets for UN peacekeeping – both at headquarters and for individual missions – are also approved annually by the General Assembly, through the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary).

The Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Peacekeeping Operations at UN headquarters provides overall direction for peacekeeping, advises the Secretary-General on peacekeeping matters and acts as a focal point on peacekeeping in the Secretariat for Member States. Regional teams in DPKO's Office of Operations support mission components, including civil affairs, with day-to-day operations. A small civil affairs team, housed within the Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET), supports civil affairs components in the field through policy, guidance, advocacy and training.



An organizational chart of DPKO and DFS can be found at:

[http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/dpkodfs\\_org\\_chart.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/dpkodfs_org_chart.pdf).

The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) is another key department within the UN Secretariat. It collaborates with DPKO as a partner for peacekeeping operations in mediation and elections. The Department of Political Affairs manages political missions and peacebuilding support offices engaged in conflict prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding. Several DPA-supported special political missions (SPMs) have civil affairs components, for example in Sierra Leone, Somalia and the former mission in Nepal.

## 1.2. Core principles of peacekeeping

The UN Charter lays the foundation, under international law, for the responsibility of the UN system to maintain international peace and security. Peacekeeping is one of many instruments available to the UN in carrying out this work. While missions with different characteristics have emerged, peacekeeping has most commonly been used in recent years to preserve and build the conditions necessary for sustainable peace where a ceasefire or peace agreement is already in place and where the parties to a conflict have consented to the deployment of a peacekeeping mission. However, peace – like war – is a protracted process and a peace agreement may exist, only later to unravel. Therefore, while peacekeeping may entail monitoring peace processes that emerge and assisting the signatories to implement the agreements, it may also involve efforts to instil confidence and reaffirm commitments to stalled or thwarted peace processes.

Peacekeeping is defined as an instrument for peace and security by three mutually reinforcing core principles, listed below, which provide a compass to guide peacekeepers in the implementation of their mandates. *The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (“Capstone Doctrine”), 2008, lays out these principles in greater detail, and **chapter 5** of this Handbook looks in more detail at how they relate specifically to civil affairs work on the ground.

- **Consent**

Peacekeeping can only take place with the consent of the parties to the conflict. This consent ensures that the mission has the political and physical freedom and the protection needed to carry out its mandate effectively. Without consent, the security of peacekeepers may be jeopardized as a peacekeeping mission risks becoming a party to the conflict, rather than the arbiter of the peace agreement.

- **Impartiality**

Peacekeepers will implement their mandate without favour or prejudice to any of the parties to the conflict. Impartiality is not the same as neutrality, however, and does not mean that peacekeepers need to be apolitical in condoning violations of the peace agreement or of international norms. Rather, it requires that they hold all parties to a conflict to the same standards. Abiding by the principle of impartiality will ensure that a peacekeeping mission is perceived as fair and transparent.

- **Non-use of force**

Peacekeepers will refrain from the use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. With the authorization of the Security Council, the use of force may occur as a tactical measure of last resort in self-defence of UN personnel and property and to defend the mandate. In contexts where the civilian population is at risk, the Security Council may give the mission a mandate to use force to protect the civilian population from imminent threat of physical violence.

**Other conditions**

The three principles above are necessary conditions for peacekeeping to be effective in the implementation of a mandate and to be credible in the eyes of the host population, but they are not sufficient. Three other critically important conditions, namely credibility, legitimacy, and national and local ownership, further underpin successful peacekeeping. Credibility rests, to a large degree, on the mission’s ability to meet local expectations. To achieve and maintain this, the mission must have a clear and deliverable mandate, with resources and capabilities



UN Photo/Paulo Filgueiras

**The UN Security Council debates Peace and Security in Africa (April 2008)**

to match. Perceptions of the legitimacy of a peacekeeping mission will fluctuate throughout its life cycle, but ultimately legitimacy depends on various factors. These include the perceived impartiality with which the mission exercises its mandate; how it uses – or does not use – force; the conduct of its personnel and the respect they demonstrate for the culture, customs and people of their host country; and the visibility of actual peace dividends. National and local ownership is not only considered essential to building sustainable peace but also critical for preserving consent, and reinforcing the legitimacy of a mission.

### 1.3. History and evolution

Over the years, UN peacekeeping has evolved to meet the demands of different conflicts and a changing political landscape. The first peace operation, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), was established in 1948 when the Security Council authorized the deployment of lightly armed UN military observers to the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Since that time, 69 UN peacekeeping operations have been deployed worldwide.



UNTSO is typical of what is now known as “traditional” peacekeeping. Traditional peacekeeping falls under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) of the UN Charter, which stipulates that there can be no use of force except in self-defence, and which requires the consent of the host government and a ceasefire for deployment. Such traditional peacekeeping is typically focused on the containment of conflicts between countries through border demarcation and the separation of forces after inter-state wars. These traditional observer missions remained the norm up until the 1990s. However, the end of the cold war signalled an increase in peace operations required to respond to intra-state conflict or the containment of conflict within states, rather than simply to inter-state conflict. Deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression), these operations are permitted to use force to defend themselves, the mission mandate and civilians in imminent danger. The advent of the *Agenda for Peace*, a landmark report by Boutros Boutros-Ghali on preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, marked the first time that Chapter VII was invoked for this purpose.<sup>2</sup>

Peacekeeping today ranges from small unarmed ceasefire observer missions to large-scale multidimensional missions. Mandates cover a variety of missions, for example supporting the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement, such as in Liberia; responding to destabilization, such as in Haiti, where peacekeepers were sent following the deterioration of the political, security and humanitarian situation; and engaging in contexts such as Darfur, where no peace agreement exists and peacekeepers are there to support the preconditions necessary to forge one.



A detailed timeline of UN peacekeeping can be found at:

<http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/timeline.pdf> and an up-to-date list of all past and present peacekeeping operations can be found at:

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf>.

## 1.4. Trends and key reforms

In the more than 60 years since its inception, UN peacekeeping has celebrated many successes. UN peacekeepers have supported political processes and helped national actors to take important steps towards durable peace in numerous countries in the post-cold war era. These include Namibia, El Salvador,

<sup>2</sup> *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, A/74/277—S/24111 (June 1992).

Cambodia, Mozambique and eastern Slavonia (Croatia) in the mid-1990s, and Sierra Leone and Burundi more recently. While facing difficult problems on many fronts, these countries have not relapsed into violent conflict for several years since the UN peacekeepers departed. In fact, they have all successfully managed two or more elections, including several cases that required transitions of power among former enemies. Similarly, a number of more traditional missions have helped to prevent relapse into violence in the absence of a political settlement.

In the past 15 years, more civil wars have ended through negotiation than in the previous 200 years and the UN has been instrumental in this achievement. It is, however, very difficult to meaningfully monitor and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, especially while they are deployed. Success depends on many factors, including those beyond the scope of the missions, and certain impacts can only be assessed over the long term. Determining the role that a particular peacekeeping operation or peacebuilding mission played in the establishment of a strong and durable peace is even more difficult.

The Secretariat and Member States are in continuous dialogue about how to address the recurrent challenges that UN peacekeeping faces, such as those related to the protection of civilians. The UN is always striving to learn from its past experiences and is continuously engaged in reforms to meet the perpetually changing and increasingly complex needs of the global security environment. As such, peacekeeping operations look very different today from 1948 or even 1999. Peacekeeping reform is an ongoing process, especially in the wake of the highly visible and tragic failures of the UN missions in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s. The following lists some of the major initiatives for reform since that time:

- The 2000 Brahimi Report represented an important turning point in setting out a renewed vision for peacekeeping in the 21st century. It initiated major reforms that have, to a large extent, enabled the tremendous surge in size and complexity that UN peacekeeping has since undergone. Subsequent reform initiatives of the UN Secretariat and Member States have built on this foundation for improvement by seeking to adapt UN peacekeeping to changes in the strategic and operational environments.
- “Integration” is a concept that has been introduced over the past decade to describe a system-wide UN response to UN engagement in countries emerging from conflict, specifically where a multidimensional peacekeeping mission, or

special political mission (SPM), is deployed alongside a United Nations Country Team (UNCT). The main purpose of integration is to maximize the collective and individual impact of all the various UN efforts in support of peace consolidation. This often involves a strategic partnership between a multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation and the UNCT, under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC). A series of tools has been introduced to bring this concept to life, including the Integrated Mission Planning Process, which is discussed in more detail in [chapter 8](#).

- In 2007, the UN sought to better meet the support needs of its increasingly high-paced, global operations by restructuring DPKO and consolidating administrative and logistics field support under the newly created Department of Field Support (DFS). This department oversees the daily field support operations in personnel, finance, logistics, and information and communication technology necessary to deploy, direct and sustain UN field-based peace operations worldwide.
- The publication of the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* or “Capstone Doctrine” in 2008 sought to introduce a guiding doctrine for peacekeeping across operations. This initiative forms part of a broader effort to develop a doctrinal basis for UN peacekeeping work, with the development of policies, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and guidelines to govern and support the work of staff. The Civil Affairs Policy, and accompanying guidance such as this Handbook, is part of the greater body of formal guidance developed for peacekeepers over the last few years.
- In 2009, a set of proposals to reform and strengthen peacekeeping were launched as part of the “New Horizon” initiative, with a view to defining a policy agenda for peacekeeping that reflects the perspectives of the global peacekeeping partnership and that seeks to make peacekeeping operations faster, more capable and more effective. This initiative, which provides the basis for ongoing reform activities within the UN Secretariat and missions, represents an effort to respond to the operational and policy challenges that have emerged through the gradual evolution of UN peacekeeping during the past decade. It aims to reinvigorate the partnership among all peacekeeping stakeholders and to build a common framework for strengthening peacekeeping to meet the requirements of the future. An important reform that emerged from the “New Horizon” initiative was the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS), approved by

the General Assembly in 2010. The GFSS is an integrated services delivery model aimed at enabling faster response times for mission start-up and improving support to mission operations.

- A further initiative of key significance for UN peacekeeping was the publication in 2011 of a report on *Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict*, by an independent group of senior advisers appointed by the Secretary-General. This report proposes practical measures to improve civilian support to conflict-affected countries, focusing on how to recruit and deploy the range of expertise required, as well as on how to transfer skills and knowledge to national actors.

## 1.5. The core functions of multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations

Although specific mandates vary from context to context, the core functions of multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations, as identified in the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* or “Capstone Doctrine” in 2008, are to:

- (a) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- (b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance;
- (c) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

Civil affairs supports each of these functions through its work on the ground across UN peacekeeping missions, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

## Recommended resources

<b>Name</b>	<b>United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (“Capstone Doctrine”)</b>
<b>Description</b>	A readable introduction to all aspects of UN peacekeeping, as well as the highest level DPKO doctrine document, covering many key policy questions.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf">http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Department of Peacekeeping Operations Website</b>
<b>Description</b>	Provides an overview of current and past missions with basic statistics and maps, as well as news intended for an external audience.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/">http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>POINT: Peace Operations Intranet</b>
<b>Description</b>	Provides online access for UN peacekeeping personnel to peacekeeping news and resources, including the policy and practice database, careers portal and other relevant topics. This link is only accessible to UN peacekeeping personnel.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="https://point.un.org/UNHQ/SitePages/POHome.aspx">https://point.un.org/UNHQ/SitePages/POHome.aspx</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Policy and Practices Database</b>
<b>Description</b>	Provides a visual framework for all the functions performed in UN peacekeeping, and contains any available policy and good practice for these functions. This link is only accessible to UN peacekeeping personnel.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, Center on International Cooperation</b>
<b>Description</b>	Provides detailed statistics on peace operations annually, as well as a thematic article about an area of current concern.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacekeeping/annual_review_11.html">http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacekeeping/annual_review_11.html</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Charter of the United Nations</b>
<b>Description</b>	The constituent treaty that founded the United Nations, binding for its signatories.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml">http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml</a>

<b>Name</b>	<b>Report of the Panel on Peace Operations (“Brahimi Report”)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Landmark reform agenda from 2000.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/">http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping</b>
<b>Description</b>	The most recent reform initiative in UN peacekeeping. Two progress reports are also available.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf">http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict: Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group, A/65/747—S/2011/85 (2011)</b>
<b>Description</b>	A report on how civilian support is provided by the UN in post-conflict countries. Contains several proposals relevant for civil affairs work, including on supporting national capacities.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.civcapreview.org">http://www.civcapreview.org</a>

## Chapter 2 | Overview of civil affairs



*This chapter provides an overview of the role of civil affairs in UN peacekeeping. It introduces the three core civil affairs roles and discusses how the work of this component evolves over the life cycle of a mission. The chapter includes information and statistics on current civil affairs deployments and discusses the future direction of this “core” component of peacekeeping.*

### 2.1. The role of civil affairs in UN peacekeeping

Civil affairs components are deployed in almost all DPKO-led peacekeeping operations, and are also a feature of many DPA-led special political missions (SPMs). Civil Affairs Officers are civilian peacekeepers, usually deployed at the local level, where they serve as the link between the UN mission and local authorities and communities. Civil affairs components work countrywide to strengthen the social and civic conditions necessary to consolidate peace processes and are a core function of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations.

In 2008, DPKO/DFS approved and promulgated a Policy Directive on Civil Affairs for the first time.<sup>3</sup> The policy sets out three core roles for civil affairs in UN peacekeeping, depending on the context and mandate:

- **Role one: Cross-mission liaison, monitoring and facilitation at the local level**
- **Role two: Confidence-building, conflict management and reconciliation**
- **Role three: Support to the restoration and extension of state authority**

The three core civil affairs roles are discussed in detail in **part III** of this Handbook. Under role one (**chapter 9**), civil affairs components liaise with local communities and authorities on behalf of the mission. They coordinate with and facilitate the work of partners, gather information, monitor the situation on the ground and conduct analysis. Under role two (**chapter 10**), civil affairs undertakes a range of activities aimed at supporting the development of social and civic conditions for peace as well as popular engagement and confidence in the peace process. This includes, but is not limited to, convening or facilitating dialogue between interest groups, direct outreach to the population and working with civil society groups. Under role three (**chapter 11**), civil affairs components provide operational support to the restoration of state presence and administrative functions, in close coordination with other partners that have specific mandates and capacities in this regard.

In each of the roles they perform, Civil Affairs Officers are primarily enablers, facilitators and problem-solvers. They look for opportunities to support and leverage the work of other actors (particularly local actors), to make connections and to help build on existing dynamics.

The activities of civil affairs are intended to support the implementation of the mandate as a whole, contributing to the core functions of multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations as set out in the previous chapter.<sup>4</sup> Civil affairs can facilitate or directly implement tasks that require a cross-cutting approach, such as the protection of civilians (discussed in **chapter 4**). Civil affairs components can also directly implement specifically mandated tasks. These are often in areas that affect either relationships between citizens, or relationships between citizens and the state.

Examples of mandated tasks for which civil affairs have lead or key responsibility:

- In **Chad**, Security Council resolution 1861 requested the mission to: "... support the initiatives of national and local authorities in Chad to resolve local tensions and

<sup>3</sup> The DPKO/DFS Civil Affairs Policy is subject to regular review. The most recent version can be found at: <http://ppdb.un.org>

<sup>4</sup> These are laid out in the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* ("Capstone Doctrine", 2008), section 2.3.



promote local reconciliation efforts, in order to enhance the environment for the return of internally displaced persons”.

- In the **Sudan**, Security Council resolution 1870 called upon the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to: “... strengthen its conflict management capacity by completing as soon as possible its integrated strategy to support local tribal conflict resolution mechanisms in order to maximize protection of civilians”.
- In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, Security Council resolution 1856 requested that the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), together with partners: “... promote national reconciliation and internal political dialogue, including through the provision of good offices, and support the strengthening of civil society”.
- In **Liberia**, Security Council resolution 1509 gave the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) the mandate to assist the: “... re-establishment of national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both the national and local levels”.
- In **Côte d’Ivoire**, Security Council resolution 1739 requested that the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) facilitate, with partners: “... the re-establishment by the Government of Côte d’Ivoire of the authority of the State throughout Côte d’Ivoire and of the institutions and public services essential for the social and economic recovery of the country”.

A key characteristic of civil affairs components is their ability to adapt to different needs at different times and in different places. Conditions vary dramatically between mission environments – even within host countries the priorities in one geographical area may be significantly different from those in another. In some cases it is not until the mission fully deploys that a clear picture emerges of what the needs are. Moreover, these are dynamic environments that can change fast. The local-level response needed in the early stages of mandate implementation is usually considerably different from what is needed a few years on. The civil affairs function is designed to be flexible enough to accommodate these factors, with recruitment profiles and training methods that are intended to help develop the core skill set necessary for this work, as well as a series of specializations relevant to different contexts and phases of mandate implementation.

## 2.2. Civil affairs and transition

As noted above, the civil affairs role is flexible, and almost always evolves over the course of a mission. Although there is no strict typology for how transitions occur in post-conflict settings, the following is a sample typology, albeit “idealized”:




Figure 2.1 Sample typology of an evolving operating environment

**During deployment and mission start-up**, the civil affairs focus is typically on rapid deployment into the field, depending on the security environment, in order to perform the cross-mission, local-level representation and monitoring role. During the early stages of a mission, civil affairs may be the only civilian component, or one of a few, represented at the local level. As such, it may serve the needs of a wide variety of mission components and other stakeholders not represented. During the early phase, civil affairs components may focus on issues such as:

- Liaison with local communities and local authorities, development of cultural understanding;
- Conflict analysis, early warning, information-gathering, assessment of needs (on a variety of possible issues, ranging from protection of civilians to basic socio-economic information);
- Identification of potential partnerships, opportunities for cooperation and coordination with other actors at the local level, such as uniformed components and the humanitarian community; and
- Early confidence-building activities, such as rapid identification of a small number of visible QIPs.

All these tasks should draw on the UNCT and capacities of other actors at the local level, and should build on the involvement, priorities and capacities of local communities and authorities wherever possible. (Engaging longer term actors and focusing on local capacities from the outset can help to facilitate a smoother entry and exit for peacekeeping operations.)

**In a formative or transitional political environment**, such as a pre-election period, there is often a focus on:

- Activities related to supporting the development of political space at the local level; and
- In-depth activities related to confidence-building and conflict management.

During this phase, a larger variety of civilian components and other stakeholders may be present at the local level and the civil affairs component is likely to focus more narrowly on these specific roles.

**In a maturing political environment**, such as a post-election period, there is likely to be a continued focus on the activities described above. However, activities in support of the restoration of state authority, where relevant, may expand or shift in emphasis to include, for example, more hands-on support to local-level institutions and newly elected officials.

**As the mission begins the process of drawdown and withdrawal**, civil affairs may return to a broader function of cross-mission liaison and monitoring, as other civilian components which may have been represented at the local level begin to withdraw. As indicated, planning for this transition should, as far as possible, guide the civil affairs approach from the outset. The aim of the peacekeeping mission is to support the creation of minimum foundations and safeguards until national capacity or specialized international capacity takes over. As discussed, close partnership and planning with longer term actors, particularly UNCT actors, is crucial. Key considerations and areas of focus for civil affairs components during drawdown and withdrawal phases include:

- Monitoring of local perceptions, attitudes and concerns regarding issues related to transition;
- Outreach to communities to manage expectations and/or address concerns and misconceptions at the local level (e.g., about what UNCT can realistically provide, or what the mission will leave behind);
- Ongoing analysis of local context and early warning systems, including in relation to the security situation as international uniformed components draw down;
- Monitoring of mission benchmarks related to withdrawal; and
- Handover of activities, including assessment of local capacities, identification of partners (national or international), analysis of potential gaps at the local level.

### 2.3. Civil affairs deployments

At the beginning of 2012 there were around 1000 Civil Affairs Officers worldwide, working in 17 DPKO or DPA-led UN missions. The accompanying map shows the countries and size of deployments. Civil affairs components tend to have a fairly large proportion of national staff, or National Professional Officers (NPOs), working with the UN in their own country. There are also a relatively high number of United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) in civil affairs, bringing a wide range of skills and backgrounds to bear.






Figure 2.2 Categories of current staff (2012)

The international Civil Affairs Officers also embody the UN core value of diversity: hailing from over 80 Member States. The background and composition of civil affairs components reflect the regions in which their officers are deployed. The breakdown in geographic composition of international staff is depicted in [figure 2.4](#).



Map No. 4451 UNITED NATIONS  
February 2012



Department of Field Support  
Cartographic Section




Figure 2.4 Region of origin of international staff

Of the total number of national and international staff in civil affairs, 34 per cent are women. This is still well below the Secretary-General's established 50 per cent representation target for UN civilian personnel, however, it is marginally higher than the current overall representation of women in civilian UN peacekeeping, which is slightly below 30 per cent.

## 2.4. The roots of civil affairs work

There were precursors for what was later termed civil affairs in Central America and in Cambodia during the 1991 to 1993 period. For example, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)'s civil administration component was responsible for the supervision of administrative structures in Cambodia, ranging from public security to finance and information.<sup>3</sup> However, the first component known officially as "civil affairs" was formed in 1992, with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)'s mandate in the former Yugoslavia.

<sup>5</sup> William J. Durch, *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (Henry L. Stimson Center, 1996) and Steven R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War* (St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 149.

The development and growth of civil affairs work has been a critical element of the development and growth of multidimensional peace operations. With the end of the cold war and the increase in peace operations required to respond to intra-state conflict, the UN was increasingly asked to tackle complex civilian tasks. These went beyond the quite limited role of liaising with political actors and the “good offices” work that had characterized civilian peacekeepers until that point. Cedric Thornberry, the first Director of Civil Affairs in a UN mission (UNPROFOR in 1992), described this new broader role as follows:

To fully understand the UN's meaning of “civil affairs” it is first important to appreciate that most of the missions created between 1989 and 1992, especially, were qualitatively different from those which had preceded. It is not just that most were a lot bigger ... they were to fulfil many roles additional to the archetypal ones of the 1947-1988 period. The task of the UN became, not merely to observe, but actively, itself, to bring about peace [...]

In a rapid sequence of major operations – principally in Namibia, Central America and Cambodia – the UN was required not only to make peace, but to conduct nationwide processes of reconstruction and national reconciliation. Their task was, in broad terms, to harmonize or unify deeply divided societies, long racked by war, and to establish democracy where previously there had been tyranny.<sup>6</sup>

These key themes of helping to unify divided societies and helping states to exert legitimate authority are central to the continuing role of civil affairs today.

During the 1990s small civil affairs components were included in a number of missions, including those in Cyprus, Tajikistan and Georgia. At the end of that decade, major civil affairs components were deployed to Kosovo and East Timor, to implement the executive mandates that were given to peacekeeping operations at that time. In these cases civil affairs components found themselves mandated to establish effective administrations and to support capacity-building for self-government.

The start of the 2000s saw a surge in the deployment of large civil affairs components to peacekeeping missions. Each one had its own unique focus and contribution to make in implementing peace mandates at the local level, but each was there to strengthen links to ordinary citizens, as well as to support the development of social conditions conducive to peace and provide an overall facilitation role locally.

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<sup>6</sup> Cedric Thornberry, “Civil affairs in the development of UN peacekeeping”, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 1, No. 4 (1994), pp. 471–484.



**In Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL<sup>7</sup> 1999–2005)**, the civil affairs component was tasked to help consolidate state authority around the country by supporting the establishment of newly elected local councils, among other tasks. This set the foundations for the ongoing work of civil affairs in the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) in 2005 to 2008, which was involved in supporting the activities of the District Recovery Committees as well as the Chiefdom Recovery Committees, and providing a conduit for passing the views and aspirations of the local people to decision makers at the national level.

**In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC and MONUSCO<sup>8</sup> from 2000)**, the civil affairs component is taking a lead role in developing conflict prevention and reconciliation activities as well as early warning mechanisms to protect civilians, and in supporting civil society and state institutions.

**In Liberia (UNMIL from 2003)**, civil affairs is assisting in the extension and consolidation of state authority and institutions, the establishment of a functioning administrative structure, the administration of natural resources, civil society capacity-building and reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts.

**In Lebanon (UNIFIL)<sup>9</sup>**, the civil affairs component was established in 2003 with one Civil Affairs Officer. This was increased in the aftermath of the 2006 conflict with the augmentation of UNIFIL under Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). The core focus of civil affairs in UNIFIL is local-level liaison and monitoring. Civil affairs is also engaged in conflict analysis and mitigation at the local level and in confidence-building.

**In Afghanistan (UNAMA<sup>10</sup> from 2003)**, the civil affairs unit is split, providing staff within the sub-units of the Director of Development, including the Governance Unit, while also providing personnel for UNAMA Regional and Provincial Offices. The Governance Unit works closely with Afghan partners in central Government to promote good governance and ensure the successful implementation of governance programmes countrywide. Working with the Provincial and District Councils, civil affairs has also worked to promote democratic, representative and effective governance at the subnational level, while also providing support to state institution-building, civil service reform, capacity-building and coordination.

**In Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI from 2004)**, the civil affairs component has three main areas of intervention: to assist in the redeployment of the administration and the restoration of state authority; to promote the culture of peace by supporting social cohesion

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<sup>7</sup> United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone.

<sup>8</sup> United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

<sup>9</sup> United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

<sup>10</sup> United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

UN Photo/Evan Schneider



**The Security Council authorizes the provisional expansion of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and the strengthening of civil affairs**

and peaceful resolution of local conflicts; and to ensure the overall management and secretariat for Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).

**In Haiti (MINUSTAH<sup>11</sup> from 2004)**, civil affairs uses the concept of effective local governance to drive its strategy to support the government's efforts to strengthen state institutions at all levels and to extend state authority beyond the national capital. Civil affairs personnel lead the ten field offices of the mission, overseeing local-level civilian mandate implementation.

**In Burundi (ONUB<sup>12</sup> 2004–2006)**, civil affairs provided information and analysis to mission headquarters, enabling the development of local-level municipal profiles and mapping of political/ethnic rivalries. This provided an early warning mechanism for potential conflicts resulting from a lack of effective governance. In the pre-election period, a strategy framework was developed to support the post-transition government and to identify capacity-building opportunities.

**In South Sudan (UNMIS 2005–2011, UNMISS<sup>13</sup> from 2011)**, civil affairs has had several key focus areas since 2005, including conflict prevention and reconciliation, support to

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.

<sup>12</sup> United Nations Operation in Burundi.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

local governance, maintenance and enhancement of political space, and cross-mission support on information-gathering and dissemination. The widespread deployment of civil affairs has enabled greater monitoring of conflict triggers and development of early warning systems, mapping to improve understanding of the conflicts, contingency planning for peaceful dry-season migrations, and support to local peace and reconciliation committees. Civil affairs in UNMISS is a major component deployed extensively around the country. Officers work with government officials, traditional leaders and armed youth, leading the conflict mitigation and resolution efforts of the mission.

**In Darfur (UNAMID<sup>14</sup> from 2007)**, the work of civil affairs is organized around four areas: information management and analysis; training and capacity-building; natural resources and the environment; and the implementation of QIPs. Unusually, UNAMID civil affairs works to promote peace in an ongoing conflict context.

**In Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT<sup>15</sup> 2007–2010)**, the three main objectives of civil affairs were: to contribute to the creation of security conditions conducive to the voluntary return and social reintegration of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); to support the initiatives of the local authorities to resolve local tensions and promote local reconciliation efforts; and to support the reinforcement of state authority.

**In Nepal (UNMIN<sup>16</sup> 2007–2010)**, an example of a DPA-led special political mission (SPM), civil affairs monitored the non-military aspects of the ceasefire arrangements not covered by other UN bodies. Civil affairs promoted the development of conditions conducive to a free and fair constituent assembly election, working in rural areas of Nepal where there had been a prolonged absence of the state.

**In Somalia (UNPOS<sup>17</sup> from 1995)**, there are two Civil Affairs Officers, who work closely with political affairs and other mission actors on enhancing popular support for the peace process, improving human security and improving governance through the establishment of effective and accountable civilian institutions.

**In Syrian Golan (UNDOF),<sup>18</sup>** civil affairs was introduced to the mission in 2010. There is one Civil Affairs Officer deployed to support the mission through liaison, monitoring and analysis. The Civil Affairs Officer also supports civil-military coordination capability and cultural awareness of peacekeepers.

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<sup>14</sup> African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

<sup>15</sup> United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad.

<sup>16</sup> United Nations Mission in Nepal.

<sup>17</sup> United Nations Political Office for Somalia.

<sup>18</sup> United Nations Disengagement Observer Force.

## 2.5. Civil affairs into the next decade

In 2008, for the first time, DPKO and DFS developed and disseminated a policy directive that defines and conceptualizes the diverse work of civil affairs. This has provided the foundation for the development of this Handbook, as well as training and recruitment profiles to ensure that civil affairs components are strong, well-trained and well-planned, ready to address the challenges ahead.

This institutional framework will need to continue to evolve and develop in response to analysis of the ongoing shifts in the global security environment. The *World Development Report 2011*, for example, found that many countries are caught in a mutually reinforcing cycle of violence and poverty. It also found that more and more people are suffering from violence that is linked to lack of governance and rule of law, rather than to outright war. These changes in the global security environment have resulted in mandates increasingly requiring higher levels of civilian engagement on a wide variety of thematic and cross-cutting issues, ranging from governance, rule of law and institution-building through to early peacebuilding and protection of civilians (POC).

For peacekeeping, of particular note among these emerging issues is the protection of civilians, which has increasingly become a major part of the international discourse around intervention. This was demonstrated in the international dialogue on both Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Côte d'Ivoire in early 2011 and earlier in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Darfur. Protection of civilians has also increasingly become a specific mandated task, after inclusion in eight UN peacekeeping mandates by the Security Council. It can be expected that civil affairs will be at the forefront of an integrated and coordinated approach to mandate delivery on this issue, in terms of civilian and government engagement on the ground.

Meanwhile, as many peacekeeping operations mandated as part of a surge during the 2000s are starting to draw down their military presence, the UN continues to evolve, transitioning towards an increased focus on the civilian dimension of "peacebuilding" and its role in avoidance of a return to conflict. Here, civil affairs has a key role to play – within both peacekeeping and political missions – by ensuring that efforts to mitigate conflict drivers and to engage and support local government and communities have meaning on the ground outside the capitals in which the UN is deployed. A continued focus on local presence in these contexts is key if the UN is to ensure that its work genuinely responds to the priorities and concerns of ordinary citizens within post-conflict countries, thereby helping to ensure their consent and to create durable conditions for peace.

These evolving roles, and the range of partners working in related fields and capacities, all create the need – and potential – for increased partnership and cooperation, to

ensure that mandate aims progress effectively. Similarly, as these complex and multidimensional trends for the UN response to conflict emerge, the identification and provision of appropriate and available resources to respond to them effectively must also evolve. As indicated in the report of the Senior Advisory Group on *Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict* (A/65/747—S/2011/85), these challenges will require a nimble, harmonized and, where necessary, specialized civilian response, as well as a focus on partnership across organizations such as the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and regional organizations such as the African Union (AU).

One of the major issues identified in the review of civilian capacities is the need to be able to better identify and support national capacities. As the review states: “The United Nations has seen success in humanitarian operations and peacekeeping, built on a strong partnership with Member States. But the international community has had less success in supporting and enabling the national capacities that are essential for an enduring peace.”<sup>19</sup> Civil affairs components have a key role to play in identifying and supporting national capacities, within civil society and local government, including through helping to ensure that voices from the local level are heard in nationally led peacebuilding processes.

Overall, in the evolving environment of international peace and security, a key asset of civil affairs components is their agility and their capacity to respond flexibly to the wide range of demands and expectations within Security Council mandates. One aspect of this flexibility is their ability to direct their focus depending on the availability and presence of other international partners at the local level, particularly those with expertise in highly specialized areas. Civil affairs can play an important role in mobilizing these partners in places and at times where they are most needed. This is a cost-efficient model, given the prohibitive and unnecessary expense of having a full complement of specialized expertise available in each locality around the country at all times. It also helps to ensure that local-level support is need-driven, rather than simply provided because a particular service or resource happens to be available.

Civil affairs can be expected to remain at the forefront of the UN response to conflict, and to building the processes, structures, relationships and trust required to assist countries and communities to break the cycle of violence.

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<sup>19</sup> *Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict: Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group, A/65/747—S/2011/85* (2011).

## Recommended resources

<b>Name</b>	<b>DPKO/DFS Policy Directive on Civil Affairs (April 2008)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Provides the official DPKO/DFS position on the roles of civil affairs components and key aspects of their management.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the Policy and Practices database on the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Civil Affairs Network</b>
<b>Description</b>	The library and discussion forum are full of information about the work done by these components in missions. Members can also ask and answer questions and start discussions with colleagues from other missions.
<b>Source</b>	People with a UN email address can request access to this network by emailing: <a href="mailto:doko-civilaffairsnetwork@un.org">doko-civilaffairsnetwork@un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>POINT: Peace Operations Intranet</b>
<b>Description</b>	All mission intranets can be accessed from here, and the sites provide a starting point for finding out about civil affairs work in other missions. This link is only accessible to UN peacekeeping personnel.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="https://point.un.org/UNHQ/SitePages/POHome.aspx">https://point.un.org/UNHQ/SitePages/POHome.aspx</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Civil Affairs Guidance and Training Needs Assessment (2008)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Provides a snapshot of the civil affairs function at that time, identifying the variety of tasks undertaken.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the Policy and Practices database on the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations A/65/19 (2011)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Provides the first legislative references by the General Assembly to civil affairs, recognizing the importance of their three core roles and, separately, referencing their work to support the protection of civilians. For references to civil affairs, see pp. 19 and 37.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/65/19">http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/65/19</a>

## Chapter 3 | Cooperation and integration



A UN team meets with the local community, southern Darfur

UN Photo/Olivier Chassot

*This chapter describes key structures and actors within UN peacekeeping missions, discusses integrated missions, the UN Country Team and non-UN partners and looks at coordination and cooperation between these stakeholders.*

One of the driving factors behind the type of role that civil affairs plays is the presence and activities of other actors and any correspondingly strong or weak areas in the collective effort of the UN in a particular context. The relatively flexible design of civil affairs and its ability to tailor its response to the evolving context on the ground means that it has a vital contribution to make in facilitating a strong and coherent UN-wide effort. To make the most of this, it is very important for Civil Affairs Officers to understand the roles played by internal mission partners, wider UN Country Team members and others, so that effective and complementary partnerships can be established.

### 3.1. Key partnerships within the mission

UN peacekeeping operations share certain commonalities but no mission is the same and there is no “one size fits all” approach or structure to peacekeeping. The design of individual missions is specific to their context. It is based on the Secretary-General’s proposals to the Security Council, usually developed through the Integrated Mission Planning Process undertaken following a Strategic Assessment and Technical Assessment Mission (TAM). Planning processes and tools used in UN peacekeeping are discussed in more detail in [chapter 8](#).

While traditional operations are largely comprised of military observers with limited civilian personnel, multidimensional operations are much larger and far more diverse in their composition. Personnel within these operations may include military contingents, observers and staff officers; police officers and formed police units; and international and national civilians organized into several different components. Each of these groups, and sections within them, often has a distinctive subculture that civil affairs can benefit greatly from trying to understand and work with. Below is a description of the relationship that civil affairs tends to have with the major components:

#### **Mission Leadership Team**

A small number of “traditional” missions are headed by a Force Commander (FC), however, the majority of missions with a civil affairs presence are led by a civilian SRSG with the support of one or two deputies (DSRSG). Usually there is one DSRSG with a focus on political issues, and another “double-hatted” or “triple-hatted” DSRSG, serving at the same time as the Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator in countries with humanitarian crises. The Mission Leadership Team also comprises the heads of the major functional components, in most cases including civil affairs.

The question of which DSRSG the civil affairs component should report through to the SRSG is one that has prompted a lot of discussion. This is because the work of civil affairs is clearly so relevant to work done across the whole of the rest of the mission, and often at the local level civil affairs components serve as the interface between political and security actors on the one hand and humanitarian and development actors on the other hand. DPKO has decided, through promulgation of the Civil Affairs Policy in 2008, that because the primary function of civil affairs tends to be political it will typically report through the political DSRSG, particularly in the early stages of a mission. However, it does foresee circumstances under which civil affairs may later



shift to report through the DSRSG/RC/HC, as the situation evolves.<sup>20</sup> Either way, civil affairs can help to play an integrative function between the two branches through effective planning and information-sharing.

### **Political affairs**

This is probably the component with which civil affairs works most closely, and with whom a shared strategic approach and effective arrangements for the two-way sharing of information and analysis are essential. The work that a mission does is inherently “political”, in that it is mandated by the Security Council and has specific objectives in support of a peace process, and this is reflected in the role played by civil affairs. Typically, political affairs components work on national-level political processes, and civil affairs components work on subnational political processes as one aspect of their cross-mission function at the local level. A strong linkage with the political affairs component is therefore extremely important. It is worth noting that where there is more than one geographical “centre of gravity” at which national-level politics are negotiated, it is generally the case that political affairs will be represented in these localities, alongside civil affairs, as well as in the capital. However, where political activity is largely focused in the capital city, political affairs components tend to be limited to the capital, and political reporting and analysis from the local level about centre-periphery issues and relationships can usually be provided by Civil Affairs Officers, alongside their other tasks.

### **Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC)**

This is a relatively new unit in missions, and the role is still evolving. The exact function performed varies from mission to mission, however, in essence the Joint Mission Analysis Centre brings together information from across a particular mission and produces analysis to support the strategic activities of the mission. Naturally, civil affairs reporting and analysis is a key source of information from the local level, and can also help to refine the analysis conducted by JMAC, by checking it against what is happening on the ground. Civil affairs can be an extremely useful resource for JMAC in researching specific issues as they manifest countrywide.

### **Public information**

Civil affairs components play a direct role in support of public information activities, by providing information about the attitudes and perceptions of different groups at the local level, and providing input into the design of messages that are delivered to the population through the media. Good coordination with the public information

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<sup>20</sup> DPKO/DFS Policy Directive on Civil Affairs, paras. 24 and 25.

component is essential to ensure the consistency of the messages communicated directly to the public and through the media.

**Mission support**

Within a mission, specialized support services are crucial for the effective implementation of mandated tasks. The mission support component oversees critical support elements, including administration, human resources and logistics. Mission support also oversees components that work closely with civil affairs on QIPs, including engineering and finance. Because these components must comply with strict UN rules and regulations, mission support can sometimes face criticism for not being responsive enough. Knowing the roles and responsibilities of the support components in the mission and building early cooperative relationships on projects can contribute to a common understanding of priorities and the provision of optimum support.

**Military**

Military contingents from troop-contributing countries (TCCs) are often the largest component of peacekeeping operations. Their exact functions depend on the individual mandate, but among their primary functions is to secure an enabling environment for all aspects of the mission to operate. Civil Affairs Officers on the ground will usually have two main points of contact with the military component of the mission – the senior officer in the location where they are situated and the Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC) Officer for that region. CIMIC Officers facilitate the flow of information, provide advice on how the military may assist the civilian components or local authorities, liaise with local authorities and coordinate requests to the military. CIMIC Officers report through the military command structure, however, they usually participate in the coordination mechanisms of the civilian components. CIMIC Officers may only be present at the headquarters or sector level, so occasionally a military observer assumes the CIMIC function at the local level and serves as the primary interface for civil affairs staff. It is very important that civil affairs at the headquarters level works well with the military, and develops an agreed system of interaction that filters down through both the military command structures and to the Civil Affairs Officers.

It is important that Civil Affairs Officers understand the military ranks, roles and command structure. This will help civil affairs to understand how to interact with its military counterparts and how to build effective partnerships.

Civil Affairs Officers at the local and regional levels can provide military components with advice concerning civilian issues, cultural norms and the broader context of mandate implementation, which is particularly important for continuity given troop rotations. They can help to manage any misunderstanding or conflict between communities and

military units. The work that civil affairs performs at the social and administrative levels countrywide can also help gradually to demilitarize problems faced by the military, for example through encouraging dialogue or civic interaction in buffer zones. Civil affairs can advise on selection and management processes for QIPs and facilitate the involvement of the military in these, including by advising on where and how this kind of involvement can be appropriate or inappropriate. Where military contingents have their own resources for projects, civil affairs can advise on ensuring that these activities are in line with overall mission priorities and approaches and with DPKO/DFS policy. Civil affairs can also assist in the planning and implementation of joint civil-military initiatives, including in relation to the protection of civilians.



### The military component may include:

**Military advisers:** military officers assigned to advise the FC or the SRSG at mission headquarters.

**Military observers/experts on mission:** unarmed military officers deployed to monitor and supervise any military or security arrangements of the peace agreement. These are usually present at all levels and civil affairs works closely with them locally.

**Formed military units:** Member States contribute units that correspond to traditional military formations, for example:

- Section, squad or brick (7–12 soldiers)
- Platoon or troop (3–4 sections, 30–40 soldiers)
- Company (120–150 soldiers)
- Battalions (500–1,000 soldiers)
- Brigades (4,000–10,000 soldiers)

There is usually either a platoon or a company at each mission site at the local level.

Military staff are organized into different branches, usually under the following numbers. Depending on the scale and nature of deployment and the operational units, these may be designated J (joint), G (army) or S (subordinate staff). The numerical designations remain the same.

- 1 – Personnel and administration
- 2 – Intelligence and security
- 3 – Operations
- 4 – Logistics
- 5 – Plans
- 6 – Communications
- 7 – Training
- 8 – Finance and resources
- 9 – CIMIC (Civil Military Coordination)

**Police**

UN police (UNPOL) components are made up of two distinct types of personnel: individual police officers (IPOs), who are “experts on mission” and generally unarmed; and formed police units (FPUs), armed contingents of about 140 police from a single country, assigned to public order management, protection of UN staff and facilities, and high-risk operations.

UNPOL mandates have become more complex over time, progressing from observation and advice to capacity-building and institutional reform. UNPOL officers co-locate with their host-state counterparts, working alongside them while promoting change. IPOs are ideally placed for liaison and advice on any project involving the national police. FPUs, although designed for public order management duties, may also be helpful in providing security to transport and facilities, including humanitarian aid delivery and IDP camps.

Coordination between UNPOL and civil affairs should take place at the mission headquarters and the district and regional levels, as well as station levels where appropriate. As they do in support of military components at the local level, civil affairs can advise on the strategic and policy framework for operations and liaison with communities, helping to ensure cohesion and consistency across local-level mission actors. Civil affairs can also provide input both for induction processes and for development of police projects or programmes where requested, helping these components to understand the political and socio-economic context within which they are operating. In missions that are mandated to protect civilians, UN police have worked with civil affairs – and other mission partners – in joint protection, rapid response and early warning mechanisms.

**Human rights**

Many UN peacekeeping operations are mandated to promote and protect human rights by monitoring and helping to investigate human rights violations and/or developing the capacity of national actors and institutions to do the same. Human rights components within multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations are provided with expertise, guidance and support by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Where human rights components are not represented at the local level, civil affairs can provide information about the situation at the local level and play a vital role in early warning and advising on a possible need for a temporary increase in presence in a particular location. Where human rights components are represented locally, close coordination is needed. It is essential that Civil Affairs Officers remain in contact with, and seek guidance from, Human Rights Officers who should possess specialist skills in analysing human rights threats. Relevant information and analysis should be shared,

taking into account concerns about confidentiality, and information that requires technical follow-up should be passed to human rights components, which are in a better position to advise on the best course of action, including by referring specific cases to the UN human rights mechanisms.

### Gender

DPKO/DFS multidimensional missions are now all mandated to mainstream gender in all policies, programmes and activities, and to implement Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. Missions have gender teams of varying sizes depending on the scale of the mission, which advise the SRS and the mission on how to mainstream gender and integrate gender perspectives into all areas of activity. These teams frequently work with civil society and women's organizations – often alongside civil affairs components – to support the involvement of women in areas such as early warning, protection of civilians, community policing and local peacebuilding. Given the close contact that civil affairs has with local communities and authorities around the country, the civil affairs community can support the gender team with information and analysis about any trends or specific concerns at the local level. Similarly, the gender team can be an essential resource for advising civil affairs

UN Photo/Asric-Helene Meister



**UNMIL Chief of Civil Affairs outlines the Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) programme at the Pakistani Contingent Headquarters in Tubmanburg, Liberia**

components how to mainstream gender and integrate gender perspectives into the planning and conduct of their work.

### **Electoral**

Where a UN peacekeeping operation is provided with a mandate to assist or support an electoral process, electoral components or units will be established within the mission structure. They are provided with strategic guidance and operational support by the Electoral Assistance Division of the DPA. In general, these components play a technical support role in relation to elections, which is complemented by the work that civil affairs does. It is important that close coordination is maintained and information shared between these components.

### **Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)**

Many missions have a mandate to support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and these components are sometimes represented at the local level alongside civil affairs. Where they are not represented locally, civil affairs can play a facilitation role, as for other components, keeping them informed of issues of local concern and mobilizing their involvement at the local level when necessary. DDR is a complex process with political, military, humanitarian and socio-economic aspects. DDR components undertake a range of activities aimed at building confidence to foster stabilization and progress, while also serving as enablers for longer term political and security arrangements affected by DDR. There are clear complementary areas with the work that civil affairs does to build confidence and support conflict management at the local level in post-conflict settings, and close coordination and mutual support is important in both the planning and execution of work in this area.

### **Integrated missions and UN Country Team partners**

Integrating a peacekeeping mission and the UNCT behind one overarching strategy, under the leadership of a civilian representative of the Secretary-General, can significantly enhance the collective impact of UN peace consolidation efforts. **Chapter 8** looks in more detail at planning frameworks, such as the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), used to support this coordinated approach.

