



Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic: Challenges and Priorities



High-level dialogue on building support for key SSR priorities in the Central African Republic, 21-22 June 2016

Cover Photo: High-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR at the United Nations headquarters on 21 June 2016. Panellists in the center of the photograph from left to right: Adedeji Ebo, Chief, SSRU/OROLSI/DPKO; Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation; Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic; Joseph Yakété, Minister of Defence of Central African Republic; Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA.
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Map of the Central African Republic



Foreword

Many political and military crises over the years have afflicted our country and caused both serious violations of human rights and insecurity throughout our land. These crises have also made the security sector institutions more fragile. The international community has had to intervene to help protect both our people and the country, and a number of strategies on security sector reform have been tried. These, however, have failed thus far and the cycle of violence and insecurity persists. The people of the CAR, who have been brutalized by so much fighting, are waiting for more effective and professional security forces which are under civilian control and accountable to the National Assembly. In this respect, the importance and timeliness of the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR cannot be overstated, and we are particularly grateful to the United Nations Group of Friends of SSR and to the Government of Slovakia for facilitating this dialogue.

Since his election earlier this year, President Touadéra has focused on national reconciliation, and to attain his goals, he has taken on the issue of insecurity. The reform of the security sector will be a part of the national reconciliation process. The development

of a professional gendarmerie and police is essential to build sustainable peace and security in the country. The security sector in particular can make an effective contribution to the protection of people and securing the land and borders. A revitalized SSR process offers an opportunity to transform the security sector into one that is more accountable, representative, effective and efficient. And today, senior officials of the state institutions are working to ensure that the new SSR process succeeds. We are already cooperating with multilateral partners and civil society to that end. But the efforts made by all of these Government institutions and actors can benefit from technical and financial support. In this respect, we look forward to the donor conference in Brussels this November, and hope that the international community will respond to the needs expressed by the Government, and supported by the United Nations and other partners.

Jean Willybiro-Sako
Special Minister-Counsellor
to the President of the CAR for DDR,
SSR and National Reconciliation
Bangui
October 2016

A Word From:

Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)

Security is a key challenge to restoring peace and stability in the Central African Republic, and one of MINUSCA's main priorities is to assist the CAR in reforming its national vision of security. The security of the people and the state, which is at the heart of the political dynamic in the CAR, touches on democratic rules and good governance through the distribution of tasks and the delineation of responsibilities assigned to respective security institutions involved in providing protection. The high-level dialogue on building support for key SSR priorities in the Central African Republic both revealed and confirmed the political nature of SSR in the CAR and the challenges that lie ahead. To date, the high-level dialogue represents the most important platform on SSR issues in the CAR since the election of the new CAR Government. The dialogue paved the way for the formulation of the national SSR commitments in the *Cadre d'engagement mutuel* (Mutual Accountability Framework) and the part on SSR of the National Plan for Recovery and Peacebuilding, which President Touadéra will present at the November Brussels donor conference on the CAR. I am hopeful that the Brussels event will respond positively to the needs identified at the New York dialogue.

The security institutions are meant to protect not only the public institutions, but also all the citizens of the CAR, irrespective of their ethnicity, religion and traditions, or cultural and political affiliation. However, currently the CAR armed and internal

security forces have a loose structure, an unbalanced ethnic distribution, a lack of command, and overall poor management. They still have a long way to go before they reach commonly accepted standards for such institutions. Furthermore, the security institutions have been at the heart of the problem in CAR, and they must therefore also be an essential part of the solution to the problems in the country.

There is no doubt that the ability of the international community to address the issue of SSR is central to its long-term efforts in support of the CAR's democratization, national reconciliation and security stabilization. Implementing a coherent and realistic SSR strategy represents a key process and a powerful enabler in support of MINUSCA's mandate. And while the high-level dialogue clearly demonstrated the political will of the CAR national authorities to tackle the challenging issues, it also showed that significant work lies ahead both politically and in terms of resources. Past SSR efforts have failed not only because of political challenges, but also in part due to the international community's lack of financial commitment for SSR efforts. It is therefore my sincere hope that donors can provide the much needed financial support for the SSR activities that will help to restore peace and stability in the country, and that will help to shape a brighter future for the Central African Republic.

Bangui
October 2016

Foreword

Since its establishment in 2007, the United Nations Group of Friends of SSR has played a key role in facilitating and promoting security sector reform as a key item on the United Nations agenda. The high-level dialogue on SSR in the Central African Republic is the first country-specific meeting of the Group of Friends on a high level after years of consensus building on a normative basis of SSR within the United Nations. As co-Chairs, Slovakia and South Africa are very proud to have had the opportunity to facilitate this important event, and are grateful to the Security Sector Reform Unit in the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, for the close cooperation and moderation of the event. We sincerely hope that the dialogue will galvanize the necessary support on SSR in the CAR.

It is also our hope that the dialogue will further contribute, from a field perspective, to the implementation of Security Council resolution 2151 (2014), the first stand-alone resolution on Security Sector Reform, and

will add to the growing body of knowledge and lessons on the support to SSR in post-conflict contexts. As noted by the Security Council, for SSR to be successful, it is essential to strengthen partnerships among national, multilateral and bilateral partners, and in this respect the involvement of numerous partners in the dialogue, including from the World Bank and the European Union, was significant. Our previous discussions within the Group of Friends had highlighted that SSR is firmly linked to peace and transition processes, and the dialogue on the CAR provided us with an opportunity to discuss the ways in which the United Nations can support the on-going political processes surrounding SSR in the CAR. The Group of Friends dedicates itself to maintaining and focusing international attention on the SSR agenda in the CAR.

Miroslav Lajčák
Minister of Foreign & European Affairs
of the Slovak Republic
Bratislava
October 2016

Moderator's Overview

The Central African Republic is literally cartographically central to Africa, physically located at the heart of the continent. In terms of political geography therefore, the CAR is indeed the “centre” of Africa. It connects the north, south, east and west of the continent and shares borders with countries belonging to the entire compass of Africa. Supporting security sector reform (SSR) in the CAR is therefore of strategic importance for and relevance for the entire African continent and beyond.

In post conflict and fragile contexts in which the United Nations is engaged, the goal of building effective and accountable institutions is a key exit strategy for peace-keeping. United Nations member states have agreed to support security sector reform on the basis of national ownership, as stated in Security Council resolution of April, 2014.

National ownership represents the yardstick for assessing the “success” (viability and sustainability) of such SSR processes, and thus, a relevant framework through which to assess the New York CAR dialogue.¹ The United Nations has further identified four key elements that constitute the basis national ownership:²

1. Common national security vision;
2. Implementation capacity;
3. Financing;
4. Monitoring and Evaluation.

Against these criteria, the “dialogue on challenges and priorities of SSR in the CAR” reflected mixed results with respect to the results of reforming the security sector efforts in the CAR thus far, but with encouraging signs for the path ahead.

In terms of the first element of national ownership – a common national vision – the dialogue demonstrated that “we are not there yet.” While there is indeed a na-

tional consensus on the need to address security governance deficits in a comprehensive manner, a commonly agreed agenda for a transformative trajectory is still evolving. A new National Security Policy, based on the concept of human security and endorsed by all national stakeholders, is essential for advancing human development in the CAR. The politics of SSR is therefore a key and foundational area in which the CAR would need the support of the international community. The United Nations is particularly well placed to play this role of facilitating a common security vision, based on a legitimate social contract and a political framework in which all citizens of the country can identify themselves and are stakeholders in security institutions.

The second element of national ownership – national capacity to implement the common vision – was severally referenced during the dialogue as a major deficit area for the CAR. The discussions illustrated a systemic and systematic dysfunction in the capacity of security institutions to effectively deliver security services. The *Forces armées centrafricaines* (FACA)³ seemed often to seize the focus of the New York CAR dialogue, recognized both as a challenge and a solution to insecurity. However, the capacity gaps in internal security services also featured prominently. In this regard, it should be stressed that while significant financial assistance from the international community would be necessary, it is not a sufficient condition for building national capacity. Exchange of experiences with other states who have and/or continue to face similar security governance challenges (south-south cooperation) would also be critical.

Financing, particularly financial responsibility, is the third element of national ownership, which illustrates the challenge facing SSR in the CAR, and needs to be highlighted in summarizing the dialogue

that was held in New York. While the CAR understandably faces resource constraints, primacy of financial responsibility necessarily rests with the CAR Government. This is an essential element of national ownership. Thus, the Government needs the support of the international community in integrating security governance and reform matters into public expenditure and budgeting processes. In this regard, it is encouraging that the Government is, with the support of the World Bank and the United Nations, initiating a *Security Sector Public Expenditure Review*. As both organizations confirmed during the dialogue, this is a key area for ensuring the viability, sustainability and accountability of the security sector reform process.

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the security sector reform and governance processes also features as central to the viability and sustainability national ownership. As the New York dialogue richly illustrated, it is important for national actors to be at the centre of efforts to identify indicators, benchmarks, targets, objectives and scope of reform processes. From this perspective, the New York dialogue was a major contribution to enhancing the level of national ownership in the CAR's SSR process.

The New York dialogue represented a very instrumental platform in the identification of the main priority areas in which the CAR can benefit from the support of the international community. These are presented in five “baskets”, namely:

- Politics of SSR
- Institutional Capacity
- Democratic Oversight and Accountability
- Affordability and Sustainability
- Coordination of international support

It was not lost on the participants that this is not the first attempt at SSR in the CAR.