Integration arrangements and structures vary according to context and may change depending on the phase of the mission and the situation on the ground. They tend to be less developed in situations with ongoing conflict. Some missions are structurally integrated, which means that the RC/HC serves as the DSRSG in order to promote effective coordination between the mission, UN agencies and external partners. Whether structurally integrated or not, there should be an effective strategic partnership between the UN peacekeeping mission and the UNCT so that all components operate in

a coherent and mutually supportive manner. Because of its local presence on the ground, and its focus on social and civic issues, civil affairs is often one of the components of peacekeeping operations with the closest operational links to the work of UNCT partners. This means that it can play an important role in bringing the concept of integration to life in practical responses to problems on the ground. Coordination at the field level is discussed in more detail in **chapter 9**.

The UNCT brings the different UN agencies, funds and programmes together, ensuring inter-agency coordination and decision-making at the country level. Led by the Resident Coordinator, the UNCT encompasses all the entities of the UN system that carry out operational activities for development, emergency, recovery and transition in programme countries. The main purpose of the UNCT is for individual agencies to plan and work together, under the Resident Coordinator, to ensure the delivery of tangible results.



Further information about each of the UN agencies, funds and programmes can be found at: [www.unsystem.org](http://www.unsystem.org).

Among other things, UNCT actors often lead the humanitarian planning, preparedness and response, and bring programme resources, as well as specialist expertise on a range of issues and a long-term approach to some of the key problems. From their side, civil affairs components bring a strong countrywide presence, access to the political process, and access to logistical and security resources. Based on these areas of comparative advantage, civil affairs and UN agencies might partner with each other in a number of ways, including through local-level implementation of joint programmes. Civil affairs components can also, where appropriate, facilitate the work of UN partners that are not represented at the local level, by providing information to support their programming, helping to monitor the implementation of their programmes at the local level, or facilitating logistical support. A number of examples of good cooperation are provided in **part III** of this Handbook. As a general rule, it is useful to remember that some UN actors may have been operating in a country for several years before the arrival of the mission and will continue to operate following its departure. It is therefore important that civil affairs components take account of any networks of contacts and activities that have been undertaken by UNCT partners before their arrival and, where relevant, draw on their existing knowledge and understanding of the situation on the ground. Similarly, it is important to consider in the early stages of cooperation what is likely to happen with these partnerships, and the issues that they address, when the peacekeeping missions withdraw. In planning for mission withdrawal, it is important that civil affairs coordinates closely with the UNCT from early on, and avoids the assumption that tasks previously

undertaken by the mission can simply be handed over to UNCT partners when the mission departs.

Integration potentially offers notable advantages, such as helping to harmonize resources and providing a common countrywide vision and strategy for peace consolidation. However, it also presents a number of challenges, not least because UN partner agencies are governed by mandates, timeframes, decision-making structures and funding arrangements that are considerably different from those of the peacekeeping operation. It can be helpful to emphasize the opportunities that arise from the collective attention of Member States' engagement, including through a clear set of goals expressed through a Security Council mandate. This level of engagement can be an important window of opportunity for countries emerging from conflict and for the broad range of international actors with different mandates and expertise.

One of the notable differences between peacekeeping missions and UN partner agencies is funding: the funds for a peacekeeping mission come from assessed budget contributions and are therefore relatively predictable, whereas the funding sources for many UN partner and programmatic agencies come from voluntary contributions. This can prove challenging during planning processes. Similarly, the time horizons of partners may also differ: humanitarian actors are oriented towards the immediate, temporary relief of need, while peacekeepers operate on a political timetable and development actors adopt a more long-term view in their interventions. Understanding these institutional differences among key UN partners can help to ease possible friction and support the building of partnerships. It can also help to ensure that relevant activities introduced during the humanitarian or stabilization phases are carried over into the development phase.

### 3.2. External partners

Major non-UN international actors – many of whom are represented at the national rather than subnational level – include bilateral national development agencies, multilateral organizations, international financial institutions, regional and subregional organizations and international NGOs. These actors will all have independent agendas, which may not always be aligned with those of the UN mission. However, as with internal coordination and UN integration, interacting with non-UN actors is about building relationships and understanding the different rules and mandates that govern each actor's approach. It is also about realizing that the UN plays only one part – albeit a critical one – among a host of other actors. Civil affairs often plays an important role of coordination with international actors at the local level, seeking to harmonize activities as much as possible, given the different interests and objectives involved. This is discussed in detail in [chapter 9](#).



## Recommended resources

<b>Name</b>	<b>United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (“Capstone Doctrine”)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Contains a concise overview of key partners.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf">http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>DPKO/DFS Policy on Joint Mission Analysis Centres (July 2010)</b>
	<b>DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Joint Mission Analysis Centres (February 2010)</b>
	<b>DPI and DPKO Policy and Guidance for Public Information in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (July 2006)</b>
	<b>OHCHR/DPKO/DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations and Political Missions (September 2011)</b>
	<b>Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC) (November 2010)</b>
	<b>DPKO Policy: Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (February 2008)</b>
	<b>DPKO/DFS Policy Directive on Gender Equality in Peacekeeping (July 2010)</b>
<b>Description</b>	The above are all official DPKO/DFS doctrine on the roles and responsibilities of other components within UN peacekeeping missions and can be consulted for detailed information about partners.
<b>Source</b>	These documents can be accessed by UN peacekeeping personnel only via the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Secretary-General’s Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions (February 2006)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Official UN guidance on integrated missions.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the Policy and Practices database on the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Decision of the Secretary-General on Integration (Issued 4 May 2011)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Official UN guidance on integration.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the Policy and Practices database on the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>

## Chapter 4 | Cross-cutting themes: peacebuilding and protection



*This chapter introduces peacebuilding and the protection of civilians, which are two important cross-cutting themes in civil affairs work. The chapter considers the role of Civil Affairs Officers as local peacebuilders and discusses the evolving engagement of UN peacekeeping in efforts to protect civilians.*

### 4.1. Civil affairs as local peacebuilders

#### **What is peacebuilding?**

“Peacebuilding” is a deeply political process that entails a range of activities – varying from context to context – aimed at making peace self-sustaining and reducing the risk of a relapse into conflict. It is work that happens at many different levels and is carried out by many different actors, both national and international.

The *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict* (2009) sets out five recurring priorities:

- Support to basic safety and security, including mine action, protection of civilians, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, strengthening the rule of law and initiation of security sector reform;
- Support to political processes, including electoral processes, promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, and developing conflict-management capacity at the national and subnational levels;
- Support to the provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, health and primary education, and support to the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees;
- Support to restoring core government functions, in particular basic public administration and public finance, at the national and subnational levels;
- Support to economic revitalization, including employment generation and livelihoods (in agriculture and public works), particularly for youth and demobilized former combatants, as well as rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.

The term “peacebuilding” has been evolving since its first use in the former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *Agenda for Peace*. The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the authorization of several special political missions with peacebuilding mandates has generated a need to clarify the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

DPKO has emphasized that peacekeeping is not an alternative or precursor to peacebuilding but that peacekeepers are important peacebuilding actors, particularly in the early stages of peacebuilding. The work that civil affairs components have been doing globally for almost twenty years to try to support societies in transition from conflict to peace has essentially been local peacebuilding work.

In order to clarify better the relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and the comparative advantage of peacekeeping operations within the broader enterprise of peacebuilding, DPKO identified three roles for peacekeepers in a 2010 paper called *Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Clarifying the Nexus*.<sup>21</sup> These roles are to “articulate, enable and implement”. The chart below briefly summarizes these, and explains the ways in which civil affairs supports them from the local level.

<sup>21</sup> These are also laid out in the Secretary-General’s report: *Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, A/65/680 (2011).

## Articulate

### Mission-wide role

The SRSR and leadership team work with national and international partners to articulate strategic priorities and a critical path towards them, brought together in the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) and elsewhere. The SRSR reports through the Secretary-General to the Security Council and engages with other actors to sustain international political support. Where the country is on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission, the mission and DPKO/DFS provide support. The mission supports effective consultation and communication between state and society and – together with partners – assists government in articulating priorities, plans and programmes.

### Civil affairs contribution

Civil affairs components assess the perceptions and priorities of the local population around the country, in order to ensure that national peacebuilding efforts by the mission are developed with sensitivity to local realities, and to flag up any contradictions between elite-oriented and bottom-up perspectives. They help to ensure awareness of different regional realities. They provide a platform so that the voices of diverse stakeholders can be heard in negotiations or processes of priority-setting. They also help local government to articulate priorities, plans and programmes linked to the national-level process. They are also involved in the process of monitoring countrywide progress against benchmarks.

## Enable

### Mission-wide role

Missions help to create a conducive environment for peacebuilding countrywide by providing a security umbrella through uniformed peacekeepers. They also work with national counterparts to create and maintain political space, including through political dialogue and conflict management. Missions help to coordinate the efforts of the broader international community and strengthen national coordination mechanisms. They help to mobilize assistance in order to fill critical peacebuilding gaps from both UN and external partners, particularly where the Resident and/or Humanitarian Coordinator is also the DSRSG. Missions repair, within their capacity, the public infrastructure on which they must rely, and provide logistical support to other partners involved in peacebuilding (such as transport and communications).

### Civil affairs contribution

Civil affairs components address local-level and inter-community conflict, work to build confidence in the peace process, facilitate processes of reconciliation and support the development of political space countrywide. They also help to provide an enabling environment through hands-on support bringing government officials out to districts and helping strengthen relationships between state and society around the country. Civil affairs helps uniformed components to perform their tasks, ensuring that they are well briefed on the cultural and community contexts within which they are working. Civil affairs can also facilitate, enable or help to mobilize development and humanitarian actors at the local level, including through providing an interface to assist their operations in locations where they may not be represented.

## Implement

### Mission-wide role

In limited areas, missions are mandated to perform peacebuilding tasks themselves – generally catalytic tasks intended to generate momentum or lay a foundation for the future. Areas of focus could include security sector reform, mine action, protection of civilians, justice and corrections, and so on. The objective is usually to lay the foundations for the development of national capacity. This may include capacity assessment, support to planning and training or other capacity-building support.

### Civil affairs contribution

Civil affairs components sometimes play a direct implementation role, primarily at the local level, through their efforts to strengthen the capacity of state authorities to function. This work is usually done in partnership with other actors with technical expertise in this field. Among other things, these interventions are often focused on strengthening the capacity for effective engagement between local authorities and the central level, and between local authorities and the local population.

There are continuing debates at the policy level on the degree to which peacekeeping missions should be carrying out an “implementation” role in peacebuilding, rather than just coordinating and supporting the implementation work of other actors. This will likely be an ongoing tension, with a different balance found in each context depending on a number of factors – including the strength and presence of the UNCT.

### Priorities and sequencing in peacebuilding work

Peacebuilding can cover a myriad of areas and possible tasks, and ultimately the identification and sequencing of tasks will vary enormously depending on a thorough analysis of each situation. Civil affairs can contribute to this a great deal, particularly by helping to ensure that there is an awareness and understanding of what “peace” means for the ordinary people of the country in question, and what their priorities may be.

As the *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict* (2009) points out: “Local and traditional authorities as well as civil society actors, including marginalized groups, have a critical role to play in bringing multiple voices to the table for early priority-setting and to broaden the sense of ownership around a common vision for the country’s future.”

In addition to the priorities set out in the 2009 *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, outlined above, DPKO has developed an Early Peacebuilding Strategy, which contains some suggestions for sequencing and prioritization between tasks for many of the functional areas in missions. This document introduces two tracks, one involving short-term stabilizing

tasks and the other the early initiation of tasks with more far-reaching impact. It stresses the need to focus simultaneously on the short and medium term.

The *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* identifies “legitimate institutions that provide citizen security, justice and jobs” as being central in breaking cycles of violence. It asserts that these three areas should be prioritized, meaning that other reforms – such as political reform, decentralization, privatization and shifting attitudes towards marginalized groups – should be more paced and gradual in most situations. In terms of programming, it maintains that priorities should be laid out in a very limited number of core programmes that should be delivered at scale, in large national or subnational programmes, rather than small projects. Of particular relevance for civil affairs, the *World Development Report 2011* stresses the importance of strategic communications and confidence-building in peacebuilding contexts, and identifies support for bottom-up state-society relations as one of the top five lessons in programme design.

The latest initiative to guide the enterprise of peacebuilding is the “New Deal for engagement in fragile states”, endorsed in November 2011 at the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea. Through this initiative, a broad collection of states and international actors commit to five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals that should guide the work of fragile and conflict-affected countries and development partners. Again, there is a focus on state-society relations, as well as the question of supporting national capacities: “We will increase our support for credible and inclusive processes of political dialogue. We will support global, regional and national initiatives to build the capacity of government and civil society leaders and institutions to lead peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts.” This initiative includes the G7+ countries, many of which themselves host UN peacekeeping missions, including DRC, Haiti, Liberia, Afghanistan, South Sudan and Timor-Leste.

## 4.2. Protection of civilians

A number of peacekeeping missions have a mandate to “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”, bearing in mind that the host state is primarily responsible for protecting civilians within its borders. Implementation of the protection of civilians (POC) mandate requires all mission components to work in a coordinated way, each bringing their own unique contribution to the table. While there is no one uniformed or civilian element that is solely responsible for implementing POC mandates, civil affairs is a key player in this area of work.

Missions with POC mandates are required to conduct a detailed analysis of risks facing civilians in the area of operations and to devise a comprehensive POC strategy that

articulates the mission's approach towards addressing the priority POC risks that it has identified. The DPKO/DFS Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations explains that a POC risk is calculated by weighing a given threat to a civilian population against its vulnerability to that threat. Civil Affairs Officers contribute to that analysis by relaying relevant information from the community level, including perceptions of the communities about their own vulnerabilities and capacities, which are all-important measures in this regard. Civil affairs components can play an important referral role through relaying information on allegations or risks of human rights violations to Human Rights Officers for further investigation and action. (It should be underscored that monitoring and protection work should be performed by trained staff with the necessary expertise and knowledge.) Civil Affairs Officers also act as an important link between the mission and external POC stakeholders, including local communities and civil society actors. In some cases, civil affairs has been tasked with coordinating the mission's overall POC activities.

A variety of measures can be taken by a mission in order to prevent and respond to the identified POC risks. The DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations, which stresses prevention as a priority, organizes the work of UN peacekeeping missions in support of this mandated task into three tiers, each of which is pursued simultaneously:

- **Tier one: protection through political process**
- **Tier two: providing protection from physical violence**
- **Tier three: establishing a protective environment**

**In support of tier one**, civil affairs contributes by facilitating processes that enable local political leaders, local authorities and communities to identify, plan for and take concrete steps to protect local communities from risks, and by helping them to link up with regional, national and international protection resources. Civil affairs also contributes to protection by supporting reconciliation and conflict management at the local level, promoting the use of dialogue to address triggers for violence against civilians and advocating for the peaceful resolution of conflict.

**In support of tier two**, based on their regular contact with local authorities and community leaders, civil affairs plays a particularly important role in an early warning function: relaying information on potential risks and threats to civilians to other civilian elements of the mission and uniformed components. Civil affairs can also provide information on overall local dynamics, which help to inform operational responses, in turn helping to enhance the capacity of the peacekeeping force to answer to protection needs and to prevent and mitigate any unintended consequences of military operations.

**In support of tier three**, civil affairs supports national actors – including authorities, communities and civil society – in strengthening longer term social and civil conditions for peace and addressing the root causes of POC risks.

The General Assembly has welcomed the role of civil affairs in the protection of civilians (A/65/19), stressing:

[...] the importance of the mission having the capacity to interact closely with the host government, local authorities and the local population in order to raise awareness and understanding of its protection of civilians mandate and activities. [...] The Special Committee welcomes practices such as the fielding of joint protection teams, community liaison interpreters and Civil Affairs Officers, which improve local level analysis and assist with expectation management among the local community regarding the role and limitations of the peacekeeping mission.

It is important to bear in mind that different actors approach the challenge of protection differently. Peacekeeping missions are usually mandated to focus on the protection of civilians from the imminent threat of physical violence, creating a safe and secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid, as well as on issues related to child protection and protection from sexual violence in conflict. Humanitarian actors, on the other hand, generally adopt a much wider understanding of protection which focuses on ensuring respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. Therefore, the types of issues identified as protection risks, as well as the proposed responses to these risks, often differ between the mission and humanitarian actors. In this respect, it is important that missions and the Global Protection Cluster, which also comprises humanitarian organizations involved in protection activities, jointly engage in the POC risk analysis, to ensure that there is a shared understanding of the risks facing civilians in the mission area and in the strategy to mitigate them. As a key interface with humanitarian actors in the field, Civil Affairs Officers have a role to play in *enabling* the protection work of humanitarian actors. At the same time, civil affairs plays a key role in *implementing* the mission's POC mandate. These are two distinct functions of the civil affairs component.



DPKO has developed specialized training modules on POC and conflict-related sexual violence in order to improve the overall coherence and effectiveness of POC activities. The DPKO training modules on POC can be downloaded via the peacekeeping resources hub. See [Recommended resources](#) section below for access details.



## Recommended resources

<b>Name</b>	<b>Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Clarifying the Nexus (September 2010)</b>
<b>Description</b>	A short and clear explanation of the relationship between these two concepts.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the Policy and Practices database on the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, A/63/881—S/2009/304 (June 2009)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Lays out the current UN-wide position on the enterprise of peacebuilding.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/63/881">http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/63/881</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Progress report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, A/64/866—S/2010/386 (July 2010)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Formal progress report on peacebuilding with several references to the work done by civil affairs in this field.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/64/866">http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/64/866</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development</b>
<b>Description</b>	The latest thinking on the complex relationship between conflict and development.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/">http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>A New Deal for engagement in fragile states</b>
<b>Description</b>	Details the commitments and priorities made by donor and recipient states on the path out of fragility. Likely to significantly impact how peacebuilding is supported in the years ahead.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document/">http://www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document/</a>

<b>Name</b>	<b>DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (April 2010)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Provides the conceptual framework for the protection of civilians in the context of UN peacekeeping operations.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the Policy and Practices database on the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations</b>
<b>Description</b>	Provides missions with a set of practical guidelines to assist them in drafting comprehensive POC strategies tailored to their mission context.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the Policy and Practices database on the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/65/19 (2011)</b>
<b>Description</b>	The General Assembly formally recognizes the work of civil affairs in supporting both peacebuilding and the protection of civilians.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/65/19">http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/65/19</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>OHCHR/DPKO/DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations and Political Missions (September 2011)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Outlines the role of human rights components in protection of civilians.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the Policy and Practices database on the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>DPKO Training on Protection of Civilians</b>
<b>Description</b>	DPKO training modules on POC can be downloaded via the peacekeeping resources hub. These modules are a useful resource for Civil Affairs Officers involved in POC.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org">http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org</a>



## PART II:

### Preparing for and overseeing civil affairs work

UN Photo/Olivia Grey Pritchard



## Chapter 5 | Guiding principles for civil affairs work



Civil Affairs Officers discuss security issues with IDPs in Darfur

UN Photo/Olivier Chassot

*This chapter looks at how the principles of consent and impartiality, introduced in chapter 1, both guide and can be reinforced by the work of civil affairs at the local level. It discusses gender and diversity issues, local ownership, “Do No Harm” and conflict-sensitive approaches in civil affairs work. The chapter also considers some of the challenges of putting these principles into operation in complex post-conflict contexts.*

### 5.1. Impartiality and consent

As discussed in [chapter 1](#), impartiality and consent are key principles of UN peacekeeping. The principle of impartiality should guide Civil Affairs Officers in all their interactions. Being impartial does not mean that Civil Affairs Officers should be neutral or apolitical, rather it implies that all parties should be treated equally and held to the same standards. Impartiality is critical to maintaining credibility in the eyes of the host community and to ensuring the consent of the parties. In a post-conflict context, however, where the resolution of the conflict may be far from complete and there may

be deep-rooted mistrust, the impartiality of the mission may be tested and questioned.<sup>22</sup> This can be challenging for Civil Affairs Officers in their work with local authorities, communities and civil society actors. Civil Affairs Officers should be aware that certain actions could generate a perception that the mission is partial, including, for example, providing disproportionate support to returnees versus the community as a whole, engaging with one party or group more than another or distributing QIPs inequitably. Understanding the power dynamics and potential divisions between or within communities is important in this regard and is discussed in more detail in **section 5.2**.

‘Consent’ of the parties takes place at the national political level and, as a result, local communities do not directly consent to the peacekeeping presence and may have limited understanding or knowledge of the mission’s mandate. Civil Affairs Officers often play a critical role in seeking or strengthening acceptance of the mission and its mandate at the local level, which can help to maintain consent at the national level. This is done through liaison and coordination with local authorities, community leaders and civil society actors, as well as by monitoring and reporting on the attitudes and perceptions of local people and examining the intended and unintended impacts of the mission. Civil affairs often works closely with public information components to promote better understanding of the mission and its mandate. These activities help to ensure that the mission is informed of any changes or problems that may impact on acceptance of the mission and consent.

## 5.2. Diversity, gender and culture

Respect for diversity and gender equality are core UN values and cross-cutting principles of civil affairs work. The UN code of ethics urges that, “in the performance of their official duties and responsibilities, United Nations personnel shall act with understanding, tolerance, and sensitivity and respect for diversity and without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, disability, property, birth or other status.”<sup>23</sup> While gender can be included under the umbrella of diversity, it is mentioned separately and considered in slightly more detail here.



**Diversity** in this context refers to the diverse character of a society or workplace and can include sex, gender, race/ethnicity, religion/belief, disability, social status and sexual orientation.

<sup>22</sup> “Mission readiness: preparing for fieldwork” (United Nations Office of Human Resources Management, March 2005).

<sup>23</sup> UN code of ethics draft (2008).

**Gender** refers to the socially determined ideas and practices of what it is to be female or male. This is distinct from sex, which refers to the biological differences by which someone is categorized as male or female.<sup>24</sup>

**Culture** is the distinctive patterns of ideas, beliefs and norms which characterize the way of life and relations of a society or group within a society.<sup>25</sup>

### From the toolkit:



#### Considering gender, diversity and culture

- **How are decisions made, by whom and in what circumstances?** Authoritarian, consensus, joint, collaborative; individuals, men, women, groups, elders, superiors; social class; work, formal, informal, family, clan?
- **Who is included and who is excluded from the decision-making structures/peace process** at the local, regional and national levels (for example, what is the extent and quality of women's participation)?
- **What are the prevailing religious and cultural norms, attitudes and practices** in relation to gender, age, disability, religion, ethnicity and sexual orientation?
- **Are there special ways of conducting meetings; greetings; doing business, negotiation; making agreements or changing agreements; admitting mistakes, "saving face", making apologies?**
- **How are disputes resolved and what is the attitude towards reparations for wrong-doing?** Formal/informal, traditional, restorative, punitive, material compensation?
- **What are the traditional roles of women and men, and have these changed during the conflict?**
- **Are there any groups that are marginalized, excluded or vulnerable, and how does this affect them?** For example, lack of access to the decision-making process, employment or income generation, discrimination in the legal system or customary justice mechanisms, lack of access to public services etc. On what basis are they excluded (IDP, former combatant, ethnicity, religion, gender, tribe, clan)?

Box 5.1 From the toolkit: Considering gender, diversity and culture<sup>26</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Definition taken from 'Gender and Development: Concepts and Definitions, Prepared for DFID for gender mainstreaming intranet resource' by Hazel Reeves and Sally Barded (2000).

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Content of the box was adapted from "Mission readiness: preparing for fieldwork" (United Nations Office of Human Resources Management, March 2005) and *Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping Operations* (p. 208).

Culture is linked to and interacts with gender and diversity in so far as roles, relations and social dynamics are culturally mediated. Understanding the diverse character and social dynamics of a community or society is crucial to civil affairs work. Violent conflict may affect women, men, boys, girls, the young, the old and those from particular ethnic or religious groups in different ways. Gender, age and culture may influence the type of risk someone is vulnerable to, as well as their role in the conflict, their coping mechanisms, their specific needs during post-conflict recovery and their role in building peace. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts have a better chance of being effective if they are sensitive to these diversity issues.

In contexts where identity (ethnic, religious, political, tribal, gender etc.) has been a feature of the conflict, it is particularly important to be sensitive to diversity within and between communities. Interventions that take into account these dynamics are less inclined to exclude already marginalized sections of the population, or to disproportionately offer gains to one group or another or exacerbate underlying conflicts. It should also be noted that conflict can transform social relations and patterns of exclusion both by creating newly vulnerable groups (people with physical disabilities, female-headed households, IDPs or returnees) and by creating new opportunities for certain groups, such as minorities or women, to play a greater role in the public realm. Civil Affairs Officers should pay careful attention to these dynamics in order to understand the specific needs and concerns of different groups and support the participation and inclusion of the various constituencies. Through listening to the agendas and grievances of different constituencies and endeavouring to understand the power dynamics that define their relations, Civil Affairs Officers can identify appropriate partners and ensure that their interventions are sensitive to diversity, gender and the local cultural context. The questions outlined in **box 5.1** are a useful starting point for examining the social structures, dynamics and cultural practices, as a first step to mainstreaming diversity and gender issues and promoting cultural sensitivity.



#### **UN Security Council resolutions on gender, conflict and peacekeeping**

The importance of incorporating gender perspectives in conflict, peacekeeping and peacebuilding is established in UN Security Council resolutions 1325 and 1820 (later reinforced by resolution 1888). These resolutions place gender equality and women's active role in conflict resolution and peace processes as integral to the core business of UN peacekeeping, as well as recognizing sexual violence as a weapon of war and mandating peacekeeping missions to protect women and children from sexual violence during armed conflict.



Myriam Asmann



Participants listening to the proceedings of the 10th Anniversary of Security Council resolution 1325 ceremony in DRC

As noted above, conflict can transform gender relations and may offer women increased opportunities to engage in the public realm. Civil Affairs Officers are well placed to identify and support women's participation in both formal and informal peace efforts and to build upon any new opportunities provided to them in the post-conflict period to assume new roles in the public realm at local and national levels. Close collaboration with mission gender teams, where they exist, can support these efforts. The role of gender components in peacekeeping operations and the way in which Civil Affairs Officers work with them is described in [section 3.1](#).

Cultural sensitivity requires understanding and consideration of prevailing beliefs, norms, traditions, attitudes and practices when planning and implementing activities and interacting with communities. Failure to consider the local cultural context can result in ineffective or irrelevant interventions and may damage relations with local authorities and communities. Civil Affairs Officers often play a key role in ensuring other mission actors understand the sociocultural contexts in which they operate. Being culturally sensitive does not, however, imply uncritical assumptions that all "local" or "traditional" structures, mechanisms or processes are inherently good. In some instances local customs or practices may run contrary to other principles, such as equality, inclusiveness or human rights. For example, the customary justice mechanisms in a number of countries have failed to protect women and girls from gender-based violence. In Sierra Leone, the peacekeeping mission's gender team focused on sensitizing local chiefs to the issue and promoting harmonization between customary justice and statutory laws, which offer better protection for women and girls. While Civil Affairs Officers may face slightly different challenges, this example demonstrates how working with traditional authorities can help to ensure a culturally

sensitive approach while adhering to UN principles. Working closely with local partners (local authorities, civil society organizations, community leaders etc.) and seeking guidance from national staff is essential in balancing a commitment to cultural sensitivity with other UN principles the implementation of mandated tasks.

Sensitivity to gender, diversity and culture is important in all areas of civil affairs work and should be mainstreamed from planning through to implementation and reporting. For example:

- **In consulting local communities and gathering information** on perceptions, needs and concerns (**chapter 9**), civil affairs should consider, where appropriate, undertaking additional separate consultations with the youth and elders, and with men and women. This can allow those whose voices are usually excluded from the public realm to be heard.
- **In analysing information and reporting** (**chapter 9**), civil affairs should disaggregate data according to age, gender, ethnicity, religion etc. as and when relevant to the context, conflict or planned intervention.
- **In conducting a conflict analysis** (**chapter 8**), Civil Affairs Officers should consider how diversity and gender identity have featured in the conflict and develop an understanding of the experiences, priorities and grievances of different groups.
- **In conflict management** (**chapter 10**), civil affairs should be mindful of cultural attitudes and practices towards conflict and reconciliation and consider traditional conflict mitigation and management mechanisms.
- **In supporting the development of political space and the restoration and extension of state authority** (**chapter 10** and **chapter 11**), civil affairs can support the participation of women and cultural/ethnic minorities in civil administration, including their appointment as community or government leaders.
- **In protection of civilians** (**chapter 4**), civil affairs should consider how issues of gender and diversity interact with risk and vulnerability and think about the role different groups play in early warning and prevention.
- **In enabling local actors** (**chapters 9 to 12**), civil affairs should map organizations or networks that represent minorities or marginalized groups and assess the key issues they are working on, the role they play in decision-making and the level of influence or capacity they have.
- **In recruiting a team** (**chapter 7**), civil affairs managers should, to the extent possible, consider gender and diversity when building teams.
- **Through reporting and briefing** (**chapter 9**), civil affairs can help other mission components (uniformed and non-uniformed) to understand the sociocultural context and operations, and help them to promote a culturally sensitive approach.
- **In the implementation of QIPs** (**chapter 12**), civil affairs can support projects that feature marginalized groups as beneficiaries or implementing partners, as one aspect of building confidence in the mission, mandate and peace process. Projects themselves should, where possible, be sensitive to gender and diversity issues.

### 5.3. Local ownership

Recovery from conflict is primarily a national challenge and internal factors will largely shape its pace, progress and outcome. The merits of a locally owned process can include: sustainability; context and cultural appropriateness; local capacity development; minimizing or preventing dependency; smoother mission transition or exit; and improved links between local and national peace efforts.

It is important to remember that local ownership is not an abstract concept, and cannot be discussed in the abstract. In supporting local ownership, Civil Affairs Officers should start by asking “ownership of what and by whom?” This will affect the way in which Civil Affairs Officers put this principle into operation. Broadly speaking, local ownership refers to the extent to which domestic actors are involved in the priority-setting, decision-making, design and implementation of key activities and processes.

Civil Affairs Officers should be aware of the various perspectives that exist about local ownership and what it involves, including the level of inclusiveness it implies and who are defined as the “local owners”. For example, local ownership is sometimes conflated with government and political elites, which may exclude civil society or public engagement. Other commentators take a broader view of the concept and prefer to use the terms “insiders” and “outsiders” as a means to better capture the notion that nationals of a country may still be considered outsiders in certain communities or regions.<sup>27</sup> The “New Deal for engagement in fragile states”, introduced in [section 4.1](#), represents a shift towards fragile and conflict-affected states taking the lead in determining how peacebuilding and statebuilding are approached in their countries. The New Deal refers to “country ownership” and articulates a commitment to country-led plans, based on input from both state and non-state stakeholders and developed in consultation with civil society. Civil affairs should start by considering what local ownership means to local partners, at both the community and state level, within the countries in which they are deployed.

Civil Affairs Officers can play an important role in promoting ownership by local actors at various levels and in strengthening inclusive country ownership. They can help to promote discussion between stakeholders by facilitating consultation processes and providing a platform for local populations and constituencies to input into national processes and discussions. Through community outreach, civil affairs can provide information and promote public discussion about key issues, which can support popular engagement in national priority-setting. Civil affairs can also play an important role in helping to ensure the concerns and priorities of local communities,

<sup>27</sup> Béatrice Pouligny, “Local ownership”, in Vincent Chetail (ed.), *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon* (Oxford University Press, 2009).

including those whose voices may not usually be heard, are conveyed to the mission leadership and integrated, as far as possible, into operational plans.

### From the toolkit:



#### Putting local ownership into practice

While the approach will vary depending on the specific context and activity, there are some general good practices that can be applied.

- **Take a participatory approach and engage local actors at the earliest possible stage** through liaison, coordination and consultation, gathering information about needs and perceptions, and engaging local stakeholders in planning processes.
- **Channel information from the local level to mission headquarters** about local constituencies and marginalized populations' needs, concerns and priorities, and support the articulation of local grievances, interests and needs to inform national-level processes.
- **Tailor the approach to the specific context and the nature of the activity** by looking at local systems, structures, strengths, weaknesses and dynamics. Conduct regular analysis of the micro-level sociopolitical, economic and cultural context and calibrate the approach accordingly.
- **Value and make use of local or "insider" knowledge and expertise**, including that of National Professional Officers and local counterparts.
- **Avoid undermining local capacity by "doing" or "replacing" rather than enabling:** identify and build on existing processes and structures (informal and formal).
- **Guard against bringing preconceived ideas or assumptions about what the problems or solutions are**, for example by conducting joint assessments with local counterparts, by asking local stakeholders what they consider their needs or capacity gaps to be, or what they believe are the root causes of and solutions to conflict.

Box 5.2 From the toolkit: Putting local ownership into practice

### *Challenges of ensuring local ownership*

It is also important for Civil Affairs Officers to be aware of the complexities around local ownership and the tensions that can arise when putting the principle into practice. Being aware of the potential challenges and of some possible strategies to mitigate them can help Civil Affairs Officers avoid some of the pitfalls.

**There may be numerous and/or conflicting local voices.** Societies and communities comprise different groups and actors with numerous, sometimes divergent, priorities, needs and concerns. These differences can cause conflicts and/or be compounded

by conflict. Depending on the nature of the conflict, post-conflict settings can be characterized by mistrust between the government and its citizens, tensions between communities or groups, and polarization and/or politicization of civil society actors. In some instances, the practices or priorities of key local players may run contrary to UN principles, international norms or the interests of other actors. Civil Affairs Officers may be faced with difficult dilemmas in supporting locally owned processes while adhering to core UN principles or international norms. Understanding and being sensitive to these complexities is a fundamental part of civil affairs work. Careful analysis of the local context (see [section 8.1](#)), engaging with a wide range of actors (see [section 9.1](#)), and making use of “insider” knowledge are all crucial in supporting local ownership while avoiding bolstering one party to the detriment of another.

**Being “all-inclusive” can slow down the process and damage confidence.** While the principle of local ownership should never be suspended, the approach and degree of inclusiveness may have to be calibrated to the specific context. The World Bank’s *World Development Report 2011* introduces the idea of “inclusive enough” coalitions being important for confidence-building, in that national support for change is needed among relevant stakeholders (government, community leaders, civil society and so on), but it asserts that these coalitions do not need to be “all-inclusive” in order to generate enough confidence for progress to be made. Some commentators assert that an oversimplistic prescription for local ownership in fragile post-conflict environments can even damage peace efforts.<sup>28</sup> While there are no hard and fast rules regarding the degree of inclusiveness, conducting detailed analysis of the context and adapting the approach to the specific activity is an important starting point.

**Local actors may seem to lack capacity and/or willingness.** In the immediate aftermath of conflict, local authorities and civil society actors may have diminished material or human resources and lack capacity. In some cases, the mission is required to temporarily assume certain functions, either directly as in the case of transitional administration, or in support of the state.<sup>29</sup> In these cases, the mission mandate is often orientated towards restoring and developing local capacity. Any efforts to support local capacity development should start with a detailed assessment of local systems, structures, strengths, weaknesses and dynamics, and Civil Affairs Officers should make an effort to understand what local actors consider their capacity gaps or barriers to taking full ownership. This will help to develop an approach that neither assumes that local capacity is “weak” or “non-existent” nor that local actors have the resources or political will to coalesce around common goals.

<sup>28</sup> Dan Smith, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together*, overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding (Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004).

<sup>29</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (“Capstone Doctrine”, 2008), pp. 38–39.

## VOICES FROM THE FIELD

Name: **Maud Ropars**

Civil Affairs Officer,  
MONUC/ MONUSCO:  
2006–2012

***“How do you enable the work of local actors without taking over?”***

*In 2007 I was in charge of creating and managing a new civil society pillar for MONUC civil affairs section in DRC in support of our 16 field offices. Coordination among civil society organizations (CSOs) is now better organized at both the national and local level and CSOs are recognized as key actors by the government, the mission, UN agencies and international partners. However, this hasn't been an easy path!*

*It takes time to ensure local ownership, to promote sustainability and to avoid setbacks, particularly around election times when politics may divide CSOs that have recently regrouped under common thematic or development objectives. CSOs are young in DRC and 60% were created after 2000. Due to a lack of capacity and resources, CSOs requested support from the mission to help them to play a role in development, alongside government institutions, and to advocate for good governance practices.*

*To avoid working with self-declared civil society “presidents” and to better identify representative CSOs, we created a detailed nationwide database. This database of 3,000 CSOs is now recognized as extremely useful by CSOs themselves, as well as international organizations and donors.*

*Together with eight donors and thanks to the logistical assets of the mission, we supported the organization of the very first civil society national symposium in 2009. This led to the signature of a civil society charter of ethics and to the creation of 20 thematic groups at national and provincial level. However, the process wasn't easy and fights over leadership impeded the process at times. While it may have been easier to choose participants and organize the forum ourselves, we decided to let civil society find solutions and overcome their differences. At critical points, we supported mediation efforts carried out by religious leaders and the Ministry of Planning. The symposium was eventually a success and all the main CSO platforms were involved. Today, almost all the CSO platforms claim to have been instrumental in the success of the symposium.*

*Aside from this particular initiative, thanks to the presence of civil affairs across the country, we have been instrumental in conveying and gathering information to and from civil society and organizing training sessions and forums involving both civil society and the government. We are able to gather information on the concerns of civil society about the upcoming elections, and to support the national electoral commission and the mission in overcoming difficulties as they arise. This has helped us to prevent local conflicts and stay informed about the situation on the ground.*

*I'm happy to see that civil society is now a key partner of the government and the international development community. CSOs are involved in all civil affairs activities and are consulted by the senior mission management and high-level visitors regarding the mission mandate. Two donors recently decided that the growing maturity of CSOs in DRC should be supported. They created a basket of funds for CSO projects which will continue to support local ownership even after the mission withdraws.*

Box 5.3 Voices from the field: “How do you enable the work of local actors without taking over?”

## 5.4. “Do No Harm” and conflict-sensitive approaches

As discussed above, sensitivity to the local context is essential in facilitating local ownership. Similarly, understanding how the peacekeeping presence and activities interact with local dynamics is critical to mitigating any unintended negative impacts of the mission. There is often an impulse to assume that – if intentions are benevolent – then the impacts of our actions will necessarily be positive. Yet, with the complexity of the conflict environments in which peacekeeping missions deploy, the actions or the mere presence of peacekeepers can be harmful to the local society and to the broader peace process. While these adverse impacts may be referred to as unintended consequences, it is still very much the responsibility of peacekeepers to consider, anticipate and mitigate them. As the primary interface between local communities and the mission, civil affairs often plays an important role in monitoring and reporting on the unintended consequences of mission operations, in terms of social, economic and environmental impacts.

The “Do No Harm” concept outlined in Mary Anderson’s book of the same name in 1999 highlights the importance of understanding how international assistance interacts with local conflict dynamics. It is based on a hypothesis that interventions, such as humanitarian aid, can have positive and negative impacts on conflict dynamics.<sup>30</sup> While much of the “Do No Harm” guidance relates to humanitarian aid, many of the principles can be applied to a range of international interventions, including peacekeeping. For example, the influx of foreigners working for international organizations affects prices, wages and profits in the local economy and may be accompanied by inflation in housing and staple goods, sometimes enriching war-related sectors of the economy. Disproportionate distribution of resources, through QIPs or other types of support provided by peacekeeping missions, may exacerbate conflict where it overlaps with the divisions represented in the conflict. Furthermore, peacekeeping missions can inadvertently cause environmental damage to local communities through, among other things, putting additional pressure on already scarce natural resources, such as water. Failure to mitigate the negative environmental impacts of peacekeeping missions can create tension with local communities and may even exacerbate conflict.

The concept of “conflict sensitivity” emerged from “Do No Harm” and can be defined as the ability of an organization to understand both the context in which it operates and the interaction between the intervention and the context, and then to act upon this understanding, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How aid can support peace—or war* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).

<sup>31</sup> Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding: A resource pack (International Alert and Saferworld, 2004).

For civil affairs components, this means understanding how their work interacts with existing power relationships, customs, values, systems and institutions. A number of commentators have highlighted the importance of applying a conflict-sensitive approach to peacebuilding activities. Lessons drawn from the experience of peace practitioners are particularly useful for civil affairs. In *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners*, Mary Anderson et al. highlight how peacebuilding efforts can sometimes inadvertently fuel conflict in a number of ways. This includes, among other issues: a failure to recognize the depths of divisions; a misplaced assumption that simply bringing people together will automatically have a positive impact; re-enforcing unequal power relations by the choice of actors to include/exclude and the nature of their participation, or by supporting an unjust status quo etc.; arriving with preconceived ideas or models and failing to consult properly.<sup>32</sup> Conflict sensitivity, based on regular conflict analysis (see **chapter 8**), should be mainstreamed from planning, through to implementation and monitoring of activities.

## Recommended resources

<b>Name</b>	<b>DPKO Policy Directive Gender Equality in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2006)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Provides the basis for work on gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping operations.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/">http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Ten-year Impact Study on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in Peacekeeping (2010)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Looks at how effective peacekeeping missions have been in implementing the women, peace and security agenda across a number of thematic areas.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/recentwork.shtml">http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/recentwork.shtml</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>DPKO/DFS–DPA Joint Guidelines on Enhancing the Role of Women in Post-Conflict Electoral Processes (2007)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Provides guidance on how to increase the participation of women as voters, candidates, and electoral officials in post-conflict contexts.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/">http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/</a>

<sup>32</sup> Mary B. Anderson & Lara Olson, with assistance from Kristin Doughty, *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners* (Reflecting on Peace Practice Project/Collaborative for Development Action, 2003).



<b>Name</b>	<b>DPKO/DFS Guidelines Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations (2010)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Includes practical guidance on translating existing Security Council mandates on women, peace and security at strategic, operational and tactical levels. This guidance can help Civil Affairs Officers support the gender mainstreaming efforts of military components at the local level if relevant. Similar guidance exists for UN Police.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the Policy and Practices database on the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Béatrice Pouligny, “Local ownership”, in Vincent Chetail (ed.), <i>Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon</i></b>
<b>Description</b>	This chapter on local ownership looks at issues of local involvement, participation and empowerment in relation to peacebuilding.
<b>Source</b>	Oxford University Press (2009)
<b>Name</b>	<b>Mary B. Anderson &amp; Lara Olson, with assistance from Kristin Doughty, <i>Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners (Reflecting on Peace Practice Project/ Collaborative for Development Action, 2003)</i></b>
<b>Description</b>	This book is about the effectiveness of peace practice. It contains useful material on the unintended negative impacts of work to support peace, as well as on monitoring and improving effectiveness.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.cdainc.com/publications/rpp/confrontingwar/ConfrontingWar.pdf">http://www.cdainc.com/publications/rpp/confrontingwar/ConfrontingWar.pdf</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Timothy Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes”, <i>Peace and Change</i>, vol. 34, No.1 (2009)</b>
<b>Description</b>	This article looks at some of the dilemmas and challenges of local ownership in post-conflict peacebuilding.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this and other online journals via the POINT intranet: <a href="https://point.un.org/SitePages/eresearchpackage.aspx">https://point.un.org/SitePages/eresearchpackage.aspx</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Do No Harm Handbook (revised 2004)</b>
<b>Description</b>	This online handbook provides a framework for analysing the impact of assistance on conflict. It is a product of the Do No Harm Project (Local Capacities for Peace Project).
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.cdainc.com/dnh/docs/DoNoHarmHandbook.pdf">http://www.cdainc.com/dnh/docs/DoNoHarmHandbook.pdf</a>

<b>Name</b>	<b>Mary B. Anderson, <i>Do No Harm: How aid can support peace—or war</i></b>
<b>Description</b>	This book, which is based on lessons from the field, is about how aid and conflict interact. It is primarily targeted at humanitarian organizations, but is also applicable to development cooperation and peacebuilding.
<b>Source</b>	Lynne Rienner Publishers (1999)
<b>Name</b>	<b>Conflict Sensitivity Consortium</b>
<b>Description</b>	The Conflict Sensitivity Consortium website provides access to a range of data and resources on conflict sensitivity.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.conflictsensitivity.org">www.conflictsensitivity.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding (International Alert and Saferworld, 2004)</b>
<b>Description</b>	This online resources pack documents current practice, available frameworks and lessons learned in relation to conflict sensitivity.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/148">http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/148</a>

## Chapter 6 | The Civil Affairs Officer



*This chapter looks at the skills, attitudes and experience required to be a Civil Affairs Officer and at the conditions of work. The chapter aims to provide introductory guidance to help Civil Affairs Officers prepare for work in the field, cope with stress and manage expectations. The final section of this chapter discusses the importance of conduct and attitude for peacekeepers, including Civil Affairs Officers – both professionally and privately.*

### 6.1. The Civil Affairs Officer profile

While the work of Civil Affairs Officers varies from mission to mission, there is a specific combination of knowledge, attributes and skills required for the role. Civil Affairs Officers are expected to demonstrate the UN competencies in communication, teamwork, planning and organizing, accountability, creativity and client orientation. Managers at different levels are expected to demonstrate a variety of UN managerial competencies, including leadership, vision, empowering others, building trust,

managing performance and judgement/decision-making.<sup>33</sup> In addition to these standard UN competencies, officers and managers are expected to meet standards of professionalism that have been defined specifically for civil affairs work.

In 2010, the recruitment profiles for international civil affairs staff were updated, introducing three specializations in addition to a core profile. The core profile is that of an action-oriented problem-solver, able to build trust with local counterparts, coordinate and enable other actors, and conduct effective analysis. The three additional specializations require knowledge and expertise in:

- (i) Programme management;
- (ii) Conflict management; and
- (iii) Support to state institutions.

At the entry level (P2), would-be Civil Affairs Officers must have some basic field experience in addition to meeting the “core profile” criteria. From the P3 level upwards, Civil Affairs Officers are expected to acquire some knowledge of these additional specializations. At the P3 level, Civil Affairs Officers are expected to have at least one of these specializations and at the P4 level they are expected to have at least two. From the P5 level and above, programme management becomes a core requirement together with one of the other two specializations.

A centralized Civil Affairs Roster of staff from the P2 to the D1 levels is managed in the Field and Personnel Division of DFS at UN headquarters. Generic job vacancies are periodically posted and candidates are assessed to ensure that they meet the requirements for civil affairs work, after which they may be selected from the roster by hiring managers without further formal process.<sup>34</sup>

This work attracts practical and dedicated people who want to be actively engaged in communicating and helping to address problems. Civil Affairs Officers come from diverse professional backgrounds, including, among others, INGOs/NGOs, UN agencies or international organizations, public administration/local government, grass-roots or community groups. Many Civil Affairs Officers have served in several missions, and bring a wealth of experience with them to every new mission. Civil Affairs Officers often move between roles within the DPKO, the broader UN family and beyond. Some begin their careers as National Professional Officers (NPOs) in their own country and move on to

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<sup>33</sup> Further information about the UN competencies can be found in the Recommended resources section at the end of this chapter.

<sup>34</sup> The formal rules for staff selection are laid out in ST/AI/2010/3: Administrative Instruction: Staff Selection System, which can be found at <http://iseek.un.org/LibraryDocuments/1209-20100513022219853947.pdf>. A Standard Operating Procedure on application of this guidance in UN peacekeeping is forthcoming.

an international post in another mission. Civil Affairs Officers often have transferable skills, such as project and programme management, which allow them to move to UN agencies or other organizations. For those whose long-term professional interests lie in civil affairs, career progression may enable more senior staff to assume managerial or head of office coordination functions in addition to cultivating expertise in a specialized area.

Civil Affairs Officers tend to spend longer in a given mission and function than other substantive components. The relatively long period (on average three years)<sup>35</sup> that Civil Affairs Officers stay in post means that they often provide the institutional memory and continuity in relationships with local actors, and that they develop in-depth knowledge and understanding of the context. While this has significant benefits, in thinking about their career progression Civil Affairs Officers should also be mindful that, after many years in one mission, it may become more difficult to maintain “distance” and impartiality in relation to conflict issues and actors.

## 6.2. Conditions of civil affairs work

Civil affairs work is highly field-based with three-quarters of personnel stationed outside mission headquarters, often far away from the capital. The conditions of work can be a source of both significant challenges and rewards. The role often requires living and working in isolated – and sometimes insecure – areas with basic living conditions where access to material comforts, technological capacity, social and professional engagement is limited. In some cases, the choice of food staples and other supplies is constrained by what can be procured locally. These conditions can create a sense of isolation and may exclude Civil Affairs Officers from the kind of recognition and visibility that is often tied to proximity to mission headquarters, its leadership and decision-makers. At the same time, however, Civil Affairs Officers often earn the recognition and trust of key interlocutors – the host community. This field presence also enables Civil Affairs Officers to better understand local dynamics and is often central to their ability to build the credibility of the mission in the eyes of the population.

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<sup>35</sup> Figure from “Civil Affairs Guidance and Training Needs Assessment” (2008).

**VOICES FROM THE FIELD**

***“How would you describe the living and working conditions in a newly established field office?”***



Name: **Lino Sciarra**  
 Civil Affairs Officer,  
 UNMIL: 2003–2011  
 Civil Affairs Officer,  
 UNMIK: 2000–2001

*I was posted in Fishtown in Liberia, where the office had just opened and was functional but only at the most basic level. The office was based in a room made up of two prefab containers within the UNMIL compound. Aside from civil affairs and the Ethiopian battalion stationed there, only UNPOL and the Electoral Division had a presence in the region. It was so remote that there were no NGOs with international staff stationed there. From the first day of my assignment, I lived just outside the compound in a mud-and-sticks house without electricity or running water. In the absence of suitable accommodation, some colleagues were sleeping in their offices. During the two years I was stationed in Fishtown, I spent a lot of time and energy advocating for improvements to the security, living and working conditions of the compound. It was particularly difficult during the long rainy season from June to October when the roads became impassable.*

*In order to prepare for my deployment, I took with me a GPS system, portable satellite phone and IT equipment. I also had to equip my vehicle with the tools to survive should I be stranded given the extreme driving conditions. Overall, it was a significant personal and professional experience for me to be deployed to such a hardship and isolated duty station. The permanent presence of our team made a difference for the local population in such a neglected area and they were extremely grateful for our assistance.*

Box 6.1 Voices from the field: “How would you describe the living and working conditions in a newly established field office?”



**A Civil Affairs Officer from the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) facilitates a reconciliation conference in Dilling, south Khordofan, Sudan**

### 6.3. Managing stress

While the conditions outlined above can create a sense of solidarity among colleagues and between the mission and host community, they can also exacerbate stress. The uncertainty of working in a new cultural context and the pressure to work long hours with limited recreational options can make it difficult to maintain a work–life balance. Like other peacekeepers, Civil Affairs Officers often live and work with communities that have suffered significantly as a result of conflict and may be faced with requests for assistance that they have no capacity to meet. These and other factors can place significant stress on both individuals and teams. Living alongside colleagues who are subject to the same pressures can compound this and work-related stress can spill over into the personal lives of staff. While stress and anxiety are normal reactions, they can damage physical, mental and emotional well-being if left unchecked. It is important that Civil Affairs Officers recognize stress both in themselves and colleagues and develop mechanisms to minimize the negative impact on their happiness, health and ability to function properly.

#### From the toolkit:



#### Strategies for Stress Management

- Identify and, if possible, address the sources of stress
- Develop your time-management skills
- Get adequate rest and use your R&R regularly
- Eat regularly and, where possible, eat a well-balanced diet
- Avoid excessive use of alcohol, caffeine, nicotine
- Keep in touch with friends and family
- Pursue physical or creative activities, such as exercise or art/music
- Recognize the signs of stress and know your limit
- Seek help through contacting the staff counsellor in your mission or at headquarters in New York

Box 6.2 From the toolkit: Strategies for stress management<sup>36</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Content of the box was adapted from “Mission readiness: preparing for fieldwork” (United Nations Office of Human Resources Management, March 2005).

Peacekeepers often deploy within the context of ongoing instability and may also be exposed to situations that cause trauma.<sup>37</sup> Civil Affairs Officers may be especially vulnerable to trauma due to the unusual circumstances of their environment. Professional support from staff counsellors or other resources are recommended to cope with this. It is also important to remember that the host population, including local partners and national colleagues, may have experienced and witnessed deeply painful things over the course of the conflict. Frequently, experiences of trauma only emerge once it is safe for individuals to consider them.

### VOICES FROM THE FIELD

#### *“How do you manage stress and maintain a work–life balance while working in an isolated duty station?”*



Name: **Blandine Umurerwa**

Civil Affairs Officer,  
MINUSTAH

Civil Affairs Officer,  
MINURCAT: 2008–2010

*I served as the acting Head of the Office in the Goz Beida Regional Office of the mission in Chad. The duty station took a long time to fully set up because it was in an isolated area and the bad quality of the roads meant it was difficult to transport the materials needed to construct the base. The security situation was also unstable, with attacks from rebels recorded in the area many times, including against UN vehicles. We were not able to leave the base without an escort.*

*It was a stressful environment to live in, largely because it was impossible to find private accommodation outside the base. We all worked and lived in our office. We had to share rooms with colleagues – strangers – and we did not have enough rooms, nor enough water for our shower...*

*In fact, this was the toughest thing in the beginning... no daily shower!! However, after visiting the area, meeting with local authorities and listening to other UN agency colleagues, the stress did not affect me in the same way. Compared to the living conditions and suffering of the population in that region my problems began to seem minor and insignificant.*

*The most effective way that we found to manage stress was through parties that we organized on Saturday evenings. We invited our partners and clients, including UN agency personnel, NGO staff and local authorities. As well as helping to manage our stress, this also contributed to strong working relationships with our partners – everyone looked forward to meeting again the following weekend. Another key factor was being able to link to the outside world, and particularly with our families, through the use of PIN codes that enabled us to use the communications equipment.*

Box 6.3 Voices from the field: “How do you manage stress and maintain a work–life balance while working in an isolated duty station?”

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.



## 6.4. Managing your own expectations

In post-conflict settings, indigenous capacity is often severely depleted as a result of conflict. In the absence of infrastructure or capacity, ordinary tasks may take much longer to carry out. It is therefore critical that peacekeepers scale their own expectations for the completion of mandated tasks to the exigencies of post-conflict environments. Living and operating in a post-conflict environment requires a special temperament to cope with undue physical and emotional demands.

Different conceptions of time, poor or non-existent infrastructure, and frequent civil strife may all impinge upon the efficiency of Civil Affairs Officers in carrying out their tasks. Civil Affairs Officers, like local communities, may have unrealistically high expectations of what can be achieved and may get frustrated by slow progress. This can be particularly true of work that involves support to state institutions and governance, where progress is not measured in months but years or even decades. At times they may resent working with local interlocutors who appear to be less invested in positive change than the officers themselves. They may start believing that change is not possible and can become more passive and less consistent in pursuing the goals and objectives set in their workplan. This is something that Civil Affairs Officers need to be aware of and have to manage by recognizing and valuing even marginal progress over time.

## 6.5. Conduct and attitude

The professional and private conduct of peacekeepers can have a significant impact on the legitimacy and credibility of the mission. The line between professional and personal conduct can easily become blurred in small duty stations and field missions where individuals are highly visible. The nature of civil affairs engagement with local authorities and communities means that these components are particularly influential in shaping local perceptions of the mission. Civil Affairs Officers, like other peacekeepers, must therefore be conscious of the way they behave both on and off duty.

If the Security Council gives the legal basis for a mission's work, in many ways it is civil affairs that gives the work its legitimacy at the field level. In many places where mission field offices are set up, it is the first time that a community has experienced a large international presence. Part of the work of civil affairs is to overcome that distance and help convince the population that the disturbance to their lives is justified by the benefits that the mission can bring. Even in circumstances where peacekeepers are seen as life-savers, there is a need for permanent legitimization of the mission, which



**In a survey conducted in 2008, Civil Affairs Officers were asked what they considered the most important values, attitudes and approaches for civil affairs work. Below are some of the responses from the civil affairs community.**

- “Patience, impartiality, humility, flexibility and a positive results-focused attitude are essential.”
- “It is important to be genuinely committed to your task, the longer term objectives and to have a positive attitude.”
- “An authentic interest in and respect for local cultures and values.”
- “Taking an approach that focuses on the empowerment of local people and their ownership of the process is important.”
- “Professionalism, integrity and respect for diversity.”
- “Team spirit and consensus building.”
- “Open-mindedness, creativity, tenacity and a hardworking attitude.”
- “Willingness and energy to adapt and ‘go the extra mile.’”
- “Exemplary staff conduct within and outside working hours in order to project and maintain a positive image of the mission among local communities and external counterparts.”

is normally best done by regular contact and building up good relations with the local community – a role discussed in more detail in [chapter 9](#).

Many of the places where peacekeeping missions deploy had high poverty levels prior to the conflict, and these have often been exacerbated by the violence. It is important that Civil Affairs Officers are mindful of economic and other power differentials that may apply to the relationships between peacekeepers as assistance providers and the host population as beneficiaries, as well as between international and national personnel. To a certain extent, peacekeepers have the power to provide or renege security, to give or take away aid and to stay or evacuate when the situation escalates.<sup>38</sup> While power differentials between UN personnel and beneficiaries of UN assistance are often more apparent, differences also exist between international and national staff in terms of compensation and security. Although it may not be entirely possible to alter these dynamics, efforts can be made to be more sensitive to them by, for

<sup>38</sup> From “United Nations Pre-deployment Guide: An Introduction to Peacekeeping Operations” (forthcoming).

example, avoiding excessive displays of consumption and considering the security implications of your actions for national colleagues.<sup>39</sup> It is also important to be aware that relationships – whether emotional, financial or work-related – between staff members and the local communities they serve could be seen as potentially involving an abuse of power or a conflict of interest.<sup>40</sup>

Staff regulations and rules entitled “Status, basic rights and duties of United Nations staff members” outline the “code of conduct” for UN personnel. If UN personnel act with impropriety or impunity it may damage the credibility of the mission in the eyes of local people. Furthermore, failure to hold UN personnel accountable for their actions also sets a poor model for countries working hard to re-establish the rule of law.<sup>41</sup> Demonstrating understanding of and respect for local laws, norms, customs and practice is essential in maintaining credibility and establishing a mutually respectful relationship between the mission and the host community. This includes adhering to the UN code of conduct and core values (integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity) and abiding by local laws. The importance of impartiality and of sensitivity to gender, culture and diversity in civil affairs work are discussed in more detail in [chapter 5](#).

## 6.6. Information and training for Civil Affairs Officers

While this Handbook is intended both as an induction for new Civil Affairs Officers and as a reference guide, it is inevitable that questions and situations will arise for which it cannot offer guidance. Fortunately, however, there is an active guidance and support network available for Civil Affairs Officers to tap into in order to share experiences, learn best practices and seek peer support. The Civil Affairs Network, comprising more than 650 members, is an online forum where training events, queries from the field, relevant literature and best practices are shared. Anyone with a UN email address can join the Civil Affairs Network by sending an email to the address in the [Recommended resources](#) section at the end of this chapter.

The civil affairs team in the Policy and Best Practices Service (PBPS) facilitates the network and is also available for policy, advisory and advocacy support for civil affairs components. Civil Affairs Officers are encouraged to take an active role in capturing and sharing good practice and lessons learned from their own experiences. There are a number of other online networks with cross-cutting relevance to civil affairs (for

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> “Working together: Putting ethics to work” (Ethics Office, United Nations Office of Human Resources Management).

<sup>41</sup> From “United Nations Pre-deployment Guide: An Introduction to Peacekeeping Operations” (forthcoming).



Civil affairs skills training and training of trainers in Gbarnga, Liberia, 2011

example, protection, DDR, integrated mission planning and mediation, among others) that may be of interest. All of these online networks, along with a wealth of internal documents, policies and reports, can be found on the DPKO intranet.

Finally, there are both generic and specialized skills training programmes for civil affairs. In 2009–10, a new approach to training civil affairs components was developed and introduced. The training focuses on a range of key skills including: conflict analysis; strategic planning; negotiation, mediation and facilitation; mobilization and coordination; and encouragement and support for local actors (state and civil society). Training is delivered in-mission, using participatory methodology with case studies and exercises that focus on the country context, the mandate and the challenges of civil affairs work in that specific context. Components are trained as a team and modules are tailored specifically to the implementation of the annual workplan of the unit, contributing to team-building and coherence of effort. Sometimes the training is linked up to the component's annual retreat, so that the tools can be used to facilitate joint analysis and planning. Specialized training for QIP programme managers was also launched in 2010.

As budgets allow, Civil Affairs Officers can also avail themselves of other training opportunities offered through partner training institutions in topics such as reconciliation, conflict management and protection of civilians. The Integrated Mission

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Training Centre (IMTC) is a good starting point to enquire about potential training opportunities, as well as the UN System Staff College (UNSSC). Also, as noted above, joining the Civil Affairs Network is a good way to get information about relevant training institutes as well as upcoming courses. Finally, there are a wealth of online resources available, including an extensive collection of web-based skills development courses for UN staff on SkillPort (referenced below) allowing staff to develop their competencies at their own pace.



**UNMIL civil affairs role-playing during in-mission skills training and training of trainers event in Gbarnga, Liberia, 2011**

## Recommended resources

<b>Name</b>	<b>The Ethics Office</b>
<b>Description</b>	Information and guidance on ethics can be accessed via the Ethics Office page on iSeek. Resources include the UN code of ethics (draft 2008) and a guide to putting ethics into practice entitled “Working together: Putting ethics to work”.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this via iSeek, the UN Secretariat intranet: <a href="http://iseek.un.org">http://iseek.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Status, basic rights and duties of United Nations staff members (ST/SGB/2002/13)</b>
<b>Description</b>	UN “code of conduct” document that outlines the formal rules about how UN staff should behave.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via iSeek, the UN Secretariat intranet: <a href="http://iseek.un.org">http://iseek.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Staff Counsellor</b>
<b>Description</b>	The Staff Counsellor’s office home page contains details of counselling services and resources for UN personnel.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access staff counselling resources under the topics “health and wellness” on iSeek, the UN Secretariat intranet: <a href="http://iseek.un.org">http://iseek.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Civil Affairs Network</b>
<b>Description</b>	The library and discussion forum are full of information about the work done by civil affairs components in missions. The online network is also a place where all Civil Affairs Officers can ask for information or share ideas.
<b>Source</b>	People with a UN email address can request access to this network by emailing: <a href="mailto:dpko-civilaffairsnetwork@un.org">dpko-civilaffairsnetwork@un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Civil affairs in-mission skills training package</b>
<b>Description</b>	Guidance for missions preparing to organize skills training as well as a manual for trainers, including PowerPoint presentations that accompany the modules.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the civil affairs page on the POINT intranet: <a href="https://point.un.org/SitePages/civilaffairs.aspx">https://point.un.org/SitePages/civilaffairs.aspx</a>

## United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support

<b>Name</b>	<b>UN Competency Development – A Practical Guide</b>
<b>Description</b>	Sets out the key competencies required for UN work, and provides practical guidance for staff members on how to develop them.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.un.org/staffdevelopment/DevelopmentGuideWeb/image/OHRM_CDG.pdf">http://www.un.org/staffdevelopment/DevelopmentGuideWeb/image/OHRM_CDG.pdf</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>SkillPort</b>
<b>Description</b>	An online training resource available to UN staff with many courses to help them develop their skills. Can be used directly or in conjunction with the UN Competency Development guide above.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="https://un.skillport.com">https://un.skillport.com</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC)</b>
<b>Description</b>	The website contains details of all (online and face to face) UNSSC courses, seminars and workshops.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.unssc.org/home/">http://www.unssc.org/home/</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>The Peacekeeping e-Research Package</b>
<b>Description</b>	Provides peacekeeping staff at headquarters and in field missions with access to a common set of online databases for international affairs, global news, country profiles and analysis of geopolitical dynamics.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this via the POINT intranet: <a href="https://point.un.org/SitePages/eresearchpackage.aspx">https://point.un.org/SitePages/eresearchpackage.aspx</a>

## Chapter 7 | Managing civil affairs components



*This chapter considers the role of civil affairs managers, from heads of component to team leaders. It discusses some of the challenges of undertaking a management role in complex peacekeeping environments. The chapter looks at some key areas of management, including communicating vision, managing information and staff management.*

The complexities of operating as a manager within a UN operation are enormous. These are large and yet temporary organizations, operating within environments that are often volatile, unpredictable and dangerous. They are not just multicultural working environments, but organizations that bring together a combination of civilians, police and military – often with entirely different working cultures, and from a variety of different backgrounds. The tasks that these organizations are mandated to perform are complex and ambitious. Missions usually don't have significant programme resources to employ and often work with international partners that have unpredictable funding arrangements, further complicating planning processes.

Since they have not usually had the time to develop optimally functional structures and processes, missions are highly dependent on individuals – and in particular the senior



management team – for effectiveness and decision-making. Yet high turnover and lengthy recruitment procedures often result in vacancies, including in key positions. Missions are also governed by strict personnel and financial procedures but with a substantive guidance framework that, although growing, is not yet complete.

Despite these challenges, UN missions present enormous opportunities to have a positive and far-reaching impact on the lives of vast numbers of people in critical situations. In this context, what are needed are not just managers who can apply sound management techniques, but those who have the creativity and flexibility to navigate situations of extreme complexity and apply those management techniques in very unusual contexts. The Head of Civil Affairs plays a vital role in terms of strategic leadership and operational oversight for the component, contributing to the overall strategic vision of the mission and ensuring that civil affairs work is integrated into the work of the mission and the broader UN effort. These tasks require managers with considerable skill and experience in relationship-building, strategy development and staff management.

Other managers within the component also play a vital role, often leading small teams in isolated conditions. Civil Affairs Officers leading a team in a field or sub-field office, regardless of their grade, have an important role in managing the colleagues in their teams. Often it is managers at this level that have the most difficult task – that of translating the very broad objectives of Security Council mandates into operational reality on the ground. Strong skills and consistent application of good practice in planning and in staff, resource and information management are key.

## 7.1. Developing vision and matching it to resources

The DPKO/DFS Policy on Civil Affairs is extremely broad, providing parameters for the work but essentially allowing civil affairs components the flexibility to respond to the needs dictated by mandates and evolving contexts. This means that the Head of Civil Affairs needs to develop, and continually refine, a coherent vision for what the component can do in a specific context – as well as ensuring that the resources are there to deliver it. **Chapter 8** suggests possible ways to approach analysis and planning in support of this vision.

One of the key functions of civil affairs leadership is to help the component as a whole to forge an agreed workplan that fits into the mission's overall goals and maintains a level of coherence at national level, while also allowing sufficient flexibility at the local level for field teams to adapt the programme to the specificities of their area. Without this basic coherence, it is difficult for the field teams to mutually enrich each other's work and what can sometimes result is simply a set of discrete local programmes.

## VOICES FROM THE FIELD



Name: **David Harland**

Executive Director, Centre  
for Humanitarian Dialogue

Head of Civil Affairs,  
UNPROFOR / UNMIBH:  
1993–1998

***“How did you refocus the work of the component in the face of evolving needs?”***

*During the war in Bosnia (1992-1995), civil affairs had been the United Nations’ tool for understanding the dynamics of the conflict, for advising the military, and for negotiating much of what had to be negotiated. It was civil affairs, for example, that negotiated the package that partially restored water, gas and electricity to Sarajevo, saving thousands of lives.*

*The 1995 Dayton peace agreement left a complicated and sometimes bitter peace: politics as the continuation of war by other means, as someone put it. And in response to this, there was a need to reinvent the role of civil affairs.*

*There was still a role for political analysis and for negotiation – civil affairs, for example, negotiated the size, numbers and ethnic composition of the police forces that would have primary responsibility for security in the fragile post-war period. More and more, however, civil affairs needed to be skilled not just to negotiate, but to conceive, develop and oversee key “cogs” in the machinery of peace. We needed to map the clandestine power structures within the police, to identify the sources of illicit funding, to intercede with neighbouring countries to block those sources, to establish and operate vetting procedures to bring in new blood, and to work with the entities to build a police apparatus.*

*So, the civil affairs component needed to keep its capacity for analysis and negotiation, but at the same time to rapidly balance that with a broader set of capacities, both operational and administrative. In order to achieve this, my focus as a manager was on developing mixed teams of people with the right collective combination of analytical, political, administrative and project-management skills.*

*These new mixed-skill teams proved to be an invaluable resource in devising and implementing (together with the Office of the High Representative) a joint, random-numbered vehicle registration plate system to secure freedom of movement between heavily ghettoized post-war enclaves of Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats. Making this happen required a capacity not only to analyse how nationalist extremists controlled movement, but also to conceive and implement programmes to undo that control. The re-establishment of freedom of movement remains one of the principal achievements of the post-war period in Bosnia.*

Box 7.1 Voices from the field: “How did you refocus the work of the component in the face of evolving needs?”

With rapid changes in operating environments, the vision and corresponding plan for the work of civil affairs components needs to be able to evolve quickly. However, the machinery to deliver human or financial resources in support of it usually moves more slowly and managers may need to find ways to navigate this challenge, as discussed in **box 7.1**.

### Operational resources

In addition to finding ways to respond to the environment as it shifts, planning ahead is extremely important, as discussed in the next chapter. In particular it is important that civil affairs managers ensure that the basic programme costs for the component are budgeted for well in advance, in terms of activities such as workshops, training events, travel, consultancies and the organization of public perception surveys. Operational requirements should be communicated by the Head of Civil Affairs to the budget officer for inclusion in the Results-based Budget (RBB) through the established coordination mechanism in each mission. (In most cases this will be through the office of the Chief of Staff.)



Note that operational costs are not included in the RBB under components, but are grouped by category of cost.

This means that once budgets have been approved, the component will need to follow up with the budget office to ensure that they have access to the funds requested. Given that the resource requirements are formulated at a very early stage, i.e. up to two years in advance, operational priorities may change and require the mission to adjust allocation of resources. It is therefore very important that civil affairs components have a record of their initial budget requests and are either able to show that these continue to match the current priorities of the mission, or that the request has been changed to align with the new priorities.

### Staff recruitment

The recruitment of staff can be a time-consuming process, but investing sufficient resources in this is essential if the component is to perform effectively. International staff from the P2 to D1 levels can be selected from a centralized Civil Affairs Roster, managed from New York by the Field Personnel Division (FPD) within DFS.<sup>42</sup> Candidates that have been cleared for this roster will have passed an assessment process to ensure that they meet the requirements for civil affairs work, and thus can be selected by hiring managers without further formal process.

The Occupational Group Manager (OGM) for Civil Affairs within FPD is an invaluable resource for civil affairs managers in helping to identify a shortlist of rostered candidates with the right set of skills for their vacant post. Contact details for the OGM can be found in the **Recommended resources** section. The more detail that

<sup>42</sup> The formal rules for staff selection are laid out in ST/AI/2010/3: Administrative Instruction: Staff Selection System, which can be found at <http://iseek.un.org/LibraryDocuments/1209-20100513022219853947.pdf>. A Standard Operating Procedure on application of this guidance in UN peacekeeping is forthcoming, and guidelines for hiring managers are also anticipated.

managers are able to provide about the skill set required for a particular post, the more precise the match likely to be identified by the OGM. Maintaining close contact with the OGM, including by keeping them abreast of projected needs, will help the OGM to conduct outreach and ensure that the roster is populated with people with the right combination of skills that are likely to be needed within each component.

The maintenance of a high-quality global roster for civil affairs work relies significantly on the support provided by civil affairs components in missions. It is serving Civil Affairs Officers that make up the “expert panels” that are periodically formed to assess and interview prospective candidates for the roster. This means that civil affairs managers will occasionally be requested to release some of their best staff to form expert panels. Although this might be perceived as an inconvenience at the time, the quality of the roster depends above all on the quality of these panels, so managers can expect to significantly benefit down the line when accessing the roster to fill positions in their teams.

Beyond the Civil Affairs Roster itself, the recent review of civilian capacities identifies potential alternative mechanisms for accessing expertise in specialized areas through partnerships rather than traditional staff hires. For example, it may be possible to approach UN Member States to provide personnel as experts on mission (as is currently done for UN police) in areas such as public administration. The OGM and the civil affairs team in the Policy and Best Practices Service at headquarters are a good place to start exploring these possibilities.

In conclusion, it is important to remember that in most situations, the total resources – financial and human – available to civil affairs will still be inadequate to meet the size of the tasks at the local level. Many civil affairs field offices will consist of a couple of staff confronted by complex disputes over a large geographical area with difficult communications and limited access to up-to-date information about the environment. The only way really to overcome this disconnect is for civil affairs managers to encourage staff to work hand in hand with all units present in the field office, including political affairs, human rights, child protection, women’s officers, public information and of course the military component. Formal information-sharing mechanisms are important in this, however, they tend only to be really effective if the different sections actually integrate their work.

## 7.2. Communicating vision and managing information

Given that the specific focus of civil affairs components will vary from mission to mission, and that it is also likely to change over time in any given context, it can sometimes be difficult for partners to fully understand the role and contribution of these components. Therefore, in addition to having a clear vision for the work of the component, around which financial and human resources are mobilized, managers also need to have a clearly articulated message about this vision, consistently delivered to partners from the Senior Management Team to representatives of the UNCT to local and national partners.

It is important that managers are able to comprehend, and persuasively communicate, the versatility of civil affairs. Being versatile does not mean that civil affairs components are there to perform any task that comes along, but rather that they are a valuable and unique resource, which can be used strategically to respond to evolving needs.

Managing the day-to-day information flow and ensuring that staff have the guidance that they need is just as important as effectively communicating the big-picture role that the component plays. As discussed on [page 39](#), civil affairs components usually report through the political side of the mission, but can report through either the DSRSG Political or the DSRSG/RC/HC, depending on the context. Similarly, there are a variety of different reporting arrangements for civil affairs staff in regional and local field offices. Despite these differences, the need for excellent information-sharing and management is common to all missions, and is a key responsibility for civil affairs managers, both at mission headquarters and in the field.

This means that managers have the responsibility to:

- Identify key stakeholders for civil affairs information and analysis, and determine what format they need it in;
- Ensure that civil affairs staff members are given clear guidance on what information and analysis to produce and how to present it;
- Determine what information and analysis civil affairs staff need from other stakeholders; and
- Institute and monitor effective arrangements for the flow of information in both directions, so that local level information and intervention is fully integrated into mission-wide analysis and strategies.

It is the central-level civil affairs office that needs to be able to take all of the reporting from the local level and synthesize it into a coherent picture of what is happening countrywide, as well as to analyse it for trends and interpret what local-level events mean for the national-level process. Civil affairs managers need to be able to

present this information and analysis to the right people and structures at mission headquarters in a digestible format, and they need to be able to reflect the big picture back to the local level.

Another aspect of information management, often overlooked, is that of ensuring institutional “memory”. Peacekeeping missions see a relatively high turnover of staff, and often people arrive with no information about what has been done beforehand. Managers have a responsibility to ensure that systems for records management are in place and observed.<sup>43</sup>

### 7.3. Team leaders and field offices

Civil Affairs Officers deployed as team leaders of civil affairs units in field offices at the regional or local level have many of the responsibilities outlined in the other sections of this chapter, but also often have to juggle different reporting lines, priorities and instructions. Where they also head up local or regional offices they may have additional managerial responsibilities beyond the scope of the civil affairs work. This may include coordinating the work programmes of other substantive components as well as administrative responsibilities such as staff movement approvals, rotation, leave approval and so on. For the heads of these local or regional offices, the exact responsibilities will be spelled out in a Terms of Reference in each mission.<sup>44</sup> There can be advantages for civil affairs components in playing this role, however, there can also be disadvantages in that competing demands may be made on the staff member that detract from their substantive role. The answer to this conundrum, as elsewhere, consists in good planning, discussed in [chapter 8](#).

There are yet other cases in which the regional head of office is not drawn from within the civil affairs component. Reporting lines differ depending on the structure of the mission, but in these cases it is not uncommon for the civil affairs team leader to have the regional head of office as the first reporting officer and one of the senior Civil Affairs Officers in mission headquarters as the second reporting officer. Demands from both sides, in terms of setting day-to-day priorities or responding to particular situations, can lead to tensions or leave staff struggling to deliver to both supervisors. While these dynamics are clearly permeated by personal relationships and the ability to reach satisfying agreements with all involved, the solution lies again in planning the work and resources efficiently.

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<sup>43</sup> Resources available on POINT (<https://point.un.org>) in this regard include the DPKO/DFS Peacekeeping File Classification Scheme (FCS), the DPKO/DFS Guidelines on the use of the Peacekeeping and Political Operations Retention Schedule (PORS) and ST/SGB/2007/6, the “Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Information sensitivity, classification and handling”.

<sup>44</sup> A number of sample Terms of Reference for heads of regional/local field offices are available on the library of the Civil Affairs Network.

**VOICES FROM THE FIELD**

Name: **Peggy Hicks**

Director of Global  
Advocacy, Human Rights  
Watch

Director, Office of Returns  
and Communities (Civil  
Affairs), UNMIK: 2002-2004

Civil Affairs Officer /  
Human Rights Adviser,  
UNPROFOR: 1995-1996

***“How did you deal with the fact that many of your staff reported to both you and to a regional head of office?”***

*When I was working as Director of the Office of Returns and Communities in Kosovo most of my staff worked in teams that were situated within the regional offices. It was very important that they were able to do their work in a way that supported the overall efforts of the mission to help minorities to return, but there were times when regional office heads were concerned that such work would undermine political work being done at the regional level. After a few occasions on which staff were pulled in different directions, I reached an agreement with the heads of regional offices that they would provide ‘operational’ level direction and that I would provide ‘policy’ direction. This essentially meant that they should direct the day-to-day operations of the teams, but that there were certain principles or approaches that should be consistently applied in their work, and that the objective of their work was clearly spelled out.*

*Another key thing I did was to jointly plan out, in consultation with the regional office, the activities that the teams would be involved in and what they would be trying to achieve over the course of the year. The evolving needs of the regional office meant that their work sometimes departed from this, but it did mean that there was a framework that they could reference when there were competing demands.*

*Regular meetings at which either entire teams or team leaders came to Pristina to share information with each other were invaluable, in terms of staff being able to understand how their work at the local level fitted into a broader effort across the mission area.*

*Finally, a huge part of my job involved managing relationships and troubleshooting problems as they came up, not only in terms of heads of regional offices but with the wide range of partners in the mission and beyond with whom good working relationships were essential if we were to achieve our objectives.*

Box 7.2 Voices from the field: “How did you deal with the fact that many of your staff reported to both you and to a regional head of office?”

At a minimum, a civil affairs team leader is responsible for contributing to civil affairs analysis and planning processes and to the elaboration of workplans in at least four ways:

- (i) Understand the national civil affairs workplan and adapt it to the regional context in developing the unit workplan;
- (ii) Feed into the overall civil affairs analysis through conflict analysis conducted at the regional level;
- (iii) Ensure that the civil affairs unit workplan is consistent both with the civil affairs national workplan and also the regional strategy set out by the head of office (which in some cases is formalized through regional action plans);

- (iv) Guide the Civil Affairs Officers in her/his team to develop an individual workplan that contributes explicitly to the implementation of the unit workplan.

Given the fact that civil affairs team leaders are often outside the capital, some of the burden of good communications with civil affairs leadership lies with them. Two of the most effective ways to do this are to ensure that the regional workplan is well understood by the mission headquarters and is coherent and consistent with countrywide priorities, and to ensure that the reporting and information that is provided from the local level is provided in as readable and useable a format as possible.

While team leaders are obviously accountable to their supervisors, they also have a responsibility to ensure that their team is able to clearly understand and implement their workplan and to deliver on the planned outputs. This is dealt with in more detail in the next section.

## 7.4. Managing staff

The comparative advantage of civil affairs tends to lie primarily in the presence of its staff countrywide. While it is rare that civil affairs components have programme resources beyond a few QIPs, there are few other international actors – if any – that enjoy the coverage that civil affairs has at the local level. The staff members themselves are the key strength and asset of the component.

It is important, therefore, that managers invest appropriate time and effort in ensuring that these staff members are operating as effectively as possible, and that they have all the support that they need. The primary tool for performance management is the individual workplan. Defining appropriate tasks for individuals, understanding where they fit into the work of the overall component and sharing responsibility for their performance are all key. However, good management goes much further than this. Managers at every level are responsible for coaching their staff, for building capacity and for ensuring consistency in the respect and implementation of organizational rules and procedures. These are not additional activities that managers should deal with when there is time; they are instead part of the daily routine of every manager and adequate time needs to be planned for them. One management style will not suit all staff and it is a manager's responsibility to understand which management style is most appropriate for each staff member, to entice the best performance out of them.

Managers do have a responsibility to uphold performance standards, including by addressing poor performance where this is a problem. In some cases this may simply involve better matching the strengths of an individual to their tasks. In all cases it entails a responsibility to develop the capacities and expand the skills of the staff



members that are being managed, as well as promoting understanding of the larger organizational goals in addition to those specific to civil affairs. It is the manager's responsibility to initiate and maintain a constant dialogue with staff to provide appropriate guidance and constructive feedback. A key responsibility of managers is performance appraisal, a vital mechanism for ensuring that staff are performing according to the highest standards set by the UN, and for recording good and bad performance in a consistent manner across the board. If managers overrate performance to avoid confrontation, this damages the ability of the organization to retain qualified and motivated staff and address underperformance.

There are cases in which consistent poor performance by a staff member will need stronger action. In September 2011 the Secretary-General made it mandatory for all managers and supervisors to undertake training on "Performance Management and Development Learning". The training aims to familiarize managers with the tools and procedures at their disposal to address underperformance through "remedial measures [that] may include counselling, transfer to more suitable functions, additional training and/or the institution of a time-bound performance improvement plan, which should include clear targets for improvement, provision for coaching and supervision by the first reporting officer in conjunction with performance discussions, which should be held on a regular basis".<sup>45</sup> If, despite all efforts, the staff member continues to underperform, administrative actions can then follow, including the non-renewal of a fixed-term appointment. The guide to managing poor performance mentioned in the **Recommended resources** section provides detailed guidance on how to deal with this.

There is a wealth of resources available to managers in honing their management skills, including those listed in the **Recommended resources** section below. However, it is worth noting that the conditions of civil affairs work do present some particular challenges.

- Many staff are working in isolated, difficult and sometimes dangerous conditions in which it is easy to burn out. Managers need to be aware of the stresses that staff face on a daily basis, be sensitive to how different people respond to these and to how stress can accumulate, and be ready to support if necessary. There are no hard and fast rules about the kind of solutions that will work in different contexts, however, communication is the first step to understanding what is going on with individual staff members. Good communication is particularly important after a crisis or incident, in which it can be very important to individuals that "the

<sup>45</sup> Administrative Instruction: Performance Management and Development System (ST/AI/2010/5, para. 10.1), <https://itsforreal.un.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/ST-AI-2010-5.pdf>.

## VOICES FROM THE FIELD



Name: **John Bevan**

Head of Civil Affairs,  
MONUSCO (then MONUC):  
2008–2009

Head of Civil Affairs,  
UNMIN: 2007

Head of Political Affairs,  
MINUSTAH: 2005-2006 and  
2010–2011

**“How do you address the challenge of managing widely dispersed teams?”**

*The first step for any CA manager is to try and create uniformity of understanding, approach and practice. This is made more challenging given that CA staff are typically thinly spread over vast geographical areas and operating in very different sociopolitical contexts.*

*A sense of belonging to a team with central backup is essential for colleagues working in isolated areas, and field offices should be encouraged to be in contact with each other directly to exchange experiences and lessons learnt.*

*If the problems of long-distance management are to be overcome, it is essential that induction training be given adequate time and resources to create a common understanding and sense of purpose. Equally, national retreats should be held as often as is practically possible with at least one annual meeting of all CA staff members. These annual events are a major investment in terms of time and energy.*

*My own experience of an all-staff retreat in DRC is that the event itself is much more productive if all staff have participated in the preparation. As is often the case, this meeting was aimed at planning a national workplan for CA. All 16 offices prepared detailed self-evaluations of their past year's work well in advance of the retreat and these were circulated in advance. This freed the meeting up from laboriously going through 16 individual reports and we could move almost immediately to planning future work based on a shared understanding of the team's overall successes and shortcomings in the previous period. The consolidated self-evaluations, for example, revealed a widespread concern over the impact of QIPs and the amount of time each office had to dedicate to them. If we had started cold at the meeting it would have taken hours simply to collect each office's experience and instead the time could be used for substantive discussions. The fact that all the offices had done a review of their own work and had shared it in advance with all those present made the event much more productive.*

Box 7.3 Voices from the field: “How do you address the challenge of managing widely dispersed teams?”

mission” (in the form of the manager) acknowledges what has happened and that it has had an impact on the staff member. Managers can also institute systems for the rotation of staff between different field offices and headquarters, in order to minimize the amount of time that staff spend in hardship locations. These systems cannot make everybody happy all of the time, but if instituted in a fair, transparent and predictable way (involving consultation with all stakeholders) then the majority of staff will accept the logic of them.

- A further challenge is the fact that staff tend to be widely dispersed around the country, and those that are further afield may not get much time with managers at headquarters or even with civil affairs staff in other parts of the country. While the head of component can rely to a certain extent on subordinate managers in

the field, ultimately it is an important investment to get to know the strengths and weaknesses of individual staff members as much as possible. The head of component should not only encourage and plan for vertical two-way communication with her/his staff, but should also nurture horizontal exchanges so that civil affairs staff working around the country can get to know each other. Annual retreats and more regular coordination meetings can be invaluable for this purpose, as can regional activities that bring together Civil Affairs Officers working on issues that have ramifications in more than one area of responsibility or that have common roots. Often these are the only times that many staff members get to interact professionally and socially with their immediate colleagues face to face, improving their understanding of common problems, but also of existing good practices and innovative approaches.

- Mandates tend to be quite broad and it can be difficult for staff on the ground to understand how to go about translating them into operational activity. As discussed above, managers need to provide a consistent vision for the work of civil affairs, as well as clear guidance and feedback on how to conduct this work at the local level. This vision needs to permeate the planning exercise and needs to be shared with other stakeholders, such as the heads of office or other mission components, that have a significant stake in civil affairs work.

## 7.5. Additional responsibilities

As discussed above, organizing annual retreats can serve a number of purposes. In addition to supporting the analysis and planning activities of components, retreats can also support the personal and professional well-being of staff members. They give staff the opportunity to develop personal contacts, meet colleagues in person, and overcome the communication barriers posed by chains of command and the absence of direct contact. Retreats need to be planned and budgeted at the central level in advance, which also means that they are something predictable that Civil Affairs Officers can look forward to.

As well as retreats, specific thematic working meetings can be arranged to bring staff members with particular responsibilities together to discuss a certain issue. In addition, managers should endeavour to carry out field visits to improve their understanding of the working environment and conditions under which their staff are performing. While field visits are often the first victim on busy and hectic schedules, managers should nevertheless make all possible efforts to establish a calendar of field visits and respect it.

Similarly, civil affairs managers are expected to participate in global meetings of Heads of Civil Affairs components from UN Field Missions, at which the overall work of these components can be discussed, support needs identified and good practice shared.

Encouraging the collection, sharing and use of good practice and lessons learned at all levels within the component is an important responsibility for civil affairs managers. Again, this is something that is all too easily forgotten with the many competing priorities that staff have to deal with, however, managers should encourage staff to join the online Civil Affairs Network and to actively participate, both sharing their own experiences and seeking ideas and information from others.

Providing opportunities to further improve professional skills is another critical responsibility for managers and this can be done by planning (and budgeting) for training activities within the mission or, less frequently, outside. Training is a precious resource which is in short supply and therefore managers have a responsibility to identify the most relevant needs – both in terms of staff expectations but also in terms of added value to the realization of the section’s goals – and the appropriate resources to address those needs. Internal and informal training can be organized by making use of the specific competences of individual staff members, whether within civil affairs or outside of it.

A tailored civil affairs skills training methodology has been developed to support civil affairs managers to train their staff with the limited resources that are available to them. This approach trains teams on the ground on the skills that they need for the implementation of their workplan for the year ahead. The training events are tailored, in that the civil affairs manager can decide which sets of skills are the priority for the group that will be trained (be it analysis, planning, reporting, negotiation etc.). The specific modules are also tailored to the context in which the team is working. Several missions have used these training events as planning, teambuilding and skills-building events all in one – bringing components together to jointly analyse their environment and plan their activities for the year ahead. Guidelines are available for civil affairs managers on how to plan and organize one of these events, as outlined in the **Recommended resources** section, and the civil affairs team at DPKO headquarters can also support with this.

The Integrated Mission Training Centre (IMTC) may also be well positioned to organize specific training modules and to support civil affairs in delivering them to their staff and/or to support more structured training strategies such as the in-mission skills training discussed above.

## Recommended resources

<b>Name</b>	<b>The Civil Affairs Roster</b>
<b>Description</b>	Managers can access profiles from the roster through the Occupational Group Manager for Civil Affairs in DFS, to whom they can also provide information about their projected staffing needs.
<b>Source</b>	The OGM can be reached at the following email address: <a href="mailto:civilaffairsog@un.org">civilaffairsog@un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>The Management Handbook: A Practical Guide for Managers in UN Field Missions (forthcoming)</b>
<b>Description</b>	A handbook under development by the International Peace Institute (IPI) to support the work of managers in UN Field Missions, looking at leadership, communication, managing people, security management, organization and coordination, decision-making and problem-solving, planning, project management, financial management, time management, knowledge management and evaluation.
<b>Source</b>	Will be available on the website of the IPI: <a href="http://www.ipinst.org">http://www.ipinst.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Managing Field Offices: Peacekeeping Practice Note</b>
<b>Description</b>	One of three studies looking at field offices in UN field missions. Provides a brief summary of some of the key considerations involved in managing local / regional level offices. The other two studies look at planning and setting up field offices.
<b>Source</b>	Available on the library of the Civil Affairs Network. People with a UN email address can request access to this network by emailing: <a href="mailto:dpko-civilaffairsnetwork@un.org">dpko-civilaffairsnetwork@un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Inspira: performance management and development</b>
<b>Description</b>	Website with many resources on performance management in the UN context, from official guidance to resources for managers to hone their managerial competencies, and advice and checklists on issues such as preparing for performance reviews.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="https://itsforreal.un.org/performance/">https://itsforreal.un.org/performance/</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Addressing and Resolving Poor Performance</b>
<b>Description</b>	A guide produced by the Field Personnel Division of DFS to support managers in dealing with poor performance, including communicating expectations and performance problems, providing an opportunity to improve and taking action.
<b>Source</b>	Available on the library of the Civil Affairs Network. People with a UN email address can request access to this network by emailing: <a href="mailto:dpko-civilaffairsnetwork@un.org">dpko-civilaffairsnetwork@un.org</a>

<b>Name</b>	<b>Tailored in-mission skills training for Civil Affairs Officers: Guidance for missions on planning and implementation</b>
<b>Description</b>	This is a guide for managers on how to plan and organize a tailored in-mission training event for civil affairs components. The modules and accompanying PowerPoint presentations are also available online.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the civil affairs page on the POINT intranet <a href="https://point.un.org/SitePages/civilaffairs.aspx">https://point.un.org/SitePages/civilaffairs.aspx</a>

## Chapter 8 | Analysis and planning



Civil affairs conducts an analysis and planning exercise in Kinshasa, DRC

*This chapter discusses the importance of analysis and planning for every aspect of civil affairs work, and gives an overview of the tools and processes relevant for analysis and planning in UN Field Missions. It provides basic models for conducting both analysis and planning exercises that can be adapted to the needs of Civil Affairs Officers and components.*

### 8.1. Conflict analysis

If the most important skill of a good Civil Affairs Officer were to be defined, it would most likely be his/her ability to understand the context in which s/he is deployed and to analyse the conflict dynamics that undermine the peace process. Conflict analysis is not the prerogative of a few analysts in JMAC or political affairs, but is the responsibility of every Civil Affairs Officer, whose analysis at the field level is often the basis for much of the overall conflict analysis carried out at the mission headquarters. If the basic facts and the interpretation of the local conflict dynamics are inaccurate, the overarching strategy of the mission to fulfil its mandate is likely to be misdirected. It is clear that

understanding and analysing the conflict is not a goal in itself, but instead a means to defining a strategy that can address the dynamics of the conflict and help to set the peace and stabilization process on solid ground. Civil affairs activities, like any activity, should be planned in such a way that feasible objectives are set out in advance based on clear analysis.