There is indeed a history of mixed results. The failure of the last SSR process between 2008 and 2010 was caused by insufficient coordination between partners and national authorities, unrealistic expectations, and unsteady support on the part of the international community. The dialogue was, however, an affirmation of renewed international support to the Government and people of the CAR in meeting the challenges of building effective, accountable and sustainable security institutions in the

CAR. It was indeed the first of its kind and an important indicator that, this time, the path to reform will be transformative, and a major contribution to a new inclusive social contract in the CAR.

Adedeji Ebo
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New York
October 2016

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

APRD	Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy
CAR	Central African Republic
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Repatriation
DSR	Defence Sector Reform
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
EUMAM RCA	European Union Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic
EUTM-RCA	EU Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
EUFOR RCA	European Union Force in the Central African Republic
FACA	Central African Armed Forces (<i>Forces armées centrafricaines</i>)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HRDDP	United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISF	Internal Security Forces
ITGN	Integrated Technical Guidance Notes
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MISCA	African Union Mission in the Central African Republic
MoD	Ministry of Defence
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NSP	National Security Policy
NSHC	National Security High Council
OROLSI	Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (DPKO)
PNDDRR	National Program on Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSRU	Security Sector Reform Unit (DPKO)
SRSRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSPER	Security Sector Public Expenditure Review
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UFDR	Union of Democratic Forces for Unity
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

Executive Summary

The crisis that has swept across the Central African Republic (CAR) since December 2012 led to the near-complete breakdown of law and order and collapse of state institutions in the country. The struggle for power and wealth in the CAR has had a debilitating effect on the country's ability to govern itself peacefully and on its ability to develop functioning security institutions. President Faustin-Archange Touadéra has recognized that reforming the security sector is crucial for sustainable peace and development in the CAR, and has made security sector reform (SSR) a key priority of his mandate. Previous SSR efforts in the country failed in part because of a lack of political will of national authorities, institutional governance deficits and the international community's unwillingness to commit the necessary financial resources in the long term. However, a change in the political landscape in the CAR has opened up many new opportunities for the United Nations and the international community more broadly to enhance engagement with the national authorities on SSR. SSR in the CAR has the potential to transform the relationship between the State and its citizens by enhancing inclusivity and legitimacy of the State's security institutions. SSR is also essential for preventing a return to violence.

A successful transformation of the security sector hinges on our understanding of the specific SSR challenges and support priorities. In this context, the co-chairs of the United Nations Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, Slovakia and South Africa, facilitated a dialogue on building support for SSR priorities in the CAR. The dialogue, which took place in New York on 21 and 22 June, 2016, was chaired by Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic and co-Chair of the United Nations Group of Friends of SSR, and moderated by Mr. Adedeji Ebo, Chief of the Security Sector Reform Unit (SSRU), Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) of

the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

The main objective of the event was to identify the key challenges for SSR in the CAR and priorities for SSR support, and it provided a platform for a discussion among and between a high-level delegation from the Central African Republic, multilateral institutions and United Nations Member States on this important topic. The delegation from the CAR, which included among others Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako, the Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the CAR for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation, and Mr. Joseph Yakété, Minister of Defence of the CAR, had the opportunity to lay out its priorities for SSR support. The CAR Government's high-level participation demonstrated its strong desire to coordinate the assistance on SSR with the United Nations, as well as with the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU).

The high-level dialogue revealed and confirmed the political nature of SSR and the challenges that still lie ahead. It also highlighted a number of reform priorities, including on the politics of SSR, institutional capacities, democratic accountability, affordability and sustainability, and coordination of international support. The Co-Chairs' Statement, which is included in this report, underscored that SSR is "a key tool for preventing relapse into conflict" and stressed three key elements that must be contained in a strategic approach to SSR: first, "[p]ut in place a national policy and governance framework for the security sector"; second, "[l]ay the ground for the effective functioning, professionalism and internal accountability of security institutions, in particular the FACA, gendarmerie and police"; and third "[e]nhance coordination of international support, including of MINUSCA support, to the national SSR process within a mutual accountability framework (compact)."

Overall, the dialogue highlighted that there is general agreement on some of the key elements of reformed defence and security forces, including the FACA, the police and the gendarmerie, which need to be republican, professional, multi-ethnic and regionally balanced, as well as on the specific resource needs. However, it was evident that there is still some way to go before all the national stakeholders reach a commonly shared vision on SSR. The dialogue also exposed some differences between the international community and the CAR Government on the best way to address the CAR's security challenges: while some national interlocutors portrayed the non-state armed groups in the country as criminal elements, and pushed for a military solution, the international community emphasized the need for political solutions to essentially political problems, and called on the CAR Government to engage with armed groups in a candid and genuine political dialogue about the way forward in the country. From this perspective, the United Nations strategic priority in the CAR is the reduction of the presence of and threat posed by armed groups through political dialogue.

The report makes a number of recommendations on ways to transform the security sector. In the first instance, a dialogue between the CAR Government and armed groups leading to the peaceful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of those armed groups will be essential for achieving the ultimate end-state of SSR in the CAR as envisioned by President Touadéra and the Security Council, namely the establishment of "professional, ethnically representative and regionally balanced national defence and internal security forces," which are under civilian control, accountable to democratic institutions and respectful of the rule of law and human rights.⁴ Such a dialogue, which can be facilitated by the United Nations, will also be important for the development

of a national SSR strategy that is inclusive and sustainable. Furthermore, the report also recommends that over the course of the next two years, the United Nations should adopt a support strategy – ideally jointly developed and endorsed by the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the European Union. Such a support strategy should be structured around key priority objectives, and underpinned by specific policy commitments and programmatic initiatives, clearly set out in the Framework of Mutual Accountability (*Cadre d'engagement mutuel*) and the National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan. The following key strategic objectives would address in a structured manner what is required on SSR in the CAR:

- Support and facilitate the development of the national security framework, including a credible vetting strategy, so as to build a credible institutional basis for the transformation of the security sector;
- foster the integration of demobilized combatants of the armed groups into the national defence and security forces on the basis of a political agreement;
- promote and support an enhanced inclusion of marginalized groups, including Muslims in the security institutions;
- strengthen the institutional and operational capacities of the security institutions, with the European Union playing the leading role for supporting defence sector reform (DSR), and the primary responsibility for the reform of the police and gendarmerie belonging to the United Nations;
- foster democratic accountability of the security sector within the framework of the rule of law;
- promote the affordability and sustainability of SSR processes;
- enhance the effectiveness of nationally-led coordination of international support, including of MINUSCA support, to the national SSR process.

The specific recommendations on attaining these objectives are grouped into the following categories:

Politics of SSR:

To establish a national security strategic framework and mechanisms for security management

- Ensure the sustained political engagement of the United Nations and international partners so as to foster broader political support for these sensitive reforms in the Government, and so as to engage the President in a high-level discussion on his vision for national security and SSR;
- Facilitate (additional) review, (re) validation and eventual adoption of the draft National Security Policy (NSP); create a National Security High Council (NSHC) and its Secretariat (Secretariat-General for National Security);
- Encourage and support the development of a national SSR strategy and/or a national security strategy led by the NHSC.

To improve the security of the minority and marginalized groups, including CAR's Muslim citizens

- Assist the Government in developing an action plan for the enhanced inclusion of Muslim citizens and other minorities in the governance of the security sector.

Institutional Capacity:

To foster the effective functioning, professionalism and internal accountability of security institutions, including internal security institutions and FACA

- Support institutional development and capacity strengthening of the internal security forces, so that they can effectively provide security, including public order and law enforcement, in Bangui and other main population centres of the CAR;
- Establish defence institutions under democratic civilian control capable of defending the territorial

integrity of the CAR and contributing to the extension of state authority outside Bangui.

Democratic Accountability:

To foster an effective democratic governance of the security sector

- Establish effective parliamentary oversight of the defence forces and internal security services;
- Strengthen civilian control of the security institutions;
- Strengthen oversight capacity of civil society and customary institutions on monitoring of the security institutions.

Affordability and Sustainability:

To promote the affordability and sustainability of the security sector

- Support the Government of the CAR in the preparation and implementation of a Security Sector Public Expenditure Review (SSPER);
- Mobilize resources for funding a severance package and pension plan for eligible personnel of security institutions.

Coordination of International Support

To enhance the effectiveness of nationally-led coordination of international support, including of MINUSCA support, to a national SSR process

- Establish a Government-led coordination mechanisms;
- Build partnerships and a strong coordination mechanism between the United Nations, EU and other donors and political and security partners, in order to foster a common political and sectoral dialogue with the Government, based on common messages; avoid overlap between various donors' interventions and reduce the burden of coordination on the Government; and ensure very coordinated interventions in terms of support to the security sector;
- Continue to discuss the CAR within United Nations Group of Friends of SSR.

Introduction

The election of a new President and National Assembly in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2016 represents a major step in the country's democratic transition, peacebuilding and recovery from crisis. The new President – Faustin-Archange Touadéra – has publicly recognized the important role that the security sector plays in sustainable peace and development. In this respect, the President has stated that Security Sector Reform (SSR) will be a key priority of his presidential mandate.⁵

However, security sector reform is not new in the CAR. In 2008, the country undertook an innovative security sector reform process, which proclaimed national ownership and a holistic approach to SSR. A national seminar on SSR took place in Bangui in April of that year and brought together about 200 national and foreign participants; they drafted the *SSR Chronogram*, a formal document laying out the 146 activities that the CAR was believed to have needed, in order to transform its security sector. While President Bozizé committed to implementing the ambitious SSR plans, and despite initial enthusiasm for the document, the SSR process stalled in 2009 and by early 2010, the process was limited to a few technical projects. At the core, the problem was a lack of political will on the part of national authorities and ultimately the Government's resistance to any reforms that could weaken its control over resources. This problem was compounded by an international community that was not willing to commit financially to the reform process, as evidenced by donor conferences in 2009 and 2010, which failed to raise the requisite resources for some of the more ambitious activities discussed during the national SSR seminar.⁶

With a different political landscape in the CAR, and also the national and international political will for SSR in the country, the United Nations support for the CAR's SSR efforts has the opportunity and potential

to be transformational: enhancing inclusivity and legitimacy and contributing to the avoidance of relapse into conflict. This underscores the United Nations overall strategic objective in the CAR: "to support the creation of conditions conducive to the sustainable reduction of the presence of, and threat posed by, armed groups through a comprehensive approach."⁷ The Security Council has emphasized that a political process must remain at the forefront of the United Nations efforts to create and also maintain the political space that will be required to address the root causes of the conflict.⁸ As part of its overall political strategy, the United Nations can support the CAR authorities in implementing an inclusive process of national reconciliation, and the promotion of local reconciliation initiatives that address grievances at all levels of the society and which would involve a wide range of stakeholders. As part of these reconciliation efforts, it will be important for the United Nations to facilitate a dialogue between the CAR Government and the armed groups on resolving security challenges, and on transforming the security sector.

As a first step, the successful transformation of the security sector depends on identifying the challenges and support priorities in the area of security sector reform. In this regard, a dialogue on SSR in the CAR, which took place from 21 to 22 June 2016 in New York, offered an opportunity for the United Nations and the CAR Government to consensually identify challenges and support priorities in the area of SSR. The initiative was chaired by Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia and co-Chair of the Group of Friends of SSR, and moderated by Mr. Adejeji Ebo, Chief of the Security Sector Reform Unit (SSRU), Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The overall objective of the event was to identify the challeng-

es for SSR in the CAR and priorities for SSR support.

The dialogue was structured in two parts – a high-level event and a working-level event. The high-level event brought together a high-level delegation from the CAR Government, the United Nations Integrated Stabilization Mission to the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), as well as representatives from key partners including the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the African Union, the European Union and bilateral donors. Discussions focused on the challenges and priorities for SSR. During the working-level event, in-depth discussions built on the outcomes of the high-level segment of the dialogue, and participants had the opportunity to further elaborate proposals for international support for SSR in the CAR.

Mr. Joseph Yakété, Minister of Defence of the CAR, and Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the CAR for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation, gave remarks during the event. Other members of the CAR delegation included Mr. Thierry George Vackat, Member of the National Assembly and President of the National Defence and Security Commission, and General Francois Mobebou, Counsellor for SSR to the President of the Republic. In addition, high-level remarks during the event were also made, amongst others, by Ms. Annika Söder, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sweden; Mr. Mario Giro, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Italy; Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for MINUSCA; and Mr. El-Ghassim Wane, Assistant Secretary-General in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

In light of MINUSCA's new mandate, derived from Security Council resolution 2301 (2016), which prioritizes reform

of the security sector, and based on the New York dialogue, the purpose of this report is, in the first instance, to present the outcome of the dialogue on the key SSR challenges and priorities in the CAR. Furthermore, the report also provides key strategic, policy-level, and programmatic recommendations, which can help to transform the security sector in the CAR. The report is structured in three parts: part I provides an overview of the current

context for security sector reform in the CAR; part II captures the main elements of the dialogue, and of the specific reform priorities discussed at the high-level and expert-level events; and part III provides recommendations on transforming the security sector, including on ways in which it can become inclusive, multi-ethnic, regionally balanced, professional and republican, factors which will ultimately determine the sustainability of reform efforts.

PART 1

Security Sector Reform Context in the CAR

1.1 Historical Context

The Central African Republic gained its independence from France in 1960. However, five military coups d'état since then, with the most recent one in March 2013, have led to repeated cycles of political instability. These coups are both the symptoms and the outcome of the misplaced involvement of the armed forces in the CAR's politics. Each successive regime has promoted economic development in its own way: minerals in particular, but also other cash crops provided some fiscal revenues, and development was also boosted by the presence of the former colonial power – France. However, a colonial clientelist and authoritarian governance style has defined the politics of the post-independence period, and led to one of the world's lowest socio-economic development situations, resulting in recurring political crises, persistent conflicts, coups d'état and ultimately, state collapse.⁹

In 1965, Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa overthrew the then President David Dacko. In 1979, French military assistance helped to restore Dacko to the Presidency, which, however, lasted only until he was ousted again in 1981 by the Chief of Staff of the FACA – Andre Kolingba – in another military coup. Twelve years of military rule ended in 1993 when Ange-Felix Patasse defeated both Kolingba and Dacko in presidential elections. What followed was a turbulent decade, which saw mutinies by soldiers in the capital Bangui over unpaid wages in 1996 and again in 1997, and a failed coup attempt in 2001, in which Kolingba attempted to oust Patasse with the help of army chief of staff General François Bozizé.¹⁰

While Patasse was able to suppress the coup attempt in 2001 with the help of Libyan and Chadian troops, and Bozizé was sacked, he was less successful in 2003. While Patasse was out of the country, Bozizé and his rebel forces seized Bangui and successfully toppled the President. Bozizé remained in power throughout a further turbulent decade, which saw him elected as President in 2005, and re-elected in 2011. In 2006, rebels took up arms against the Govern-

ment and managed to obtain control of areas in the northeast of the country. The conflict with various rebel groups did not come to an end until June 2008, when two of the three main rebel groups – the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) and the Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD) – agreed to a peace deal with Bozizé's Government.¹¹

The final coup, which precipitated the most recent crisis in the CAR, took place in March 2013, and saw President Bozizé ousted by Séléka rebels under the leadership of Michel Djotodia. Following pressure from the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the National Transitional Council was established and elected Michel Djotodia, the sole candidate, as Head of State of the Transition in April 2013. Hailing from north-eastern CAR, the Séléka drew on the grievances of the minority Muslim community, which mainly dwells in the north-east of the country. Such grievances stemmed from their perceived exclusion and persecution by successive Christian-led governments.¹²

The March 2013 coup was followed by severe human rights abuses and looting by Séléka combatants, who tended to target the Christian population of Bangui and other cities. In September 2013, President

Djotodia formally dissolved the Séléka coalition. However, this political act did not end the widespread abuses committed by the Séléka rebels. Anti-balaka militias arose in response to counter the Séléka: anti-balaka are essentially loosely organized village self-defence groups – mostly composed of Christians – which ended up violently retaliating against Séléka combatants and also against the general Muslim population, giving the conflict a sectarian dimension. The resulting violence killed thousands of civilians and left hundreds of thousands displaced. On 5 December 2013, the anti-balaka coordinated a vicious attack against the Muslim population in the capital, where more than 1,000 civilians died.

Concerned with the alarming escalation of violence, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2127 on 13 December 2013, which authorised the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic, known as MISCA, to stabilise the CAR, alongside the French force, *Operation Sangaris*. The security situation also improved following the signing of a cease-fire agreement between armed groups on 23 July 2014 in Libreville. The deployment of EUFOR RCA (February 2014 – June 2015) in Bangui and the United Nations Multidimensional Inte-




Muslim neighbourhood in Bangui. United Nations Photo/Catianne Tijerina.

grated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which took over from the African-led MISCA in September 2014, was instrumental in restoring security.

The political situation became more stable following the resignation of Michel Djotodia and the selection of Catherine Samba-Panza, a former mayor of Bangui, as interim head of state in January 2014. The transitional authorities launched the reconciliation process, culminating in the May 2015 Bangui Forum, which brought together some 700 individuals from across CAR's society, including the Séléka and anti-balaka, the transitional Government, the nation's political parties, traditional chiefs, civil society, and religious groups, so as to define a common vision for the nation's future.¹⁴ Despite occasional outbursts of violence in Bangui, and clashes between the ex-Séléka and anti-balaka armed groups along the country's north-south divide, the transitional authorities successfully organized a referendum on a new Constitution in December 2015, as well as presidential and parliamentary elections (December 2015 – April 2016). The elections resulted in the inauguration of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra on 30 March and a new National Assembly on 3 May 2016.

The recent crisis exacerbated the deeply entrenched systematic socio-economic and political challenges the CAR has been facing since its independence. It also resulted in the near-complete breakdown of its state institutions and of law and order. The low economic activity in the country was further compounded by the destruction of infrastructure and insecurity, and the country has experienced a drop in almost all socioeconomic indicators. As of February 2016, 2.3 million people (about 46% of the total population) were in need of humanitarian assistance.¹⁵ What has further exacerbated the challenges is a political economy marred by conflict and the fight for control over the country's natural resources between the Government and the armed groups, as outlined in the next section.