Civil affairs will clearly not be the only actor within the mission conducting conflict analysis, and it will not be the main one at the national level. However, analysis from the local level will feed into a complex stream of analysis by different internal and external actors within a post-conflict mission environment, sometimes carried out collaboratively and sometimes in parallel with each other. Civil Affairs Officers need to be aware of these analyses, especially the higher order analysis (for example, in an Integrated Strategic Framework) underpinning the mission mandate implementation strategy. If available and of good quality, higher order analysis can be a good starting point for civil affairs; however, general assumptions need to be tested in the field at the local level – and then fed back up. It makes sense for the civil affairs component, and also the units and field teams within the component, to carry out and maintain their own conflict analysis for the following reasons:

- To ensure a sufficient level of detail (for example about dynamics at the local level and between the local and national levels);
- To feed into and help refine the higher order analysis;
- To provide a reference framework to guide ongoing civil affairs reporting and analysis; and
- To provide the foundation for the development of strategic plans, as well as for updating them based on new information or an evolving understanding of the situation.

There are many different ways to conduct and write down an analysis. In any case, making the analysis explicit – rather than just assuming that everyone shares the same understanding – is extremely important in ensuring that everyone involved in implementing the plan understands it in the same way. The actual “process” of jointly conducting a conflict analysis and planning exercise, for example at the component annual retreat, can also be an excellent way of ensuring that everyone is on the same page. A shared analysis of the conflict overall is a good reference point for individual Civil Affairs Officers or teams to carry out a more in-depth analysis of a particular issue, and to analyse the meaning or relevance of specific events or incidents as they occur.

### *Lessons learned on conflict analysis*

There are many different ways to approach conflict analysis. The section on analysis in this Handbook draws heavily on the lessons learned through the Reflecting on



Peace Practice Project (RPP), which is an experience-based learning process involving agencies with programmes that attempt to prevent or mitigate violent conflict. This section reproduces material from the RPP manual, with their permission, but adapted for civil affairs purposes.<sup>46</sup>

The RPP process revealed that there was no consistent practice or accepted methodology for conducting conflict analysis. Certain trends were noted, however:

- **Practitioners often do only partial analysis.** They focus on how their particular approach or area of interest might fit or be useful in the context, which can lead them to miss important aspects of the conflict or to develop misguided or irrelevant programmes.
- **Many people carry out context analysis, believing it to be conflict analysis.** A context analysis seeks a broad understanding of the entire political, economic and social (historical, environmental etc.) scene. A conflict analysis is more narrowly focused on the specific elements of that broader picture that may trigger or propel conflict.
- **Analysis is not updated.** Analyses are often performed only at the beginning of the programme and there is a lack of ongoing analysis, other than the natural process of noting events and changes.
- **Programming is not linked to analysis.** In a seeming contradiction, RPP found no clear link between a programme's effectiveness and whether or how it had performed conflict analysis. One explanation is that even when practitioners do analysis, they often fail to link their programme strategy to it. It is also important to note that even good analysis may not guarantee effectiveness given that there are many factors that cannot be controlled.
- **Many people work on the basis of an implicit analysis,** often based on their deep experience of a situation. Some programmes – often effective ones – are grounded in an *informal* analysis that draws on the long experience of local people, or long-time observers of a conflict. Analysis may be constantly updated, as individuals move about and talk with many different people. The downside of this approach can be a lack of shared understanding among teams or within an organization.

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<sup>46</sup> RPP engaged over 200 agencies and many individuals who work on conflict around the world in a collaborative effort to learn how to improve the effectiveness of efforts to establish and build peace. The agencies included international peace and conflict resolution NGOs as well as local organizations and groups working for peace in their countries. By analysing these experiences through 26 case studies and consultations with over 1000 practitioners, RPP was able to clarify why some analysis techniques work and others do not. Diana Chigas and Peter Woodrow, *Reflecting on Peace Practice: Participant Training Manual* (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2009).

Therefore, efforts to make the implicit more explicit and to share observations are usually valuable.

### *Elements of good conflict analysis*

While the research did not find agreement regarding any particular methodology or framework for analysis, it did identify several shortcomings of existing methods and was able to identify elements of analysis that, if not addressed, lessen the effectiveness of programming. This included:

- **Too comprehensive.** Many of the frameworks for analysis aim to be comprehensive, but do not help to identify which factors are the most important. As a result, they do not help practitioners to identify priorities and focus on factors that are important to the conflict dynamic. The lists of factors can be overwhelming!
- **Lists without dynamics.** Conflict analysis tools tend to present a static snapshot, often in the form of a list of factors, without much sense of how the factors work together. The *dynamics* of conflict are missing.
- **No linkage to strategy.** Analysis processes and results remain disconnected from programme strategies. Even good analysis processes do not enable people to identify what to do about the situation.
- **Biased and narrow.** Analyses tend to be performed by single agencies, in order to justify the agencies' favourite approach or methodology (dialogues, trauma healing etc.) or sector (for example, women, youth), without much sense of whether these approaches are the most effective or the best use of scarce funding resources for peacebuilding.

Where these limitations are transcended, good analyses – that is, ones that help practitioners to develop programmes that do not “miss the mark” – ask certain questions:

1. Of all the causes of the conflict, **what are the key driving factors** (both issues and people), and what are the causes and effects of these factors? Key driving factors are factors without which the conflict would not exist or would be significantly different.
2. **What are the relationships and dynamics among factors?** How do the factors interact and affect each other? How are actors and factors related?
3. **What could be stopped and what could be supported** and who will do it? Many programmes are biased towards creating “positive peace” by building or reinforcing positive factors. The most effective programmes also ask what factors (actors, issues, motives, resources, dynamics, attitudes, behaviours) maintain or

reinforce the conflict system, as well as considering who would resist movement towards peace and why. Conflict analysis must clarify what the war system or injustice system depends on, and how it could be interrupted. Must the trade in arms be stopped? Recruitment of young people? Exploitation of natural resources to support warring? Misuse of the media to target certain groups or distort facts? Funding from diaspora groups? And so on.

4. **Who are the “key” actors?** Key actors are people or groups who have significant influence on the conflict dynamics, are able to decide or strongly influence decisions for or against peace, and/or are able to “spoil” or undermine peace.
5. **What are the international or regional dimensions** of the conflict? Analysis and programming often focus on the immediate conflict area and fail to incorporate the powerful influences of the broader area. Good analysis asks how the policies and actions of forces outside the immediate local context (village, province, nation) affect the conflict, how such factors might be addressed, and what kinds of local-international cooperation are needed to handle these external issues.
6. **How can local/community factors** of conflict be related or linked to what is happening at the **national level**?
7. **What has already been tried, and with what results?** Has the proposed programming approach been tried in this conflict before, and if so, what were the outcomes? Practitioners often repeat programme approaches (such as dialogues, training, women’s consultations etc.) that others have tried before with little effect (or that have even failed) without analysing why this has happened.

### *A simple conflict analysis model*

Based on these findings, RPP developed an approach to conflict analysis that builds on other models or systems for looking at conflict. The model outlined below draws on this approach, but adapts it for the civil affairs context. It aims to keep the processes simple without losing the real complexity of the situation.

This analysis model can be used by individuals or by groups. Jointly developing a shared analysis is one of the strongest foundations for solid teamwork and the civil affairs component should aim to do this exercise as a group, bringing in other partners as appropriate.

#### **Step 1 → Three-box analysis**

The box below can be used to conduct a brief conflict analysis of the context you are working in. The analysis can be performed at various levels (local district, province, national, regional). The focus could also be on a particular issue, a subcomponent of the larger conflict.

Forces for peace →		← Forces against peace/for conflict	Key actors
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the forces in the situation that exists now that can be built upon to promote movement towards peace?</li> <li>• What currently connects people across conflict lines?</li> <li>• How do people cooperate?</li> <li>• Who exercises leadership for peace and how?</li> </ul> <p>(Note: these should not be things that you want to exist or that you would like to see—they must be true now.)</p>	<p><b>P</b> <b>E</b> <b>A</b> <b>C</b> <b>E</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What factors are working against peace or for conflict?</li> <li>• What factors, issues or elements are causing conflict and/or dividing people, and how?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Which individuals or groups in the situation are in a position to strongly influence the conflict – either positively or negatively?</li> <li>• Who can decide for/against peace?</li> </ul> <p>(Note: these are not necessarily targets/ participants, such as women, youth or religious leaders. We may be interested in engaging with those groups, but they are not always “key” in the situation.)</p>

Figure 8.1 Three-box analysis of conflict

**Step 2 → Key driving factors of conflict**

Identify, among the factors against peace or for conflict, which ones are “key driving factors”. These are the factors without which the conflict either would not exist or would be totally different.

**Step 3 → Explore the dynamics among factors**

If conflicts are understood as dynamic systems, it is important to understand how the conflict factors interact with each other. Explore how the factors might interact with each other in causal loops. Which factors reinforce other factors (i.e. make them increase)? Which factors balance or mitigate others? The following example maps the relationship between local government performance and community relations, with the assumption that citizen cooperation and participation is essential to long-term peace. The “causal loop” diagram explores (in simplified form) some of the interactions between local government performance, service delivery, people’s perceptions of state legitimacy, and citizen cooperation with local government. (Note that this example is not intended to be a picture of “the answer” about local government performance but rather an example of one use of an analysis methodology: there are many important dynamics not reflected here.)




Figure 8.2 “Causal loop” diagram: virtuous circle

This cycle can work either positively (a “virtuous” cycle) or negatively (a “vicious” cycle). Good performance improves service delivery, increases people’s sense of legitimate governance and increases their willingness to cooperate with local government and pay tax. Poor performance, on the other hand, results in poor or inequitable service delivery, a lowered sense of legitimacy and decreased willingness to cooperate or contribute.




Figure 8.3 “Causal loop” diagram: vicious circle

#### Step 4 → Explore how key actors intersect with conflict dynamics (and with each other)

Identify in just a few words:

- Each actor's possible influence in improving or making worse any of the dynamics identified; and
- Each actor's own interests and objectives.

It can also be productive to map out the relationships between key actors, describing their relationship in a few words in terms of its impact on the issue (positive, negative, allies, enemies, ambiguous, high/low influence, high/low polarization etc.).

Different actors and institutions have specific motivations and interests. If those interests are understood it is possible to design effective approaches to building alliances and partnerships, or carrying out advocacy or mobilizing action. Civil affairs may not always be the best-placed actor to carry out certain interventions, so actor-mapping helps to identify other actors who might have a more effective influence in a given situation. This understanding can strengthen alliance-building strategies, capacity-building strategies and advocacy strategies.



Photograph of an actor-mapping exercise carried out by civil affairs in Liberia, 2011

#### Step 5 → Identify points of intervention

There are no quick and easy formulas for finding leverage points. Due to the complex ways in which the parts of a system are connected, leverage points are often not

intuitive; indeed, they are often counterintuitive. Successful interventions often involve breaking a link between factors – either by changing the key assumptions and attitudes that underlie the links, by working on the parties' behaviour directly, or by changing the factors themselves, including the structural elements and rules that shape how the parties behave. In addition to trying to break or weaken links in vicious cycles, as described above, interventions may also seek to create or strengthen links in virtuous cycles.

The answers to the following questions help to focus on those elements that will make the biggest difference:

- What factors are driving the evolution of the system? Which factors, if they were changed, would lead to a significant change in the system?
- Where are the “weak” links? Where are the opportunities to break links between factors, so that x does not need to lead to y?
- Where are there positive dynamics that can be reinforced?

It is worth bearing in mind that later, when it comes to planning a response to the conflict, there is a further question to be asked:

- Given who we are (our mandate, resources, structures, access etc.), which of these are we most likely to be able to influence, either directly or by mobilizing others?

#### **Step 6 → Write down and share the analysis**

People that have participated in an analysis process such as that described here will have developed a good shared analysis of the conflict, and they will be able to reference and discuss it based on the graphics and notes that were produced as part of the process. They will also be able to reconnect as a group later and quickly see how the analysis may need to be updated based on these graphics.

However, it is also essential that the analysis can be shared with others who were not part of the development process, and for this reason, the analysis needs to be translated into narrative form, making use of any graphics where they help to illustrate the points being made. There are many ways to write down the analysis, no one being necessarily better than any other. However, the better written and more concise the narrative, the more likely people are to read and reference it.

#### **Step 7 → Update the analysis**

Post-conflict environments are highly dynamic and can be influenced by a number of factors, such as elections, departure of old actors and arrival of new ones, and changes in international or regional dynamics. Access to new information can also influence the analysis. It is vital that conflict analysis is updated regularly as the situation changes.

## Beyond conflict analysis

This chapter has introduced a simple model for conflict analysis that can be a starting point for civil affairs work. However, it is clear that the analysis needs do not stop here and that there are other non-conflict types of analysis, such as analysis relating to support for local actors and institution-strengthening, that are also important for civil affairs work. To a certain extent these issues are discussed in subsequent chapters, however, Civil Affairs Officers will likely research and find tools and resources from many different sources, well beyond what is covered in this Handbook, to help them to assess and analyse the specific issues that they face.

One particular tool that is worth mentioning here, however, is the formula that has been developed to help missions with mandates to protect civilians to assess the level of risk faced by populations under threat.

### From the toolkit:



#### Assessing the level of risk to civilians under threat

The DPKO/DFS Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations explains that risk can be understood as the relationship between threat and vulnerability.

**Threat** relates to the intentions, motivations and aggressive capabilities of the perpetrator(s) of violence. Are they physically/militarily strong, well-supplied and effective? Politically protected? Strongly motivated by the benefit they receive from threatening or perpetrating violence? A stronger threat means a greater risk of violence.

**Vulnerability** relates to the susceptibility of a particular group or population to physical violence. Those who are displaced from their homes, for example, are generally more vulnerable to violence. Environmental factors, such as geographic location and infrastructure, can also increase vulnerability. The capacity of local communities to protect themselves or to access outside assistance are factors that impact their vulnerability.

Analysis should look to identify the ways in which threat and vulnerability could be decreased, and the capacity of local communities increased, as in the following example.

#### Example: Rape of women while collecting firewood

Reduce threats?	Action which changes the motivation or capacity of perpetrators: sensitization campaigns, prosecutions, community pressure etc.
Reduce vulnerability?	Reduce the need or frequency of collecting firewood; change patterns or routes etc.
Increase capacity?	Going out in groups; accompaniment of firewood collection by someone whose presence would deter attack.

Box 8.1 From the toolkit: Assessing the level of risk to civilians under threat



## 8.2. Planning

### *Planning tools in UN peacekeeping*

This section provides an explanation of some of the key tools associated with planning in missions that Civil Affairs Officers may encounter when planning their work. It is important to note that this represents an idealized representation of the hierarchy of possible plans within a UN Field Mission and that not all missions will have the full array of plans, particularly at mission start-up.




Figure 8.4 Idealized hierarchy of planning tools in UN Field Missions

Integration, requiring a common strategic effort by the mission and UNCT, is the guiding principle for UN planning at the field level, and the key reference for this is the **Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)**.<sup>47</sup> A major contribution of the civil affairs component should be to ensure that local and regional nuances from around the country, as well as the concerns and priorities of the local population, are well understood and reflected in planning decisions.

- A UN countrywide, **Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF)** brings together the combined mandates of the UN Field Mission (i.e. from the Security Council and General Assembly) and the UN Country Team, as well as their resources, around an overarching framework of agreed peace consolidation priorities. The ISF is a strategic plan for the UN Field Mission and UN agencies, funds and programmes operating in the host country. It provides a vision of the UN's strategic objectives for peace consolidation, with agreed results, responsibilities and timelines and a mechanism for monitoring and evaluation. It is usually a multi-year plan. It is required in a country where there is both a UN Country Team and either a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or a special political mission. The UN ISF is linked to national strategies and plans, as well as other relevant UN plans such as the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP). Civil affairs should contribute actively to the development and implementation of an ISF, for example by contributing to the initial conflict analysis and development of priorities, and to the monitoring of implementation.
- The **mission concept** is based on the ISF and translates the political intent in Security Council and other mandates into strategic planning guidance for mission components. The mission concept contains:
  - (a) a vision to capture and communicate the purpose of the mission;
  - (b) a strategy to promote coherence by sequencing and prioritization of tasks within the context of the conditions governing their achievement; and
  - (c) timely and detailed direction to guide and enable the planning and operational processes of each mission component.

It is a multi-year plan that covers the life cycle of the UN Field Mission. It is required in all UN Field Missions except for special political missions.

<sup>47</sup> IMPP Guidelines for the Field, available on POINT. The "Planning Toolkit for Rule of Law and Security Institutions Components" mentioned in the **Recommended resources** section at the end of this chapter also contains a lot of practical guidance on how to approach the UN planning tools described here. Formal DPKO/DFS Policy and Guidance on Programme Management is also under development.

- On the basis of the mission concept, it is good practice for civil affairs components to develop a **multi-year strategy or concept of operations**, which analyses the current situation in a sector, and identifies the strategic objective(s) for the UN Field Mission in this sector and how best to implement them. These concepts of operations or multi-year strategies do not contain detailed operational information on outputs and activities.
- In some cases civil affairs components may also have **multi-year programme plans** (for example, a plan for a multi-year joint programme or joint initiative with the national government and another UN entity on local government support, or a multi-year training programme). These would feed into the development of the component's annual workplan.
- The **component annual workplan** is a key management tool. It is drawn from the multi-year strategy or concept of operations. It maps out the activities that will be undertaken over the course of one year in pursuit of civil affairs objectives. It generally follows the same timeframe as individual workplans – which is April to March. It identifies timeframes, regional priorities and how resources will be used, as well as key indicators of impact and progress. It also needs to include details of the logic behind the specific approaches identified. It is a key document for staff members to understand their role and how their individual work fits into the broader strategic work of the component. Developing the details of this plan is often the main feature of an annual retreat for the entire civil affairs component.
- The **field/regional team workplan** is developed by the civil affairs team at the field office or even sub-office level to translate the component workplan into concrete activities and outputs in the specific context of the office's area of responsibility. This is the critical tactical level where national conflict analysis is tested in the local context and where a bottom-up and top-down approach in planning ideally come together to deliver realistic outputs and sound rationales behind the proposed activities. Often this workplan will need to be agreed with both civil affairs senior management and the regional head of office to ensure integration with the regional strategy, while pursuing the civil affairs overall mandate.
- As part of the annual workplan, the component or team may design and implement specific projects with their own **project plan(s)** that are one year or less in duration, such as Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), or projects on specific issues or events, such as a sensitization campaign.
- The **individual workplan** elaborates on the performance expectations for individual staff members, and is based on the field/regional team workplan. It is used as the basis for evaluation of individual performance over an annual period from April to March through the **ePAS** system.

The annual workplan of the overall UN Field Mission is funded through contributions from Member States. The annual budget of the UN Field Mission is called a “**Results-based Budget**” (RBB). The RBB focuses on the high-level goals of the mission, and often combines the work of more than one component under one expected accomplishment. The budgetary year runs from July to June,<sup>48</sup> however, the budgetary committees of the General Assembly tend to start looking at mission budgets in February and planning within missions therefore starts earlier, generally around August each year. As the plans cover one year, and the planning is done one year in advance, there is a time lapse of up to two years between budgeting and implementation. Given the fact that these are highly dynamic environments, the actual outputs may change based on analysis of the situation as it unfolds (these changes to the plan will then be explained during the reporting process at the end of the budgetary year). For this reason the RBB is better understood as a budgeting tool than as an operational planning tool. See also [chapter 7](#) for a discussion on planning operational costs.

In addition to these tools, civil affairs staff should be aware of any national plans and strategies, as well as mechanisms used by major partners, including:

- The **United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)**, a planning mechanism between a government and the UN Country Team. The end product, a programme document, describes the collective actions and strategies of the UN in support of national development; including outcomes, activities and UN agency responsibilities that are agreed by government and that support national priorities. An UNDAF typically runs for five years, with reviews at various points.
- The **Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP)** is a strategic plan for humanitarian response in a given country or region, developed at the field level by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Country Team, under the leadership of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator. It normally includes the following elements: a common analysis of the humanitarian context; an assessment of needs; best, worst and most likely scenarios; stakeholder analysis; a statement of longer term goals and objectives; prioritized response plans; and a framework for monitoring the strategy. The CHAP is the foundation for developing a Consolidated Humanitarian Appeal or a Flash Appeal. As such, it is a critical step in the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), although the CHAP, as a strategic planning tool, can also be produced for humanitarian situations that do not require a Consolidated Appeal. As a part of the CHAP, priorities (for example, humanitarian relief, protection and early recovery) are established and areas of assistance for affected populations in need are outlined. This could include such areas as food aid, nutrition, health, shelter, water, sanitation

<sup>48</sup> It should be noted that the budget cycle for special political missions (SPMs) runs from January to December.

and hygiene (WASH), protection, education, agriculture and fisheries, logistics and others.

- A **Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP)** "...contains an assessment of poverty and describes the macroeconomic, structural, and social policies and programmes that a country will pursue over several years to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as external financing needs and the associated sources of financing. They are prepared by governments in low-income countries through a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders and external development partners, including the IMF and the World Bank."<sup>49</sup>

Aligning these different instruments can be a challenge, particularly as timelines vary. In theory, the PRSP process should feed into the UNDAF and there should be harmonization between UN frameworks and national planning cycles.

### *Strategic planning for civil affairs work*

Civil affairs will be required to fit into and around the various UN planning mechanisms described above at different times and in various ways. Although the overarching objectives for the component will sometimes, in theory, be established in larger venues than a solely civil affairs-focused planning process, civil affairs will need to have done the thinking behind what contribution it can make, and how, in order to contribute effectively to these. The subsequent development of detailed operational plans and strategies for implementation of the objectives will also be a civil affairs responsibility.

In the next section there is a tool for helping Civil Affairs Officers to conduct a planning exercise in a mission environment. But it is worth remembering that the basic components of a strategy are simply:

- (i) A prioritized list of objectives and desired outcomes.
- (ii) A set of planned activities, taking account of the real resources available and all contextual constraints.
- (iii) A clear logic that links the two.

Importantly, a strategy is not just a document or a logframe. While documentation is an important part of strategy design, the strength and validity of the ideas behind that will be most crucial. Both the actual strategies and their documentation are tools and should be useful, rather than seen as an end in themselves.

The main planning tool used by the component is usually the workplan, however, this frequently stops short of being *strategic*, often simply listing outputs and objectives. A core element of the workplan, or any other plan, should be information about the

<sup>49</sup> IMF factsheet March 2011: <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm>.

logic and reasoning between the levels. In other words, in order to be *strategic*, a plan needs to include detailed explicit reasoning that links day-to-day activities with the ultimate goals and objectives of the mission. The **programme logic**, or detailed reasoning and assumptions behind any plan of action, is the core of strategic planning and needs to be made explicit and documented. Not only does this quickly expose any flaws or weaknesses in the logic, it also makes it easier to identify whether there are alternative pathways to achieving the expected accomplishment or the objective itself. The chain of causality also becomes a basis for constant review and refinement of the strategy as circumstances change.




Figure 8.5 Basic components of a strategic plan

### *A basic model for strategic planning*

The steps outlined below are intended to map out a possible planning process within the context of a UN Field Mission, whether at the individual, team or component level. Managers should be able to use these steps to help them to apply the three basic components of a strategic plan mentioned above in navigating the various mechanisms and processes used in UN peacekeeping.

A planning process should always start with the broadest objectives and work its way down. It is worth noting that, although the model below sets out the steps sequentially,

<sup>50</sup> The terms “outcome” or “sub-objective” are often used here, although “expected accomplishment” is the term generally used in the UN peacekeeping context.

the reality of planning is often a little different, and objectives may be set in advance or several of the early steps take place simultaneously as the analysis unfolds.

### Step 1 → Conduct a conflict analysis

All planning should be based on and make reference to prior analysis. See the conflict analysis model above, [page 106](#).

### Step 2 → Define objectives

An objective is an overall desired achievement. Another term that is often used here is “goal”. Sometimes these higher order objectives for the component (or team, or individual) have been established in advance, but even if they have not, it is advisable to align the language with Security Council mandates, national programmes, higher order component workplans etc.

## From the toolkit:



### Tips on defining objectives

- An objective should describe a desired change at the sociopolitical level (e.g. “Increased authority of the state at the local level in country X”).
- It is not necessary to explicitly include the civil affairs role (e.g. ~~“To contribute to increasing the authority of the state at the local level in country X”~~ or ~~“To strengthen the capacity of national actors to increase the authority of the state at the local level”~~). Many actors contribute to achieving these broad objectives, and it is understood that civil affairs will be one of them.
- Objectives should identify the change that is desired and the beneficiaries, for example the country, region, group of people etc. The objective itself does not need to explain “how” this will be done (e.g. ~~“To increase the authority of the state at the local level in Country X through improving the perceived legitimacy of local government”~~).
- Civil affairs objectives should only focus on sociopolitical changes in the host country, not on work that the component may do to support the UN mission or others.

Box 8.2 From the toolkit: Tips on defining objectives<sup>51</sup>

<sup>51</sup> Some of these tips, and several of the other tips and materials in this section, are adapted for civil affairs from the “Planning Toolkit for Rule of Law and Security Institutions Components”, which contains much more detailed guidance on planning processes than covered here.

### Step 3 → Define expected accomplishments and their relationship to the objective

An expected accomplishment is a desired outcome or consequence that is expected to contribute to the fulfilment of an overall objective. The terminology can be confusing here, as some people would correctly point out that these are in effect lower order objectives that the component or team intends to achieve en route to achieving the overall objective. Whatever word is used, this is the level at which what the component or team wants to concretely achieve is clearly defined.

#### From the toolkit:



#### Tips on defining expected accomplishments

An expected accomplishment should also describe a desired change at the sociopolitical level. It may refer to changes in knowledge, skills, behaviour, awareness, condition or status.

- Start the expected accomplishment with a noun (e.g., “Civil society organizations invited to participate in national level peace negotiations in country X”) or an adjective + noun (e.g. “Improved capacity of local government in conflict mediation in region Y”).
- Try to make the expected accomplishment “**SMART**”:
  - Specific:** specify the benefit to the end-user.
  - Measurable:** use an indicator to make the expected accomplishment measurable.
  - Attainable:** it can be attained within the life cycle of the UN Field Mission
  - Realistic/relevant:** it must fall within the mandate of the UN Field Mission.
  - Time-bound:** use an indicator for the expected accomplishment that can be attained or measure change within the time period covered by the plan.
- Expected accomplishments should not be confused with activities, such as: “To facilitate the involvement of civil society in local-level decision-making” or “To support local authority capacity to mediate conflict”.

Box 8.3 From the toolkit: Tips on defining expected accomplishments

It is important to be explicit about **how** it is understood that this outcome will contribute to achieving the overall objective in question, by spelling out the analysis that has taken place in selecting it. For example, “It is expected that increased transparency in municipal decision-making will help to change perceptions among the local population about the local government, and in particular to increase the sense that that government is operating legitimately. This will contribute to the objective ‘To restore state authority at the local level in country X’ because in order to have authority, it is a prerequisite that the local government is perceived to be legitimate.”



Assumptions can also be spelled out at this point. For example, “The success of this outcome in achieving the objective is based on the following assumptions: (a) making the proceedings of local government more visible will ensure that they operate in a legitimate way; and (b) citizens will be interested in the proceedings of local government if made more visible to them.” It can also be useful to mention which other options were considered and why this one was selected.<sup>52</sup>

#### **Step 4 → Generate possible pathways to reaching expected accomplishments**

Once the expected accomplishments have been established, the next step is to brainstorm the possible ways of achieving them. There are usually many different mechanisms by which a particular expected accomplishment can be achieved and this step should generate a range of alternatives, using the prior conflict analysis as a basis. This process should be as creative as possible, consciously open to new ideas and perspectives without judging them. The focus should be on the logic of how things can change, not the detailed questions of implementation. Evaluation of these ideas and discussion of their feasibility and implementation is left for later.

#### **Step 5 → Identify points of impact and/or leverage for component or team**

As outlined in step 5 of the conflict analysis model, part of the analysis will be to identify possible “points of intervention” on the conflict system by relevant actors (not only the mission, but also actors such as civil society, politicians, other international actors and so on). Now this analysis can be applied to the pathways identified above.

The process should provide some insight into the different kinds of ways in which civil affairs components, or the team or individual conducting the planning exercise, could potentially impact on the situation. What are the points at which an external actor can exert a meaningful influence? Civil affairs components can influence conflict dynamics through direct intervention themselves, or – just as effectively – they can leverage other actors, or “enable” them to have impact. This ability to act as an enabler or catalyst, particularly for national actors, is one of the key features of good civil affairs work.

#### **Step 6 → Prioritize, evaluate and refine**

After these possible interventions are identified, a more rigorous evaluation and prioritization is needed. The most important criterion in judging an intervention is its potential effectiveness in achieving the defined expected accomplishments and

<sup>52</sup> RPP refers to this process of making explicit the programme logic as identifying the “Theory of Change”, and RPP is a useful resource on why/how to do this at each point in the planning process. They have also developed specific tools to help with identifying and comparing different pathways, as identified in steps 4 and 5. More details on these are provided in the [Recommended resources](#) section at the end of this chapter.

objectives. Within this overarching criterion, a number of elements are crucial to consider:

- Is the intervention feasible? How would it work? Who would do what? What is realistic to expect as a result?
- Does civil affairs involvement fill an important gap (in knowledge, analysis, skills, resources, relationships, other)? Are others able to do the job equally well? Can national capacities be supported to do it?
- What resources would be needed? Are these available? Is there a way of using less time, money etc.?
- How would this intervention relate to the other priorities of the mission?
- What unexpected consequences and risks would need to be taken into account, evaluated and mitigated?
- How can difficulties be overcome?

This process is not simply about prioritization of fixed ideas. Instead there needs to be a problem-solving approach of refining each alternative to best fit the criteria, paying special attention to the most innovative and promising alternatives.

The goal of this analysis is to identify where the efforts of civil affairs can best be targeted for greatest effect. (It is worth remembering that prioritizing, in essence, means saying NO to all the other things that you cannot do.)

### **Step 7 → Devise indicators**

Indicators are measures of variables that provide a simple and reasonable basis for assessing progress or impact. They measure whether, and the extent to which, the expected accomplishment has been achieved. Indicators are intended to determine trends over the timeframe covered by the plan, whether in terms of improvement or deterioration.

Where expected accomplishments are clearly defined, indicators may be directly related to them and relatively simple to formulate. For example, for the expected accomplishment “Civil society organizations are invited to participate in national-level peace negotiations in country X”, the indicator is very simple to formulate, simply looking at whether civil society organizations were invited to participate. In other cases the process can also be very direct, for example if the strategy is to get an external actor to do something in particular, the indicator may simply be whether or not they do it.

Indicators may also be derived from the logic of the intended interventions – understanding *how* it is intended that a change be achieved gives clues as to the best way to measure it.

## From the toolkit:



### Tips on selecting indicators

- Indicators should measure changes that are external to the UN mission. For example, progress towards an expected accomplishment such as “Improved protection of civilians in country X” could be measured by an indicator such as “Reduction in the number of casualties as a result of conflict between groups A and B” but not by “Increase in the number of foot patrols conducted by the UN military component”.
- In addition to numeric indicators, targets or milestones can be used to determine trends (e.g. “Civil Society Charter of Ethics signed by national symposium of civil society organizations”).
- As a rule, it makes sense to select a combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators. For example, progress towards an expected accomplishment such as “Increased transparency in local government decision-making processes” could be measured by a quantitative indicator such as “Increased number of public forums organized by the local government to engage citizens in the decision-making process” combined with a qualitative indicator such as “Surveyed citizens participating in exchanges with local government consider that they have improved visibility of decision-making”.
- Indicators should accurately reflect the objectives and expected accomplishments they measure, and it should also be feasible rather than onerous to collect data for them. It can be helpful to agree with UN or non-UN partners on using the same indicators so that data collection responsibilities can be shared.
- More nuanced information on specific conflict-affected groups, such as women or minorities, can be obtained by disaggregating the data and/or selecting an additional indicator to measure a specific concern.

Box 8.4 From the toolkit: Tips on selecting indicators

There are a number of possible sources of data to inform indicators, some of which are more reliable and/or easily accessible than others. Possible sources include:

- **Administrative data** – quantitative information compiled routinely by national institutions, international organizations, civil society groups etc.
- **Field data** – data that is already available in the UN Field Mission or with the UN Country Team, or can be collected by UN field staff.
- **Document review** – information obtained from written documents, such as peace agreements, media reports, published laws, standard operating procedures and

guidelines of national institutions, administrative acts, budgets, fiscal reports and reports from NGOs etc.

- **Survey of experts** – information gathered confidentially from individuals with specialized knowledge based on their experience or professional position using a written questionnaire. Expert surveys should be carefully designed so as to avoid bias.<sup>53</sup>
- **Public survey** – information gathered from the population in a country in relation to particular issues, whether across the country or in a restricted geographical area. As discussed in [section 9.10](#), these surveys are particularly useful for collecting data about public perceptions.

### **Step 8 → Identify activities, timeframes, responsibilities and resources**

The next step is to go into more detail as to *how* the expected accomplishments will be achieved. This involves mapping out and allocating resources behind the issues that were analysed in step 6. Who will do what? When? What are the different activities that will need to be done? What resources are needed? Responsibilities and resources for monitoring implementation of the plan should also be assigned at this stage. When putting down the concrete plan on paper it is important, again, to make explicit the programme logic that was identified in steps 4 and 5.

### **Step 9 → Identify outputs**

Outputs are the “deliverables” produced by the activities, including things like publications, training events, meetings and the provision of advice. There should be a direct causal relationship between the output and the expected accomplishment. In other words, the expected accomplishment (for example, “Increased transparency in municipal decision-making processes”) should be expected to directly result from the output (for example, “Three round-table discussions between civil society and local government on municipal expenditure”). [Box 8.5](#) on the following page provides tips on defining outputs.

### **Step 10 → Identify risks and contingencies**

To a certain extent, key risks can be identified by looking at the assumptions that have been identified in making explicit the logic for the plan. For example, if the plan rests on the assumption that “citizens will be interested in the proceedings of local government if made more visible to them”, then one of the risks will be that citizens are not interested in engaging.

<sup>53</sup> Further guidance is available in the “Planning Toolkit for Rule of Law and Security Institutions Components” from which this list is drawn.

## From the toolkit:



### Tips on defining outputs

- An output must always be something that is within the capacity of the team/component to deliver and should not be confused with the outputs of others to which the team contributes. For example, a civil affairs team may have a series of five planning meetings with local authorities to help them to develop a strategy on public consultation. The output of the local authorities is a strategy on public consultation. The output of the civil affairs team is “Advice on a strategy for public consultation provided through five planning meetings with local authorities”.
- Outputs should not be confused with activities. For example, “monitoring of benchmarks” may be an activity conducted by a civil affairs component, whereas the output is the result of this monitoring, such as a report.
- Outputs should also be drafted to make them “SMART”.
- Outputs can be made specific and measurable by making reference to:
  - (a) **Quantity** (e.g. 5 workshops; 20 villages; 100 participants);
  - (b) **Frequency** (e.g. monthly meetings);
  - (c) **UN partners involved in jointly implementing** the output; and
  - (d) **Recipients** of the output (e.g. local authorities, civil society organizations, villages, IDPs).

For example, “Four training courses for 80 local government officials on decentralization, in collaboration with UNCDF and UNDP.”

Box 8.5 From the toolkit: Tips on defining outputs

These risks should be actively evaluated, monitored and mitigated during planning and again continuously during implementation. For the example above, the interest of citizens in engaging should be analysed from the beginning and if such interest is absent or minimal, appropriate steps should be taken or the feasibility of the strategy should be questioned.

However, there are other risks that do not relate to the immediate logic of the plan itself, such as a breakdown in the security environment. It is important to brainstorm on possible risks, and to identify contingency plans for those risks that are considered to be either of high impact or of high probability.

**Step 11 → Implement, monitor, update, revise**

Once implementation begins, effective management and coordination will be essential to ensure that the process stays on track. Good monitoring is a key part of this. Indicators are one of the ways in which the plan is monitored and it is important to maintain a portfolio of evidence to inform them from day one. It is essential that information about progress is actively analysed so that adjustments can be made, whether to amend the programme or to re-evaluate its feasibility. If something is not working, it is necessary to identify what it is, and where the initial planning logic is breaking down, so that changes can be made.

Given the poor quality of data generally found in post-conflict countries, there will also be a need to be sensitive to anecdotal and subjective information. A range of sources, both internal and external to the mission, can provide hints that suggest a closer look is necessary, including situation reports, views of national authorities, perceptions of the local population, information from the local and international media and so on.

Inevitably, the analysis of the situation will evolve, and plans need to be able to respond to changes and improvements in the understanding of the conflict dynamics. As such, the plan should be regularly reviewed to identify any flaws in the logic or practicality of its goals. It is for this reason that it is critical that planning documents have included the logic and assumptions behind any activities and interventions.

**Step 12 → Evaluate the plan**

After a plan is completed, a full evaluation is often carried out. Good practice in evaluation suggests that it should be carried out independently of those that developed and implemented the programme or plan. In some cases in peacekeeping missions it may be possible to arrange for an external evaluation to be conducted, but this is rarely the case. It can, however, be extremely valuable for those that have developed and implemented the plan to conduct an assessment of how it went – not only to inform future planning within the mission but also to help other civil affairs components that may be attempting to do similar work in comparable circumstances.<sup>54</sup> There are many possible ways of evaluating programmes, however, the OECD/DAC “Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance” can be an excellent reference point for this. The five criteria used are: Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>54</sup> The DPKO/DFS Mission Evaluation Policy sets out the expectations for self-assessment in peacekeeping missions. It can be found on the POINT intranet at: <http://ppdb.un.org/Policy%20%20Guidance%20Database/2010.27DPKODFSMissionEvaluationPolicy.pdf>.

<sup>55</sup> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) “Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance”: [http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,2340,en\\_2649\\_34435\\_2086550\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,2340,en_2649_34435_2086550_1_1_1_1,00.html).

## Recommended resources

<b>Name</b>	<b>Diana Chigas and Peter Woodrow, <i>Reflecting on Peace Practice: Participant Training Manual</i> (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2009)</b>
<b>Description</b>	A training manual containing useful ideas and accessible tools for both analysis and planning, based on lessons collected from practitioners.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/manual/rpp_training_participant_manual_rev_20090104_Pdf.pdf">http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/manual/rpp_training_participant_manual_rev_20090104_Pdf.pdf</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>A Theory of Change: A thinking and action approach to navigate in the complexity of social change processes</b>
<b>Description</b>	A guide containing several tools to help planners make their programme logic and assumptions explicit and to analyse them critically.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.gsdc.org/go/display&amp;type=Document&amp;id=4095&amp;source=rss">http://www.gsdc.org/go/display&amp;type=Document&amp;id=4095&amp;source=rss</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Planning Toolkit for Rule of Law and Security Institutions Components</b>
<b>Description</b>	A collection of in-depth tools for planning the work of rule of law components in UN Field Missions, including on working with RBB. Tailored to rule of law but also relevant for civil affairs components.
<b>Source</b>	Forthcoming: UN peacekeeping personnel will be able to access this document on the POINT intranet: <a href="https://point.un.org/UNHQ/SitePages/POHome.aspx">https://point.un.org/UNHQ/SitePages/POHome.aspx</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>IMPP Guidelines for the Field</b>
<b>Description</b>	The required standards for integrated strategy, planning and coordination at the country level. These guidelines are part of the IMPP guidance package, which also includes (1) UN Strategic Assessment and (2) the Role of Headquarters in Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the Policy and Practices database on the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance</b>
<b>Description</b>	Set of criteria to evaluate programmes developed by the OECD/DAC, widely used in international work. The website sets out a list of questions to ask when applying each of the criteria.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,2340,en_2649_34435_2086550_1_1_1_1,00.html">www.oecd.org/document/22/0,2340,en_2649_34435_2086550_1_1_1_1,00.html</a>

<b>Name</b>	<b>Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (2008 working draft, new version forthcoming)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Discusses how the five basic criteria can be applied in the context of peacebuilding and fragile/conflict-affected states.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.oecd.org/secure/pdfDocument/0,2834,en_21571361_34047972_39774574_1_1_1_1,00.pdf">http://www.oecd.org/secure/pdfDocument/0,2834,en_21571361_34047972_39774574_1_1_1_1,00.pdf</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>UN Strategic Assessment Guidelines</b>
<b>Description</b>	A pre-deployment assessment tool used by the UN to determine options for UN engagement in a post-conflict country. Contains analysis and prioritization tools for use at the macro level.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the Policy and Practices database on the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>UN System Staff College: Online course on conflict analysis for prevention and peacebuilding</b>
<b>Description</b>	An online course aimed at providing practical conflict analysis skills for professionals working in contexts of deteriorating human security, armed conflict, political crisis and other threats to peace.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.unssc.org/home/activities/online-course-conflict-analysis-prevention-and-peacebuilding-semi-tutored">http://www.unssc.org/home/activities/online-course-conflict-analysis-prevention-and-peacebuilding-semi-tutored</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>RBB THEORY: What, Why &amp; How</b>
<b>Description</b>	A PowerPoint presentation that explains in simple terms what Results-based Budgeting (RBB) is and how it works.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via iSeek, the UN Secretariat intranet: <a href="http://iseek.un.org/LibraryDocuments/377-201007121415345133482.pdf">http://iseek.un.org/LibraryDocuments/377-201007121415345133482.pdf</a>





## PART III: Implementing the civil affairs roles

UN Photo/Olivia Grey-Pritchard



PART III: Implementing the civil affairs roles

## Chapter 9 | Cross-mission representation, monitoring and facilitation at the local level



Civil affairs meets with local authorities in Lebanon

UN Photo/Pasqual Goritz

*This chapter outlines the activities conducted by civil affairs components as part of the first core role: cross-mission representation, monitoring and facilitation at the local level. This includes liaison and representation on behalf of the mission, coordination and facilitation activities, information-gathering and monitoring. The chapter provides tips, examples and good practices in the implementation of this core role.*

Cross-mission representation, monitoring and facilitation are performed in most missions and usually throughout the life cycle of the mission. In many situations civil affairs is the most important interface between the UN mission and the community, not just in terms of the local/regional authorities but also civil society in its broadest sense. Through its multiple interactions with the local population, civil affairs provides the mission with the pulse of the nation beyond the high-level contacts with government and political party leaderships.

No single civil affairs field office will provide the key to mission policy, but a synthesis of reporting by the civil affairs offices countrywide will provide the mission leadership with a sense of the tone of local feeling that informs national politics.

This helps to nuance the mission's understanding of the sociopolitical climate, allowing analysis to move beyond the carefully articulated positions of national spokespeople and representatives, and to ensure that regional and local considerations are integrated into national negotiations or priority-setting processes.

In return, local communities and groups have an opportunity through civil affairs to access the mission, which they may perceive as distant and militarized. Civil affairs can be a bridge, which means that groups who previously would not have dared to approach the heavily guarded mission gates and ask for a discussion with the mission field leadership, civilian or military, can now approach the UN as guests rather than applicants. The mission is inevitably enriched by this kind of dialogue and Civil Affairs Officers are often the best facilitators of it.

## 9.1. Local-level liaison and representation

Civil Affairs Officers represent the mission at the local level, where they are sometimes the only civilian component present. They tend to be the primary interface between the mission and local communities, building wide networks in order to:

- Ensure that the local authorities and population are informed about the work of the peacekeeping mission and other issues, such as the political process, elections and the content of peace agreements and Security Council resolutions;
- Develop and foster good relations between the mission and the population;
- Address any misperceptions and manage expectations about what the mission can achieve;
- Gather and report information about priorities, perceptions and concerns of different groups with regard to the mission, mandate and peace process;
- Report on the local situation and feed into a wider understanding and analysis of the conflict and peacebuilding context within the mission;
- Build relationships with key actors who can affect the peace process;
- Plan joint activities, or seek input on activities planned by the mission; and
- Demonstrate the commitment of the mission to reach out beyond the capital.

Interlocutors range from local government officials, elders and traditional leaders to a wide spectrum of non-institutional actors, including civil society organizations, media, the business sector, IDPs and members of the general population.

Civil Affairs Officers in field offices have to be careful to avoid being perceived as having privileged or even exclusive interlocutors. Clearly Civil Affairs Officers must start their engagement at the local level with the authorities, particularly those with democratic credentials. However, this should rapidly be extended to civil society

groups and not just those seen as close to the local authorities or power-brokers. Civil Affairs Officers should make an exhaustive survey of civil society beyond the most vocal or empowered groups and look to provide “a voice to the voiceless”. Sometimes the most marginalized groups who have no vehicle to articulate their grievances are overlooked. Time needs to be invested to make sure that all elements of civil society have access to civil affairs staff and thereby to the UN mission. In this way, without taking sides, civil affairs components can ideally start to provide a neutral and safe space for these groups of society to come together to begin to discuss the issues that lie behind the conflict and their local manifestations.

The success of the work of Civil Affairs Officers at the field level depends on the whole community having a positive perception of civil affairs and its work. Any initiative will of course stand on its own merits, but no initiative can succeed if one or more sections of the community perceives civil affairs and/or the mission as biased. As such, every Quick Impact Project provided to a specific group has the potential merely to underline to the rest of the community that they have received no such project and leave them feeling that the UN is not offering them anything.

The creation of broad-based community relations is the foundation for all civil affairs work, and time and patience must be invested in establishing these relations.

Local-level liaison and representation takes place in a range of settings including: one-on-one scheduled meetings; conferences, round-table discussions or meetings held by groups or third parties; drop-ins to the office; chance meetings; public

### Case study



#### Mainstreaming gender in community liaison in Kosovo

Civil affairs in the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) liaised with and supported a large network of grass-roots organizations that reached out to women and youth, with activities ranging from summer camps and youth centres to computer and advocacy training, civic education and other community-building activities.

The mission also ensured that there was diversity among the national civil affairs staff that worked with communities, taking steps to recruit women as Municipal Community or Returns Officers. This was a priority because of the message it sent, the different insights and greater understanding of cultural intricacies that were available, the potential for wider access to analysis and perceptions from the grass roots, and the relationship-building advantages. The approach paid off in many ways, including in Mitrovica Municipality where a Romani woman, herself an IDP, was recruited as Municipal Returns Officer. She played an important role as community advocate, focusing attention on the living conditions of IDPs where previously the emphasis had been directed mainly at political aspects of minority returns.

Box 9.1 Case study: Mainstreaming gender in community liaison in Kosovo

meetings organized by the mission (often referred to as town hall meetings); and through the media (press conferences, call-in radio shows etc).<sup>56</sup>

The organization of town hall meetings can be an effective way of providing information on and/or promoting public discussion about key issues, such as peace agreements and Security Council resolutions. The box below contains tips and considerations for organizing them.

### From the toolkit:



#### Organizing public “town hall” meetings

- Civil Affairs Officers should first identify what they want to achieve with the event, and what they want to avoid. This will guide the rest of the preparation.
- Consultations should be conducted with all the key stakeholders so that:
  - They are aware of the intended purpose;
  - They have been consulted and their role has been recognized and acknowledged; and
  - The information to be shared is appropriate to the audience and any likely issues have been flagged.
- Ideally, sensitive or contentious topics would have been discussed in advance so that issues raised during the meeting do not surprise Civil Affairs Officers or stakeholders. Ideally, the meeting itself should affirm a range of key messages that stakeholders have discussed in advance.
- Despite extensive consultations and planning, difficult issues may emerge. Civil Affairs Officers must be prepared to deal with difficult questions and de-escalate the situation if necessary. If issues arise that you/other mission representatives cannot answer, listen, report back and follow up but don't make promises you cannot keep.
- The communication that takes place at such meetings is not only about the substance, but also about the symbolism of who is involved in the proceedings and the degree of respect that is being shown to local culture, custom and personalities.
- Notions of how public events of this nature should be managed will vary from one context to another and it is important that local expectations are considered and

<sup>56</sup> Before speaking to the local media, civil affairs components consult with the public information section of the mission. DPI Guidelines on speaking to the media state that: “As a matter of principle, every member of the Secretariat may speak to the press, within limits: i) speak only within your area of competence and responsibility; ii) provide facts, not opinions or comment; iii) leave sensitive issues to officials who are specifically authorized to speak on them.” (Department of Public Information, *Media Guidelines for United Nations Officials*, 2001, p. 2).

incorporated. Following the local customs associated with such meetings will help to generate credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of local people. This includes, among other things, the order of proceedings, the role of local dignitaries, and the manner in which the meeting is facilitated.

- Civil Affairs Officers new to an area therefore need to take great care when preparing for such meetings to ensure that the messages they wish to convey are not undermined by practical arrangements.
- In some cases Civil Affairs Officers may wish to support local authorities to themselves hold town hall meetings with the general population. This would require a different approach, with civil affairs providing an enabling role, as discussed in [chapter 11](#), and with local authorities and/or civil society population setting the agenda.

Box 9.2 From the toolkit: Organizing public “town hall” meetings

### *Possible challenges with liaison and representation work*

#### **Interlocutors may have unrealistic expectations of what you can achieve**

When peacekeeping missions deploy, expectations among local people and the parties to the conflict are understandably high regarding the capacity of peacekeepers to improve the situation. When local and/or international partners see the resources and assets that the mission brings with it, they may assume it has greater capacity to engage and assist than the mandate actually allows, lacking an appreciation of the constraints placed on mission asset use. And while Quick Impact Projects are intended to build confidence in the mission and the peace process, they may also raise expectations about the mission’s role in undertaking more large-scale development activities.

Civil Affairs Officers can play an important role in communicating the mandate of the mission as well as the restrictions imposed by UN Member States, which limit and direct the engagement of the mission to a few select areas. Being upfront about limitations and discussing with local counterparts ways in which the mission can realistically support, complement and augment local capacities can go a long way in dispelling misconceptions and managing expectations.

#### **Interlocutors may not see the value of meeting you**

Sometimes, local interlocutors may not immediately understand what they have to gain by meeting with Civil Affairs Officers, particularly given that the mission does not bring programme resources to bear. It is important to be able to explain the ways in which the peacekeeping mission can benefit local communities – beyond what is hopefully an improved security environment – and to demonstrate the added value of establishing regular contact through civil affairs. This includes:

- Sharing information;
- Providing advice, support and training;
- Convening or facilitating meetings involving various local and international stakeholders;
- Linking local needs and national programmes;
- Mobilizing other actors or resources to support local needs; and
- Supporting local actors to participate in the political process.

One tool that can be useful, in some circumstances, in building relationships is Quick Impact Projects or QIPs (see [chapter 12](#)). If identified and implemented in a collaborative manner with local partners, QIPs can open doors to wider cooperation with important actors. It is important to remember that QIPs are a tool for confidence-building, and not an end in themselves.

**Interlocutors may suffer “meeting fatigue”**

Civil Affairs Officers should coordinate with other international actors to ensure that local interlocutors are not barraged by excessive meeting requests. If effective information-sharing arrangements are established it may be possible to plan out who should hold day-to-day meetings, which meetings can be conducted jointly and who best should step in if there is a situation that escalates or if there is a particular need for a political perspective. Civil affairs can play an important role in fostering a collaborative approach.

**Interlocutors may see you as an “outsider” who doesn’t understand the situation and/or cannot be trusted**

Interlocutors will often have preconceived ideas about what individual staff members do or do not bring with them, based on things such as their age, gender, ethnicity or nationality. This can manifest itself in many ways. Local women may be much more willing to talk about their concerns and priorities to female Civil Affairs Officers. Community representatives may be unwilling to freely share their views with a national staff member from another tribe or part of the country. Local officials may find it easier to build a rapport with Civil Affairs Officers from their own or a neighbouring country rather than one that is further afield. Some may feel that young officers, perhaps in their first UN deployment, lack credibility or experience, and should not be too vocal in public settings. Others may feel resentment towards visible disparities of wealth, such as the large UN vehicles that most Civil Affairs Officers arrive in, and may question the motives of people that have come to work in their country. Some people may have had negative experiences with your predecessors or colleagues.

It is extremely important to try to understand how you are, or might be, perceived by different interlocutors. As discussed in [chapter 5](#), part of this is about understanding and



being sensitive to the local customs, traditional and formal institutions, and the social and ethnic characteristics of the area. There are some other general rules to building credibility with interlocutors, including:

- Be consistent;
- Do not make promises that you cannot keep;
- Follow up on issues where you have committed to do so; and
- Treat information people share with you with sensitivity if need be.

A lot can also be gained through understanding how business is conducted in the context in which you are operating. For example, it may be normal for extended small talk and relaxed conversation to take place before the main issue is briefly broached and agreed at the end of the meeting, or it may be customary for everyone in the room to have the opportunity to speak in a formal session before a break is taken and the “real business” is conducted over coffee. The more you can learn and understand about how these dynamics work, from observation and by asking questions of those with experience of the context, the more successful your interactions are likely to be.

However, there may be those that have entrenched negative perceptions about you that are hard to change. It is important not to take this personally or respond angrily. In these cases judgement is needed to decide whether or not to try to counter what you feel are unfair or inappropriate views. All civil affairs staff are primarily there to represent the UN, so it may be important to try to direct the focus of interlocutors to this fact rather than automatically bowing to perceptions based on factors such as gender, age or nationality. However, there may be times in which it simply makes sense for another member of the team to participate in a certain meeting, or to take on a more active role in a particular situation. In fact the capacity for flexibility is one of the great strengths of a diverse team. There are no hard and fast rules on these issues. Ultimately the best approach is to try to strike a balance and to maintain a focus on how the end goals of the relationship can best be achieved.

#### **Interlocutors may have highly negative or emotive messages to deliver**

In many circumstances, Civil Affairs Officers are the only representatives of the international community that local interlocutors have the opportunity to meet directly. Some may feel resentful towards the international community and take the opportunity to express this. Some may be traumatized as a result of conflict or feel anxiety about the future or the slow pace of progress. Others may have something to gain politically by publicly taking a position against the UN. In any given context, Civil Affairs Officers should prepare in advance how they can constructively respond to expected criticisms. It is important to recognize that sometimes angry complaints about the UN might be entirely legitimate. Again, it is important not to take these issues personally, but to

understand that you are there as a UN representative and, as such, it is your responsibility to make sure that you understand and reflect the concerns of the interlocutor, although you may not be able to solve the problem by yourself. It is important to remain calm and consistent in the messages that you send, to demonstrate respect for the person communicating, and to show that you are taking note of their concerns and perspectives.

**Interlocutors may falsely claim to represent the views of a community**

Sometimes interlocutors put themselves forward as representing a specific constituency or community without necessarily having the backing of the people they claim to represent. They may do this to gain access to resources or prestige, or for any number of other reasons. Care should be taken to mitigate the risk of artificially creating a community representative, or of working with people who do not genuinely represent the broader interests of the community.

The first step is to be aware of how different communities constitute themselves, either formally or informally. Many civil society organizations have formally constituted management boards with elected representatives, for example. But either way it may be important to try to understand the power dynamics and the major interests involved. Depending on the purpose of the interaction and whether it is a “community” or a more formal grouping, it might be necessary to talk to different elements (in terms of age, gender, religion etc.) and to invest in finding less formal spaces where you can get different kinds of information.

**From the toolkit:**



**Working with interpreters**

While being able to communicate in the local language is desirable it is not always possible. In many cases, Civil Affairs Officers will need an interpreter when they meet and interact with local interlocutors. Given that communication is such a crucial part of civil affairs work, relying on someone else to filter this interaction brings both opportunities and risks.

**Opportunities:**

- The interpreter is usually more knowledgeable than you about local cultural habits and customs and can alert you to potential communication problems and help you to formulate your message in a way that is more effective and accessible.
- If the interpreter is acceptable to the local interlocutors, s/he can be an important entry point to build confidence with that group or community.

- The interpreter may filter some of your language and make it more culturally sensitive rather than provide a literal translation if it may cause uneasiness with your interlocutors.

**Risks:**

- The person interpreting may not be a professional interpreter and may only provide approximate translations of your words, running the risk of your message getting twisted.
- It is not uncommon that the interpreter becomes the interviewer and starts answering questions instead of interpreting them. Sometimes this works very well – if the interpreter has the right skills and knowledge – but in other cases they may not conduct the discussion in the way you had planned.
- Relatedly, the interpreter might feel uncomfortable with your tone, choice of words or the message you wish to convey and may decide to adapt it to a message s/he believes to be more acceptable without telling you.
- You may assume your interpreter will filter your language to make it more culturally appropriate while s/he may do a literal translation.
- The interpreter might come from an ethnic, cultural or political background that will raise suspicions and even hostility among your interlocutors and compromise the dialogue.

**Civil Affairs Officers can do a number of things to mitigate these risks:**

- Arrange a separate meeting with the interpreter before the interlocutors get involved to discuss how you would like them to represent you. For example, do you want them to summarize and to filter culturally sensitive issues?
- Get to know your interpreter and try to assess her/his translation skills, weaknesses and strengths and particular aspects of her/his background that may be useful/detrimental in different circumstances and factor these elements into your communication strategy.
- If you are not in a position to learn the local language, show respect by learning a few words to greet your interlocutors at the beginning and end of a meeting.
- Try to learn to recognize the local communication formalities, styles and norms.
- Use simple language and break down your message to a manageable length.
- Do not continue speaking until the interpreter has clearly finished translating.
- Avoid using slang and idioms, instead choose words that are commonly known.
- Depending on the level of trust you have in your interpreter and the sensitivity of the communication, you can provide longer messages that the interpreter will summarize or short sentences that will need to be translated word for word.
- Your intonation and your body language are also part of the message that you are delivering through the interpreters and you need to remain aware of this.
- Listen carefully to your interlocutors and do not hesitate to ask for confirmation of understanding if needed.
- If you are obliged to use an interpreter that is not well accepted by your interlocutors, tailor your message appropriately and avoid all sensitive matters.
- Help your interpreter to find alternative “appropriate” translations of key issues, phrases and terms that will be used often.

Box 9.3 From the toolkit: Working with interpreters

## 9.2. Information-gathering

The long-term success of UN peacekeeping operations hinges on their ability to reach out beyond the politics of the capital city in post-conflict settings, and to both understand and respond to the societal dynamics that determine whether a peace process is ultimately tenable countrywide. Their ability to do this will depend not only on the quality of the dialogue that Civil Affairs Officers have established with local interlocutors, as discussed above, but also on how skilled Civil Affairs Officers are at understanding what information the mission needs from this dialogue, as well as how to provide it in a way that has an impact.

Civil affairs components gather information on, monitor, analyse and report about a range of issues, such as conflict drivers, perceptions of the mission, its mandate and the peace process, institutional capacities and gaps, and the political relationship between the centre and the periphery.

In essence, information-gathering is primarily carried out to help the mission, as well as partners, to understand the situation at the local level so that they can monitor the effectiveness of strategies and operations and plan accordingly. The information that is gathered and analysed by civil affairs may contribute to baseline data on the country or feed into reports. An archive of reports and analysis also helps to promote a common understanding of the situation, allows for the analysis of trends over time and ensures institutional memory. Reporting skills, tools and good practice are discussed in detail in [section 9.3](#).



One-on-one meeting with a local NGO, DRC

## From the toolkit:



### Assessing your information needs and gaps

- **What type(s) of information is needed?** How will it be used and for what purpose?
- **What information or data is already available?** Or is being collected within your team and section, other mission components (including uniformed components)? What can be gathered through existing external sources, such as studies or surveys conducted by NGOs, research institutes or UN partners, statistics compiled by UN, government or international or national partners?
- **What is the quality of the existing information?** Is it accurate? Are there systematic biases or gaps in the existing information? What is missing? This should cover not just which “facts” are missing, but also which perspectives and opinions might be missing.
- **Do the existing data-gathering tools capture the different opinions?** Are the different needs or opinions of women, men, minorities or excluded groups included? If not, how can this be achieved?
- **How can the information gaps be filled?** Who or what might be the best sources and what might be the best techniques?
- **Is there a need to make new contacts or employ new tools and techniques?**
- **Are there sensitivities around the type of information generated or the process of gathering?** This includes the risk of endangering those who share information or gather the information, sociopolitical sensitivities (e.g. collection of information about natural resource ownership, access and allocation, as well as religion or ethnicity, can be viewed with suspicion in countries where identity has been part of the conflict) and the danger of raising expectations.
- **How will the information be managed and analysed?** Is there capacity and a system to adequately organize, manage and analyse the information that is gathered?
- **How will it be shared with the relevant people?**

Box 9.4 From the toolkit: Assessing your information needs and gaps

#### Information needs and information-gathering techniques

There are many kinds of information, data and analysis that may be useful to different audiences. This being the case, the type of information and the mechanisms for sharing it should be identified in advance, and agreed by managers and relevant stakeholders to avoid wasted effort. Knowing what information is being collected for whom, and why, is essential.

Using a diverse range of information sources and information-gathering techniques (data triangulation) can help to prevent bias and can improve the quality and validity of analysis. Using a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches and techniques can be particularly useful. There are many potential ways to collect information, such

## From the toolkit:



### Gathering information through one-on-one meetings or interviews

- **Know all you can** about the people and the situation before the meeting (especially when visiting vulnerable communities).
- **Plan your approach.** What is your objective? What questions are appropriate? Plan ahead for delicate issues or tense responses.
- **Consider the local cultural context**, including different cultural meanings, taboos or sensitivities.
- **Think about who from civil affairs attends.** It can be helpful to go in a team of two so that one person can establish a rapport and ask questions while the other keeps track. Having two people also allows you to double-check your judgement of the content afterwards. However, in some situations it may be more appropriate to have a one-to-one meeting. Whether going as a team or as an individual, it is important to consider age, gender, seniority etc. (as discussed in [section 9.1](#)) when establishing who should attend.
- **The location** can affect the quality of the interview: some situations require privacy. Some local interlocutors may also have security concerns.
- **Keeping a record.** In most sensitive situations, audio recording will not be considered appropriate. More often you will take notes but in some settings, even taking notes may seem too sensitive. If you cannot take notes write down the key points immediately afterwards and, if you are with other colleagues, discuss what you heard.
- **Starting a meeting or interview.** Put the person you are meeting at their ease from the start. Always introduce yourself, explain the mandate (don't assume people know your mission, mandate or identity) and the purpose of your visit if this has not been established in advance.
- **Informed consent.** Anyone volunteering information has a right to know how you will use their information, and they have the absolute right to share or withhold information based on that knowledge. This is called informed consent. They may be putting themselves at risk in sharing certain information, and they must be in a position to judge whether to take such a risk.
- **Establish expectations about outcome.** Don't raise hopes unrealistically. For example, if your counterpart incorrectly believes that talking with you is more likely to get them material assistance, this does not constitute informed consent.
- **Wrapping up.** Re-emphasize how the information will be used and make sure they know what to expect from you (for example, referrals, feedback, follow-up etc.). Establish a mechanism to keep in touch if needed.

Box 9.5 From the toolkit: Gathering information through one-on-one meetings or interviews

as monitoring local media (e.g. community radio stations), monitoring food prices in the markets to identify trends, analysing census records (where they exist), conducting public opinion surveys, accessing pre-existing research available online or with other actors, and mining earlier reports from the civil affairs office. It is important to invest time into investigating the many kinds of information that may be available in the context that you are working in. One of the most common ways of collecting information is through interviews, discussed in [box 9.5](#).

### **Maintaining baseline information about the operating environment**

Some civil affairs components collect and maintain some kind of “profile” of villages, towns or districts within the mission’s areas of responsibility. This can be used as a basic reference point for the mission. Part or all of the information may also be used by international partners and sometimes by local authorities, who may not have this kind of information in consolidated form, as well as by local journalists and civil society organizations. This systematic way of gathering and storing information can be useful for a range of purposes – particularly if regularly updated.

### **From the toolkit:**



### **Examples of county, state or district profiles**

Various kinds of information can be included in profiles:

- Map(s)
- Topography and demographics (geographical area, population, regional capital, large towns, ethnic groups)
- History and major events during recent conflict
- Economic structure and conditions (production, services, agriculture, availability and access to natural resources, trends in food prices, employment, state of infrastructure, human resources and education)
- State – or other level – constitution
- Local executive (structure of governor's office, state ministries, county commissioners – including information on gender, party affiliation and contact details)
- Local judiciary (courts and post holders with contact details)
- Legislative assembly (leadership of the assembly, members of the assembly, committee structure and leadership – including contacts, party affiliation and gender)
- State – or other level – legislation passed and pending
- Local representation in regional and national assemblies
- Information on elders, traditional authorities, religious organizations, NGOs and other civil society groups

Box 9.6 From the toolkit: Examples of county, state or district profiles

### Researching specific issues

Civil Affairs Officers may also investigate or collect information about a specific issue at the local level. Often information collected by civil affairs will feed into JMAC at the central level. Because of their countrywide coverage, civil affairs are well placed to help build up an accurate and detailed picture on a specific issue, as in the example from Nepal described in [box 9.7](#).

#### Case study



### Mapping conflict transformation institutions in Nepal

In the drawdown phase of UNMIN in Nepal, the civil affairs component undertook a mapping activity to identify challenges to the peace process at the local level, as well as opportunities for local institutions to address them. The information was intended for partners, including the UNCT and INGOs as well as governmental authorities and national NGOs.

The five regional offices undertook this work following a common methodology over a one-month period in June 2008. Information was collected about the following issues:

- Vulnerable groups, such as marginalized communities, women;
- Land issues;
- Conflict-related issues (such as water rights);
- Displaced persons;
- Human rights;
- The media, including freedom of expression; and
- Public security issues, including protection.

Conflict transformation institutions (CTIs) that worked on these issues in their local area were then identified, including:

- Village elders or informally functioning village Panchas;
- Local community-based conflict mediation mechanisms;
- Religious elders (or ex-senior officials);
- NGO or community-sponsored groups;
- Court, legal system and other administrative procedures, and;
- Intervention or assistance/investigation by international organizations.

Civil affairs tracked the various mechanisms that these institutions used to try to transform conflict, including: public awareness campaigns, investigations, rallies/campaigns, media, and formal and informal dispute resolution. The outcome was an annotated mapping of functioning CTIs at regional and district level for use by partners who would continue to support peace consolidation after the mission left.

Box 9.7 Case study: Mapping conflict transformation institutions in Nepal



### Early warning and protection of civilians

As well as mapping processes, such as those described above, civil affairs may be called on to provide an early warning function on conflict at the local level – particularly in relation to the protection of civilians. MONUSCO has developed some innovative approaches to this (see [box 9.8](#)), which will be evaluated by stakeholders to assess their potential for replication elsewhere.

#### Case study



### Early warning and protection of civilians in DRC

In MONUSCO, civil affairs plays a key role in the joint coordination mechanisms for protection of civilians and in the development of innovative protection tools, including:

#### 1. Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs)

CLAs, who are part of the civil affairs component, are deployed alongside the UN military in remote strategic localities in eastern provinces to identify risks and develop locally tailored protection responses. CLAs monitor protection plans, provide other mission actors with regular information, and hold monthly briefings together with substantive and military components at the provincial level.

#### 2. Joint Projection Teams (JPTs)

JPTs analyse local protection dynamics, improve relations between the mission and local communities and develop local protection plans. JPTs consist of a range of mission actors (child protection, political affairs, human rights, public information, UNPOL) and are coordinated by civil affairs.

#### 3. Community Alert Networks (CANs)

In response to requests from local communities to improve their early warning capacity, MONUSCO launched the Community Alert Network (CAN) initiative. The initiative enables local people in isolated areas in eastern DRC to contact relevant authorities through MONUSCO's Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) in order to report threats to their communities and request intervention when required. It reinforces local protection capacity by enhancing communication mechanisms through the distribution of mobile telephones. The CAN system has had a catalytic effect, giving momentum to a number of other early warning initiatives, including a VHF radio project which is being implemented by a partner NGO and which will be linked to the MONUSCO initiative.

Box 9.8 Case study: Early warning and protection of civilians in DRC

### **Gathering information about the concerns, priorities and perceptions of the population**

Another key issue about which civil affairs components collect information is the perceptions of the local population, as well as their priorities and concerns. This is a very important task as most of the information that is fed into the mission is based on the voices of national-level political actors. Civil affairs plays a unique role in trying to make sure that the concerns and priorities of all communities and interest groups are also heard. Much information can be gathered through regular meetings with local interlocutors, however, additional techniques and tools can be used to supplement this information when necessary. These include, for example, public opinion surveys, focus groups and public consultations.

The method, or combination of methods, for collecting information about public perceptions and priorities will depend upon the type of information required as well as the resources, capacity and skills available. Public perception surveys can be a useful means of capturing the opinions of a broader swathe of the population. They may be used to gather quantitative data, which can be useful in identifying trends, establishing baselines, monitoring trends and measuring change over time. However, public perception surveys require significant resources, specialized skills and usually need to be outsourced. Whether information is gathered directly by Civil Affairs Officers or commissioned by the mission, the ethics and sensitivities around information collection in post-conflict environments should be kept in mind.

#### **Case study**



#### **Public consultation forums in Liberia**

UNMIL civil affairs in Liberia facilitated a series of consultative forums with local officials, civil society and community representatives in 15 counties. Topics included reconciliation, peacebuilding and conflict resolution issues. During the consultations, complex issues surrounding identity and citizenship, land, religion and governance were raised and discussed. This yielded important information for civil affairs on themes such as ethnic identity and land disputes and helped UNMIL to gauge the pulse of local communities. The forums went beyond simple venues for sharing information. The need to develop sustainable peace structures was identified through this process and a key eventual output was the establishment of County Peace Committees.

Box 9.9 Case study: Public consultation forums in Liberia

## Case study



### Public perception surveys in Lebanon

In 2007, UNIFIL initiated a series of public perception surveys in order to address possible apprehension about its new mandate and increased troop strength. The surveys also explored issues of security, people's needs and concerns, and the perceived source and impact of aid and humanitarian assistance. The project was managed by civil affairs and funded through the UK Government's Global Conflict Prevention Pool and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A Lebanese consultancy undertook fieldwork, data entry and analysis. The survey questionnaire was developed by UNIFIL (civil affairs, political affairs and public information) with technical support from the consultant. Information was gathered through face-to-face interviews conducted by Lebanese field workers in the UNIFIL area of operations.

Surveys were conducted at regular intervals (every two to three months) over a three-year period. Findings of the first survey were taken as a baseline of public opinion upon which changes and developments were measured. These trends were analysed in the context of the broader sociopolitical and media environment of Lebanon and UNIFIL's own activities. Civil affairs delivered regular briefings on the survey findings to senior mission leadership, military peacekeepers and ambassadors of troop contributing countries (TCCs).

These surveys helped UNIFIL to monitor public perceptions of progress in relation to key aspects of the mission's mandate through local assessments of security, perceived impacts of the mission, evaluations of UNIFIL's support to the national army and perceived sources of security in south Lebanon.

Surveys were particularly useful in guiding community outreach and public information activities. For example, UNIFIL was able to gain a detailed view of the reach and impact of public information initiatives, such as the Arabic-language magazine, TV spots and documentary. Information gathered, analysed and shared through this initiative helped to guide mission strategy in a number of key areas, and provided key insights into local perceptions for both mission leadership and peacekeepers on the ground.

Box 9.10 Case study: Public perception surveys in Lebanon

#### Collecting data about the progress or impact of overall mission operations

Civil affairs may be called upon to collect a variety of baseline information from the local level to monitor progress against mission-wide benchmarks.

As noted in [chapter 5](#), civil affairs might also play a role in monitoring the *unintended* social, economic and environmental consequences of mission operations. Again, there will be many possible sources of data for this, depending on the context and area of focus. Civil affairs can play an "early warning" role through alerting the

mission to negative unintended impact of the mission based on feedback from local communities. Further information on the economic and environmental impacts of missions can be found in the **Recommended resources** section at the end of this chapter.



Benchmarking can be understood as a type of monitoring process that uses a benchmark as a reference point against which change and progress can be measured. A benchmark, from this perspective, can be seen as a target that has been predefined and is used to track and assess how much progress has been made towards achieving it. Information about developing benchmarks at the macro level in UN peacekeeping can be found in *Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking* (UN, 2010).

### 9.3. Reporting

The most common way in which information is shared is through reports. Reports are a major vehicle for Civil Affairs Officers to make an impact, yet this opportunity can easily be missed if the key points are lost in too much irrelevant detail, or not enough explanation is given of why the information is important.

Civil Affairs Officers produce a range of reports, including daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly situation reports, as well as thematic reports and records of meetings, events or incidents. Civil affairs components sometimes produce Code Cables and often provide input to Reports of the Secretary-General. The structure and frequency of internal reporting tends to vary from one mission to another. It is therefore important that Civil Affairs Officers familiarize themselves with procedures and templates within the mission as well as DPKO/DFS guidance on reporting and correspondence.

It is very important to remember that most reports are not meant to provide an account of your activities or to justify your work – this is done on an individual level through regular performance appraisals (ePas) and at the management level through RBB. However, good-quality reporting – reporting that provides the recipient with the information and analysis they need in a well-written and persuasive way – always gets noticed.

Reporting needs will vary in different contexts and in addition to the general guidance on the following pages, civil affairs managers in most missions will produce additional guidance for staff on how and what to report in order to meet these needs, as in the example from DRC in **box 9.14**.

## From the toolkit:



### Step 1: Preparing to write your report

Before starting to draft your report, ask yourself the following:

- **What is the purpose?** Is it to inform, explain, persuade, elicit information, instruct, record, or several of these?
- **Is there a mission-specific/ DPKO template or guidelines for this type of report?** For example, mission templates for daily, weekly or monthly reports, DPKO/DFS templates for Code Cables etc.
- **What are the most important points I want to communicate?** Why?
- **What is the significance of the events I am reporting?** Do they fit into a broader analysis? How are these events relevant to the mandate and objectives?
- **Who will read the report?** What do they already know or understand? For example, if shared analysis has not already been established, reports require more context and a brief outline of the significance of factors or dynamic being discussed.
- **Make an outline showing the structure and key content of the planned document** that includes key events that must be reported, summary analysis of what these events mean, key conclusions or recommendations. Make sure that your report will say **who** did **what, how, when** and **where** and **why**.

Box 9.11 From the toolkit: Step 1: Preparing to write your report

### Step 2: Writing your report

Based on the outline, write the first draft of the report bearing in mind the following:

- **Use language that is straightforward**, easy to read and appropriate for the intended audience. Avoid emotive language.
- **Use short sentences**. If you combine independent points into one sentence, it can be confusing. Look for ways to separate them into shorter sentences that are easier to read.
- **Stick to one topic per paragraph**. Expressing too many concepts in one paragraph can be distracting for a reader.
- **Use the active voice where possible**. Don't say that "a meeting was convened by the authorities"; it might sound more formal and sophisticated, but it actually just demands more effort from the reader. Instead say that "the authorities convened a meeting".

- **Get the facts right: clarify sources and reliability of data.** There is no room for approximations. Always indicate the source of information and which points are opinions and which are second-hand and have not been verified. If you are referring to figures, use only those provided by reliable and legitimate sources; if you relate incidents make sure you have all the facts and go back to your sources to clear up any doubts you might have. It is important to use phrases such as “reportedly” when someone else has related the information, “allegedly” when the information is largely based on rumours, or “according to local media” to clearly refer to the source of the information.
- **Substance vs. form.** When reporting about meetings or events, don’t dwell on insignificant details but instead report what was discussed and why it is important. Report the decisions that were taken and the follow-up actions. Substantiate your observations: for example, it is not very useful to say that the participants were satisfied if you cannot explain how you came to that conclusion and what they were satisfied about.
- **Provide analysis.** Do not simply deliver information and updates on activities without providing any explanation of why these are relevant, or how what is happening at the local level may impact on broader conflict dynamics. It may sometimes be important to reflect on the mood and perceptions of local actors while also looking at trends and how events or issues raised are relevant to the bigger picture.
- **Mainstream gender.** Include, where relevant, gender-related issues, priorities and concerns. Where possible and relevant include sex-disaggregated data. Avoid referring to women solely as “victims” or “vulnerable” and ensure that their role as actors or participants is also acknowledged where this is the case.

Box 9.12 From the toolkit: Step 2: Writing your report

### Step 3: Reviewing your report

Review your report considering the following:

- **Are the most important points clearly highlighted?**
- **Is there a logical flow to the points?**
- **Are the facts accurate?** Are you sure the report is not exaggerating or perpetuating rumours?
- **Is the description of events or analysis brief and to the point?** (Don’t include details that are not necessary for understanding the key points.)
- **Is there sensitive or confidential material?** Is there anything that could put a people at risk? Even confidential reports can fall into the wrong hands: do not name victims or witnesses and, in general, avoid individual names and instead refer to titles and functions, unless the name is critical to understanding the information.

Box 9.13 From the toolkit: Step 3: Reviewing your report

## Case study



### Keeping reporting on track in DRC

The checklist below was provided to staff in 2007 as part of the MONUC civil affairs component's reporting guidelines to help them make sure that their reporting was relevant and useful.

REPORTING CHECKLIST	YES?	THEN...
Is the report in line with one of the 3 pillars of the civil affairs workplan?	yes	continue
Is this information of a humanitarian nature?	yes	do not include – send to OCHA copied to civil affairs in Kinshasa
Is this information worthy in your opinion to be discussed in a Senior Management Team meeting at Kinshasa level?	yes	continue
Is this information relevant to the achievement of peace and security in DRC?	yes	continue
Is this information the outcome of direct civil affairs involvement?	yes	continue
Is this information concerning civil affairs routine activities (e.g. trainings, briefings on mandate, regular meetings etc.)?	yes	in principle do not include unless all the other conditions are met
Is this information concerning a preparatory action, a general agreement, a statement of principles?	yes	do not include
Is this information concerning a concrete decision taken on the basis of civil affairs input with an established follow-up mechanism?	yes	great, this is what we really need -> you can make a special report out of it and it's even better
Does this information clearly specify why who did what, when, where and how?	yes	continue

Box 9.14 Case study: Keeping reporting on track in DRC

#### Focusing on outcomes and analysis

A survey of the recipients of civil affairs reports during 2010 indicated that there tended to be two key problems that were consistent with civil affairs reporting across the board:

- (i) Too much focus on activities rather than outcomes; and
- (ii) Not enough analysis.

In some ways, the easiest way to report is simply to write a detailed chronological account of every meeting held. However, reports like these are very long and tend to be extremely boring to read. While the level of detail needed about context will vary in

different situations, and guidance should be provided in mission about this, in general it is much more useful for the reader to hear about what was agreed (or not agreed) and why this is important.

Focus on activity <span style="color: red;">✘</span>	Focus on outcome <span style="color: green;">✔</span>	Focus on comment and analysis <span style="color: green;">✔</span>
<p>X and Y from the civil affairs team attended a meeting at 2pm on Wednesday at the municipality building between the Mayor and other representatives of the municipality as well as representatives of the A community, the B women’s group and the association of business owners from C. Representatives from UNDP, UNICEF and the Danish Refugee Council were also present. The Mayor opened the meeting, welcoming everyone that was present. He explained that the purpose of the meeting was to talk about development needs in the municipality and asked all the participants to be brief in their comments. The first person to speak was X from Y, who said that his organization was very happy to have been invited.... [etc. etc.]</p>	<p>Agreement was reached today between the Mayor of X and key civil society representatives on the establishment of a provincial development platform. This will convene monthly and will have the following members and responsibilities...</p>	<p>Business leaders were particularly vocal in the discussion, providing many of the key ideas. Their presence at the meeting, after a long period of indifference to the work of local government in X, is a further indication of the growing credibility of the local administration over recent months.</p>

Identifying and commenting in a concise way on what is important about local-level events, conditions and dynamics can be challenging, and yet this is the kind of analysis that is most sought after by the readers of civil affairs reports and the ability to do it is a skill well worth developing.

One good way to approach this task is through reference to a prior analysis of the conflict, as discussed in [chapter 8](#). Having already established the key driving factors and their relationship with each other, it is easier to identify which information might



shed light on these dynamics. You might find information which does one of the following things:

1. **Reinforces the analysis:** e.g. “In line with our existing understanding of popular perceptions about the local administration, the community representative declined to participate in the meeting, saying that she refuses to recognize the local government because they do not provide any services to her village.”
2. **Indicates potential flaws in the analysis:** e.g. “The evidence from public opinion surveys shows that the population of X believe local land disputes to be the main reason for conflict in the area, with almost no emphasis placed on problems that might be caused by political activity in neighbouring countries. This is a surprising outcome that will require further investigation and potentially a re-examination of our overall understanding and approach to local-level conflict management.”
3. **Demonstrates a change in the dynamics (either improvement or deterioration):** e.g. “The regional heads of both political parties participated in the final panel discussion – engaging in debate with each other as well as taking a number of questions from the floor. This is the first time that they have appeared in public together, and this, together with the lively exchange, is a good sign that space for political discussion is opening up following the series of public meetings organized by civil affairs over the past year. We expect a positive effect on the upcoming elections in terms of increased voter awareness, but also potentially in terms of reduced conflict, given that a non-violent means to express political difference is now available.”

Providing ongoing local-level conflict analysis to the mission or UN presence overall is much easier where the mission or UN has an explicit overarching conflict analysis that Civil Affairs Officers and components can reference in their reporting. They can use it to explain how local dynamics, events, actors and conditions impact – or shed new light on, or confirm or contradict – the key driving factors and dynamics. Either way, it can support the reporting process enormously to maintain an updated conflict analysis of the *local* area, including analysis of what the dynamics are between the national and local levels, so that changes in the environment – or outside it – that influence the dynamics are much more obvious.

Of course, groundbreaking information does not emerge every day. Where the environment is fairly stable, it can be an opportunity for Civil Affairs Officers to provide thematic reports, looking more deeply at specific dynamics or actors.

Finally, Civil Affairs Officers, like anybody else in the mission, may change duty station, rotate or move on to other missions or elsewhere. It is critical that they do not keep the knowledge that they have accumulated during their service to themselves. They should make it available to those that come after them through well-archived reports

and notes to the file that will allow fellow Civil Affairs Officers to work in a continuum and not to have to start from scratch at every rotation or change in duty station.

## 9.4. Coordination with partners

Civil Affairs Officers are frequently tasked to work in coordination with other actors towards common objectives. Sometimes this requires participation in multi-lateral coordination structures, while in other cases it calls for a leadership role as a “coordinator” of other actors in short or longer term initiatives. Coordination needs arise frequently among mission actors, including UN military, UN police and other civilian components, as well as with development and humanitarian actors in the UNCT. In addition, there are often benefits to coordination with international and national NGOs as well as local and national authorities.

Coordination is a complex and multi-faceted process, with objectives ranging from simply sharing information and analysis among partners to negotiating decisions and implementing joint activities. Civil Affairs Officers work in many formal coordination structures, including Protection Working Groups, inter-agency coordination meetings, regional mission headquarters meetings and so on, each with different objectives and modes of operation. Given the essential problem-solving nature of civil affairs work, other less structured ad hoc coordination efforts aimed at specific contextual objectives are also common.

In order to engage effectively with this diverse range of possible coordination functions and structures, the Civil Affairs Officer needs to understand some of the fundamental dynamics of good coordination, which will be addressed in this section.

These include:

- Effective relationships, partnerships and teamwork;
- Negotiation and mediation skills in coordination;
- Effective decision-making processes;
- Facilitating meetings.

Any engagement in coordination has both benefits and costs for each participant. An accurate assessment and analysis of these costs and benefits for ourselves and other partners is essential to good teamwork. We need to understand why our partners are engaged in the process, and what challenges this engagement creates for them, in order to effectively work together.



### **Costs and benefits of engagement in coordination**

#### **Benefits**

- Access to information
- Avoiding duplication
- Avoiding contradiction
- Meeting objectives you cannot achieve alone
- Getting credit for shared achievements
- External appearance of unity
- Building relationships and alliances
- Efficiency (sometimes)
- Others...

#### **Costs**

- More work (meetings, communication, transaction costs)
- Compromises (accepting less than optimal agreements)
- Dependence on other actors
- Slower decisions and implementation
- Damage to relationships (if process is poor)
- Sharing credit for achievements
- Others...

### **Effective relationships, partnerships and teamwork**

Good relationships and good teamwork are the building blocks of effective coordination. In remote locations, for instance, colleagues from different organizations often develop strong personal relationships, and this can be a major contributing factor to effective teamwork. Sometimes very effective teams are constituted from a diverse range of organizational backgrounds, with different actors bringing different expertise to the table.

Any effort that Civil Affairs Officers can invest in developing one-to-one relationships with people who will be partners in coordination efforts is time well spent. These relationships develop trust and a sense of shared commitment to common goals, all of which makes coordination function more smoothly.

## From the toolkit:



### Characteristics of effective teams

- Each actor has a contribution to make, is clear about their role and contributes fully.
- The motivation and contribution of each actor is understood and respected by the others.
- A shared vision and goals are pursued.
- Open and informal communication is in place and information exchange is effective.
- Disagreement on professional issues is seen as normal and addressed without bad feelings.

Box 9.15 From the toolkit: Characteristics of effective teams

### VOICES FROM THE FIELD



Name:

**Ewa Turyk-Mazurek**

Civil Affairs Officer, UNIFIL

Civil Affairs Officer, UNDOF:  
2010–2011

Civil Affairs Officer, UNMIK:  
2002–2006

#### *“How do you build strong working relationships with military counterparts?”*

*First of all, I try to fully appreciate “where they are coming from”. There is no uniform military culture – the values, principles and even jargon differ even within the same regional (NATO, EUFOR, AU<sup>57</sup>) or international (UN) military organization. Moreover, there are even differences between various military units within one national army. Learning a bit about these helps you to navigate your way through the diversity of military cultures.*

*Depending on the level of coordination (field or HQ) I try to grasp the basics of tactical/staff work procedures. Training with the military on the specific civil-military related issues (NATO CIMIC<sup>58</sup> Centre of Excellence, UN OCHA CIMCOORD<sup>59</sup>) helped me become familiar with some military objectives, language and working tools (like fragmentary orders!). Certainly, knowing and respecting the military structure and chain of command is a must if I am to properly identify and engage with my potential ally/interlocutor. Once I am equipped with all this background knowledge and am aware of major differences between us, I can identify points of shared concern and build effective cooperation around them. In particular because of the rotation of troops it is a laborious effort to continually search for consensus in identifying issues and agreeing on common solutions.*

*Last but not least, I should warn that it does not help much to try to be like a soldier when working with military. Instead, it is better to know and appreciate the differences and build complementary relationships that take full advantage of each other’s strengths.*

Box 9.16 Voices from the field: “How do you build strong working relationships with military counterparts?”

<sup>57</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization; European Force; African Union.

<sup>58</sup> Civil military coordination.

<sup>59</sup> Civil military coordination.

### **Negotiation and mediation skills in coordination**

Each organization or actor in a coordination effort comes from a different perspective: different mandates, different objectives, different resources, and sometimes even very different ideas about what really needs to be done. We do not engage in coordination because we are all the same, but because we think we will achieve more of our own objectives that way than by working alone. A coordination process, therefore, is a negotiation among multiple actors to find a common area of agreement and collaboration.

Sometimes the different organizations have enough in common to work together on shared commitments. In other cases their objectives are quite distinct, but there is a *quid pro quo* process, “You help me towards my objectives and I’ll help you towards yours.” In order to get the best results from any coordination you have to try to put yourself in the shoes of each partner, analysing their interests and objectives in the process. The more you understand your partners and their needs and the differences from your own needs, the more you can help each other to meet these diverse objectives. Ask yourself, “What can they get out of coordinating with me/us? Can they do better by coordinating than by working alone? How can I help them to achieve their objectives and get more out of this coordination relationship?”

To reach coordinated agreements among multiple parties, you need to identify outcomes that meet each one’s interests. In the beginning of the process there may be many contradictory positions among them, so the deeper mutual interests need to be identified through dialogue and analysis together.

Given this essential negotiation aspect of coordination, sometimes a neutral party can help diverse groups to find their points of agreement. A good coordinator is in this sense a mediator, who:

- Encourages participation and buy-in from parties whose absence would obstruct others;
- Helps the different parties to look behind their positions and identify interests that might be shared with others;
- Uses a problem-solving approach to overcome obstacles to agreement.

In many multi-party coordinations, however, there is no neutral coordinator – the coordinating function is more often than not fulfilled by someone who is also representing their own organization’s agenda. When this happens, the coordinator has an obligation to be transparent and objective, putting aside her/his own institutional agenda to serve this function. The coordinator should try to be an honest broker among others, representing the good of the collective. But if s/he feels it is essential for

her/his own institution that s/he stands up for its interests, this change of hats should be explicit: “Stepping out of the coordinator role for the moment, I need to point out some of the concerns of my institution...”

**Effective decision-making processes**

Even if the coordinating partners have a great deal in common and do not face negotiation obstacles, there is still a risk of failure in coordination efforts unless there are effective decision-making and meeting processes in place. Civil Affairs Officers need skills and practice in consensus-building, group process, meeting management, leadership and listening skills in order to ensure that the coordination processes they engage with are effective.

One of the most frequent mistakes made in coordination processes is that too many expectations are placed on group coordination meetings, as if this were the only tool available for making coordination happen. *Coordination is not a meeting.* There are different stages in any coordination process, and they do not all most effectively occur in a group meeting.

**From the toolkit:**



**Different stages in coordination decision-making processes – and tools available**

**STAGES**

- Information-sharing
- Prioritization of issues to work on together
- Constructing proposals for consideration
- Resolving disagreements
- Collective action decisions
- Monitoring and evaluation of results

**TOOLS**

- Written documents
- Shared databases
- E-mail
- Telephone
- One-on-one bilateral discussions
- “Shuttle diplomacy”
- Small working groups (formal or informal)
- Coordination meetings Small working groups (formal or informal)
- Coordination meetings

Box 9.17 From the toolkit: Different stages in coordination decision-making processes – and tools available

The “coordination meeting” is only one of the available tools, and it is not necessarily the best approach to all of the stages of the process. Information-sharing can usually be done in a more time-saving manner through the sharing of written documents among partners. The construction of proposals for consideration is often far more effectively done by an individual or a small working group, after getting input from the broader group of stakeholders. Resolving disagreements or lack of consensus can often be far more effective through a series of one-on-one discussions. “Shuttle diplomacy”, for instance, is a standard mediators’ technique that can be used by coordinators, in which the coordinator meets individually with parties who have strong differences of opinion to hear them out, and then tries to construct a proposal that will be mutually agreeable. Good coordination mostly happens *before* the big coordination meeting where a decision can be taken. All the bilateral and small group work that creates an agreeable proposal must happen first.