IDPs in CAR as of May 2015¹³



Ambrosine Kpongo, Permanent Representative of the Central African Republic to the United Nations, addresses the Security Council. United Nations Photo/Evan Schneider

1.2 Political Economy

The CAR is a resource-rich country that suffers from extreme poverty. The state has limited reach beyond the capital, and political power is concentrated in and around Bangui. The country's wealth is concentrat-

ed in the hands of armed groups, which control natural resources outside Bangui. The struggle for power and wealth in the CAR has had a debilitating effect on the country's ability to govern itself peacefully and on its ability to establish functioning institutions, including in the security sec-

tor. Meaningful progress on security sector reform would require consolidation of democratic gains and an inclusive process of national reconciliation resulting from dialogue with the armed groups. Thus, the key to effective SSR lies in the ability of the opposing sides to arrive at a non-antagonistic political economy.

The CAR is also one of the least developed countries in the world, despite the country's abundance of natural resources. In 2015, it ranked 187 out of 188 on the human development index.¹⁶ Even before the political and security crisis which ensued in 2013 and devastated the country's economy, the CAR had one of the highest poverty rates in the world.¹⁷ The GDP for 2015 was \$US 1.503 billion,¹⁸ which amounts to less than 0.01 percent of the world economy. Successive crises have resulted in an increasingly fragile economy, which is heavily dependent on multilateral foreign aid. Much of public investment is externally financed and numerous international non-governmental organizations provide services to the population which the Government itself is unable to provide.¹⁹

The landlocked country of 4.9 million is sparsely populated and its rich resources remain largely underexploited. Agriculture, mining, and forestry are the key economic sectors. Of these, agriculture represents the largest sector of the economy, occupying nearly four-fifths of the workforce and accounting for half of the country's GDP. The majority of the population relies on subsistence farming for their livelihoods. Timber is a key source of foreign exchange, but the country has been very vulnerable to price fluctuations as the CAR has been heavily reliant on international commodity markets. Minerals make up over half of the country's total export earnings; diamonds in particular are a key export, and gold, uranium, copper, iron ore and manganese are also mined, but to a lesser extent.²⁰ However, the CAR's rich resources, which in addition to minerals also include oil, have not been exploited on an industrial scale. The country has not become industrialized


as infrastructure such as roads and power sources have not been significantly developed beyond the capital.²¹

It should be noted that while agriculture, forestry and mining make up the most important economic sectors, all three have suffered significantly since the 2013 crisis.²² The political and security crisis in the country led to major population displacements, which have disrupted the farming cycle and other livelihoods severely, and have led to crisis-level food insecurity throughout the CAR.²³

What has compounded the economic collapse of the country is the flight and displacement of Muslim communities, which had previously run many of the trade networks in the CAR. In addition, in 2013 the country was suspended from exporting diamonds under the Kimberley Process, which aims at preventing "conflict diamonds" from entering the legitimate diamond trade. By July 2015, the Kimberley Process allowed the trade again from special compliant zones.²⁴

The CAR's economy has been described by some as a "warlord economy" especially as illicit economic networks have sprung up in many areas.²⁵ Due to the state's limited reach, armed groups have been able to exploit and benefit from the CAR's abundant natural resources to the detriment of both the central Government and the people of the CAR more broadly. Armed groups currently control mining sites in central CAR. Between May 2013 and October 2014, diamonds worth \$US 24 million were smuggled out of the country.

Furthermore, armed groups in the CAR have profited from "forceful taxation and illicit trade with gold and diamonds that are smuggled across international borders or sold to Central African diamond companies. Moreover armed groups use violence, attacks, and threats to collect revenue from civilians, business and public institutions and to conduct widespread looting."²⁶ Since 2013, the Séléka and the anti-balaka have both controlled and profited from the trade of natural resources, and also by taxing the cattle trade, and



Illegal trafficking routes in CAR²⁷

those profits have ultimately allowed these groups to perpetuate a continuous state of instability.²⁸ Furthermore, the armed groups have also profited from the poaching of elephant ivory.²⁹ It is clearly evident that these groups have significant economic power in the country, and that they have access to and control the key resources which would be essential for the effective governance of the CAR.³⁰

While armed groups have controlled much of the country's economic power, the Government has remained reliant on outside help. The financial assistance which the IMF had approved for the CAR between 2013 and 2015 amounts to \$US 31.5 million. These monies were approved specifically for the Transitional Government's "emergency economic recovery program, which aimed to improve macroeconomic stability and government capacity."³¹ Furthermore, the World's Bank commitment of \$US 100 million worth of grants and loans during the same period aimed to help restore essential government services. The country remains heavily reliant on humanitarian organizations for the provision of basic services.³²

Given the state's inability to collect revenue from its resources, which are controlled by armed groups, the state's institutions, including those in the security sector, are disproportionately reliant upon external support and funding. The state needs to generate a much higher level of domestic revenue in order to ensure the financial viability of its security institutions. A new fiscal contract between the State and the citizens of the CAR is required to ensure the sustainability of SSR. A transformation of the political and economic landscape in the CAR will also require addressing the regional inequalities with a comprehensive security and development strategy for the north-eastern region. The state will also have to address socio-economic marginalization by expanding public services, including security and justice, to the north-east of the country.

It is important to note that without a fundamental change in the relationship between Bangui and the CAR's north-eastern region, it will be difficult to transform the security institutions of the country in line with the Security Council's envisioned end state of professional, republican, ethnically representative and regionally balanced security forces. This will ultimately require

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a transformation of the prevailing political culture in Bangui, from a history of exclusion to a culture of broader inclusion and participation of all citizens in the public life. What will be further necessary for sustainable peace is a change in the relationship between various other groups, including the rich elites and the impoverished citizens of the country, the military and civilians, and importantly between the CAR's religious groups.

1.3 Overview of the Security Sector

1.3.1 Structure of the rule of law and security sector


The structure of the CAR's security sector was originally influenced by its historical link with France. The FACA, under the Ministry of Defence, is responsible for the country's territorial defence. Currently, there are 8,360 troops on the government's payroll. The defence forces have historically included "the Bureau of the Chief of De-

fence Staff, ground forces, [an] air force, a fluvial battalion, a brigade of protection and security of institutions, a battalion of fire-fighters, an engineering brigade, services (such as health and armoury) and schools and instruction centers," with the FACA falling under the Ministry of Defence.³³ A National Defence Council addresses national security matters, and is chaired by the President; the National Parliament's Commission on Defence and Security is designed to provide democratic oversight of the armed forces.

The country's Internal Security Forces (ISF) are made up of the National Police and the Gendarmerie. There are currently 1,500 police officers and 2,161 gendarmerie officers. While the Gendarmerie was originally under the Ministry of Defence, an administrative decree in 2013 placed it together with the National Police under the operational command and

control of the Ministry of Interior, Public Security, and Territorial Administration. The National Police and Gendarmerie both have training centers in Bangui. The ISF also includes Water and Forest Guards, assigned to police the 5 million acres of dense rainforest, and they number some 466 officers, of which 350 are uniformed personnel. They fall under the Ministry of Water, Forest, Tourism and Environment.

The Customs Service in the CAR falls under the Ministry of Finance and has about 518 customs officers. The Justice and Penitentiary System, both of which fall under the Ministry of Justice, are the final element of the CAR's security sector. The civil-law based judicial system is spread over sixteen prefectures and has three tiers: A constitutional court, three courts of appeal, and twenty-four courts of first instance. There are also thematic courts: a court of auditors, a permanent military tribunal and also a children's tribunal. A specialized mobile court with nation-wide jurisdiction addresses inter-



Distribution of security forces in CAR

national criminal cases.³⁴ About 177 magistrates work in the legal system, and there are around 150 lawyers for the entire population, with a high concentration of lawyers based in and around Bangui. Finally, the penitentiary system is made up of 38 prison facilities, which are spread evenly across the CAR's territory, and a total of 40 personnel work in Penitentiary Administration. In the absence of correction officers, the FACA provide security to the two main prisons in Bangui.

1.3.2 Overview of the United Nations mandate for SSR

On 10 April 2014, the Security Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) through resolution 2149 (2014). For the first year, Security Sector Reform was one of the “additional tasks” of the Mission’s mandate, to be undertaken “as conditions permit.” Since then, there have been two changes to the mandate, which has seen a more strategic prioritization of SSR. On 20 April 2015, the Security Council adopted resolution 2217 (2015) extending MINUSCA’s mandate until 30 April 2016. While the new resolution preserved the

main features of resolution 2149 (2014), it introduced new decisions on the prioritization and sequencing of tasks. In particular, resolution 2217 (2015) adopted a three-tiered approach to the mission’s mandate including immediate priority tasks, essential tasks, and additional tasks.

Resolution 2217 (2015) only placed SSR in the second tier of “essential tasks,” despite

the critical role of SSR in ensuring the delivery of MINUSCA priority tasks. Throughout 2014 and 2015, and in a context where the security and defence forces have historically been a source of instability and a conflict driver, SSR remained critical for national reconciliation, peacebuilding and the successful implementation of MINUSCA’s priority tasks. However, considering MINUSCA’s resource constraints and the urgent need to disarm armed groups, the mission had decided to prioritize support to the implementation of an agreement on disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR), and to keep SSR as a second layer of priority.