### **Facilitating meetings**

When stakeholders in a coordination process are all together in a meeting, good facilitation is a must. The facilitator in a coordination meeting has the following functions:

- Managing group dynamics;
- Recognizing obstacles to agreement;
- Offering alternatives;
- Identifying areas of consensus;
- Setting aside one’s own agenda (the “two hat” challenge);
- Encouraging participation.

Meeting facilitation is a vital skill, not only for coordination work but for many other parts of civil affairs work, and it is a good idea for Civil Affairs Officers to seek out training and learning opportunities to develop it.

### ***Common coordination and meeting challenges***

There are a range of common problems that arise in coordination processes. Some are related to the negotiation challenge, others to the decision-making and facilitation processes.

**Imbalance of power biasing the process.** Depending on the topic or decision, different organizations will have differing levels of influence and expectations of control, and these differences are legitimate. However, a good facilitator will monitor whether a few participants are excessively imposing their will over others, and will try to make the



Joint Protection Team in action, DRC

balance of interests and influence as transparent as possible and ensure a fair level of participation by those who feel less powerful.

**Conflicts of interest.** Frequently the outcomes of a coordination process have consequences that go beyond the intended external impact on a shared problem. Coordination decisions can affect different organizational budgets and access to funding, individual reputations and workplans, and more. These kinds of factors create conflicts of interest which must be managed very carefully. Conflicts of interest are not intrinsically bad but rather a logical consequence of complex institutional structures. Participants themselves should try to be transparent and objectively acknowledge their own interests and those of their organization, and a facilitator should keep an eye out for when hidden interests are biasing a discussion or decision.

**Weak participation.** Sometimes the key partners necessary to a coordination process are not showing up, or not actively participating in discussion, or sending representatives who have no authority to debate or take decisions. A coordination group needs to monitor whether the motivation for these weaknesses in participation are circumstantial and easily resolvable (for example, by ensuring the meetings are scheduled conveniently), or whether there are deeper problems of motivation or resistance to joint collaboration that need to be resolved. A good facilitator will insist that a group



acknowledge when the levels of participation are insufficient for legitimate coordinated decision-making.

**Lack of shared objectives.** Sometimes coordination structures are created with such a diverse range of institutions that they do not have enough in common to effectively work together on concrete collaborative projects. These situations often result in a process that limits itself only to the sharing of information, in which organizations share facts and analysis of situations, or update each other on their own activities.

**Unwillingness to share information.** Within missions, for example, individuals or components may wish to be the ones to have the “exclusive” report on a particular event or issue. Actors outside the mission may resist sharing information with political and/or security actors, out of concern for jeopardizing their operations and the security of their beneficiaries and personnel. Some programme actors, such as NGOs, may have a built-in disincentive for sharing information, as they might be in competition with each other for resources from the same donors. In these instances, there are a number of different strategies that Civil Affairs Officers can try:

- Focus on building trust and developing personal relationships;
- Ensure that credit is always attributed appropriately;
- Generate as much focus as possible on the larger shared goals and vision behind the work;
- Understand the incentives and disincentives behind cooperation for different actors (and focus on the incentives);
- Recognize the minimum required level of information exchange and institute formal mechanisms to guarantee it; and
- Focus on building teams composed of actors that have a readiness to work together.

**Unclear meeting objectives.** A coordination meeting can only be efficient if its objectives are clear in advance, in order to ensure the correct participation of partners and adequate preparation for decision-making. Unfortunately, this often fails to happen. For example, “regular coordination meetings” become a habit but are implemented without concrete objectives associated with each meeting. If the objective is limited, for example, to updating partners on each other’s work, then this should be specified in advance, so participants do not come with unreasonable expectations, but come prepared to share information. If the objective is to reach a decision about something, participants must also know this in advance so they can come with sufficient preparation and authority to take decisions. Meetings without explicit objectives tend to be poorly facilitated and inefficient.

**Group is too big.** If there are too many participants, the average level of participation is greatly reduced. Frequently in these situations, a few participants dominate the process and the others mostly observe. If everyone tries to participate adequately, discussion processes take too long and processes do not finish. Facilitators of coordination processes should propose methodologies that limit the number of people in a given group discussion, and yet also give an opportunity for input to all participants who have a stake in the decision. As with some of the other challenges, the frequent result of this problem is that coordination meetings limit themselves to only sharing information, and cannot move to the stage of joint decision-making.

**Agenda is too long or complex.** Because of different pressures from different stakeholders, each with different perceptions of what is most important, it can be very difficult to prioritize and limit the agendas of coordination meetings. And yet, when the agenda is unrealistic, the result will be frustration. It will either be simply impossible to finish or discussion will be rushed and lack adequate participation, which in turn will reduce the buy-in from participants to actually follow up on anything that is decided. This is why one of the most important stages in a coordination process is the initial prioritization of issues. If a coordination process does not limit itself to a reasonably small number of issues, it will have difficulty treating any of them effectively. If partners agree in advance on the prioritization, it is easier for a facilitator to exert discipline over the agenda.

**Disruptive behaviour.** Disruptive behaviour comes in many forms, both deliberate and unconscious. Some people simply talk too much or are unable to focus on a topic. Others cannot stop leaving the room for phone calls. More seriously, sometimes individual positions or conflicts of interest are leading one or more participants to take extreme and stubborn positions, blocking forward motion in the process. There are a wide range of facilitation techniques to approach these situations, and the [Recommended resources](#) section at the end of this chapter suggests places to look for these.

### *Structures and mechanisms of coordination*

Structures and mechanisms for coordination can be either ad hoc or formal and vary from one context to another. Depending on the partners, it can be extremely helpful to have formal structures and procedures for coordination agreed centrally. It is also important to identify and, if possible, build upon existing coordination structures. Local or international partners may have established coordination mechanisms before the deployment of the peacekeeping mission and, where these exist, civil affairs should seek to engage and, if necessary, augment these structures. If pre-existing coordination mechanisms of this kind do not exist, civil affairs components sometimes initiate them, especially by chairing coordination meetings.

When structures for coordination already exist, it is vital that they be assessed and constantly improved. *The existence of a coordination structure or a regular coordination meeting does not necessarily mean that effective coordination is happening.* More often than not, these structures are plagued by the problems listed above: unclear objectives, lack of focus, lack of common objectives, poor facilitation, too many actors etc. Civil Affairs Officers are problem-solvers and if a coordination structure is not achieving the desired result of joint decision-making and collaborative action, they should seek to improve the process. Just attending meetings is not enough.



In mission contexts with a significant presence of humanitarian agencies, humanitarian coordination will be structured around clusters, as per agreement in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).<sup>60</sup> This approach aims to ensure that within the international humanitarian response, there is a clear system of leadership and accountability for all the key sectors or areas of humanitarian activity. Clusters have designated lead agencies, determined by the Humanitarian Country Team (IASC Country Team), and normally in line with the lead agency arrangements at the global level.<sup>61</sup>

### Case study



#### Example of a shared benefit of coordination: The JPTs in DRC

MONUSCO established Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) as a coordinated process for assessment and response to the complex protection needs of communities – needs that demand responses from multiple actors.

JPTs are drawn from all MONUSCO components (political affairs, human rights, child protection, public information and UNPOL) and are usually coordinated by civil affairs. JPTs gather and exchange information, define protection priorities and make recommendations regarding operational responses. The establishment of JPTs has helped the mission plan how best to deploy resources, and has improved civil and military knowledge and context analysis. This has in turn improved community relations and enabled the mission to better anticipate protection risks and local needs.

JPTs are an example of how a coordinated approach can achieve a better outcome for all actors: combining the complementary logistical capacity of the military with the civilian capacities of the substantive sections and humanitarian actors to come up with more integrated responses.

Box 9.18 Case study: Example of a shared benefit of coordination: The JPTs in DRC

<sup>60</sup> The IASC is the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance. It is a unique forum involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. It was established in June 1992 in response to General Assembly resolution 46/182 on the strengthening of humanitarian assistance. General Assembly resolution 48/57 affirmed its role as the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance.

<sup>61</sup> IASC guidance note on using the cluster approach to strengthen humanitarian response: <http://onerresponse.info/Coordination/ClusterApproach/publicdocuments/Forms/DispForm.aspx?ID=25>.

## 9.5. Facilitation and mobilization of partners

Given that civil affairs tends to be more widely represented at the local level than other civilian mission components, it may be called upon to facilitate the work of other mission components. Civil affairs may also facilitate the work of other UN partners not represented at the local level.

Within the mission, this could include, for example, information-gathering or analysis (including early warning and needs assessment), consultation processes and delivery of messages or information to interlocutors at the local level on behalf of components represented at mission headquarters. This kind of cooperation should always be done on the basis of explicit arrangements endorsed by supervisors and managers, and bearing in mind official reporting lines, in order to reduce the risk of overlapping with other partners' functions and responsibilities.

With UNCT or other non-mission partners, facilitation can involve the kind of information-gathering or dissemination role outlined above, as well as joint initiatives in which civil affairs contributes management oversight and partners contribute programme resources. In Liberia, a mechanism called "County Support Teams" (CSTs) was set up to maximize the impact of the UN at the local level. Each team is supported by a "facilitator" – often drawn from civil affairs, and meets regularly with the County Superintendent to support their work. There are also project funds attached to this coordination mechanism, focused on capacity-building, administrative infrastructure and information management. The CST initiative is discussed further in [chapter 11](#) and [box 9.20](#) below.

Even in places where formalized structures for collaboration with the UNCT do not exist, UN instruments, such as the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) or a UN Humanitarian Plan or Appeal, often count on input from the mission at the local level. In DRC, for example, a joint UNDAF and Country Assistance Strategy (World Bank) were developed through the coordination of the UN Integrated Office under the DSRSG/RC/HC. Often an interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP) is developed in the later phases of a mission, as the country moves towards recovery and development. Civil affairs in both Sierra Leone and Liberia worked to support the local-level consultations that fed into the PRSP paper, which helped to strengthen community involvement in the development process. In southern Sudan, civil affairs has supported the UNCT at the state level by assisting in county consultations to define priorities for the Sudan Recovery Fund.

### Case study



#### Facilitating the work of other mission components in Haiti

In Haiti, in the run-up to the 10th anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, MINUSTAH civil affairs supported the work of the gender unit by compiling a countrywide study on the impact of the resolution on the implementation of MINUSTAH's mandate, as well as on the country as a whole. The study involved interviews, focus group discussions and formal data collection from a wide range of state institutions, including the Ministry of Women's Affairs and the Haitian National Police, as well as NGOs, international organizations, women's organizations, political figures and community leaders. It captured both the positive and negative impacts of the resolution and provided an assessment of progress to date and constraints encountered.

Box 9.19 Case study: Facilitating the work of other mission components in Haiti

In other instances, civil affairs may be involved in facilitating the work of UNCT, or other (usually humanitarian) actors who are present at the local level, by assisting them to access mission resources such as transport and logistics in remote areas.

The major challenge encountered by civil affairs in facilitating the work of other actors is the level of demand. The need for support often outstrips capacity and Civil Affairs Officers sometimes struggle to balance the daily requirements of their role with requests to facilitate the work of others. In these situations, it is important that realistic objectives and priorities are established through ongoing planning processes, in agreement with the Head of Civil Affairs.

### Case study



#### Good practice in the County Support Teams project in Liberia

A joint DPKO/UNDP study in 2007 identified the following good practices with the County Support Teams (CSTs) in Liberia:

- UN actors are organized around a common objective (support to local governance).
- A strong, integrated technical team coordinates from the central level.
- The project has been jointly developed with, and led by, national authorities.
- The CST structure is aligned to the objectives and plans of the national government.
- There are project funds directly attached to the coordination framework.
- UNMIL civil affairs staff have performed a cross-UN support function at the local level.

- Mission monitoring is focused on country conditions, not exclusively on mandate implementation.
- Information is collected in a format that can be owned by local authorities.
- Training for local authorities is designed and delivered jointly with national institutions.
- CST project staff are oriented and trained to effectively fulfil their functions including approaches to capacity development.

The study also identified the following success factors:

- Leadership and commitment from the highest levels, starting with the SRSG and DSRSG/RC/HC.
- The commitment of staff to the UN technical team who have very strong strategic, integrated thinking and planning skills, and who have experience of, and a strong dedication to, cross-UN collaboration.
- A high level of flexibility to accommodate evolving thinking and experience in the application of the initiative.
- A philosophy of looking at UN (mission and UNCT) assets as fully complementary when deployed side-by-side, rather than differentiated.
- The intent to promote national ownership and capacity from the beginning.

Box 9.20 Case study: Good practice in the County Support Teams project in Liberia

## Recommended resources

Name	Skillport
<b>Description</b>	A resource available to UN staff with a vast range of online skills-building courses, including: How to Write Clearly and Concisely Writing Under Pressure Writing to Persuade Business Grammar – the Mechanics of Writing Managing Effective Business Meetings Facilitating Meetings and Workgroups
<b>Source</b>	<a href="https://un.skillport.com">https://un.skillport.com</a>

<b>Name</b>	<b>Drafting and Reporting: Guidance for the Office of Operations at DPKO Headquarters</b>
<b>Description</b>	A collection of resources to support Political Affairs Officers at headquarters with report writing, including templates, tips and lists of “dos and don’ts”, many of which may be relevant for civil affairs report writing.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document on the POINT intranet: <a href="https://point.un.org/SitePages/ooresources.aspx">https://point.un.org/SitePages/ooresources.aspx</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners’ Guide to Benchmarking (UN, 2010)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Contains information about developing benchmarks at the macro level in UN peacekeeping.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/monitoring_peace_consolidation.pdf">http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/monitoring_peace_consolidation.pdf</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Peace Dividend Trust</b>
<b>Description</b>	A series of resources on the economic impact of peacekeeping can be accessed via the topic section of the Peace and Economic Library of the Peace Dividend Trust website.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.peacedividendtrust.org/en/index.php?sv=&amp;category=EIP&amp;title=EIP_library">http://www.peacedividendtrust.org/en/index.php?sv=&amp;category=EIP&amp;title=EIP_library</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Greening the Blue Helmets: Environment, Natural Resources and Peacekeeping Operations (UNEP, forthcoming)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Includes examples of the environmental impact of peacekeeping missions.
<b>Source</b>	Forthcoming on: <a href="http://www.unep.org/">http://www.unep.org/</a>

## Chapter 10 | Conflict management, confidence-building and support to the development of political space



*This chapter considers the key concepts, activities and challenges in implementing the second core civil affairs role: confidence-building, conflict management and support to the development of political space. The chapter outlines the work of civil affairs in facilitating dialogue, addressing conflict drivers, local-level conflict management and working with civil society. It includes tips, examples and good practices in the implementation of this core role.*

### 10.1. Key concepts and areas of civil affairs engagement

Conflict management, confidence-building and supporting the development of political space are integral to UN peacekeeping and central to civil affairs work. Through this role, civil affairs actively supports the development of social and civic conditions conducive to sustainable peace, and promotes popular engagement and confidence in the peace process. The 2008 DPKO/DFS Policy Directive (see [section 2.1](#)), highlights support to reconciliation as a key part of the second core role of civil affairs,



however, this chapter takes a step further – focusing on the wider issue of political space, the development of which creates the conditions for political reconciliation.

While often the lead component in this area of work, civil affairs usually undertakes these activities in partnership with other mission components, as well as UN agencies and local and international partners. Within the mission, police and military components and other civilian components, such as political affairs, public information and human rights, may all contribute in one way or another to objectives in this area.



#### Key concepts

Many of the terms used in relation to this role are used by different actors – sometimes to mean different things. Below is a summary of how these terms are usually used in the context of civil affairs work.

**Conflict management** refers to the activities undertaken to influence a conflict system in order to avoid an escalation of the conflict and prevent it from becoming violent. It is used as an overarching term by civil affairs to encompass efforts to prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict at the local level. Civil affairs uses conflict management as an overarching term to describe a range of activities, many of which are discussed in this chapter. In addition to the activities discussed in this chapter, civil affairs seeks to manage conflict through local-level liaison, and often undertakes so-called “shuttle diplomacy” to diffuse tension, prevent conflict and prepare the ground for face-to-face dialogue between groups.

**Confidence-building** describes the efforts of civil affairs components to address the population’s perceptions of the peace process and to build trust between the parties to a conflict at the local level. Confidence-building involves a range of activities aimed at creating a positive momentum for peace, while at the same time managing expectations of what the peace process can deliver. For civil affairs, confidence-building is about strategically demonstrating positive change or “peace dividends”, such as the achievement of milestones in the implementation of peace agreements or improvements in the sociopolitical or security environment. It is also about building trust between the parties to the conflict. Many of the activities discussed in this and the previous chapter help to build confidence.

**Support to the development of political space** refers to civil affairs efforts to create a space for public debate and an environment in which different stakeholders can provide input into the political process and government activities. The objective is to support the creation of an inclusive political space, promote popular participation and build credibility in the political process. As part of this role, civil affairs facilitates consultation processes and provides a platform for local populations and constituencies to input into national processes and discussions. This can help to facilitate peace processes and generate support for them at the local level. Civil Affairs Officers also provide information and promote public discussion about key issues, including electoral issues, which can help to foster stability and lay the groundwork for longer term popular engagement in institution-building. The development of political space can help to restore local confidence in the political process as a means of managing conflict.

Civil affairs engagement in confidence-building, conflict management and support to the development of political space varies from mission to mission depending on the mandate and context. A number of UN peacekeeping missions have been given specific mandates to support local conflict management, dialogue or reconciliation.

- Security Council resolution 1861 requests MINURCAT (in Chad and the Central African Republic) to “...support the initiatives of national and local authorities in Chad to resolve local tensions and promote local reconciliation efforts, in order to enhance the environment for the return of internally displaced persons”.
- Security Council resolution 1856 mandates MONUC (in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) to “...promote national reconciliation and internal political dialogue, including through the provision of good offices, and support the strengthening of civil society”.
- Security Council resolutions 1662 and 1746 mandate UNAMA (in Afghanistan) to “...provide political outreach through a strengthened and expanded presence throughout the country; provide good offices in support of Afghan-led reconciliation programmes...”.
- Security Council resolution 1769 mandates UNAMID (in Darfur) to “...facilitate the preparation and conduct of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, as stipulated in the Darfur Peace Agreement”.
- Security Council resolution 1870 calls upon UNMIS (in Sudan) to “...strengthen its conflict management capacity by completing as soon as possible its integrated strategy to support local tribal conflict resolution mechanisms”.

### **Supporting national capacities**

As the examples above illustrate, civil affairs components primarily act as enablers, supporting and strengthening local efforts and capacity to manage and resolve conflict, facilitate reconciliation, build confidence and develop political space. The *World Development Report 2011* describes conflict and violence in any society as “the combination of the exposure to *internal and external stresses* and the strength of the ‘immune system,’ or the social capability for coping with stress embodied in *legitimate institutions*”.<sup>62</sup> Many of the activities that civil affairs undertakes under this role, and the other core roles described in this Handbook, focus on strengthening the “immune system” of conflict-affected communities. While there may be situations where local institutions or mechanisms are unable to effectively manage conflict or where external actors may be best placed to provide impartial mediation support, civil affairs should always seek to identify, protect and nurture local capacity. It is important to remember

<sup>62</sup> *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development*, p. 7.

that there is often more national capacity to manage conflict than is at first apparent and Civil Affairs Officers should always start by considering the skills and expertise that local actors possess (see local ownership in [section 5.3](#)). Initiatives that fail to recognize existing structures or expertise may disempower local actors, risk “missing the mark” and are likely to be unsustainable in the long term.

In many of the fragile states in which peacekeeping missions deploy, “traditional” mechanisms for managing conflict are the primary means of dispute resolution and reconciliation at the local level. Traditional conflict management, in this context, refers to non-state mechanisms or structures for managing and resolving conflict that have been practiced over a long period of time. Traditional mechanisms may be more culturally appropriate, enjoy greater legitimacy within the community and be perceived as more inclusive than externally imposed solutions. On the other hand, they may not tackle the problems systematically and may perpetuate inequalities or run contrary to the principles of universal human rights. Civil Affairs Officers should be mindful of these tensions, which are discussed in more detail in [chapter 5](#). Extensive consultations with the widest possible range of local actors, interest groups and stakeholders can help Civil Affairs Officers to assess whether they are working with the most credible and most broadly respected local conflict management mechanisms and actors.

### Engaging civil society

Actively engaging with civil society actors as part of broader conflict management efforts is an important aspect of civil affairs work under this role. Civil society groups are rarely neutral bystanders and can act either as powerful catalysts for peace or alternatively as spoilers. Civil society organizations are often influential opinion-formers, important local interlocutors and a conduit for information about people’s needs, concerns and priorities. Forging partnerships with civil society actors can help peacekeeping missions to better understand the local environment and help to facilitate confidence-building efforts at the local level.



Civil society can be described as “the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market where people associate to advance common interests”.<sup>63</sup> Examples of civil society organizations include, but are not limited to, registered charities, non-governmental organizations, community groups, women’s organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups.

Civil affairs may work with civil society actors in a number of ways, as part of broader efforts to manage conflict and support the development of political space, and these

<sup>63</sup> Definition from CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation (<https://www.civicus.org/>).

are discussed later in this chapter. When working with civil society, Civil Affairs Officers should consider the following issues:

- Through taking a broad view of what constitutes civil society locally, Civil Affairs Officers can establish which actors or groups to engage with in order to promote stability and conditions for peace.
- Civil society organizations are not immune to political and social tensions nor are they necessarily benevolent or positive forces. Some civil society organizations may perpetuate disparities and reflect the gender, ethnic or racial inequalities of the communities they come from.
- Take care not to support or otherwise lend legitimacy to specific interest groups by virtue of whom the UN peacekeeping mission chooses to work with. It is the responsibility of Civil Affairs Officers to study and understand the dynamics in which civil society operates so that they can assist the mission with managing its relations with local civil society in the most meaningful way possible.
- Act as an “enabler” for civil society to emerge and function, but do not take a strong lead in doing so. Civil affairs can and should encourage civil society actors to understand their potential role in conflict resolution and democratic governance, but this role can only be effective if stemming from local leadership and capacity.

## 10.2. Activities, examples and tools

The activities that Civil Affairs Officers undertake under this role vary considerably from context to context. The starting point for any interventions should be careful analysis of the local context and overall conflict dynamics, as outlined in [chapter 8](#), and development of a plan that forms part of an overarching strategy. Failure to contextualize interventions or activities of this kind can diminish impact, be counterproductive to broader peacebuilding efforts and may even exacerbate conflict (see [chapter 5](#) on conflict sensitivity). The following section outlines some activities that civil affairs components undertake in support of this core role, focusing on how the activities have been carried out in a variety of real contexts.

### **Support to dialogue between groups in conflict**

Civil Affairs Officers often assist in initiating, facilitating or structuring dialogue between different groups in conflict. In some contexts, local-level dialogue feeds into or is a precursor to a national process. Civil affairs may assist with logistical support to organize and host dialogue, such as organizing the venue, and may sometimes help to develop the agenda or act as dialogue facilitators. As a general rule, Civil Affairs Officers should encourage and empower local actors to take the lead in these processes, although there may be times when they are called upon to engage more directly.

## From the toolkit:



### Supporting dialogue

- **Understand the context and assess the depths of divisions between the parties** through conflict analysis (section 8.1) and extensive consultations with participants.
- **Identify potentially difficult issues that may come up** (see box 9.2 on town hall meetings) and have a strategy to deal with them.
- **Ensure facilitators are credible in the eyes of stakeholders.** It is unlikely that dialogue will be successful if those involved in convening and facilitating the process lack credibility with participants or stakeholders. Credibility comes from knowledge of the conflict context, cultural and linguistic competency, transparency, discretion, consistency and reliability.<sup>64</sup>
- **Let participants lead the process** as they are more likely to follow up if they have ownership and control over the proceedings. This includes setting the agenda and establishing the pace and style.
- **Facilitators should, to the extent possible, keep intervention to a minimum** and provide a space in which participants do the talking. If, however, there is a high level of hostility between participants, structured, expert facilitation is required.<sup>65</sup>
- **Include participants with a broad range of perspectives.** While Civil Affairs Officers may not be responsible for selecting participants, they will often be in a position to make suggestions. To the extent possible, dialogue should incorporate a broad range of views and perspectives, not just moderates who are willing to talk. However, a careful balance should be struck as participants with extreme or hard-line positions may derail the process.<sup>66</sup>
- **Consider security and accessibility** when selecting a location for the dialogue. For example, transport or security considerations might make it difficult for some participants to attend.
- **Be mindful of how the physical set-up of a space may impact on power dynamics** between participants and be more or less conducive to dialogue. If tensions between two parties in a dialogue or reconciliation initiative are high, it is not appropriate to seat them next to each other.
- **Follow up with participants** after the event to find out what they got from the dialogue and whether they believe there have been positive changes as a result.

Box 10.1 From the toolkit: Supporting dialogue

<sup>64</sup> Mary B. Anderson & Lara Olson, with assistance from Kristin Doughty, *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners* (Reflecting on Peace Practice Project/Collaborative for Development Action, 2003), pp. 70–75.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

Dialogue can take place at many levels – local, regional and national – and may take a variety of forms. One approach that civil affairs has supported is peace conferences. The example below (**box 10.2**) outlines the approach taken by civil affairs in facilitating a peace conference in south Khordofan state to promote reconciliation and peaceful coexistence between two rival groups.

### Case study



#### Peace conferences facilitated by UNMIS Civil Affairs Officers in south Khordofan

**Planning:** Through extensive consultations with the parties, Civil Affairs Officers supported the development of the methodology and approach to be used.

**Facilitation team composition and role:** Civil affairs led the facilitation team with involvement of other partners. The team enforced ground rules, mediated when needed, clarified issues, provided guidance on peaceful co-existence to the conference participants and controlled the time and proceedings of the sessions.

**Ground rules:** Ground rules were proposed by the facilitation team and agreed by the two tribes. Rules were enforced by the facilitation team as a means of managing the process, in order to provide a healthy environment for the negotiators to handle their agenda.

**Thematic group management:** The thematic groups comprised 20 participants (10 from each side) without any intervention from the facilitation. However, as guided by the facilitation team, each group selected its facilitator, reporter and group presenter

**Development of thematic issues:** Each thematic group separately defined the issues of concern within each theme. This formed the basis for smaller groups to address the issues of concern.

**Negotiations:** There was direct interaction between the participants from each of the two tribes through discussions in three thematic groups covering specific issues. Issues were identified and agreed upon by the two tribes:

- Homicide and blood money compensation payment;
- Peaceful co-existence and development of relations; and
- Joint services for consolidating the reconciliation.

**Consensus-building and agreement:** When each thematic group reached an agreement on the issues, they signed a document detailing what they had agreed upon. Later in the peace conference, all conference participants from both tribes endorsed these agreements.

Box 10.2 Case study: Peace conferences facilitated by UNMIS Civil Affairs Officers in south Khordofan

It should be noted that while peace conferences can play an important role in conflict mitigation and management, initiatives of these kinds should not be considered a panacea – or even considered at all unless prior analysis demonstrates that they are likely to be useful. In the long term, peace conferences and dialogue initiatives need to be coupled with or lead to a more multi-pronged approach to conflict, which will usually involve collaborating with a range of partners.

Following dialogue, civil affairs can help to facilitate and support monitoring mechanisms that report regularly to all stakeholders on the progress made in relation to the agreements reached. This can also serve as an early warning mechanism that can alert stakeholders to new tensions or to a breakdown in the implementation of the agreement. Developing joint monitoring mechanisms that ensure the continued engagement of all parties in the implementation of the agreement can be a useful tool in this context.

### Case study



#### UNOCI civil affairs support to intercommunity dialogue

In response to recurring conflicts between herders and farmers that caused significant damage (murders, killings of animals, destruction of houses etc.), UNOCI civil affairs section organized an intercommunity dialogue between farmers and herders in a village located in northern Côte d'Ivoire. During preparatory meetings intended to obtain the agreement of the parties to attend the meeting, the farmers' community strongly expressed their refusal to participate by highlighting the damage caused to their fields and crops by the herders' animals.

The civil affairs component and the local authority (the Sub-prefect) jointly proposed to the farmer community that they allow the organization of a theatre session in their village. The play allowed the community to view its own reactions and responses and to perceive several ways to deal with the conflict with the herders peacefully. The theatre session also enabled the farmers to understand the emotional bond between herders and their animals and to see how the shooting down of an animal could affect a herder. At the end of the session, the farmer community decided to participate in the dialogue.

Box 10.3 Case study: UNOCI civil affairs support to intercommunity dialogue

#### Responding to threats against civilians

The role of peacekeeping missions and civil affairs in the protection of civilians was introduced in [chapter 4](#). Among other things, Civil Affairs Officers provide an early warning function and, in this regard, act as an interface between civilians under threat

## Case study



### MONUSCO: Protection work in DRC

MONUSCO's Joint Protection Teams (JPTs, introduced in [chapter 9](#)), which are often coordinated by civil affairs, have had considerable success in enhancing the protection of civilians:

- JPTs have facilitated the establishment of market and field escorts by peacekeepers in Shabunda and Walungu in South Kivu, and Kalembe and Pinga, Masisi Territory, in North Kivu.
- In Walikale, North Kivu in October 2009, JPTs facilitated access and the provision of health services by humanitarians, such as the NGO HEAL Africa who brought psychosocial and medical assistance to several dozen victims and more than 140kg of medicine and equipment to the area.
- In North Kivu in 2009, human rights-led Joint Investigation Teams – interdisciplinary teams of UN Human Rights Officers and Congolese investigators – followed up on human rights abuses (50 per cent of the cases were successfully prosecuted).
- As a result of a JPT in Shabunda, South Kivu, human rights experts were able to visit the inaccessible village of Matili, where there had been reports of human rights attacks and sexual violence.
- A JPT mission to Fizi (Fizi Territory, South Kivu) resulted in the registration of 35 women who had been raped and led to the arrest and trial of 10 members of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), including Lieutenant Colonel Mutuare Daniel Kibibi who was sentenced to 20 years in prison for crimes against humanity.

Box 10.4 Case study: MONUSCO: Protection work in DRC

of physical violence and military components, in order to enhance the capacity of the peacekeeping force to answer to protection needs. Civil affairs components in some missions have been involved in supporting local early warning capacity and coordinating protection mechanisms within the mission (see [chapter 9](#) and [boxes 10.4](#) and [10.5](#))



## Case study



### Supporting conflict resolution and early warning in Jonglei, Sudan

In South Sudan, the strong links that civil affairs established with local communities have been critical to early warning efforts. In August 2011, despite local efforts (supported by civil affairs) to resolve ongoing conflict between Lou Nuer and the Murle communities in Jonglei, the situation escalated. Civil affairs deployed with UNMISS Integrated Teams (both military and civilian components) to Lou Nuer and Murle areas to monitor developments and deter further attacks. Civil affairs supported joint efforts to negotiate a peaceful solution, including through talks with the influential local leader known as the “prophet”, who was rallying young people and preparing for a counter-offensive. When negotiations failed to de-escalate the situation, civil affairs provided early warning about potential attacks and targets to the mission leadership and local authorities. The mission responded by deploying troops to the area to protect civilians, and local authorities were able to warn communities. Although the mission’s support to local conflict resolution and prevention efforts failed to prevent an escalation, the network of local partners established by civil affairs was essential to the mission’s ability to analyse local conflict dynamics and identify threats.

Box 10.5 Case study: Supporting conflict resolution and early warning in Jonglei, Sudan

#### Addressing conflict drivers

Civil Affairs Officers sometimes aim to address structural causes of conflict by working with partners that have expertise and programme resources in this specific area. Civil Affairs Officers can play an important role in identifying interventions that reduce conflict triggers and create confidence in the peace process. Conflict drivers vary extensively from one context to another and could include access to employment, land/property disputes, environmental degradation, and competition over natural resources. These drivers tend to contribute to conflict when they overlap with other factors, such as ethnic polarization, high levels of poverty and inequity, and poor governance.

UNMIS civil affairs recognized that conflicts in southern Sudan have many underlying causes, some of which (e.g. competition for resources, such as land, water, grazing areas, charcoal production etc.) can be mitigated through well-targeted assistance. Civil affairs worked closely with UNCT partners, such as UNDP, to access funds from the Sudan Recovery Fund to address resource-based conflicts in Jonglei and three other states. UNMIS civil affairs helped the government and local authorities to identify the most compelling conflict situations and underlying causes that could potentially be mitigated through donor funding. Civil affairs worked with local residents and leaders to consolidate this information and analysis into viable state-level plans, including the monitoring of the implementation of these plans.



Returning from negotiations on a land conflict, Fishtown Beach, Liberia

### Case study



#### Civil affairs works to identify and address conflict drivers in Côte d'Ivoire through the Peacebuilding Fund

The post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire increased intercommunity tension, which led to widespread looting of government and police premises. This diminished government capacity to ensure security and deliver services, in turn fuelling further instability.

Civil affairs conducted a needs assessment with the Ministry of the Interior, UNDP, UN police and engineers, and submitted a joint proposal to the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF).

The project, which includes rehabilitation and refurbishment of government offices, police and gendarmerie buildings, as well capacity development for government officials, gendarmerie and police officers, and initiatives aimed at supporting social cohesion, was funded by the PBF.

Civil affairs and UNDP co-chair the technical committee responsible for the implementation of the project.

Box 10.6 Case study: Civil affairs works to identify and address conflict drivers in Côte d'Ivoire through the Peacebuilding Fund

### **Supporting dialogue and cooperation between government authorities and interest groups**

The efforts of Civil Affairs Officers to support dialogue and cooperation between authorities and relevant interest groups are generally focused on supporting the initial creation of a formal platform from which different stakeholders may comment on, or provide input into, government activities.

#### **Case study**



#### **Supporting dialogue in Haiti**

In Haiti, MINUSTAH civil affairs supported the mayors in convening municipal meetings with police and justice representatives and local notables, in order to address matters pertaining to security and the rule of law in the commune. Due to the presence of an external observer, usually civil affairs or other mission components, the various actors overcame some of their mutual suspicion and mistrust and were able to open dialogue on a number of practical problems. Civil affairs contributed to creating an environment in which local stakeholders understood that it was in their power to resolve some of their problems. In some cases, mayors took the initiative to call such meetings without any further assistance from the mission. Civil Affairs Officers acted as moderators to ensure that the dialogue remained focused on concrete matters rather than recriminations.

Box 10.7 Case study: Supporting dialogue in Haiti

#### **Political round tables**

While civil affairs may or may not be a principal actor in facilitating the electoral process, depending on the particular mission configuration and mandate, components should promote the acceptance of good governance principles with both current and future local officials. This can be done during local electoral campaigns by facilitating political party round tables to bring candidates together to openly discuss policy matters with the local population. These forums can go a long way in clarifying the rules of the “democratic game” and strengthen a shared vision of the responsibilities that will fall upon future local authorities. These initiatives also allow civil affairs to play a key role in monitoring the context and identifying conflict dynamics that could exacerbate electoral tensions at the local level.



### Case study

#### UNMIS civil affairs support to political round tables in Sudan

To support the development of a healthy and inclusive political space in the pre-electoral period from January to April 2010, UNMIS civil affairs worked with political parties in all 10 of the southern states to convene 25 political party round tables. The forums attracted interest from key actors: state administration, civil society, traditional leaders, and youth and women's groups.

These forums were conceived as a conflict mitigation strategy, with the idea of promoting a common understanding of electoral procedures and codes of conduct in order to avert possible electoral violence. However, they also provided smaller parties, which lacked the necessary capacity to compete with the two main parties (SPLM and NCP), with a rare opportunity to discuss their agenda for peace and to commit to not using violence during the election process.

Many states' officials openly applauded the round tables for their role in minimizing differences and averting potential conflicts between political parties, helping to ensure a secure electoral environment. Civil affairs followed up in the post-election period with UNDP's Governance Unit so that they would continue to support local forums and political party interaction.

Box 10.8 Case study: UNMIS civil affairs support to political round tables in Sudan



### Case study

#### Mainstreaming gender in the development of political space

In MINUSTAH, in preparation for the second round of presidential and legislative elections in 2011, civil affairs organized a special electoral forum for women. The aim was to mobilize women around the upcoming elections, to create a platform for dialogue and reflection about women's rights, and to formulate recommendations for lobbying and advocacy.

Box 10.9 Case study: Mainstreaming gender in the development of political space

### Engaging civil society

As discussed above, civil affairs can play an important role in supporting local civil society actors to develop conflict management at the local level and to engage in national peace processes. Supporting civil society actors to engage in national-level peace processes is an important means of enhancing public participation

## Case study



### UNAMID civil affairs supports civil society engagement in the Darfur peace process

After an expert-level Darfur mediation held in Doha in 2009, the Joint Mediation Team, UNAMID and partners agreed on the need for civil society involvement in the Darfur peace process.

Civil affairs and other UNAMID components held a series of consultations with civil society groups to facilitate the democratic selection of representatives who could raise civil society concerns in the peace process.

In order to prepare civil society representatives for a series of Doha conferences, civil affairs facilitated a number of workshops throughout Darfur on the role of civil society in the peace process. The forums brought together diverse actors and ethnic groups to focus on complex issues.

As a consequence of the forums, civil society representatives were able to articulate clear recommendations for a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement.

Box 10.10 Case study: UNAMID civil affairs supports civil society engagement in the Darfur peace process

in peacemaking. For example, as outlined in **box 10.10**, UNAMID civil affairs has supported the Darfur peace process through facilitating the engagement of civil society representatives at a series of high-level conferences in Doha.

#### **Working with partners to support local conflict management efforts**

Where necessary, civil affairs can act as a bridge between local or international organizations or NGOs that specialize in conflict management and local communities and authorities that could benefit from their advice and assistance. In this way, civil affairs can help link local communities to capacity-building or mentoring support.

Within the UN, there is also a specialized unit that provides support to mediation initiatives of the UN system, Member States, regional and subregional organizations and relevant partners. The Mediation Support Unit (MSU), is based in the Policy and Mediation Division of DPA. MSU provides support in three main areas: capacity-building; mediation guidance, lessons learned and best practices; and technical and financial support to peace processes. Information on how to contact MSU and access lessons learned and good practice can be found in the **Recommended resources** section at the end of this chapter.

## Case study



### Civil affairs supports local capacity to manage conflict in collaboration with the NGO Search for Common Ground in DRC

In response to ongoing conflict between the people of Enyele and Munzaya in Equator province of DRC, civil affairs undertook a series of activities in collaboration with the international NGO Search for Common Ground (SFCG) and UN partners.

From 2009 onwards, two years of prolonged conflict between the two communities over access to natural resources and fishing rights had resulted in more than 100 deaths, displacement of approximately 160,000 people and the destruction of hundreds of houses, shops and personal belongings.

Over the course of a year (June 2010 to May 2011), civil affairs organized five capacity-building workshops, and this was combined with intercommunity cultural and sport activities organized by partners throughout the area affected by the conflict.

A Common Action Plan (CAP), providing a road map for further activities to support peace consolidation was developed, following a series of conflict mediation workshops organized and supported by MONUSCO civil affairs, SFCG and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The CAP outlines the creation of regulations for equal access to fishing ponds by the Enyele and Munzaya communities and direct negotiations between Lobala and Boba tribes, who were at the centre of the conflict, to establish peaceful cohabitation.

The local peace consolidation process, supported by civil affairs, the provincial government and SFCG, resulted in the renewal of a pact of non-aggression between the two communities and a large festival of reconciliation.

Box 10.11 Case study: Civil affairs supports local capacity to manage conflict in collaboration with the NGO Search for Common Ground in DRC

## 10.3. Considerations, challenges and risks

Civil Affairs Officers should be aware of some of the challenges and potential risks or unintended impacts of their involvement in the process and of implementing these kinds of activities.

### **Lack of tangible “peace dividends” might mean that local actors do not see the value of participating in conflict management efforts**

Just as some local interlocutors will not immediately see the benefit of meeting with Civil Affairs Officers (see [chapter 9](#)), they may also struggle to see the value of participating in dialogue if they do not see tangible results arising from that dialogue. Results might include better security, less tension, prevention of damage to property,

better access to natural resources and land, and improved quality of life. It is therefore important that dialogue is tied to broader processes and addresses concrete issues. While initial dialogue may focus on building or restoring contact and relations between the parties, participants' interest may wane if they do not eventually address conflict triggers. While civil affairs does not have the resources or mandate to comprehensively address conflict drivers or root causes, it can help to mobilize the resources or political will to address specific issues (such as security, justice provision, natural resource management etc.). Civil affairs may advocate, through the mission structure, with government, donors, UNCT partners and mission actors, for support in addressing concrete problems raised through dialogue.

### **Bringing the parties to the conflict together may exacerbate the conflict**

One of the biggest risks in convening dialogue or reconciliation initiatives is the possibility of exacerbating conflict and damaging confidence. Lessons from practitioners indicate that poorly conceived or badly managed dialogue or reconciliation initiatives can deepen divisions and reinforce prejudice. Civil affairs, whether in a supportive or direct facilitation role, should identify key or potentially difficult issues in advance of convening dialogue (tips for convening public meetings and dialogue can be found in [section 9.1](#)). It is important not to be overly ambitious, to be realistic about the skills and capacity within the team and to ensure that those involved in facilitating have the appropriate skills and experience to diffuse tension.

### **Local actors may be disempowered**

In general, Civil Affairs Officers should not take a lead role in conflict management and resolution. Where there are no other or no more appropriate persons or institutions that can lead the process, civil affairs can take on a leading role as a last resort. Civil Affairs Officers should be mindful at all times of the manner and method in which they support local actors and processes. Research conducted as part of the Reflecting on Peace Practice Project identifies a number of ways in which international agencies can inadvertently disempower local actors,<sup>67</sup> including:

- Presenting models for dealing with conflict authoritatively, without giving people the space to examine if, and how, these approaches fit their situation;
- Giving the impression that they are “taking care of the situation”, causing people to think problems are being handled; and
- Fostering dependency on outside “experts” who are constantly brought in to run activities.

<sup>67</sup> Mary B. Anderson & Lara Olson, with assistance from Kristin Doughty, *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners* (Reflecting on Peace Practice Project/Collaborative for Development Action, 2003), pp. 25–26.

## Recommended resources

<b>Name</b>	<b>Civil Affairs Network</b>
<b>Description</b>	The library has a section on conflict management and confidence-building with a huge selection of resources on these issues, especially on working with civil society and on reconciliation.
<b>Source</b>	People with a UN email address can request access to this network by emailing: <a href="mailto:dpko-civilaffairsnetwork@un.org">dpko-civilaffairsnetwork@un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Literature Survey on Local Peacebuilding</b>
<b>Description</b>	A summary of recent academic thinking on various aspects of local-level peacebuilding carried out for civil affairs by Columbia University.
<b>Source</b>	The survey can be accessed via the Civil Affairs Network. People with a UN email address can request access to this network by emailing: <a href="mailto:dpko-civilaffairsnetwork@un.org">dpko-civilaffairsnetwork@un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Engaging Civil Society in Peacekeeping: Strengthening Strategic Partnerships between United Nations Peacekeeping Missions and Local Civil Society Organizations during Post-conflict Transitions</b>
<b>Description</b>	A short lessons learned study with several observations and concrete recommendations on how UN Field Missions should work with civil society.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the Policy and Practices database on the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Conflict management for peacekeepers and peacebuilders (ACCORD, 2007)</b>
<b>Description</b>	A practical guide to assist with dealing with conflict in a peacekeeping environment.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.accord.org.za/publications/books/368-conflict-management-for-peacekeepers-and-peacebuilders">http://www.accord.org.za/publications/books/368-conflict-management-for-peacekeepers-and-peacebuilders</a>



<b>Name</b>	<b>Mary B. Anderson &amp; Lara Olson, with assistance from Kristin Doughty, <i>Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners</i> (Reflecting on Peace Practice Project/Collaborative for Development Action, 2003)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Includes lessons drawn from the experience of peace practitioners and highlights the importance of a conflict-sensitive approach to peacebuilding.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.cdainc.com/publications/rpp/confrontingwar/ConfrontingWar.pdf">http://www.cdainc.com/publications/rpp/confrontingwar/ConfrontingWar.pdf</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict: Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group, A/65/747—S/2011/85 (2011)</b>
<b>Description</b>	The report by the Senior Advisory Group explores areas to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of UN civilian capacities. Contains a series of recommendations on enabling and supporting local capacity in conflict-affected countries.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.civcapreview.org">http://www.civcapreview.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Mediation Support Unit (MSU)</b>
<b>Description</b>	MSU is the UN focal point for mediation support and the institutional repository of knowledge, lessons learned and best practices in this area. MSU also hosts an online mediation support tool, UN Peacemaker, for international peacemaking professionals. It includes an extensive databank of modern peace agreements.
<b>Source</b>	The UN Peacemaker website is: <a href="http://peacemaker.unlb.org/">http://peacemaker.unlb.org/</a>

## Chapter 11 | Support to the restoration and extension of state authority



*This chapter addresses the key concepts, activities and challenges in relation to the third civil affairs core role: support to the restoration and extension of state authority. The chapter introduces some different models of government, discusses the approach taken by civil affairs in supporting state institutions, outlines activities undertaken as part of this role and provides tips, examples and good practices.*

### 11.1. Peacekeeping and support to the restoration and extension of state authority

Restoration of state authority is seldom one of the primary tasks mandated by the Security Council and there have even been instances in which this element was added to the mandate at a later date. However, over the last few years, the need to stabilize fragile states has been established more and more strongly as a critical requirement for keeping and building peace.

This is clearly reflected in many of the recent UN Security Council resolutions including, for example, Security Council resolution 1974 (2011), which calls for the Government of Afghanistan “to improve governance” and “to pursue continued legislative and public administration reform in order to ensure good governance”. In the case of Haiti, meanwhile, Security Council resolution 1892 (2009) “calls upon MINUSTAH, consistent with its mandate, to continue such support to strengthen self-sustaining state institutions, especially outside Port-au-Prince, including through the provision of specialized expertise to key ministries and institutions”.

In exceptional circumstances, the Security Council has also authorized peacekeeping missions to temporarily assume the administrative and legislative functions of the state through provision of a transitional administration, as was the case in Kosovo and Timor-Leste. However, it is important to emphasize the specificity of the circumstances under which these two missions were established and the fact that executive mandates are generally seen as a last resort in situations where a territory is virtually deprived of any functioning state institutions.

#### **Legitimate state institutions and resilience to conflict**

The rationale for peacekeepers to engage in supporting the restoration of state authority was laid out, in 2008, in the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* or “Capstone Doctrine”, which states:

[...] in order to generate revenue and provide basic services to the population, the state must be able to exert control over its national territory. Multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations may support the restoration and extension of State authority [which] may include efforts to develop political participation, as well as operational support to the immediate activities of state institutions. Where relevant, it may also include small-scale capacity building or support larger processes of constitutional or institutional restructuring.<sup>68</sup>

There is increasing consensus that for the state to be resilient to conflict it needs to rest on inclusive political dynamics that give legitimacy to its institutions and that enjoy the confidence of its citizens. The World Development Report 2011, for example, has emphasized that fragile countries which have already experienced conflict are particularly vulnerable to new waves of political and criminal violence, exacerbated by a series of internal and external stress factors that can only be countered by the “social capability for coping with stress embodied by legitimate institutions”.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>68</sup> *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (“Capstone Doctrine”, 2008), section 2.4.

<sup>69</sup> *World Development Report 2011*, p. 7.



### World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development

The *World Development Report 2011* (WDR) by the World Bank focuses on the link between conflict, security and development and emphasizes that today 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by repeated cycles of political and criminal violence, which disrupt development and cause human misery. The inclusion of criminal violence in the conflict dimension is critical to a better understanding of the causes and symptoms of a state's fragility and the different ways, both internal and external, in which a peace process can be undermined. This implies that strategies to promote good governance need to be understood and implemented differently in a fragile state context than in one where internal and external stresses are not as prominent. The WDR stresses the importance of legitimate institutions as the only effective "immune system" to help a society to withstand those internal and external stresses and shocks.

The report outlines a strategy to break the spiral of violence and instability, singling out the need for security, justice and employment creation as the prerequisites for restoring confidence in the state and allowing for the positive transformation of institutions. While the WDR does not prescribe formulas for confidence-building and institution-building, it does provide lessons that have been learned in different contexts and that can be further adapted to fit the specific circumstances of different countries. Having set the priority of developing legitimate institutions, the WDR points out the importance of national leaders building collaborative coalitions that are inclusive enough to create the basis for further institutional transformation. Among the national programmes that have had success, the WDR highlights:

- Programmes that support bottom-up state-society relations in insecure areas;
- Security and justice reform programmes that start with the basics and recognize the linkages between policing and civilian justice;
- Basic job schemes, including large-scale public works;
- Programmes that involve women in their design and implementation; and
- Focused anti-corruption actions to demonstrate that the new initiatives and revenues can be well governed.

The WDR also addresses the need for international assistance to adapt to the specific needs and contexts of fragile states and to refocus its efforts in those countries on confidence-building, citizen security, justice and jobs. In addition, it recommends that there should be reform of international agencies' procedures so that they can be faster and more responsive when addressing the needs of fragile states.

The 2011 WDR can be downloaded on the World Bank website: <http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/>.

As discussed in [chapter 1](#), the nature of peacekeeping operations has radically shifted with the predominance of intra-state rather than inter-state conflicts. Instead of keeping peace between states, the UN has increasingly been called upon to support a peace process within countries where conflict is often a consequence, in one way or another, of the failure of the state to regulate political, economic and social conflict. If the authority of a state is constituted by the ability and capacity of its government to exercise its power over the whole territory and the entire population, its inability to do so highlights the weakness of the state and its government. A government whose power is weakened, for whatever reason, needs to go back to the source of that power – the citizens – to re-establish its legitimacy and therefore its authority. The delegation of power from the people to the government can take different forms, although most frequently this occurs through an electoral process. However, it is not a simple feat for a state to engage its citizens in such a process, particularly when it is perceived by many as a party to the conflict rather than a regulator of it – as is so often the case in post-conflict contexts. Conflicts can be both a cause of and a consequence of a loss of legitimacy by a government, and they will certainly entail a reduced reach for state institutions across its territory, further disenfranchising those citizens who are excluded from any tangible benefit deriving from the state’s management of social and economic resources.



**The state** can be summarized as a defined territory with a permanent population under one government.<sup>70</sup>

**Governance** “is the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s social and economic resources for development. Governance means the way those with power use that power”.<sup>71</sup>

Although this is an oversimplification of the complex dynamics between state authority and the source of that authority – in other words its legitimacy – it seems clear that if a state does not enjoy the confidence of its citizens (partially or totally) it will be particularly vulnerable to successive waves of conflict. This being the case, a key part of restoring state authority involves rebuilding its legitimacy and people’s confidence in state institutions. In particular, the legitimacy – and therefore the authority – of the state depends on the confidence that its citizens have in the government to make decisions that reflect their individual interests, within the

<sup>70</sup> Malcolm Nathan Shaw, *International Law* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 178. While definitions can risk being either too narrow or too loose, having an understanding of the key terms that are used in civil affairs work helps to better understand the rationale for certain actions and objectives. These definitions of state and governance are clearly not exclusive or exhaustive, but have been chosen to exemplify some of the arguments made in this chapter.

<sup>71</sup> Peter McCawley, *Governance in Indonesia: Some Comments* (Asian Development Bank Institute, 2005), p. 2.

confines of the collective interest. This relationship between those who govern and those who are governed, which Jean-Jacques Rousseau called the “social contract”, is today understood very much in terms of the language of good governance.

### **Good governance**

If governance, as we have seen above, is “the way those with power use that power” then good governance implies that the “way” allows for citizens to express their needs and priorities and that the ultimate use of that power is to pursue the interests of the citizens. While definitions vary, the UN recognizes that good governance, understood as good practice in decision-making and implementation of those decisions, is characterized as participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and subject to the rule of law.



#### **Extracts from “What is Good Governance?”, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), 2009**

##### **Participation**

- Participation could be either direct or through legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. Participation needs to be informed and organized. This means freedom of association and expression on the one hand and an organized civil society on the other.

##### **Rule of law**

- Good governance requires fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially. It also requires full protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities. Impartial enforcement of laws requires an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible police force.

##### **Transparency**

- Transparency means that decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and their enforcement. It also means that enough information is provided and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and media.

##### **Responsiveness**

- Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe.

##### **Consensus oriented**

- There are several actors and as many view-points in a given society. Good governance requires mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the whole community and how this can be achieved. It also requires a broad and long-term perspective

on what is needed for sustainable human development and how to achieve the goals of such development. This can only result from an understanding of the historical, cultural and social contexts of a given society or community.

**Equity and inclusiveness**

- A society's well-being depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires all groups, but particularly the most vulnerable, to have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being.

**Effectiveness and efficiency**

- Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal. The concept of efficiency in the context of good governance also covers the sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of the environment.

**Accountability**

- Accountability is a key requirement of good governance. Not only governmental institutions but also the private sector and civil society organizations must be accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. Who is accountable to whom varies depending on whether decisions or actions taken are internal or external to an organization or institution. In general an organization or an institution is accountable to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions. Accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law.

While the government – whether at the national or local level – is the decision maker, it owes its authority to the citizens that elected it, and it has the responsibility to remain accountable to them. In principle, even when not elected, a government owes its sovereignty to the people of the country. What matters here is to understand that, for good governance to be effective, the decision-making process needs to involve two key actors: the state/government and the society/citizens. That is democratic governance. It is important that Civil Affairs Officers do not think of these principles as abstract or only applicable to high-level politics, but instead learn to recognize them in their daily work. For instance, when advocating with a local mayor to hold a town hall meeting to explain to the local population how the municipality is managing revenues and expenditures, civil affairs is working with that local authority to promote the principles of good governance by fostering accountability, transparency and responsiveness, as well as effectiveness and efficiency.

In other words, the work that civil affairs is mandated to do in support of the restoration and extension of state authority is not limited to working with state

institutions and local government authorities, but also – and simultaneously – with the other key stakeholders in democratic governance: the citizens and the society they form. In order to restore the state’s authority it is necessary to restore its legitimacy and this can only be achieved when the government and the society are engaged in an open and responsive dialogue. However, there are no set models of governance and the role of civil affairs will be to facilitate and support the main stakeholders in establishing governance mechanisms that are tailored to the specific environment and needs of the host country.

The importance of national and local ownership has been reiterated in the last few years by the countries that are part of the g7+. <sup>72</sup> These countries understand themselves as being affected by conflict and fragility, and participate in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) with international partners, including donor states, in order to seek a new joint approach to building peace and reducing the fragility that exposes them to further conflict and underdevelopment. In 2010, the g7+ declared in Dili that “fragile nations recognize the need for good governance that empowers its people through open and transparent public administration and financial management [...] it is through the principles of good governance that effective and efficient public administration can be achieved”, <sup>73</sup> reiterating the importance that states emerging from conflict attach to good governance as a condition for stability and peace.

More recently, in November 2011, the IDPS adopted “A New Deal for engagement in fragile states” that further develops the primacy of country-owned and country-led transition processes out of fragility. It reiterates the fundamental roles played by legitimate politics, security, justice, employment and improved livelihoods as well as accountable and fair service delivery in building peace and statehood.

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<sup>72</sup> The g7+ is an open grouping of countries experiencing conflict and fragility, first established in 2010 and rapidly having expanded so that today it comprises most of the countries currently or recently hosting a peacekeeping mission. The current list of members contains 19 countries, although this is likely to grow further in the future: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and Togo. An updated list can be found at: <http://www.g7plus.org/members/>.

<sup>73</sup> Dili Declaration, 10 April 2010; <http://www.g7plus.org/news-articles/2010/4/10/dili-declaration.html>.





### A New Deal for engagement in fragile states<sup>74</sup>

In November 2011 in Busan (South Korea), the members of the IDPS, which include the g7+ countries, developed and broadly endorsed the “New Deal for engagement in fragile states”. The signatories “recognise that the success of our combined effort depends on the leadership and commitment of the g7+ group of fragile states supported by international actors. We also recognise that constructive state-society relations, and the empowerment of women, youth and marginalized groups, as key actors for peace, are at the heart of successful peacebuilding and statebuilding. They are essential to deliver the ‘New Deal’.”

The countries and governments that have endorsed the New Deal have:

- Agreed to use the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) to guide their work and to develop indicators to track progress. The five PSGs are:
  - (i) Legitimate politics: fostering inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution;
  - (ii) Security: establishing and strengthening people’s security;
  - (iii) Justice: addressing injustices and increasing people’s access to justice;
  - (iv) Economic foundations: generating employment and improving livelihoods;
  - (v) Revenues and services: managing revenues and building capacity for accountable and fair service delivery.
- Committed to support inclusive country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility on the basis of a fragility assessment that will, with the support of international partners, lead to “a country-led one vision and one plan, a country compact to implement the plan, using the PSGs to monitor progress, and support inclusive and participatory political dialogue”.
- Committed to building mutual trust between people, communities, the state and international partners through a more transparent use of aid and the development of joint mechanisms to reduce aid volatility, as well as improving the management of risks entailed in fragile situations and stepping up investments for peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities. Mutual trust will also be developed through the strengthening of country systems, and in particular public financial management systems, and the increased proportion of public expenditure funded by domestic revenues. Building the capacities of state institutions and civil society in a balanced manner and increasing the predictability of aid are part of the same approach, which is oriented to delivering tangible results as the basic precondition for building trust.

Considering that most countries which host a peacekeeping operation are today part of the g7+ group, the New Deal has important consequences and offers significant opportunities to engage those governments in working together towards peacebuilding.

<sup>74</sup> The full text of the New Deal can be found at: <http://www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document/>.

### Local governance

Given that civil affairs components operate primarily at the sub-state level, their impact on the restoration of state authority is stronger at the local level. In supporting good governance at the local level, Civil Affairs Officers foster a process whereby citizens have more direct access to governance institutions. This is done by facilitating communication between local authorities and citizens, promoting accountability and transparency and encouraging a participatory approach to decision-making. In other words, civil affairs components support local democratic governance.

The 2012 UNDP report *Governance for Peace. Securing the Social Contract* defines local governance as:

[...] the systems, institutions and processes through which local authorities interact with, and provide services to, citizens and other forms of associations. It is also the mechanism by which citizens themselves meaningfully articulate their interests and needs, mediate their differences, and exercise their rights and duties. As such, local governance is a two-way process of interaction, mediation and action.<sup>75</sup>

The report proposes a framework for governance<sup>76</sup> in fragile and conflict-affected settings that aims at strengthening the social contract by:

- Promoting responsive institutions (e.g. rebuilding public administrative capacities, improving service delivery etc.);
- Supporting inclusive politics (e.g. supporting electoral processes, parliamentary support, redesigning the rules of politics etc.); and
- Fostering a resilient society (e.g. supporting peace architectures and assessment capabilities, developing capacities for dialogue and mediation, cultivating leaders and leadership etc.).

Intervening on all of these dimensions might appear daunting for Civil Affairs Officers, who might experience difficulty in situating themselves in such a process while maintaining realistic and achievable goals. The *World Development Report 2011* reminds us that even in the fastest transforming countries it has taken between 15 and 30 years to transform fragile states into functioning institutionalized states.<sup>77</sup> It is important that Civil Affairs Officers understand that they are part of a much larger process and that their role, if articulated around clearly defined and understood strategic goals, can have a significant impact on the establishment of legitimate and efficient state institutions and therefore on the stability of a country.

<sup>75</sup> UNDP, *Governance for Peace: Securing the Social Contract* (2012), p. 54.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>77</sup> *World Development Report 2011*, p. 10.

As described in further detail in other sections of this chapter, Civil Affairs Officers – working hand-in-hand with national stakeholders and international partners – can promote democratic local governance through a variety of activities. The fact that Civil Affairs Officers are the only counterparts to national actors at the subnational level provides them with a unique opportunity to kick-start some of the processes highlighted in the framework for governance. The specific approach will take into account the mission’s mandate, as translated in the civil affairs workplan, and the available resources (human, logistical and, in some cases, financial), but it will frequently include some of the tools listed below. These are just a sample of the activities that civil affairs has carried out in various missions in the past:

- Capacity assessments of local government that focus on existing competencies and gaps in order to provide recommendations to central government, UN partners and donors regarding priority areas;
- Working with local authorities to publicize tax policies, revenue bases and services they pledge to provide in order to increase the accountability of local government;
- Publicizing existing channels for recording grievances and dispute resolution mechanisms, including over natural resources and land;
- Providing logistics and other support to enhance connections between central and local government.

## 11.2. Understanding different models of government

As always, the first step for Civil Affairs Officers is to understand the context in which they work, including the overarching legal framework and institutional architecture of the state, and the historical power dynamics from which it has developed. From a civil affairs perspective, the idea is not to promote one model of government over any other, but simply to understand how institutions under different models are meant to work and how it is possible to strengthen their effectiveness while helping to build confidence among the local population.

In many cases in post-conflict situations, the processes of decision-making will be limited to the capital city and a few major urban centres, regardless of whether the structure of the state is, in theory, centralized or decentralized. This being the case, civil affairs components may not only be involved in the “restoration” of state authority (helping to bring back something that was present in the past) but also in the “extension” of state authority (supporting its presence in areas where it has never been present or where it has been absent for an extended period of time). Both of these terms tend to be used in Security Council mandates.

## From the toolkit:



### Understanding the institutional context

While a Civil Affairs Officer is not required to have a degree in international law or to be an expert jurist, s/he will still need to be able to get to grips with some key elements of the institutional set-up in the host country such as:

**The Constitution.** As the supreme law of the state, it will normally describe the state's institutional architecture. In this regard, it is important to understand the level of centralization/decentralization of the state as well as the degree to which constitutional provisions are implemented.

**Central government structure.** Some basic understanding of the division of labour and responsibilities between key ministries involved in local government is essential to be able to identify the appropriate interlocutors when facilitating communication or the identification of viable solutions to a specific problem.

**Local authorities' legal attributes.** Knowing what powers are given to local government institutions, as well as the source of their authority (whether elected, appointed or a combination of the two) is necessary to understand the role they can/will play in local governance. Understanding the role of traditional authorities, which might have only a historical and moral basis for their authority is also critical in order to appreciate their potential impact on state institution support activities. Moreover, framing the legal frameworks operating in particular communities in terms of statutory, customary, religious or a combination of the three can be helpful for understanding the nature of a conflict and available recourses. This is particularly true in relation to ownership, access and allocation of natural resources and land.

**Management of local finances.** Finding out whether local authorities are receiving taxes directly or as an allocation from the central government will help Civil Affairs Officers to understand the level of autonomy these institutions have. Understanding how effective money transfer mechanisms between the local and central levels are will be useful in anticipating institutional conflicts. Some of the most contentious financial issues relate to revenue sharing among the national government, local authorities and host communities over natural resource concessions and related taxes. Finding out how the budgets of local authorities are structured (including the share that goes into salaries and running costs and that used for capital investments) and the autonomy they have in establishing priorities, will be critical to assessing capacity-building requirements.

**Status of civil service.** In some instances, the local government civil service will be regulated by a specific law or incorporated with the national civil service. In other cases, there will be no rules on recruitment, contractual arrangements, salary pay-scale etc.

Although none of these employment issues are a definite indicator of staff motivation and professionalism, it is likely that local governance will be more predictable and less prone to corruption when clear rules are set.

**Legal status of civil society organizations.** How the state defines civil society organizations in legal terms (e.g. registration procedures and requirements, inclusion or not in consultative processes etc.) is symptomatic of the political space that it allows them. Understanding this can provide opportunities either for using the existing legal frameworks to facilitate the dialogue between institutions and civil society or for advocating for such a space to be created through legal provisions.

It is recommended that civil affairs at mission headquarters provides all Civil Affairs Officers that will be working on support to the restoration and extension of state authority with a briefing kit on these topics upon deployment.

Box 11.1 From the toolkit: Understanding the institutional context

There is more scope for civil affairs to promote democratic governance principles in the context of a decentralized state where the level of responsibilities delegated to local authorities is significantly higher. This is also why UNDP and other UN agencies, funds and programmes stress the critical link between good local governance and decentralization, arguing: “Without giving authority and money to the local level, i.e. without decentralization, local governance systems will not be able to produce much good for the citizens. Without good local governance on the other hand, money and responsibility transferred to the lower level would run a great risk of dissipating.”<sup>78</sup>

However, in promoting democratic principles, Civil Affairs Officers are not – and should not be seen to be – advocating for a particular state model, selection of which remains the exclusive prerogative of the host country and of its people. Civil Affairs Officers need to remain sensitive to the particular post-conflict context in this regard. Depending on the dynamic of that conflict, a highly decentralized state may actually put an excessive burden on scarce resources, both financial and human, and as such may not be viable. Furthermore, promoting decentralization in post-conflict contexts may be politically controversial and could exacerbate factionalism and may even lead to a resumption of the conflict. Indeed, civil affairs bears a responsibility to support and foster those governance dynamics that are most likely to contribute to the stabilization of the country.

<sup>78</sup> UNDP, *Local Governance, Human Rights Based Approach and Gender Mainstreaming in the Context of Europe and the CIS*: <http://hrba.undp.sk/index.php/introduction/local-governance-human-rights-based-approach-and-gender-mainstreaming-in-the-context-of-europe-and-the-cis/182-local-governance->.



### Looking at decentralization<sup>79</sup>

- **Administrative decentralization** involves the transfer of decision-making authority, resources and responsibilities for the delivery of selected public services from the central government to other lower levels of government. There are two basic types of administrative decentralization:
  - (a) **Deconcentration** is the transfer of authority and responsibility within the same institution from the central level to its local unit, which remains fully accountable to the hierarchy.
  - (b) **Delegation** is the redistribution of authority and responsibility from a central office to local government units which are not necessarily institutionally linked to the central institution, but nevertheless remain largely accountable to it.
- **Political decentralization** is the transfer of political power and authority to subnational levels, such as elected village councils or state-level bodies. Where such transfer is made to a local level of public authority that is autonomous and fully independent from the devolving authority, **devolution** takes place. Some scholars differentiate **fiscal decentralization** from political, while others consider that the decentralization of financial responsibility is all part of the same process. From a civil affairs perspective this distinction is not particularly relevant as the work of Civil Affairs Officers mandated to support a decentralization process will need to tackle both the political and the fiscal decentralization dynamics.

## 11.3. The “light footprint” of civil affairs support to state institutions

Having already detailed the fact that establishing legitimate and functioning state institutions, as the principal bulwark against relapse into conflict and fragility, is an endeavour that requires several decades, it is critical that civil affairs components understand their work as one piece of a larger puzzle. Trying to gain quick fixes and rapid results might not be the most effective and durable way of promoting the restoration of state authority. This is why civil affairs work is often described in terms of “promoting”, “supporting”, “facilitating” or “enabling”, to indicate that, to a large extent, the process itself is as important as the goal. At times this can be a frustrating

<sup>79</sup> Adapted from: Robertson Work/UNDP /BDP, *The Role of Participation and Partnership in Decentralised Governance: A Brief Synthesis of Policy Lessons and Recommendations of Nine Country Case Studies on Service Delivery for the Poor* (2002), pp. 2–3.

experience, but it is paramount that all the efforts of civil affairs components are aimed at developing national capacities.

As outlined in **chapter 5**, the principles of local ownership and “Do No Harm” and conflict sensitivity should be mainstreamed through all aspects of civil affairs work. In supporting the extension and restoration of state authority, civil affairs should be particularly mindful of their “enabling” role and should avoid substituting for local capacity. Although playing a leading role in delivering services or taking decisions which are expected from state institutions may bring immediate benefits to the population, it does not provide these institutions with an opportunity to take responsibility for the processes or to develop capacity. To further compound this, the level of confidence that citizens have in the state is unlikely to increase if they do not see its institutions providing services and taking decisions. This being the case, taking a top-down approach to restoration or extension of the state ultimately defeats the purpose of the supportive, enabling role of civil affairs. Gauging the correct level of engagement and defining the role civil affairs should play is perhaps one of the principle challenges in undertaking this aspect of civil affairs work.

For instance, the term “promoting” occurs frequently in Security Council resolutions and is reflected in strategic documents and the workplan. This suggests an engaged but not leading role, based on advocacy and on the ability to provide relevant advice or constructive feedback to local institutions to encourage a certain course of action or bolster reforms that are underway. Reference to “supporting” brings to mind a more pro-active role that can translate into direct technical and logistic support, but also – in some cases – into embedding staff in key government institutions at the central or local level. Other terms come with different nuances. For instance, reference to “facilitating” suggests that, although state institutions might have basic capacities, they can struggle to attain their objectives, and civil affairs can assist them by providing technical advice and detailing strategies and approaches that can most effectively achieve the proposed goals in a cooperative manner. Another recurring verb is “enable”, suggesting that civil affairs helps to create the necessary conditions for state institutions to be able to rise to their responsibilities and deliver the services they are supposed to provide themselves, rather than taking a major part in the process itself.

Sensitivity to the context is essential in creating opportunities that will allow the local interlocutors to take ownership of the process, whether it is by organizing an event without taking a leading role, or by giving state institutions the opportunity to execute a project and be accountable for it, as it can be in the case of a QIP.

As discussed in [chapter 2](#), the context and the civil affairs role tend to evolve over the lifespan of a mission. In the early stages Civil Affairs Officers are often the first international actors on the ground at the field level, especially in the more remote areas. This being the case, they often become the principal interlocutor for local authorities, where present. In a post-conflict environment, some local actors may assume, particularly in the early phase of deployment, that the peacekeeping mission has infinite resources. While this may be inevitable given the high visibility of missions, it often results in mission actors being inundated with requests for assistance and support. In many cases, local actors may perceive the UN as the only actor with the capacity to carry out activities that would normally fall to the state. In these circumstances, state institutions, where they still exist, may look to civil affairs components for direct support to strengthen their capacity to perform and deliver services. Where this happens, it is crucial to refrain from investing in operational support activities before having carefully analysed the context, considered all other potential actors and players and ascertained whether there is not a more sustainable approach that can rely on local capacities. This is yet another application of the concept of “Do No Harm” illustrated in [chapter 5](#). Whatever the decision is, capacity-building should be factored in from the very beginning in any support action so as to reduce reliance on that support.

As the capacities of local government institutions improve through direct support, such as small-scale capacity building initiatives (e.g. targeted training), civil affairs should reduce direct interventions and instead become more involved in facilitating nationally owned processes. It should provide the guidance and tools needed to define policies and plan activities rather than simply addressing emergencies. As local government institutions become more and more self-reliant, civil affairs support becomes more subtle. At this point, civil affairs can assist by creating an enabling environment, which includes but is not limited to efforts to mobilize resources.

It is important to note that the distinction of the phases described here is rather a theoretical than a practical distinction, and the approach and activities described tend to overlap and complement each other. Nevertheless, it can be useful to distinguish them conceptually in order to have a better understanding of the objective and tools of each approach. Civil Affairs Officers will need to understand the added value that each approach can bring and make the best use of it.



The figure below is an graphic representation of the approximate relationship between different approaches.




Figure 11.1 Idealized graphic representation of the civil affairs approach

Some of the “non-material” assets civil affairs brings to this work are:

- Being able to offer a fresh/innovative perspective on dynamics that are locked into traditional vicious circles.
- Being an impartial observer of processes and providing advice to all actors. In the case of national officers, there might be a misperception about how impartial they are in some contexts, while in other contexts, their cultural proximity might strengthen confidence. This is why combined teams of national and international personnel are often the most effective.
- Being able to make use of and transfer knowledge on best practices in a given, specific domain, by making use of the lessons learned by other colleagues in the mission, in the wider civil affairs community through the Civil Affairs Network or beyond peacekeeping.
- Being in a position to receive, carry and deliver messages across geographical, institutional and hierarchical barriers, facilitating exchanges among local stakeholders.
- Being in a position to make use of logistic assets not available to other local actors in order to facilitate mapping exercises of needs and capacities at the institutional level.
- Being in a position to promote synergies with other actors (e.g. UNCT, donors etc.) that are not present at the local level.

## VOICES FROM THE FIELD



Name:

**Margarete Altidor****Calixte**Civil Affairs National  
Professional Officer,  
MINUSTAH***“How do you believe you have made a difference in supporting the strengthening of state institutions?”***

*In 2007 the Institutional Support Unit of MINUSTAH agreed with the Ministry of Interior and Local Government (MICT) to embed a number of officers within the Ministry to assist with the restructuring of the Department for Local Government. However, at the beginning the widespread perception that the UN mission was an infringement on national sovereignty made this a difficult task. Some national and international officers were even accused of being collaborators or colonialists, respectively. The climate of suspicion and lack of cooperation made it impossible to make any tangible progress.*

*In 2008, I was part of a group of new staff members that joined the Institutional Support Unit. At this time, a new approach, which was more sensitive to the reticence of the government officials and sought to avoid confrontation, was adopted. Instead of imposing goals and objectives we showed willingness to work with the MICT on the priorities it had identified. This strategy allowed us to gain acceptance and enabled us to progressively integrate into the Ministry and to blend with the Ministry’s staff.*

*At that time, I was responsible for supporting the Training Unit of the Ministry. I had to deal with civil servants who were not used to taking the initiative or having any real control over the training for locally elected officials that was being provided by the various actors and partners. In this context, I had to strike a delicate balance between providing guidance and support while remaining aware of individual sensitivities and the risk of provoking negative reactions should this support be perceived as interference. By building a relationship based on mutual trust and respect, I was able to motivate colleagues from the Ministry and engage them in the delivery of all the training activities provided by other partners, while they themselves also benefited from continuous training.*

*This joint work represented an important first step in developing the local government civil service, with training modules being delivered to public accountants, municipal engineers, sociocultural coordinators etc. Having gained the confidence of the MICT, I was then requested to support the Local Finance and Budget Unit with the development and execution of municipal budgets. Three years down the line the team I was working with had developed a manual on developing municipal budgets and had provided support and guidance to all 140 municipalities, enabling them to develop municipal budgets in line with existing rules and regulations.*

*The work that the Institutional Support Unit carries out with the MICT has had an important impact on local governance. It has revitalized some of the key units responsible for local governance and strengthened their approach to planning and organizing, which has translated into an enhanced ability to provide effective support to local government authorities. There has also been significant improvement in the ability of the municipalities to manage their local finances in a more transparent and accountable way. Overcoming the suspicion and mistrust between the Institutional Support Unit and the MICT has also paved the way*

*for more extensive and fruitful partnerships between the MICT and other donors, in particular bilateral and international donors. These partnerships have facilitated the development of a more coherent and consistent national strategy in support of local governance.*

Box 11.2 Voices from the field: “How do you believe you have made a difference in supporting the strengthening of state institutions?”

## 11.4. Activities in support of this role

Listed below are some examples of typical activities undertaken by Civil Affairs Officers in different missions at different times over the mission lifespan. The specific activities required in specific contexts will vary, and should be planned based on in-depth analysis of the needs of that particular situation, as discussed in [chapter 8](#).

### **Support to the development of mechanisms for accountability and transparency**

As discussed above, one of the fundamental pillars of good governance is the positive relationship between the state and society, particularly in relation to the accountability of the state to its people. Strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations to be credible and legitimate interlocutors of the state, both at the national and local level, is therefore often an important part of the role of civil affairs. Towards this end, civil affairs components have facilitated civil society forums for existing civil society networks, have encouraged the growth of emerging non-governmental forums or civil society associations and have facilitated contact between civil society and local authorities. For instance, in DRC, civil affairs undertook a countrywide mapping exercise of civil society organizations and, based on this, promoted and facilitated the establishment of a national platform for civil society that could then become a more influential interlocutor of the government.

As the different expressions of civil society become more self-reliant and assured in their goals and strategies, they will become effective actors in a dialogue with the institutions. This should lead to a more participatory approach in the identification of priority needs for any given constituency. Civil affairs may be able to help in this regard, for example by reaching out to other partners, such as UNDP, that have developed appropriate methodologies for participatory planning processes in order to share them with civil society interlocutors. Civil affairs can also play a convening or facilitation role in this regard, where appropriate. These activities will ideally be best developed in synergy with other mission components (e.g. public information, human rights etc.) and external partners.

Monitoring public policy can be another entry point for Civil Affairs Officers. By using their good offices and relations with local authorities and civil society organizations, they can promote a dialogue between the two on issues related to the public management of local finances (such as the development and execution of local budgets) as a way of illustrating how public money is being spent. In this regard, civil affairs in Haiti has encouraged local Municipal Councils to hold town hall meetings to present the new municipal budget to the public, along with the closing balance for the previous fiscal period. Similarly, activities sensitizing citizens on local taxation systems and mechanisms can also be fostered. Another area where Civil Affairs Officers can provide an effective contribution is to support initiatives that are likely to meet with high levels of institutional resistance, such as anti-corruption initiatives, coordinating with local bodies created for this purpose and relevant partners in civil society.

### Case study



#### Forum on accountability in Afghanistan

The idea of organizing a forum on accountability, in order to raise awareness about government legislation on corruption and to engage civil society, came out of ongoing discussions between the UNAMA Governance Unit and Afghani Government officials in Herat Province. Recognizing this opportunity as a means to build confidence in the peace process, civil affairs used a Quick Impact Project to fund the organization of the forum, and provided technical support to the Herat Provincial Council where the forum took place in November 2010.

During the preparation stage of the initiative a series of meetings were held with the Provincial Governor of Herat, the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC), the High Office of Oversight and other key government institutions to engage them in the process and ensure that the forum would benefit from the broadest possible support. The Governance Unit turned to UNDP and key government line directorates to identify people that could share their expertise, with constitutional, legal, academic and international perspectives on the issue. Finally, the Governance Unit provided key logistical support and served as the secretariat for the forum, collecting all presentations, translating them and then producing copies for dissemination.

The forum adopted a Declaration highlighting the areas of concern and the goals to be attained. As a direct consequence of the forum, the Provincial Council established an anti-corruption working group to coordinate different government agencies on corruption-related activities. In addition, the High Office of Oversight, the government institution responsible for tackling corruption, opened an office in Herat – the first office of its kind outside Kabul.

The success of the forum in Herat has led to similar initiatives in Farah, Badghis and Ghor, all provinces in the Western region.

Since the forum in 2010, there has been greater scrutiny over government procurement activities by various NGOs, who regularly bring up issues with the Provincial Council to be discussed at the anti-corruption working group. The High Office of Oversight field office in Herat has also hit the ground running, tackling small cases of corruption and taking them through the judicial system.

Box 11.3 Case study: Forum on accountability in Afghanistan

### **Preliminary assessments of capacity-building and support needs**

In partnership with relevant national actors, development actors and donors, civil affairs may, where necessary and appropriate, provide a preliminary assessment of priority needs in the areas of:

- Basic essential infrastructure and equipment;
- Capacity-building (including training, mentoring and coaching, and reform and infrastructural support);
- Specialist policy advice; and
- Legislative and constitutional reform, if relevant.

It is important that the relevant national actors (central authorities, local government etc.) take the lead in carrying out these assessments, so that they assume ownership and commit to the process. This helps to ensure consistency in the planning phase and to confirm that adequate resources are allocated to pursue identified priorities. If there is no will to invest by the authorities themselves it is questionable whether civil affairs should engage, as the results will surely not be sustainable. It is a slightly different case if the authorities are committed, but do not have the capacity to take the lead. In this situation, other partners, including civil affairs, can usefully intervene but only in support of a plan that national authorities have defined. When possible, formalized coordination structures (e.g. joint working groups, task forces etc.) should be established to define the role and responsibilities of each partner and the expected output ahead of the assessment itself. Civil Affairs Officers need to be honest with themselves and their partners about what they can bring to the table, which seldom includes material and financial support, and ensure that expectations on what they can deliver are realistic. Generating expectations that cannot be managed will only create a climate of mistrust that can hinder further collaborations.



### Context sensitivity while carrying out needs assessments

As in all other aspects of civil affairs work, context sensitivity is essential when carrying out needs assessments.

In the aftermath of a conflict the need to revitalize state institutions will usually be immense and the expectations will be huge. A needs assessment at this stage is likely to reflect this and result in an unrealistic and unmanageable list of priorities. To be able to “measure” the needs and define priorities, it is necessary first of all to fix a baseline: needs have to be contextualized taking into account regional norms, the pre-conflict situation, and the quality and volume of services that were being delivered before the conflict. For instance, it will not be very useful to promote the computerization of the municipal registries if none of the staff is computer literate and there are power shortages – unless the training of staff, the maintenance of equipment, the provision of IT support and the issue of a regular power supply are also priorities. The most important thing is not to measure the void, but rather to identify what the local institutions need in order to be able to fill that gap in a way that is commensurate and consistent with the reality and the resources of the host country.

In many cases, capacity-building assessments will help to shape some of the training programmes that the mission, or most probably other partners, undertake to strengthen local institutions. For instance, in Côte d'Ivoire, UNOCI, together with UNDP, conducted a needs assessment for newly elected councillors. The data was channelled into the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development's efforts to host appropriate training events for the newly elected local councils and to build confidence in the new local government system.

### From the toolkit:



#### Assessing institutional needs

- **Solid assumptions.** A clear understanding of the intended institutional architecture, functions and expected outputs is required to get rid of all preconceptions based on other, maybe more familiar, institutional set-ups. Avail yourself of pre-existing studies and evaluations: do not reinvent the wheel!
- **Good planning.** Identify all relevant stakeholders and engage them from the outset, jointly establishing terms of reference, clear objectives and a division of labour among those who will carry out the assessment.

- **Skilled assessment teams.** Try to find the technical competences required for the assessment locally, but if none is available explore the possibility of using mission resources (e.g. engineering competences).
- **Sound methodology.** Once clear objectives are set out, an the methodological approach must be assessed to ensure that whatever is being assessed is done according to objective and comparable criteria. For example, if municipal infrastructures are being assessed the same information for all will be required (e.g. legal status of the property, overall surface, number of rooms, access to power supply and water, existence of toilets, proximity to the town centre etc.).
- **Coherence in the follow-up.** Do not put the assessment report in a drawer to rest – it risks staying there forever! Capitalize on the findings and engage with those that participated in defining a follow-up strategy, with action points and identified actors responsible for their implementation. Ensure that the findings and the report are properly archived and become part of the institutional memory of your organization and of the relevant local authorities.

Box 11.4 From the toolkit: Assessing institutional needs

### Monitoring institutional performance

Sometimes civil affairs undertakes – usually in conjunction with national authorities – to monitor the performance of specific local institutions. This monitoring assesses the degree to which the needs originally identified have been addressed or remain relevant, but it also measures the overall effectiveness of the support to strengthen local institutions that civil affairs components and other partners provide. Ideally, capacity assessments do not stop at the preliminary phase as there is a constant need to monitor and evaluate progress over time, especially in terms of local government institutions' performance.

The performance of an institution should be assessed in terms of its efficiency and effectiveness in delivering public services. But which public services should be measured first? And how is effectiveness and efficiency measured? These are questions which the national authorities, together with civil affairs and other international partners, need to address. However, it is clear that the answers cannot be supplied by the service providers, but should instead be given by the clients, in other words by the citizens who use the services. Measuring the quality and quantity of a given service, as well as the efficiency of each step/actor required to deliver the service, can be helpful in determining specific benchmarks against which progress in strengthening the capacities of state institutions can be measured.

In Liberia and in Sierra Leone, for example, Civil Affairs Officers have collected information and monitored the performance of government officials in central-level

institutions in order to gauge the general overall progress in the delivery of services. Meanwhile, in Haiti, Civil Affairs Officers have developed an evaluation matrix for municipal administrations based on the measurement of standard indicators (23 precise administrative, financial, service delivery and planning and coordination activities that the municipalities are supposed to undertake), which are revisited every six months in each of the 140 municipalities of the country. In DRC, civil affairs is planning to carry out public surveys to collect feedback from the end-users of public services.

### **Civic education and sensitization activities**

Civil affairs, in coordination with local authorities and/or civil society actors and other mission components, may develop and support civic education programmes at the local level. The issues covered may range from the structure of government to voter rights and the principles of good governance. The ultimate aim of civic education programmes is to raise awareness and cultivate understanding among the local population of political processes and of their role as constituents within those processes. In order to succeed in this goal, Civil Affairs Officers need to be aware of the perception that people in the country have of the mission so that they can weigh the level of credibility and legitimacy that they can or cannot provide to a civic education or sensitization campaign. In countries where the mission is perceived as biased, civil affairs should take a more discreet approach in promoting such initiatives, and build up its credibility progressively while supporting those partners that can most effectively deliver the intended messages. In other cases, especially in the early phase of the mission, campaigns initiated by the UN may be positively received and momentum should be built around such initiatives consolidating a network of local interlocutors.

### **From the toolkit:**



### **Sensitization campaigns**

Possible things to include when designing sensitization campaigns:

- Ensure that all relevant components of the mission are involved and that formal clearance is given to the project before launching the campaign.
- Involve local stakeholders from the early planning stages to test assumptions and ensure the relevance of the desired output.
- Define clear and simple objectives for the campaign and identify straightforward indicators to measure its impact.



- Target specific audiences and tailor the language and message to that audience.
- Ensure that individuals respected by the audience play a prominent role in delivering the message, or are at least associated with it.
- Test the message and carry out pilot events to fine-tune the approach before launching a full-scale campaign.
- Encourage participatory approaches to engage the audiences in an open dialogue.
- Remain focused on the message even when encountering resentment. Some people in the audience, for whatever reason, might vent their frustrations and resentment against you and use provocative language or arguments. Do not take it personally and refrain from reacting; instead focus on the message to be delivered.
- Use the campaign to establish contacts and maintain an active network of interlocutors.

Box 11.5 From the toolkit: Sensitization campaigns

In Sudan, for example, in the early stages of the mission, UNMIS civil affairs organized Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) dissemination workshops at the local level to explain the peace agreement and the obligations associated with its implementation, including issues of power- and wealth-sharing, elections and referendum law.

#### **Logistical and administrative support**

In the early phase of a mission it is quite likely that there will be areas where public transport infrastructure is non-existent and the presence of local government has therefore been minimal. In these situations, civil affairs may provide logistical and administrative support to enable local government representatives to maintain a presence in their districts. The logistical assets of the mission might be elicited to support the re-establishment of local governance structures as well as basic service delivery through the transport of local officials and materials. In southern Sudan, for example, UNMIS developed a predictable monthly helicopter schedule which helped to enable state government officials and legislators to visit the counties.

In many cases, the mere ability to transfer messages from local authorities to the central level and vice versa fills a major gap in institutional communication. For example, in DRC, MONUSCO has facilitated the exchange and photocopying of information between central and local governmental structures and has assisted the local government to interpret and implement central government directives and

initiatives. However, Civil Affairs Officers need always to remain mindful of the need to avoid any substitution role and to use such occasions as opportunities to kick-start more sustainable mechanisms, once state institutions have developed some basic functioning capacities. Should the institutions become reliant on UN logistical and administrative support the capacity-building effort will have failed.

While it takes time for fully fledged public administration support programmes to be put in place, local officials need to have an early physical presence in areas that were abandoned or destroyed during the conflict in order to reconnect with their constituents. Once again, Civil Affairs Officers need to remain sensitive to the specific context and understand that their role is not to legitimize, through their support, any particular individual, but rather to facilitate the creation of a political space where that legitimacy can be attained.

Where appropriate, and with the full support of the host country and the necessary backing from mission support, Civil Affairs Officers may be co-located with local

### Case study



#### UNMIL logistical and administrative support for local governance

Immediately following the deployment of UNMIL and the inauguration of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) in October 2003, civil affairs initiated discussions with the Government on how the UN could support the restoration and extension of state authority throughout the country. With the encouragement of the mission, the NTGL established a National Task Force to oversee the return of government institutions and officials, including traditional leaders, to the counties and borders. The process started with the appointment of Superintendents and Assistant Superintendents for Development for each of the 15 counties.

The establishment of the Housing and Property Committees was not only critical to amicably resolving the property disputes that arose with the return of IDPs and refugees, but also to recovering local government property and premises. However, the recovery of working space was not sufficient to convince local government officials that they should re-deploy at the county level, as the problem of not being able to collect their salaries locally had not yet been addressed. Taking advantage of this opportunity to further boost confidence in the peace process and in the state institutions, civil affairs supported the reopening of local banks working with the Central Bank of Liberia through coordinating the joint efforts of mission aviation assets, military capacities and QIP resources. This joint effort supported the return of local government officials to their duty stations, which significantly facilitated the extension of state authority at the county level.

Box 11.6 Case study: UNMIL logistical and administrative support for local governance

authorities in order to share assets, such as computers and communications equipment, pending restoration or creation of organizational capacity in the local government institutions. Notably, this is one of the recommendations made by the Senior Advisory Group report *Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict*.<sup>80</sup>

QIPs (see [chapter 12](#)) and other small-scale infrastructure programmes can be used to rebuild local government offices, police stations or courts to house local officials, thereby helping to restore confidence in local government. Civil affairs should effectively liaise with local government to screen and channel requests, and to establish processes for determining priorities against the mission mandate. This is particularly important given that demand will always exceed available resources and capacities. The mission should have clear procedures that lay out the circumstances under which logistical support and mission assets can be provided and to whom.

#### **Small-scale capacity-building support**

Longer term development actors tend to be less well represented at the local level, even beyond the first phase of a mission, and under these circumstances civil affairs can play an important role in undertaking relevant small-scale capacity-building activities with local interlocutors, based on the initial capacity needs assessment. This might be done through a combination of direct support (i.e. transfer of skills and knowledge available within civil affairs or other mission components), financial resources (e.g. QIPs), mobilization of national or external expertise, and by providing local-level support in implementation and monitoring. This has often been the approach to training newly elected officials on subjects such as local finance, administration, dispute resolution, land registration, budgeting or the management of state structures, as outlined in [box 11.7](#). These programmes must be jointly designed with national authorities and, wherever possible, delivered making use of national expertise.

#### **Support to policy, planning and decision-making processes**

Civil Affairs Officers' ability to familiarize themselves with the local context, and to understand and analyse it, remains their main asset in any role or function. This is also very much the case when it comes to institutional support. Understanding

<sup>80</sup> *Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict: Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group, A/65/747—S/2011/85* (2011). The Senior Advisory Group formulated 17 recommendations to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of civilian capacities in the UN, and a number of new policies and guidelines are expected to be developed with significant impact on peacekeeping operations and civil affairs work. These are likely to cover the development of national capacities, the opportunity to co-locate international capacities with national institutions and possibly the support to the work that UNDP and the World Bank carry out on core government functionality.

## Case study



### MINUSTAH support for municipal government finances in Haiti

Recognizing that one of the underlying causes of the fragility of the Haitian state lay in the weak state presence outside Port-au-Prince, the Ministry of the Interior and MINUSTAH have jointly endeavoured to strengthen key municipal functions, with a specific emphasis on the capacity of the municipal administrations to manage their local finances. This focus has been not only on making the administrations more effective and efficient, but also on improving their ability to collect revenues, deliver services, increase capital investments and define development priorities through a participatory approach.