The Council authorized MINUSCA to use its capacities to do the following: firstly, to “support the Transitional Authorities and subsequent elected authorities in devising and implementing security sector reform and vetting processes, including through the provision of strategic policy advice, in close coordination with EUMAM-RCA”; and secondly, to “closely coordinate the provision of technical assistance and training between the international partners in the CAR in order to ensure a clear distribution of tasks in the field of SSR, for the benefit of both the FACA and the CAR internal security forces (police and gendarmerie).”³⁵ Thus,



Security Council votes on MINUSCA mandate. United Nations Photo/Loey Felipe.

SSR was not an immediate priority of the international community and of MINUSCA's mandate, and would not become one until 2016.

On 26 July, Security Council resolution 2301 (2016) extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic (MINUSCA) until 15 November 2017. The resolution, which was adopted unanimously under Chapter VII

of the United Nations Charter, adapted the mandate of the mission to the new circumstances which prevail in the country. The implementation of the mandate would occur on the basis of prioritized tasks and in a phased manner where relevant. For the first time, SSR became one of the mission's first tier core priority tasks, and the Security Council mandated MINUSCA to "provide strategic and technical advice to the CAR authorities to design and implement a strategy for the SSR."³⁶

More specifically, the resolution mandated MINUSCA with the following SSR tasks and responsibilities:³⁷

(i) To provide strategic and technical advice to the CAR authorities to design and implement a strategy for the SSR, taking into account the work done by EUMAM-RCA and in close coordination with EUTM-RCA, and with the aim of ensuring coherence of the SSR process, including through a clear delineation of responsibilities of the FACA, the internal security forces, and other uniformed entities, as well as the democratic control of both defence and internal security forces;

(ii) To support the CAR authorities in developing an approach to the vetting of defence and security elements (FACA, police and gendarmerie) which includes human rights vetting, in particular to promote accountability of violations of international and domestic law amongst security forces and in the context of any integration of demobilized armed groups elements into security sector institutions;

(iii) To take a leading role in supporting the CAR authorities on the reform and development of the police and the gendarmerie, through the design and implementation of a capacity-building and development plan, undertaken pursuant to an overall security sector reform strategy, and by providing technical assistance, in close coordination with other technical assistance providers, to the CAR Government;

(iv) To support the CAR Government in developing an incentive structure for police and gendarmerie and the selection, recruitment, vetting and training of police and gendarmerie to include at least 500 new police and gendarmerie elements, with the support of donors and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), taking into account the need to recruit women, and in full compliance with the UN Human rights due diligence policy (HRDDP);

(v) To coordinate the provision of technical assistance and training between the international partners in the CAR, in particular with EUTM-RCA, in order to ensure a clear distribution of tasks in the field of SSR, for the benefit of both the FACA and the CAR internal security forces (police and gendarmerie);

(vi) To coordinate with the CAR authorities in designing a plan for the progressive, and coordinated re-operationalization of FACA and other internal security forces within the framework of the SSR programme and in compliance with the HRDDP, in close coordination with EUTM-RCA.

1.3.3 Multilateral and bilateral support activities 2014-2016

Over the course of the first year of the mission's mandate, MINUSCA managed to support the CAR in a number of important respects of SSR, including at the Bangui Forum and on DSR. MINUSCA supported the formulation of SSR-related background documents and facilitated the organization of the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation, which took place from 4 to 12 May, 2015, and which brought together around 700 individuals from across the CAR's political spectrum and society, including the Transitional Government, the armed groups (Séléka and anti-balaka), traditional chiefs, the nation's political parties, religious groups, and civil society, with the overall objective of defining a common vision for the nation's future.³⁸ On SSR, participants endorsed the recommendations of the local consultations held all over the country prior to the Forum and called for the development of a new vision of the security sector architecture, the lifting of the embargo on weapons and the rehabilitation, restructuring and operationalization of the FACA. A key element of the discussion in this working group was the reinforcement of the capabilities of the CAR's internal security forces and their redeployment throughout the country.

The main outcome of the Bangui Forum was the adoption of the Republican Pact (*Pacte républicain pour la paix, la réconciliation nationale et la reconstruction en République centrafricaine*) and the DDDR Agreement (*Accord sur les principes de DDDR et d'intégration dans les corps en uniforme de l'Etat centrafricain*). These two documents provided a detailed road map for peacebuilding activities in the CAR. The Republican Pact positively reflected the full commitment of the participants in the Forum to a comprehensive reform of the security sector, including the establishment of accountable, multi-ethnic, professional and republican defence and internal security forces. The Agreement on DDDR and Integration set forth the principle of condition-based individual integration of the ex-combatants of armed groups into

the uniformed statutory forces/services. Rejecting collective integration of armed groups into the FACA, Gendarmerie and National Police, the Agreement laid the foundation for sustainable SSR.

Despite the complex and challenging political environment that characterized the Transitional Government, MINUSCA, in collaboration with other international actors, was able to successfully facilitate a political roundtable on security, which resulted in the adoption of a Declaration on the Principles of National Security in December 2015, and paved the way for the endorsement of a broadly consultative draft National Security Policy (NSP) by the CAR's Strategic Committee on DDR/SSR in March 2016. However, while an ad-hoc technical committee completed the review of the draft NSP in August 2016, the

new Constitution in December 2015 was a key milestone in laying the normative basis for the democratization and civilian oversight of the security sector. In this respect, the assistance MINUSCA provided to the constitutional drafting committee and the SRSG's political engagement with the Constitutional Court was instrumental in ensuring the inclusion of democratic governance norms and standards for security institutions in the Constitution.

Moreover, MINUSCA was successful at establishing functioning coordination mechanisms between the Transitional Government and the international community. The Strategic Committee for DDR/SSR, co-chaired by the SRSG and the Prime Minister, was instrumental in securing the national commitment to the reform initiatives recommended by MINUSCA,

ed by the EU Military Advisory Mission (EU-MAM). The country also made significant progress in reviewing and revising the legal and regulatory framework of the defence sector. In this respect, the ministry drafted important new laws and decrees, including a decree on the reorganization of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and of the General Staff (État-major), which outlined a new organogram and staffing table for the MoD and General Staff. Furthermore, it also drafted a decree on the retirement and pension of FACA personnel. With the joint support of EUMAM and MINUSCA, the MoD also formulated a new draft law on the Military Justice Code. However, the transitional authorities were not able to adopt these laws and decrees for reasons of political expediency.

On 16 July 2016, the Council of the European Union launched the EU military training mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA). The mission has contributed to the EU's comprehensive approach and to security sector reform in the country. EUTM RCA is based in Bangui and will operate for an initial period of two years. Major General Eric Hauteclouque-Raysz of France is currently serving as the mission's commander. Following up on the EU Military Advisory Mission (EUMAM RCA), EUTM RCA is working on the development of a modern, effective, inclusive and democratically accountable FACA. It also provides strategic advice to the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, as well as education to officers and non-commissioned officers, and operational training to the FACA. A political challenge for the national authorities and the international community is to maintain a commitment to long-term reforms of the defence sector while designing adequate security arrangements to address immediate security needs and challenges.³⁹

Resolution 2301 gives MINUSCA the mandate 'to take a leading role in supporting the CAR authorities on the reform and development of the police and the gendarmerie, through the design and implementation of a capacity-building and development plan...' The National Police

Moreover, MINUSCA was successful at establishing functioning coordination mechanisms between the Transitional Government and the international community. The Strategic Committee for DDR/SSR, co-chaired by the SRSG and the Prime Minister, was instrumental in securing the national commitment to the reform initiatives recommended by MINUSCA, such as the SSR Roadmap and the draft National Security Policy. The Technical Committee on SSR, which was hosted by the African Union and which was comprised of technical experts, such as the 'Chargés de Mission SSR' of the ministries and working-level representatives from international missions, served as an effective coordination platform for the development of SSR proposals.

national authorities have yet to approve the document. The adoption of the draft NSP is on the agenda of a meeting of the Strategic Committee for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation, chaired by President Touadéra, which has been planned for the second half of October 2016.

During the transitional period, the Central African Republic also achieved significant progress on establishing the foundation for civilian control and democratic governance of the security sector. In fact, the transitional period marked a clear turning point in civil-security relations. The adoption of a

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In the area of DSR, the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Headquarters were partially reorganized and restructured, thanks to the advice and technical support provid-

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and National Gendarmerie, with the support of the Development Pillar of the MINUSCA Police, have developed a draft Development and Capacity Building Plan for these two institutions. The document was formulated under difficult conditions, such as frequent changes in interlocutors and/or counterparts, including five different directors-general of the National Police within one year. The draft police development plan provides a clear picture of what resources are needed, the cost and how the delivery can be planned over a period of five years, going from 2016 to 2020. A programmatic approach and more in-depth police reform are needed in this area.

UNDP has also supported the justice sector, the police and gendarmerie through a number of projects, including the following: a Project to Support Reactivation of the Criminal Justice System in Bangui (2014) \$197,524; Emergency Restoration of the Police and Gendarmerie in Bangui (2014–2015) \$2,217,621; Payment of Salaries of the Police and Gendarmerie (2014–2016) \$899,135; Joint Project to Fight Against Human Rights Violations and to Revive the Justice System in the Central African Republic (2014–2017) \$16,553,925.

Furthermore, the African Union (AU) has maintained a political presence in the CAR and provides political and policy advice on SSR to the national authorities. And on the bi-lateral front, France has resumed its defence and security cooperation following the return to constitutional order. A senior French officer was appointed as Adviser to the Minister of Defence in March 2016. A



MINUSCA takes over responsibilities of the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA). United Nations Photo/Catianne Tijerina

number of FACA officers are enrolled in military education courses in France, which also occasionally supplies non-lethal military equipment to the CAR. Finally, the United States supports a small FACA contingent of the AU-led Regional Task Force for the elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

1.4 Challenges for the Security Sector

1.4.1 Politics of SSR

In the CAR, the security institutions mirror the characteristics and historical deficits of the state itself: unaccountable, lacking in legitimacy, non-inclusive, inefficient in the provision of services, composed of weak institutions and largely focused on Bangui as opposed to the country at large. State security institutions have historically been either absent from large parts of the country and/or mistrusted by the population. The absence of the state security forces in the north and north-eastern regions of the country, combined with the under-representation of the Muslim community in the FACA and Police and Gendarmerie, have fostered a perception of discrimination and marginalization in segments of the CAR’s population. Improving the security of the

population in the north and north-East is a key SSR challenge, and will be instrumental for increasing the legitimacy of the CAR authorities and reducing popular support for the armed groups. A related challenge for the politics of SSR in the CAR is finding a way for the Government and the armed groups to hold a dialogue on ways to transform the security sector and on finding common ground for a national security vision and a national security strategy, which would be viable and sustainable.

The viability, pace, and sustainability of the reform of security institutions will certainly very much depend on the broader political process of national reconciliation and the vision of the newly elected CAR Government. In this regard, the SSR process is intrinsically linked to the DDDR process. The integration of demobilized combatants into the national army and security services remains the main demand of the armed groups, and thus a key SSR challenge. The political dialogue between the national authorities and the armed groups should therefore yield a political agreement on the number of ex-combatants to be integrated. However, the current political environment could have a constraining effect on the reform of the security sector as finding the political will



MINUSCA Coordinates Food Support for Ex-Combatants. United Nations Photo/Catianne Tijerina

for a dialogue between the Government and armed groups has sometimes proved to be difficult.

Furthermore, the delineation of roles and responsibilities between these security institutions is unclear, a problem which was compounded by the practice of the Transitional Government's deployment of the military for law enforcement and internal security duties. Policy frameworks for SSR are often missing and/or anachronistic, while democratic civilian oversight has been lacking or is very weak at best. The absence of a strategic framework for SSR undermines the effectiveness of the national authorities' current SSR initiatives.

In order to ensure the viability and sustainability of the security institutions in the CAR, the SSR process needs to be transformational. So as to achieve this objective of transformation, the reform process would need to combine the technical elements of training and equipping of security institutions with the political imperatives of inclusivity, accountability, affordability and legitimacy. This is essential for the desired end-state of effective and accountable security institutions that are affordable, ethnically representative, regionally balanced, and republican that can ensure the security of the state and citizens of the CAR.

Furthermore, while DDRR is a top priority of President Touadéra, the Government has yet to engage in a formal dialogue with armed groups on the draft National DDRR Strategy, which has been developed by the Minister Counsellor and Coordinator on DDR and SSR, Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako. Building on the 10 May 2016 Agreement on the Principles of DDRR and Integration, the draft PND-DRR National Strategy lays out the objectives and financial modalities of the PNDDRR.⁴⁰ Finally, the Government will also need to formulate a plan for the integration of a limited number of ex-combatants into the FACA and state uniformed security services.

1.4.2 Institutional Capacity

1.4.2.1 *The Forces armées centrafricaines* (FACA)

The FACA collapsed during the offensive of the Séléka of March 2013. The command and control system was destroyed. Whilst some Muslim soldiers joined the Séléka, the majority of the FACA joined the anti-balaka self-defence groups. The FACA had lost the trust of much of the population, which

increasingly considered it as an illegitimate and predatory force. Many soldiers had been accused of human rights abuses such as operation of illegal checkpoints, village burning, and summary execution. There was widespread impunity of criminal elements, due to the absence of military tribunals. Because most FACA soldiers are based in Bangui due to logistics and equipment constraints, towns and villages outside the capital were left highly vulnerable to attacks by local or foreign belligerents.

When MINUSCA was deployed to the CAR, the FACA were no longer functional as a result of four major institutional capacity gaps. First the human resources management system was destroyed during the conflict. Due to the destruction of all personnel records the transitional authorities were unable to determine the actual size of the army. They could not verify the identity of all men and women who claimed to be members of the FACA. With the support of EUMAM RCA and MINUSCA, in 2015, the Ministry of Defence successfully registered 7,300 persons into a biometric database. However, a discrepancy remains between this database and the payroll of the Ministry of Finance, which counts 8,400 FACA soldiers. In addition,

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The national authorities also miss a clear picture of how many soldiers remain fit for service in the FACA. Following a light vetting process called 'simplified verification', the Ministry of Defence could only certify that about 3,600 out of 7,300 registered soldiers met the minimum conditions to serve in the FACA. This process is based on biometric thumb print test to ascertain if the soldier is already in the database followed by a self-declaration and attestation that they had not committed acts of human rights violations in the past and will desist from committing any in the future. The simplified verification also led to the diagnosis that 900 persons were overdue for retirement. Due to a chronic lack of funding for paying the pensions of retired personnel, the national authorities were always reluctant to discharge overaged soldiers.

The second institutional deficit lies with the lack of ethnic representativeness of the FACA, which negatively impacts its legitimacy in the north and north-east of the country. Indeed, the FACA have historically been dominated by three primarily Christian ethnic groups, the Gbaya (33%), the Banda (27%) and the Manza (13%). The other ethnic groups, including the Fulani, and which are predominantly Muslim, are poorly represented in the FACA.

Severe shortcomings in the governance of the defence sector combined with a broken command and control system constitutes a third set of challenges for the defence sector. The military programming law (2009-2013) is outdated, while a national defence strategy is lacking. The Defence Headquarters do not have the capacity to plan, command, control and sustain the operational deployment of the FACA outside Bangui. Currently, the only operational FACA units are the 300-strong Static



MINUSCA Police Commissioner meets Imam of the Central Mosque in Bangui.
United Nations Photo/Nektarios Markogiannis

Protection Battalion which operates ten static guard points in Bangui, the newly reactivated Presidential Guard, the small FACA contingents of the tri-partite force on the border with Sudan and Chad, and the AU-led Regional Task Force combating the Lord's Resistance Army. Due to the arms embargo, the FACA remain poorly equipped and lightly armed: according to the United Nations Panel of Experts, the FACA only have 300 small arms and light weapons, which is insufficient to equip all the units currently operational.

The President has publicly expressed his intention to transform the Central African armed forces from a "projection force" to a "garrison force" that is professional, ethnically representative and regionally balanced, with clear command and control structures.⁴¹

1.4.2.2 *Internal security forces (Police and Gendarmerie)*

Despite adopting the French policing model and structure at independence, law enforcement and internal security in the CAR have over the years become the purview of the FACA. The national police and the gendarmerie (a police force with military status, unique to French security systems) have always been underfunded, under-re-

sourced and understaffed. Thus, building their institutional capacity and finding adequate funding remains a challenge. Given the history of these institutions and the role of the FACA in law enforcement, the delineation of roles and responsibilities between the two forces and the FACA remains unclear and is a further challenge for national authorities.

The occupation of Bangui by the Séléka led to the institutional collapse of the police and gendarmerie, which have not yet recovered from the crisis despite the rehabilitation of 32 stations. The police academy and the gendarmerie school currently remain closed. The current strength of approximately 3,600 to 3,700 officers for a total population of 4.6 million inhabitants corresponds to a ratio of 1 officer for 1,277 inhabitants, which is extremely low.

Of the 3,700 registered police and gendarmerie officers, only 800 are deployed outside Bangui, so in effect these institutions have very limited reach beyond the capital. There has been no recruitment since 2010 and no retirements since 2005. The 374 officers who are eligible for retirement are unable to do so because of the absence of an institutionalized pension system. Salary arrears are common.



CAR President – Faustin-Archange Touadéra, and Head of MINUSCA – Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, visit town of Kaga-Bandoro. United Nations Photo/Nektarios Markogiannis

The operational capacity of this already very low number of security officers, for a territory as large as France and the Benelux, is further reduced by serious structural problems, as there is not a streamlined (and unified) police architecture. Gendarmerie and police have each their separate (weak) legal framework, separate command and organizational structure, different leadership, unclear management, resources, ranks, uniforms, tasks, etc. Also, despite a decree that was signed by former interim head of State Michel Djotodia to place the gendarmerie under the operational command of the Ministry of Interior, the status of the gendarmerie as a military force given the mission of protecting persons and property remains uncertain. The police are the only purely civilian security service for the civilian population. It is thus evident that many broad and difficult challenges remain on building security institutional capacity in the CAR.

1.4.3 Democratic Accountability

Democratic accountability of the security sector within the framework of the rule of law is essential for a sustainable and viable transformation of the security sector. The main challenge in this respect lies in the historic absence of democratic accountability as an important and entrenched element of the political culture, as evidenced by the five military coups that occurred in the CAR since it obtained its independence from France in 1960. Thus, the key challenge regarding democratic accountability is, in the first instance, to transform the political system, to one in which full civilian control and oversight of the security sector become the norm. In addition, a related challenge for democratic accountability is to democratize the security institutions of the state so that the CAR can have genuinely republican armed forces and securi-

ty institutions which represent and reflect the ethnic and regional composition of the country.