Given the importance of building confidence in the capacity of the local government institutions to function effectively as one of the cornerstones of the mission's strategy to stabilize the country, it was agreed that QIP resources be used to train 140 municipal accountants (one for each municipality). This initiative used MINUSTAH's logistical assets and drew on national expertise through the National School for Financial Administration. This capacity-building exercise significantly improved the ability of Municipal Councils to develop and execute their budgets.

In addition, MINUSTAH embedded three national Civil Affairs Officers within the Ministry of the Interior to facilitate knowledge transfer and boost information flow. With their support a new Guide on the Elaboration of Municipal Budgets was prepared, to ensure that municipalities were aware of and compliant with the national legislation in local financial management. Civil Affairs Officers in the regions were also asked to familiarize themselves with this document in order to be able to contribute more efficiently to the improvement of the management of local finances by municipalities.

Box 11.7 Case study: MINUSTAH support for municipal government finances in Haiti

and analysing the institutional framework, the political dynamics that underpin the institutional dynamics, and the agendas of the key stakeholders, allows civil affairs and the mission to better focus support to state authority, including through assisting national and local authorities in policy and decision-making processes.

This implies working close in hand with local institutional actors in understanding what the existing institutional capacities are, as well as the key gap areas and priority needs and the resources, both internal and external, that can be mobilized to address these needs. The analysis should not be limited only to what is required to make the institution functional, but should also look at which services that institution needs to deliver first in order for it to be recognized as effective and functional by the citizens. It is not enough for an institution to have the office space, the equipment and the qualified people for it to deliver services; it also needs to have established the

relationship between those resources and the output that the institution is expected to deliver.

Civil affairs can either provide direct technical assistance, if the required expertise is available in-house, or mobilize external partners, if available, to support local institutional actors in using a systematic and coherent approach to priority-setting, planning and budgeting. Ideally, civil affairs will advocate for priority-setting, planning and budgeting decisions that are taken with some degree of consultation with local constituencies.

Depending on the mission's mandate, civil affairs may need to recruit staff with specialist knowledge in a relevant area, as the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) did when looking for an anti-corruption specialist. However, more typically, civil affairs will assist in identifying the needs that exist at the local level and then mobilizing support from actors with technical expertise. Any responses to specialized needs are likely to be carried out in coordination with longer term development actors that possess specialist or technical knowledge in public administration.

### Case study



#### Establishment of an anti-corruption commission in Timor-Leste

Despite having an economy that is overwhelmingly state-dominated, where 93 per cent of economic activity is derived from a narrow economic base of government-controlled oil resources, until recently Timor-Leste lacked an external audit institution and remained vulnerable to the misuse of public funds.

Amid growing reports of corruption and misuse of public funds and assets, UNMIT civil affairs recruited anti-corruption specialists. These specialists have worked with national leaders and state agencies to establish a more functional anti-corruption legislative and institutional framework, including the Audit Court provided for in the Constitution.

The anti-corruption advisers have since gone on to assist Timor-Leste Anti-Corruption Commission to assess the country's compliance with the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and to begin developing the national strategy proposed in the UNCAC.

UNMIT senior officials have relied on the civil affairs anti-corruption specialists to promote dialogue among national leaders about the challenges and implications of corruption, and to cultivate an understanding of the need for an effective anti-corruption framework and functioning audit agency.

Box 11.8 Case study: Establishment of an anti-corruption commission in Timor-Leste

**Support to resource mobilization**

Civil Affairs Officers can help to mobilize donor interest to support needs identified at the local level that may otherwise be neglected in both national budgetary and international aid resource allocations. Civil affairs can leverage their presence both in the field and at mission headquarters to facilitate the flow of information as part of the overall coordination effort. However, civil affairs should not become an intermediary, but rather a partner in the mobilization process or else a facilitator in the early stages who will then leave the concerned parties to deal directly with each other.

## 11.5. Challenges and possible responses

A Civil Affairs Officer working directly with state institutions at the local level may be faced with a number of challenges. While officers may not face all these challenges at once, they should be considered when determining the best strategy to support such institutions.

**Weak legitimacy and working with controversial institutional counterparts**

As discussed at length in the first section of this chapter, the legitimacy of the state itself may well have been compromised in post-conflict contexts, and confidence in the government institutions by the citizens will probably need to be rebuilt. A subtle distinction will also need to be made by civil affairs between the institutions and the people that represent those institutions. In the aftermath of a conflict, peacekeepers often enjoy a high level of legitimacy among large sectors of the local population because they represent the UN. This will be accompanied by the expectation that peacekeepers will uphold the highest moral and ethical values. Civil Affairs Officers need to spend this “credit” of trust carefully by supporting government institutions, but not necessarily the individuals representing those institutions on the ground.

For example, when direct logistical and administrative support is required to maintain the physical presence of local government officials, civil affairs should remain sensitive to the political context and be mindful of the importance of acting, and being seen to act, impartially. Supporting the restoration of state authority might imply at times working with individuals who are controversial in the eyes of the local population. By working with them, civil affairs and the mission could be seen as compromising their impartiality. Close coordination with other mission components, such as political affairs, and sensitivity to the context is crucial to designing a strategy that is supportive of the state institutions, while monitoring how far the individuals representing them comply with the rule of law and the principles of good governance. This delicate balance is part of the skill of being a Civil Affairs Officer and is crucial to maintaining credibility throughout the process.

### **Low level of engagement of local authorities**

In the early phase of a mission it is quite possible that local authorities will have been appointed by one of the parties to the conflict on the basis of political considerations. Under such circumstances it is possible that some local authorities are resistant to change, especially change that involves the application of good governance principles, and will perceive any external intervention as unwarranted “interference”. Civil Affairs Officers will need to be aware of these circumstances in order to identify the most suitable strategy for engaging this kind of interlocutor. For example, they might find ways to persuade the local authorities of the benefits of adopting a more effective and responsive approach to public administration ahead of local elections if they are to solicit votes. (It is worth noting, however, that engaging local authorities in making changes and becoming more accountable is a process that will go well beyond the electoral period.)

### **Poor/incoherent legal framework**

In some cases the legal framework (in the form of the Constitution or other organic laws) might not provide sufficient clarity on the institutional set-up, might present loopholes or might simply make provisions that are unrealistic for the given context and circumstances of a country emerging from a conflict. While there may be overall support for reforms, the nature of those reforms and the procedures to attain them are likely to be extremely complex and cumbersome. Results cannot be expected in the short or medium term, meaning that Civil Affairs Officers are sometimes forced to work in a context of legal uncertainty. Nevertheless, a good knowledge of the legal framework and of its shortcomings will be necessary to help ensure that civil affairs interventions remain consistent in promoting good governance within state institutions.

### **Institutional conflicts**

Civil Affairs Officers will also need to be aware of tension and conflicts between institutions with competing responsibilities and mandates (especially when some level of devolution of responsibilities is part of the institutional architecture). They may need to help to diffuse those tensions by facilitating a dialogue which allows the institutions to identify and negotiate solutions. This can be the case between institutions collecting taxes (usually a tax office of some sort) and those that are responsible for allocating the money (the relevant local government institution), or when members of parliament are given a role in determining the use of funds assigned to local authorities. Similarly, institutional conflicts may emerge between the locally elected authorities and the representative of the central government responsible for that area.

**Poor and/or nonexistent infrastructure**

Public infrastructure is often directly targeted during a conflict, causing significant levels of destruction that affect not only facilities and equipment, but also institutional memory – in the form of lost archives, documents and records. This is one area where civil affairs can significantly contribute with needs assessments, and also through QIPs (or the mobilization of other funding sources) to build confidence by re-establishing some basic level of working space and capability.

In addition, civil affairs can help to address the key priorities in terms of restoring institutional memory. In some cases, a priority might be the internal administrative records, such as payrolls, financial records, inventories of equipment and properties. These might be lost forever or may never have existed, in which case it can be an important opportunity for local administrations to begin to establish proper archives. In other cases, a priority might be the vital civil registry documents (birth, death, civil status etc.) required by citizens to prove their identity, as well as land and property titles. It is important to note, however, that reconstituting records can be a very complex and controversial matter that requires both adequate technical expertise and sensitivity to the political context.

**Poorly performing civil service**

In many post-conflict countries the public administration represents one of the main employers and it is not surprising that it might be overstaffed, and that political patronage might take over merit-based recruitment. Compounding these problems, countries emerging from a conflict can rarely pay competitive wages (assuming that they have enough liquidity to pay them at all) and will therefore find it difficult to attract the most qualified individuals, who would most likely prefer a well-paid job with an international organization such as the UN. In some situations, civil servants need to hold a second job just to be able to sustain themselves and their families.

Situations like these prompt strong arguments for a radical reform of the civil service by streamlining the workforce, introducing a transparent public recruitment process, creating or restoring public administration schools and improving the salary scale. However, these are extremely slow and complex reforms to implement, especially given occasional political resistance and a chronic lack of resources. Civil affairs will often accompany this process over the course of the mandate of the mission by contributing to needs and capacity assessments, by supporting or facilitating capacity-building exercises (e.g. training and mentoring) and by developing tools and mechanisms to monitor the performance of public administrations.



**Low level of revenues**

A state emerging from a conflict or from years of endemic failure will usually have poorly organized revenue collection and an even poorer income base. The institutions responsible for tax collection, especially in countries with a sizeable high-value natural resource or industrial or commercial asset, tend to be vulnerable to high levels of corruption. Few individuals will be in a position to pay taxes, and those who can may be reluctant to pay into a system that may be highly corrupt. However, without locally generated revenues, state institutions will never be able to provide even the most basic services to the population, meaning that the level of confidence that the citizens have in them is further reduced. Breaking this vicious circle is not a task for Civil Affairs Officers alone, but they can contribute, once again, by providing accurate analysis of the specific circumstances and by promoting or facilitating initiatives that can restore the necessary level of confidence (e.g. through the promotion of transparency, anti-corruption initiatives, participatory approaches in the definition of local needs and priorities etc.).

**Poor understanding of the responsibilities entailed in governance**

In post-conflict environments, elected officials sometimes understand access to “power” as an entitlement and a benefit rather than a responsibility towards their constituency. Very often this view is paradoxically shared by the electorate themselves, whose expectations relate to individual benefits rather than collective services. In some cases, this is a direct consequence of the absence of the state, or the presence of a state that manifests its functions only through abuse and neglect. While these attitudes are deep-rooted in many cases, it is valuable to work on changing these attitudes and perceptions by fostering the introduction of mechanisms of accountability that promote a culture of public service in which both the administrators and the administered have rights and duties. There are situations where people do not distinguish between paying a legitimate tax and paying a bribe, as they do not expect any service in exchange for the payment, aside from being safe from harm. As the security and rule of law improve, the link between having authority and the duty to provide a service to the public needs to be firmly established. Civil affairs may assist this by facilitating the dissemination of information concerning the legal tools available as a recourse against abuse of power or lack of service provision. (For example, a truck driver who pays a toll but does not receive a receipt from an entity that, in any case, does not maintain the road, must have some recourse.) Civil affairs work in this area will require collaboration with other partners and mission components that work on the rule of law, sensitization campaigns and civic education activities.

**Differing goals and priorities**

Although the road map to consolidate peace and make it sustainable should be agreed by the host country and the mission, it is possible that not all stakeholders will share the same goals or the same priorities at the same time. There could be situations, for example, where fighting corruption, although considered a priority by many, might result in disrupting the whole peace process. As discussed in [chapter 8](#), a thorough mapping of the actors and of the interests at stake can help in setting achievable goals and sequencing objectives in a way that they strengthen each other instead of being pursued in isolation.

**Managing expectations**

As suggested in previous chapters, the presence of a UN mission may raise expectations in the host country that are unrealistic. Everyone hopes for a quick fix and slow progress might be viewed as a sign of lack of political will or commitment, of incompetence or even of apathy from the international community. Civil Affairs Officers will be confronted with these arguments and will need to manage the expectations of local authorities and other local interlocutors through an open and honest dialogue. They will need to clearly set out the limits of their mandate, of the peacekeeping operation itself, and also, if relevant, of any other UN agencies, funds and programmes.

## 11.6. Working in partnership

As already mentioned in the previous sections, the work of civil affairs does not take place in a vacuum. Civil affairs needs to work alongside other mission components involved in institutional support, such as rule of law and UN police, as well as UNCT partners, the World Bank, bilateral donors and INGOs, all of which may be engaged in promoting good governance and supporting state institutions.

At times, the array of different external actors operating on the ground – each with its own approach, timeframe, funding mechanisms and mandates – can make effective planning and partnership arrangements challenging. In these contexts, it is important for Civil Affairs Officers to be realistic about what added value they can bring and what niche they can in fact fill.

Civil Affairs Officers seldom deploy specialized technical experts in public administration or democratic governance. Expertise of this kind can usually be found within other agencies or institutions such as UNDP and the World Bank, or within the governance programmes of bilateral donors. However, these experts are rarely deployed in the field at the subnational level, especially during the first years of a mission. Civil affairs can use its field-level presence to liaise with local institutions

and actors in order to understand and identify their needs, while using their central-level presence to engage with governance partners and raise awareness of local-level needs. Civil affairs can leverage this position to develop strategies and build partnerships in order to address local-level needs, and can help to establish priorities while ensuring that interventions remain in line with any relevant overarching national frameworks already in place (e.g. a governance compact or local government act). In some cases, Civil Affairs Officers will simply play a role of conveying information or facilitating direct communications between local stakeholders and other governance partners, including through the use of a mission's logistic assets. In other cases, civil affairs will enter a partnership with those agencies and organizations providing the technical expertise, with the main asset of civil affairs being its presence in the field and its network of local contacts. At times, these partnerships are formalized through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This was the case, for example, in Sudan, where UNMIS and UNDP drafted an MoU outlining concrete areas of cooperation in southern Sudan in reference to conflict prevention, peacebuilding and decentralized governance activities and programmes. Similarly, in Liberia, civil affairs developed a strong partnership with the UNCT through the establishment of County Support Teams.

### Case study



#### County Support Teams in Liberia

In support of the Government's post-election decentralization initiatives, UNMIL established County Support Teams (CSTs) in each of the 15 counties in Liberia. The CSTs brought together UNMIL and the UNCT under the common goal of supporting and building the capacity of county government. The purpose of the CSTs was threefold:

- To ensure a coherent and consolidated UN approach in addressing county challenges;
- To support county government, in particular the County Superintendent's office; and
- To build the capacity of local government institutions so they could assume their responsibilities for security, reconstruction and development.

During the first phase of the project (2006-2008), the CSTs were tasked with providing material and technical support in three areas:

- Restoring the functionality of county administrative offices and transportation;
- Developing the capacity of county officials and strengthening data; and
- Information management in the counties.

Subsequently, in order to continue to support Liberian decentralization efforts, a UN joint programme was signed with the Government of Liberia in March 2009. In the second phase of the project, the focus was to consolidate the work at the county level, including handover to national counterparts, while paying extra attention to needs at the district level.

Box 11.9 Case study: County Support Teams in Liberia

Civil affairs should always be mindful of the mandate, resources and other constraints of external partners in order to manage expectations, both their own and those of local counterparts. For example, at times it is crucial to know whether a partner is represented by a consultant with little leverage in the organization or by a staff member who will oversee the implementation of a five-year programme. Similarly, it is important to be able to differentiate between a donor that comes with funds but may have programmatic constraints, and a partner that has developed a project but is yet to secure financial support for it. Building strategic partnerships with other governance and development partners, based on mutual trust and understanding of the respective potentialities and limitations, is paramount if a coherent strategy to support the establishment of legitimate and functioning state institutions is to be pursued effectively. However, there will be times when civil affairs will not be able to engage directly with international actors who, despite having relevant governance programmes, have little presence in the field or capital, resulting in limited opportunities for interaction. In these cases Civil Affairs Officers' options might be limited to learning about these programmes from the local or national authorities. Civil Affairs Officers should ensure they understand the goals, objectives and activities of such programmes in order to identify areas of synergy.

### Case study



#### MONUSCO: Civil affairs support to the Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The overall objective of the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) is to provide international assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)'s national efforts to secure and stabilize conflict-affected areas in the east. This is being realized



Local administration building constructed with support from MONUSCO in DRC

through the Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC) that MONUSCO civil affairs is contributing to. Civil affairs works with the Provincial Ministry of Interior on the restoration and extension of state authority component of STAREC. It promotes a transparent and demand-driven planning process with a focus on prioritizing

stabilization activities, including, for example, road access to territories formerly under rebel control, deployment and capacity-building of state officials, and providing the infrastructure and equipment required for them to function. In coordination with UNDP, civil affairs facilitates the mapping of capacity-building gaps, prioritizing interventions that allow local administrative structure to provide basic services. In particular, MONUSCO civil affairs plays an important role in supporting civil administration through:

- Facilitating the construction of buildings for civil administration;
- Reinforcing the capacities of local authorities and civil servants; and
- Organizing sensitization campaigns in targeted localities in order to raise awareness about new administrative services and structures.



Sensitization campaign in Kibabi, North Kivu province

Box 11.10 : MONUSCO: Civil affairs support to the Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Opportunities to work with the World Bank have been limited for civil affairs in the field, but the cases of the Country Assistance Framework (CAF) in DRC and of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP) in Liberia show that there is scope for developing strategic partnerships that can link national initiatives to subnational activities. Opportunities should be sought at the mission headquarters level to develop such kinds of synergy.



#### The World Bank

In his 2009 *Report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, the Secretary-General stressed the need for close cooperation between the UN and the World Bank, based on the “strong technical capacity [the World Bank has] in several recurring priority areas”,<sup>81</sup> which include governance and accountability.

The Country Assistance Framework (CAF) in DRC and the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP) in Liberia are two examples of the collaboration between the UN and the World Bank in post-conflict countries. In both cases, the two multilateral institutions helped to bring the international community and the national government together to agree on priorities for peace consolidation.

<sup>81</sup> *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, A/63/881—S/2009/304 (2009), p. 21.

### **The Country Assistance Framework (CAF)**

In DRC in 2006, following the national elections and the end of the political transition, the UN (MONUC and UNCT) and the World Bank agreed to set aside their parallel preparations for their respective country strategy documents (UNDAF and Country Assistance Strategy) in favour of a joint strategy. As part of this process, they also included 17 international partners including all the major donors. They defined a coordinated strategic approach to recovery and development assistance from 2007 to 2010. The international community coordinated the process with the national Government based upon the PRSP and the Government's five main priorities. The five pillars to the CAF were:

- (i) Promoting good governance and consolidating peace;
- (ii) Consolidating macroeconomic stability and economic growth;
- (iii) Improving access to social services and reducing vulnerability;
- (iv) Combating HIV/AIDS; and
- (v) Promoting community recovery.

The limited number of policy priorities, and the bringing together of a diverse group of partners were key to the success of this initiative.

### **The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP)**

The international community and the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) signed the GEMAP in 2005 as a means to address economic governance and anti-corruption issues. It is a joint programme, agreed by the NTGL and a wide range of international partners, including the UN, EU, ECOWAS,<sup>82</sup> AU,<sup>83</sup> USA, IMF<sup>84</sup> and the World Bank. The governance issues that GEMAP seeks to address are not unique to Liberia but a feature of many post-conflict and fragile states. In particular, GEMAP makes an explicit link between economic governance, the success of the peace process in Liberia and long-term economic recovery. The six parts of GEMAP are:

- (i) Financial management and accountability;
- (ii) Improving budgeting and expenditure management;
- (iii) Improving procurement practices and granting concessions;
- (iv) Establishing effective processes to control corruption;
- (v) Supporting key institutions; and
- (vi) Capacity-building.

A key feature of GEMAP was the provision of international experts with co-signature authority and management contracts in selected ministries and state-owned enterprises. This was an oversight mechanism designed to reduce corruption and increase transparency, particularly over natural resource revenues, and was directly linked to the peace implementation process and UN Security Council sanctions. GEMAP is considered an innovative policy initiative. Its tripartite steering committee is made up of Liberian government ministries, international donors and a civil society representative.

<sup>82</sup> Economic Community of West African States.

<sup>83</sup> African Union.

<sup>84</sup> International Monetary Fund.

## Recommended resources

<b>Name</b>	<b>Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict: Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group, A/65/747—S/2011/85 (2011)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Contains a series of recommendations on enabling and supporting local capacity in conflict-affected countries.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.civcapreview.org">http://www.civcapreview.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, A/63/881 (June 2009)</b>
<b>Description</b>	This Secretary-General Report provides the first conceptualization of peacekeepers as early peacebuilders.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via: <a href="http://documents.un.org/s.html">http://documents.un.org/s.html</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development</b>
<b>Description</b>	The latest thinking on the complex relationship between conflict and development.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/">http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Governance for Peace: Securing the Social Contract (UNDP, 2012)</b>
<b>Description</b>	This report builds on the findings of the <i>World Development Report 2011</i> and establishes a framework to guide UNDP in improving governance in fragile settings.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.undp.org">http://www.undp.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Lessons Learned Review of UN Support to Public Administration and Local Governance in Post-Conflict Situations, report to the Secretary-General's Policy Committee, produced under the auspices of the UN Working Group on Public Administration, New York (UNDP/BDP and UNDP/BCPR, draft March 2012)</b>
<b>Description</b>	This report examines the implications and potential for the UN as a whole in engaging in supporting public administration and local governance in post-conflict settings.
<b>Source</b>	Forthcoming, will be available on the library of the Civil Affairs Network

<b>Name</b>	<b>UNDG-ECHA Guidance note on natural resource management in transition settings</b>
<b>Description</b>	This document contains analysis and guidance on the impact of natural management resources in transition settings.
<b>Source</b>	Forthcoming, will be available on the library of the Civil Affairs Network
<b>Name</b>	<b>A New Deal for engagement in fragile states</b>
<b>Description</b>	Details the commitments and priorities made by donor and recipient states on the path out of fragility.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document/">http://www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document/</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Survey of Practice: Civil affairs support to the restoration and extension of state authority (PBPS, June 2008)</b>
<b>Description</b>	This survey of practice provides a snapshot of civil affairs activities in supporting the restoration of state authority.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the Policy and Practices database on the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Lessons Learned in Liberia: County Support Teams Report</b>
<b>Description</b>	Captures the experience of a successful partnership with the UNCT in support of the extension of state authority at the local level in Liberia.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the Policy and Practices database on the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Decentralization: A sampling of definitions, Working paper prepared in connection with the Joint UNDP-Government of Germany evaluation of the UNDP role in decentralization and local governance (October 1999)</b>
<b>Description</b>	A very technical document, which may be useful if required to engage in debating decentralization concepts.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.undp.org/evaluation/documents/decentralization_working_report.PDF">http://www.undp.org/evaluation/documents/decentralization_working_report.PDF</a>



## Chapter 12 | Quick Impact Projects – a tool for confidence-building



Distribution of solar-powered radio transmitters through a QIPin Chad

UN Photo/Olivia Grey Pritchard

*This chapter provides practical guidance for Civil Affairs Officers and staff from other mission components who are working as project focal points on Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). The chapter provides tips, tools and examples on each aspect of the project cycle based on experience from the field. This chapter is not aimed at QIP Programme Managers, for whom guidance is available in the DPKO/DFS Guidelines on QIPs.*

Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are small-scale, low-cost projects that are planned and implemented within a short timeframe. Different actors beyond peacekeeping also fund or implement QIPs with varying objectives. For the purpose of this Handbook, the term QIP applies to a project funded and/or implemented by UN peacekeeping operations.

The objectives and purpose of QIPs in UN peacekeeping operations are set out in the DPKO/DFS Policy Directive on Quick Impact Projects. The objective of QIPs is to build confidence in the mission, the mandate or the peace process. While QIPs

should always benefit the population, they are not intended to be humanitarian or long-term development support. However, good coordination with development and humanitarian actors is essential to ensure that projects do not duplicate or undermine their work.

It is important to keep in mind the distinct character and confidence-building objective of QIPs throughout the project cycle. The confidence-building objective may influence the choice of implementing partner, the identification and selection of projects, the impact assessment and publicity strategies. Clarity regarding the objective of QIPs is essential in communication with partners as it helps to manage expectations and ensure a clear understanding of the limitations.

## 12.1. How do QIPs contribute to confidence-building?

QIPs can contribute to building confidence in the mission, mandate and/or peace process in a number of ways, including:

- Through the type of project implemented, for example one that rapidly addresses key community needs, which can demonstrate early peace dividends and/or increase confidence in the mission;
- By cementing or supporting conflict management or resolution activities (see example from MINURCAT below);
- By building legitimacy and capacity of local authorities or organizations;
- Through the dialogue and interaction that comes with the process of project identification, stakeholder consultation and project implementation;
- By “opening doors” and establishing communication channels between the mission and host community;
- By helping uniformed components (UN military or police) to engage with local communities through involvement in project development, monitoring and/or implementation. This can include using military engineering assets to support a project or direct implementation by the military.

Throughout the QIP cycle, it is essential to be guided by the overarching principles of local ownership, gender, culture and context sensitivity outlined throughout this Handbook. Good project and programme management are also essential to building confidence through QIPs. Bad project management, including in the selection, implementation and monitoring of QIPs, can undermine confidence and may exacerbate conflict. Bad practice in QIP management might include:

- Failing to properly consult with stakeholders, which can lead to a lack of buy-in or a failure to address real needs;
- A lack of coordination with other actors, leading to duplication of effort;
- Poor quality work, resulting in short-lived benefits;
- Implementation delays; or
- Inequitable distribution of benefits between or within communities or regions.

Personnel working on QIPs can also refer to [chapter 8](#) in this Handbook for additional guidance and tools on analysis, planning, developing indicators and assessing impact.

### Case study



#### Cementing conflict resolution in Chad through a QIP

During the mission in Chad, MINURCAT Civil Affairs Officers were active in the resolution of disputes between farmers and herders over scarce and contested natural resources. Using an approach based on consultations with local authorities, Civil Affairs Officers in this example facilitated a successful reconciliation dialogue process between the Massalit (landowners and farmers) and Zaghwwa (herders) in a village in Chad where the former community had fled their village and become IDPs. The agreement was cemented with a QIP to build a mill in the village.



Box 12.1 Case study: Cementing conflict resolution in Chad through a QIP

## 12.2. Overall management of the QIPs programme

QIP programmes fall under the overall authority of the Head of Mission, who is responsible for ensuring effective management mechanisms. The DPKO/DFS Policy Directive and Guidelines provide additional details on the structure and mechanisms for QIP programme management.

**The Senior Management Team (SMT)** sets the priorities for QIPs and estimates overall funding level requirements, based on a needs assessment, as part of the annual mission budget submission. While the SMT is charged with priority-setting for QIP budgets, this tends to be done with input from civil affairs, who often have the greatest field presence.

**The Project Review Committee (PRC)** is responsible for evaluating proposals and selecting projects for funding, as well as for approving any changes to the project budget, outputs or scope of work during implementation.

**The QIP Management Team (QMT)**, usually within civil affairs, is responsible for ensuring effective budget forecasting, monitoring overall allocation of funds and spending according to geographical and thematic areas, reviewing and screening proposals before submission to the PRC, and ensuring timely allocation of funds over the course of the fiscal year. The QMT or Programme Manager is responsible for ensuring full records for each project are maintained and are available for auditing purposes.

**Project focal points** are individuals assigned to monitor and shepherd each project through the entire project cycle. Just as any mission component can submit QIP proposals, project focal points can come from any mission component. In some situations the project focal point may also be the QIP Programme Manager. Project focal points may assist implementing partners in proposal development and are responsible for monitoring implementation, liaising with the implementing partners throughout the process, collecting and checking financial documentation before submission to the mission, evaluating impact and reporting on the project.

**The Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS)** has delegated authority from the UN Financial Controller for financial aspects of the QIP programme and acts as certifying officer for individual projects.

**The Finance Section works** closely with the QMT in administering the budget including by obligating funds. The Finance Section is responsible for processing payment requests and maintaining original supporting documentation required for financial and budget purposes, including expenditure lists, receipts, payment requests and closure reports. The QMT maintains copies of all of these documents in project files.

### 12.3. Identification of projects

As a Civil Affairs Officer working in the field, the identification of possible projects is likely to come from your discussions and meetings with local authorities, communities and other stakeholders in your area of responsibility. Project proposals may be based upon direct requests/proposals from these stakeholders or on a need identified by your team for which you seek the relevant implementing partner. While it is important not to raise expectations that cannot be met, it is essential that potential applicants have access to accurate information about applying for projects. This promotes transparency and accountability and ensures programmes reach out to as broad a cross-section of the community as possible.

- **Be aware of criteria and strategic priorities.** Be guided by the criteria set out in the Policy and Guidelines and the strategic priorities identified by your mission, and make sure that you remain abreast of national priorities and strategies.
- **Manage expectations.** Don't promise anything during discussions with potential beneficiaries/implementing partners, ensure a wide distribution of the selection/exclusion criteria and explain the evaluation and selection process.
- **Consult and coordinate** with local communities and authorities, ministries, UN and international agencies and I/NGOs, other mission components and multi-lateral and bi-lateral donor programmes, either directly or through the QMT/Programme Manager.
- **Assess the implementing partner.** Assess the profile (including political affiliation, relationship to the host community etc.) and capacity of the implementing partner.
- **Seek technical advice/expertise,** especially in relation to projects on health, water and sanitation, education etc. (e.g. wells, clinics, schools).
- **Consider issues of culture, gender, ethnicity and vulnerability.** Consider, for example, issues of access to or benefit from the project for different sections of the community, such as women, young people, different ethnic groups or marginalized sections of the population. Arrange consultations with stakeholders and ensure that the intervention is culturally appropriate for the intended beneficiaries.
- **Assess risks and be sensitive to the context.** Look at the potential intended and unintended impact of the project. Assess the risks to practical aspects of project implementation (e.g. risk of delay, reliability of implementing partner) and the risk of generating or exacerbating conflict. Apply "conflict-sensitive" and "Do No Harm" principles, including, for example, avoiding being seen to favour one group or section of the community above others or supporting projects that could be used to further political, ideological or religious objectives.
- **Consider the impact on the environment and natural resources.** It is important to consider environmental and natural resource issues during the identification and approval process. Projects involving construction of buildings, reforestation or irrigation works often have important natural resource dimensions, such as the sourcing of materials, the suitability of species and the sustainability of water supply, respectively.
- **Conduct an initial site visit.** An initial site visit is important both in terms of assessing the feasibility of the proposed project and in documenting progress. If any kind of construction/rehabilitation of public space is involved it is useful to have "before" and "after" photos for publicity purposes. There is a specific initial site visit form in the DPKO/DFS Guidelines on QIPs.



Do No Harm” and conflict-sensitive approaches should be mainstreamed into all aspects of civil affairs work and are particularly relevant to the planning and implementation of QIPs. The principles of “Do No Harm” and conflict sensitivity are outlined in **chapter 5** of this Handbook.

## 12.4. Implementing partners

Government and state institutions, commercial companies and registered and non-registered NGOs, mission components, including the military, UN agencies and international agencies can all be implementing partners for QIPs. Each has distinct advantages and disadvantages for QIP implementation, and the choice of partner will depend very much on the type of project, mission context and particular confidence-building objective.

Implementing partner	Potential advantages	Potential disadvantages
Government or state institution.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Builds relations and opens communication with local authorities/institutions.</li> <li>• Brings additional legitimacy to authorities/institutions.</li> <li>• Supports local institutions through capacity development.</li> <li>• Contributes to the extension of state authority.</li> <li>• Promotes local ownership.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May entail lengthy administrative procedures.</li> <li>• Human or financial capacity limitations may negatively impact the quality of the project outcome or delay project implementation.</li> <li>• In pre-election periods, undertaking QIPs with government or state institutions may be perceived as supporting a particular candidate.</li> </ul>
Local civil society/grass-roots organization/NGO.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Brings specific expertise.</li> <li>• Can enhance grass-roots/popular engagement or involvement of excluded or marginalized groups.</li> <li>• Promotes local ownership and local capacity development.</li> <li>• Supports local civil society.</li> <li>• Better understanding of the local context and may be better able to navigate local procurement and labour.</li> <li>• Supports local employment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Organization may be seen to be serving one section of the community above another.</li> <li>• In contexts where local civil society is not formally organised, implementing partners of this kind may have limited project management capacity.</li> </ul>

Implementing partner	Potential advantages	Potential disadvantages
International NGO/ organization.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Specific area of expertise gained from other international contexts and/or in-country; may be able to offer expertise/ experts that cannot be found locally.</li> <li>• If well established with a good reputation, likely to deliver high-quality results, with effective monitoring and reporting.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May lack understanding or experience of the specific local context.</li> <li>• May place visibility of their organization first (visibility for the mission may be negatively impacted).</li> </ul>
UN actors.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNCT partners can provide specific expertise.</li> <li>• Can bring experience gained from other countries and/or in country (through longer term presence).</li> <li>• May enhance synergy and coordination with UNCT.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May place visibility of their organization first (visibility for the mission may be negatively impacted).</li> <li>• Can involve slow procurement procedures and prohibitive overhead costs.</li> </ul>
Private company/ contractor.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If local, supports local income generation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UN procurement rules will apply in the selection of private contractors or companies – these procedures can be lengthy.</li> </ul>
Military components.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Already have equipment, expertise and manpower.</li> <li>• Can help to navigate security or access challenges.</li> <li>• Positive role for the military in implementing technical projects.</li> <li>• Useful for building confidence between mission and host community, especially where uniformed components are the main interface and in the context of frequent troop rotations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Could undermine the local economy or result in missed local income generation opportunities.</li> <li>• Could be perceived as compromising humanitarian principles.</li> <li>• Not appropriate for some projects (e.g. engagement with a population traumatized by conflict.)</li> </ul>

Civil Affairs Officers should be aware that some humanitarian actors may be reluctant to work too closely with peacekeeping missions, particularly if military peacekeepers are directly involved in the implementation of projects. This is due to concerns that it could compromise the humanitarian principles they adhere to and politicize humanitarian action. As discussed in [chapter 9](#), it is important to understand and be sensitive to the different mandates and policies of partners, both in relation to QIPs and broader coordination issues.



For more information about humanitarian principles, download OCHA On Message: Humanitarian Principles, published by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): <http://www.unocha.org/about-us/publications/ocha-message>

## 12.5. Proposal development

As a project focal point, you may be involved in proposal writing, supporting before submission to the QMT/PRC. QIP focal points often play a mentoring role during proposal development and implementation, especially in contexts where the local capacity to develop and manage projects is limited. This approach can support local capacity development, help to ensure local ownership and build confidence between the mission and local partners. Proposals may be submitted using the suggested proposal template contained in the DPKO/DFS Guidelines on QIPs. It is also useful to work with implementing partners to ensure the following are contained in the proposal:

- Clear statement of the confidence-building objectives of the project, as well as outputs and intended outcomes and how these will be monitored and assessed;
- Initial site visit form, including photos where relevant;
- Clear scope of work, basic timeline, including two or three progress indicators or “milestones”;
- If necessary, additional technical assessments and drawings;
- Evidence of consultation with relevant clusters/bodies/ministries and awareness of national strategies (e.g. for water, sanitation, health);
- Description of whom the project will benefit (number and profile of beneficiaries) and ratio of beneficiaries to cost of project;
- Clear breakdown of costs (for example, cost of labour, machinery hire, unit cost of materials and quantities required) and price offers if relevant;
- Risk analysis (this should focus on risks to project implementation that are outside of your control) and how potential risks will be managed and mitigated;



- Description and/or evidence of local stakeholder consultation and buy-in (local ownership);
- Sustainability (for example, if the project involves provision of equipment will there be qualified staff and a capacity to run/maintain the equipment? What is the long-term impact on the natural resource, such as water or land? etc.);
- Feasibility and contingency; and
- Publicity and visibility strategy as proposed by/agreed with the implementing partner.

## 12.6. Selection and approval

Evaluation and selection by the PRC is based on information contained in the proposal form. This being the case, a clear detailed scope and an explanation of the merits of the project (both for the local population and in terms of confidence-building) are essential.

If the project is not selected by the PRC, the QMT will provide a brief written summary of the reasons why it was rejected. This should be transmitted to the applicant.

If the project is approved, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) will be prepared by the QMT. Ideally MoUs should be both in the mission language (legal copy) and local language (reference copy). Providing local-language copy can help to ensure implementing partners have a clear understanding of the contractual obligations.

The project officer submitting the proposal will be requested to provide the implementing partner's bank account or other payment details. In some missions, these details are checked with the Finance Section (this is usually done through the QMT) before the MoU is finalized. The project officer should review the MoU to ensure all other details are correct. Three or more copies of the MoU must be signed: one for the QMT, one for the Finance Section and one for the implementing partner).<sup>85</sup>

## 12.7. Once the project is approved

Ensure implementing partners understand the obligations, including timeframe, monitoring, reporting, especially financial reporting, and required documentation (provide additional guidance if required). Explain that original receipts and a list of expenditures related to the project should be maintained and submitted to a mission representative in order for instalments of project funding to be released after the initial instalment. Inform the implementing partner that the Finance Section will require original receipts and cannot process payments on the basis of copies.

<sup>85</sup> The number of copies required may vary from mission to mission depending on the mission-specific Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on QIPs.

Involve the Public Information Office (PIO) at the early stage as this makes it easier for them to tell a compelling story about the improvement that the project is bringing.

## 12.8. Implementation and monitoring

Each project should be visited at least three times. This includes:

- (i) Initial site visit (outlined earlier in this chapter);
- (ii) Monitoring visit; and
- (iii) Closure visit.

Suggested reporting forms are contained in the DPKO/DFS Guidelines on QIPs for each of these visits. The monitoring and evaluation process should be seen as an opportunity to ensure the work is progressing according to plan but also as a way to interact and talk with implementing partners and local community representatives/beneficiaries. Monitoring and evaluation should include assessment of progress and impact from both the implementing partner and the mission representative (usually the project focal point), based on observation and feedback from the implementing partners and project beneficiaries.

## 12.9. Mid-term monitoring

- Monitor timelines and milestones (measure progress against outputs in the proposal).
- Depending on the type of project, assess visible progress on the ground or observe project activities (for example, for training or capacity-building projects).
- Discuss progress with the implementing partner and address any implementation difficulties.
- Respond to contingencies, including bringing any requests to change the scope of the work or budget to the PRC.
- Report on progress (using standard template).
- Depending on the way in which the project funding instalments have been structured, you may also need to collect the receipts from the implementing partners in order to request the second instalment. If this is the case, remind implementing partners in advance that you will need to collect the financial documentation during the monitoring visit.
- PIO should also be engaged during the implementation phase and, depending on capacity, may undertake video, photographic or radio coverage of implementation.

## 12.10. Evaluation and closure

During the evaluation and closure visit, project focal points will need to assess whether the project objectives have been met. This includes assessing whether outputs and/

or activities in the project proposal have been accomplished, as well as the level of beneficiary satisfaction and the confidence-building impact. It may not, however, be feasible to fully measure the confidence-building impact of certain types of projects (e.g. access to basic services, rehabilitation of public buildings etc.) during a standard closure and evaluation visit, as it may take some time for beneficiaries to be fully aware of the project. In such cases, technical evaluations should be the main focus of initial closure visits, with further assessments of beneficiary satisfaction and confidence-building impact being undertaken at a later date. As noted above, the final evaluation of the project should include both an assessment from the implementing partners, as well as an evaluation by the project focal point, based on on-site observation and feedback from community representatives/beneficiaries.

- Prior to the closure visit inform the implementing partner that you will need a list of expenditures and original receipts for the work/equipment.
- Ensure you review the original proposal prior to the visit and, if working with language assistants, brief them about the details of the project and what information you hope to gain from the meeting.
- If necessary for the assessment, request additional technical support (e.g. from engineering components).
- If the local community has been involved in the project during implementation (for example, through receiving training or capacity-building support), include their feedback in the evaluation.
- For projects that involve construction, the provision of basic services, rehabilitation of infrastructure or other projects where the benefits to local communities may not be immediately visible, a further assessment of beneficiary satisfaction and confidence-building impact can be conducted after project closure and inauguration.
- If appropriate, take photos of the finished work.
- Double check all documentation (especially receipts and expenditure list).
- Complete project evaluation report, including your assessment of both the project outputs and, to the extent possible, the confidence-building impact.
- Sign and submit with list of expenditure, receipts and photos to the QMT.

### 12.11. Inauguration and publicity

Good publicity of QIPs can help to extend their confidence-building impact. Discuss inauguration and publicity with the implementing partner and PIO at the early stage



### Assessing impact

Tools for assessing beneficiary satisfaction and confidence-building impact may include interviews with key informants/beneficiaries, as well as focus groups and surveys. Combining qualitative and participatory methods, such as focus groups, with surveys that capture quantitative data can be particularly effective. The choice of assessment method is likely to depend very much upon resources and capacity.

of project development and again when the project is nearing completion. Many missions organize inauguration ceremonies to publicize the project and erect plaques or otherwise indicate the role of the mission. It is important to recognize the role of local partners. Highlighting the role of local authorities, where involved, can help to build confidence between local authorities and communities.

If the project was co-financed by different sources, all the organizations should be represented on the plaque. However, there are UN regulations that govern the use



Inauguration of a QIP in Yaroun Municipality, Lebanon

of UN logos on joint plaques and it is important to check with PIO about the use of UN logos.

Details of the QIP and plans for the opening ceremony (list of invitees etc.) should be transmitted to PIO well in advance of the event. PIO may be able to help provide coverage through:

- Inviting the media;
- Handling the media during the event;
- Drafting/approving and issuing a press release;
- Providing photo and video coverage;
- Drafting or inviting articles/reports (with photos) on the project for use in magazines, websites or other public information products.

### Case study



#### Publicizing QIPs in Lebanon

In Lebanon, the UNIFIL PIO played a key role in publicizing QIPs. Projects were regularly featured in the mission magazine, “al Janoub” (the South) and radio programmes, as well as being profiled as part of a series of UNIFIL TV spots.

Box 12.2 Case study: Publicizing QIPs in Lebanon

## Recommended resources

<b>Name</b>	<b>DPKO/DFS Policy Directive on Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Defines the purpose of QIPs and describes their nature, scope, value and duration.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the Policy and Practices database on the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Provides suggested procedures on the identification, selection, approval, funding, implementation, monitoring, closure and evaluation of individual QIPs and the overall management of the QIPs programme in missions.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the Policy and Practices database on the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>

<b>Name</b>	<b>DPKO/DFS Lessons learned study on management of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)</b>
<b>Description</b>	This provides lessons learned on both project and programme management. The study is based on extensive consultations with field missions and contains a series of recommendations.
<b>Source</b>	UN peacekeeping personnel can access this document via the Policy and Practices database on the POINT intranet: <a href="http://ppdb.un.org">http://ppdb.un.org</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Greening the Blue Helmets: Environment Natural Resources and Conflict (UNEP, forthcoming)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Contains case studies on environment and natural resources in relation to civil affairs work and QIPs in peacekeeping missions.
<b>Source</b>	Forthcoming on <a href="http://www.unep.org/">http://www.unep.org/</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the review of military involvement in civil assistance in peacekeeping operations, A/60/588 (December 2005)</b>
<b>Description</b>	Looks at the issue of military involvement in community support projects in peacekeeping missions.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="http://www.un.org/Depts/ios/pages/other_oiios_reports.html">http://www.un.org/Depts/ios/pages/other_oiios_reports.html</a>
<b>Name</b>	<b>SkillPort</b>
<b>Description</b>	A resource available to UN staff with a vast range of online skills-building courses, including transitioning into a project management role.
<b>Source</b>	<a href="https://un.skillport.com">https://un.skillport.com</a>

## List of acronyms

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AU	African Union
CAF	Country Assistance Framework
CAN	Community Alert Network
CAP	Common Action Plan
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CFI	conflict transformation institution
CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plan
CIMIC	civil military coordination
CLA	Community Liaison Assistant
CMS	Chief of Mission Support
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSD	civil society organization
CST	County Support Team
CTI	conflict transformation institution
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFS	Department of Field Support
DMS	Director of Mission Support
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPET	Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
DSRSG/RC/HC	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator

ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ePAS	Electronic Performance Appraisal System
EUFOR	European Force
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FC	Force Commander
FCS	File Classification Scheme
FPU	formed police units
GEMAP	Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme
GFSS	Global Field Support Strategy
HOPC	Head of Police Component
IARCSC	Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (Afghanistan)
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDP	internally displaced person
IDPS	International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
IMTC	Integrated Mission Training Centre
INGO	international non-governmental organization
IPO	individual police officer
ISF	Integrated Strategic Framework
ISSSS	International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Centre
JPT	Joint Protection Team
MICT	Ministry of Interior and Local Government
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti



MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
NPO	National Professional Officer
NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia
OCHA	Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
OROLSI	Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PBPS	Policy and Best Practices Service
PIO	Public Information Office
POC	protection of civilians
PORS	Political Operations Retention Schedule
PRC	Project Review Committee
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan
PSG	Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goal
QIP	Quick Impact Project
QMT	QIP Management Team
RBB	Results-based Budget
RPP	Reflecting on Peace Practice Project
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
SMT	Senior Management Team
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure

SPM	special political mission
SRSRG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
STAREC	Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for the Democratic Republic of the Congo
TAM	Technical Assessment Mission
TCC	troop-contributing country
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNCAC	United Nations Convention Against Corruption
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UN-CIMCOORD	United Nations humanitarian civil military coordination
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNLB	United Nations Logistics Base
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIN	United Nations Mission in Nepal
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support

UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council resolution
UNSCR 1325	United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security
UNSSC	United Nations System Staff College
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNV	United Nations Volunteer
USG	Under-Secretary-General
WASH	water, sanitation and hygiene
WDR	World Development Report

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