It should be noted, though, that during the transitional period the CAR made significant progress in establishing the foundation for civilian control and democratic oversight of the security sector. A key reform under the Transitional Government was the establishment of the cabinet post of Minister of Defence, who has organizational and functional authority over the FACA. Furthermore, the adoption of the Constitution in December 2015 was a milestone in laying the normative basis for the democratization and civilian oversight of the security sector.

Article 27 of the new Constitution⁴² translates the decisions made at the Bangui

Forum into constitutional principles governing the security sector. The article stipulates that the defence and security forces need to be exclusively composed of Central African Republic citizens and that they exist to serve the nation. It further stipulates that the defence and security forces have to be professional, multi-ethnic, republican and politically neutral. Furthermore, the mission of the defence forces is to uphold the territorial integrity of the country and ensure the security of the population against all external or internal aggression or threats. It also defines the mission of other national security providers as that of defending the authority of the law and upholding the security of people and property rights. Importantly, it states that the code of conduct of the defence and security forces must prohibit their respective personnel from engaging in political activities. Most notably, Article 27 limits the use

work for national security. Finally, Article 89 outlines the parliamentary oversight functions over the executive.

While there has been significant progress in developing a framework for democratic accountability, primarily through the adoption of the new Constitution, many challenges remain. As a first step, international support will be required on building the capacity of the National Assembly to exercise effective parliamentary oversight over the Executive branch, the FACA and the internal security forces. The international community's technical support will also be required once the National Security High Council has been established. The biggest challenge, however, will remain that of transforming the CAR's political culture to one where democratic governance of the security sector is broadly accepted as the norm.

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of the armed forces for public security, and redefines it as playing a supporting role of the internal security forces in situations of public emergency.

Furthermore, Article 33 stipulates that the President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces with responsibility for national defence. He/she chairs the National Defence Council and the National Defence Committee and appoints military officials. And Article 80 states that the general organization of national defence should be determined by laws; it thus provides a constitutional basis for the development of a legal frame-

1.4.4 Affordability and Sustainability

The envelope of financial support for reforms in the CAR, including for SSR, remains wholly inadequate relative to the vast array of challenges facing the country. The Government's fiscal revenue only covers 60 per cent of the basic state budget, 50 per cent of which currently goes towards the payment of salaries of civil servants and uniformed personnel, the latter of which account for a third of the public servants in the CAR. The share of the state budget allocated to defence is 22 per cent, compared to 3 per cent for internal security. The FACA are overstuffed with 8,300 persons on its

payroll. Ninety per cent of the defence budget is allocated to the payment of salaries of the armed forces. Thus, a key challenge will be to "right-size" the FACA to ensure its financial viability. It will be important for the Government to take substantive decisions regarding the budget for the CAR armed forces and internal security forces, as there is currently a very clear imbalance. A key challenge in this regard will be to align the CAR's budgetary priorities with the national security priorities outlined in the National Security Policy.

1.4.5 Coordination of international support

The early withdrawal of aid and support exacerbated the various challenges confronting the CAR over the years. So as to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, the international community will need to stay the course and avoid reducing or withdrawing its support once the early phase of SSR is completed. Effective SSR comes at a cost and requires sustained financial support. Thus, a key challenge in the area of support will be the international community's ability to sustain the reform pace in the long term, which will also be one of the key factors that will determine a successful outcome. Ensuring that the international community remains engaged and committed to the overall SSR process will be essential if SSR is to be transformational. Furthermore, an SSR programme will need to be carried out in a way which is consistent with other key political, economic, social and humanitarian initiatives, regardless of whether they are unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. It is therefore critical that the strategic objectives and priorities of the national authorities in the area of SSR are addressed within the framework of the Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment and properly reflected in the Recovery and Stabilization Strategy, which will be presented at the forthcoming Brussel's donor conference on 18 November 2016. The effective coordination of international support will not only be a key challenge, but also instrumental in determining whether or not an SSR programme is successful in the long term.

PART 2

Summary of Dialogues

The United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council have designated SSR as a high priority for peace building and peace sustainment in the Central African Republic. International support for SSR, however, remains palpably inadequate to meet the critical needs of the national security institutions. In the current context of global austerity and competing priorities for international support, it is crucial to identify priorities essential to preventing relapse into conflict and to sustaining peace in the CAR. It is also equally important to ensure sustained financial and political support for SSR at the national, regional and international levels for the country.

In this context, the United Nations Group of Friends of SSR, co-chaired by Slovakia and South Africa, held on 21 June 2016 a high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR at the United Nations headquarters. The

event was chaired by Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, who highlighted the significance of this dialogue for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2151 (2014) on SSR, the first stand-alone resolution of its kind. The event was facilitated and moderated by the Security Sector Reform Unit, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The CAR Government participated in the dialogue at a high level, and demonstrated a strong desire to coordinate the assistance on SSR with the United Nations, as well as with the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU). Participants focused on ways to make progress on SSR as a means for preventing a relapse into conflict, and on the priority development needs for security sector transformation in the CAR.

The dialogue continued on 22 June 2016 at the expert-level at the Greentree Estate in Manhasset, NY, and included the continued participation of the high-level delegation from the CAR, interested member states, donors, and other partners. The dialogue at Greentree was conducted under Chatham House rules, and as such, the views and recommendations of specific participants are not attributed in this report. The expert-level workshop had two major aims: The first of these was to help the national authorities of the CAR further develop their strategic vision and programmatic priorities for the transformation of the security sector. Participants focused on how the CAR authorities can address the key SSR-related challenges to peace sustainment and socio-economic recovery with the support of the United Nations system and international partners. The second major aim of the expert-level discussion was to sensitize the CAR nation-



High-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR at the United Nations headquarters. From left to right: Adedeji Ebo, Chief, SSRU/OROLSI/DPKO; Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation; Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic; Joseph Yakité, Minister of Defence, Central African Republic. Photo: Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic



Dialogue at expert level in Manhasset, New York. Photo: United Nations/Security Sector Reform Unit

al authorities on how they can address key institutional development challenges in the security sector, to provide an opportunity for the CAR authorities to present their priorities and support needs in the defence sector and internal security sector, and to sensitize international partners and United Nations member states about those priorities and needs.

The list of senior officials who gave remarks during the high-level portion of the event, include the following, among others: Mr. Joseph Yakété, Minister of Defence, Central African Republic; Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the CAR for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation; Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic; Ms. Annika Söder, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sweden; Mr. Mario Giro, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Italy; Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA; and Mr. El-Ghassim Wane, Assistant-Secretary-General in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations.

2.1 Reform Priorities

During the dialogue, participants highlighted the following reform priorities

regarding the politics of SSR, institutional capacities, democratic accountability, affordability and sustainability, and coordination of multilateral support. Participants stressed the key points outlined below, and also proposed some of the specific methods, actions and objectives through which these priorities could be realized.

2.1.1 Politics of SSR

A common national vision for SSR, which can be expressed in a National Security Policy, is important. Participants emphasized that the CAR Government has a leading role and responsibility for facilitating a national dialogue aimed at developing such a vision. Furthermore, participants emphasized that a new security sector governance and support framework needs to be established, and should consist of the following elements: firstly, a National Security Policy based on the draft endorsed by the Transitional Authorities in March 2016; secondly, a national SSR strategy informed by a nationally-led assessment of security institutions and a Public Expenditure Review (PER) of the security sector; and thirdly, the forthcoming Peacebuilding and Recovery Strategy based on the Peacebuilding and Recovery Assessment – *Evaluation du relèvement et de la consolidation de la paix (RCPCA)* – and the framework of mutual accountability – *Cadre d'engagement mutuel*, which will outline mutually

agreed SSR commitments, goals, priority objectives, strategic results and activities, monitoring and evaluation benchmarks and indicators.

Furthermore, participants also indicated that the CAR needs depoliticized and professional national defence and security forces. Importantly, the architecture of the security sector needs to be balanced, a task which can be achieved by right-sizing security institutions and balancing the allocation of the national budget between the FACA and internal security forces. The respective missions, roles and responsibilities of the FACA, police, gendarmerie and other components of the security sector must also be redefined. Some participants highlighted that the personnel of the FACA, police and gendarmerie must be inclusive of all ethnicities, as well as regionally balanced. Finally, the establishment of formal vetting mechanisms designed to identify and sanction uniformed personnel who have committed human rights violations and other crimes will further both the process of national reconciliation and the fight against impunity.

2.1.2 Institutional Capacity

When it comes to the armed forces, the strategic objective of the Government is to establish a multi-ethnic and professional FACA, staffed with younger personnel and structured around four regional garrisons, with the central mission of protecting the population and defending the territorial integrity of the CAR. Mobilizing the required resources from bilateral and multilateral partners is essential for the success of DSR. During the high-level portion of the event, the CAR's Minister of Defence, Mr. Joseph Yakété, presented four priorities and related methods and strategies for the reform of the defence sector and the reconstruction of the FACA, as outlined below.

The first priority is *reforming the governance system of the defence sector*. In order to achieve this priority, the CAR would need to implement the roadmap for the re-

form of the FACA adopted at the outset of the strategic seminar on the reform of the FACA, the *Assises de la défense nationale*,⁴³ in June 2015. As Mr. Yakété outlined, some of the key elements in this regard are: developing a new Defence Policy; developing a new military doctrine; drafting a new Military Programming Law that respects the principle of affordability; drafting a new Military Justice Code, to be adopted by the National Assembly and promulgated by the President of the CAR; and establishing defence zones aligned with the administrative regions.

The minister also highlighted that the CAR needs to develop and implement a human resources management policy. The changes to the human resources of the FACA should also include the following:

- the retirement of 750 personnel at a cost of \$US 5 million;
- termination of service of deserters and physically unfit personnel;
- design of a policy for the reconversion of military personnel into civil life;
- recruitment of new soldiers to fill the vacancy left by retiring personnel;
- reintegration of FACA personnel who have joined armed groups in the past;
- integration of ex-combatants of armed groups into the FACA in line with established recruitment criteria.

The second priority is that of *strengthening the operational capacities of the FACA*. In this respect, the minister emphasized, in particular, the need to reestablish units that are staffed with personnel who have been verified (*vérification simplifiée*) and biometrically registered. Changing mindsets through professional training and education of military personnel, with a specific focus on non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers, will also be crucial. Operational units will need to be supplied with equipment and provided with logistics support. A partial lifting of the arms embargo will enable the CAR to pro-

vide the necessary small arms and light weapons for the armed forces. Finally, strengthening the operational capacities of the FACA would also require the development and implementation of an infrastructure plan to establish garrisons in a number of strategic locations.

The third priority outlined by the minister is that of *defining the operational tasks and planning the operational deployment of the FACA*. The operational tasks of the FACA tentatively include the following:

- escorting convoys along Main Supply Road 1 (MSR 1);
- static guarding of public buildings in Bangui;
- protecting the territorial integrity of the CAR, including border security in the south of the country;
- participating in the African Union-led regional task force for the elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

The fourth priority is that of *mobilizing resources from bilateral and multilateral partners*. In this respect, the minister discussed the priorities for the reform of the internal security forces, which are outlined in the Institutional Capacity and Development Plan for the police and gendarmerie. The key priorities he highlighted in this regard include the following:

- revising the legal and regulatory framework of the police and gendarmerie, including the territorial organization of the police and gendarmerie;
- clarifying and delineating the respective roles and missions of the FACA and the police, particularly regarding their respective missions and chains of command; strengthening the human resources of the police and gendarmerie through the recruitment of younger officers,
- the integration of a limited number of demobilized combatants, the retirement of eligible officers, and
- adoption of a code of conduct.

The support of the international community for the internal security forces would further be needed on the following:

- strengthening of their operational capacity, including for the planning and conduct of operations, through pre and in-service training, and through the procurement of specialized equipment;
- strengthening logistics and financial management; building and rehabilitating infrastructure, including rehabilitating the police academy and gendarmerie school in Bangui and all police stations in provincial capitals;
- redeploying the police and gendarmerie outside of Bangui; the strengthening of the criminal justice chain; and
- as was the case with the FACA, the provision of small arms and light weapons, which will mean that the 2127 Sanctions Committee of the Security Council will need to grant an exemption to the arms embargo;
- establishment of a legal framework for intelligence governance/oversight, and the design of coordination mechanisms for sharing intelligence at the subnational level.

2.1.3 Democratic Accountability

Participants at the event agreed that democratic accountability will be critical for good governance and peace sustainment in the CAR, and identified the following key priorities in this area:

- strengthening the parliamentary oversight and judicial control of the executive policies in defence and security;
- establishing an effective Inspection and Oversight Service under the Ministry of Internal Security, with full judicial competency to investigate any allegation of misconduct in both police and gendarmerie, and full and permanent access to all their facilities;

- strengthening of financial oversight mechanisms;
- developing and implementing a national civic education program;
- promoting civic dialogue between the armed forces and civil society;
- restoration and extension of state authority and civilian control of the armed forces through the redeployment of civil servants across the entire territory of the CAR.

2.1.4 Affordability and Sustainability

The affordability and sustainability of security institutions will be critical to the effective functioning of the security sector in the long term. Participants identified a number of key priorities in this area. In the first instance, the CAR's socio-economic development is contingent on security. So as to have a clear understanding of the key strategic issues relating to security from an economic perspective, the CAR should undertake a security sector public expenditure review (SSPER). This would also help bring to light the strengths and weaknesses of the public financial management system.

Experts highlighted that an SSPER is designed to inform the policy making process by assessing and providing recommendations on the following dimension of public expenditures in the security sector:

- fiscal stability and affordability;
- allocative efficiency; operational efficiency and effectiveness;
- fiscal transparency and accountability and;
- reporting on external assistance.

The World Bank and the United Nations have acquired joint experience in this area, and would be able to assist the CAR authorities in conducting such an SSPER, which would also help the CAR authorities to assess the overall impact of SSR on public finances. Following such an SSPER, it will be essential to roll-out public financial management reforms of the security sector linked to the findings of the review.

Two further reforms linked to the affordability and sustainability of the security sector, which participants emphasized, are the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Customs Service by increasing staffing and equipment, and also the need to strengthen the effectiveness and transparency of the management of natural resources.

2.1.5 Coordination of international support

While long-term sustainability of the security sector will depend on the ability of the Government to generate revenue, international support will remain critical in the short to medium term. What will be also key is the effective national coordination of international support, and participants highlighted a number of priorities in this area.

They discussed the need to establish a national SSR structure for coordination, which should be composed of the following: a strategic committee; a technical committee; and a technical support secretariat led by the national coordinator for SSR. The effective coordination of international support also requires the adoption of a common understanding of "success" of the SSR process in the CAR, and the identification of key indicators of progress on SSR. Agreed indicators, which could be monitored as part of the proposed framework of mutual accountability between the CAR authorities and the international community, would benefit the Government by concentrating the focus on a defined set of priorities and reducing the transaction costs of coordinating multiple partners.

Indicators of SSR progress could include, firstly, the degree to which the national security sector framework reflects the aspirations of all segments of the population, including the demands of the armed groups and without prejudice to the legitimacy of the Government. A further indicator can be the degree of progress on developing, adopting and implementing an overall SSR strategy, strategic (sec-

tor-wide) activities, milestones and allocation of national budgetary resources for implementing the commitments articulated in an agreed security sector framework. Moreover, the degree to which the Government will be able to extend its authority over the country, including through a gradual transfer of responsibility for the provision of security to local communities, can also serve as a helpful indicator. Importantly, participants highlighted that what would be particularly useful are indicators that relate to the degree to which the newly trained security forces serve the needs of the population of the CAR, and the degree to which they are subject to agreed accountability mechanisms.

2.1.6 Further observations

Overall, the dialogue highlighted the overlaps and remaining differences in perspectives on the way forward on SSR in the CAR, both among the CAR authorities themselves and also between the international community and the CAR Government. While there is general agreement on some of the key elements of a reformed FACA, which needs to be republican, professional, multi-ethnic and regionally balanced, as well as on the specific resource needs, it was evident that there is still some way to go before the CAR authorities reach a commonly shared vision on SSR. While some of the CAR and international participants felt that there needs to be a holistic approach to SSR, which should include reforms in the area of justice and corrections, human rights, intelligence, border management, etc., and that a holistic approach to SSR is essential for a functioning social contract and national consensus, others were more keen to emphasize the needs of reforms of the FACA in particular as the way forward on SSR in the CAR. The latter were keen to emphasize the specific needs of the armed forces as the primary focus of the international community's future SSR efforts.

Furthermore, the dialogue also exposed differences between the international

community and some members of the CAR delegation on the best way to address the CAR's security challenges: while some national interlocutors portrayed the non-state armed groups in the country as criminal elements, and pushed for a military solution, the international community emphasized the need for political solutions to essentially political problems, and called on the CAR Government to engage with armed groups in a frank and genuine dialogue about the political way forward in the country. From this perspective, the international community's strategic priority in the CAR is the reduction of the presence of, and threat

posed by, armed groups through political dialogue. While the international community stands ready to continue helping the national authorities to address their security challenges, and while criminals must face justice, it is essential that those who have legitimate grievances are not marginalized further. The consensus view of the international community was that the MINUSCA peacekeeping force should not be used as a tool to resolve what is essentially a political problem, and that a more concerted and political approach to dealing with the armed groups is the desirable course of action.

PART 3

Recommendations on Transforming the Security Sector

While the international community and the CAR Government share a common strategic objective when it comes to SSR, which is to reduce the threats posed by the armed groups, they currently have divergent approaches to accomplishing this objective. On the one hand, the international community is focused on fostering human security and enhancing effectiveness, inclusiveness and accountability of the security institutions; and on the other hand, the CAR Government prioritizes the reconstruction and redeployment of the FACA with a view of restoring the authority of the State throughout the national territory. This latter approach entails using force to dislodge the armed groups that are refusing to participate in the national DDRR programme. It is evident that there is a need to continue sensitizing the CAR Government on the United Nations approach, which centres on political solutions to what are essentially political problems.

In the area of SSR, the United Nations can support the CAR in the development of a national SSR strategy. For such a strategy to be sustainable in the long-term, one of the elements of the process of national reconciliation that would be particularly helpful is a dialogue with armed groups on matters of security and on the transformation of the security sector. The Security Council sees the end state of SSR in the CAR as the establishment of “professional, ethnically representative and regionally balanced national defence and internal security forces,” which are under civilian control, accountable to democratic institutions and respectful of the rule of law and human rights.⁴⁴ The first step towards this end state will be a dialogue between the Government and the armed groups, which can help the CAR to find a way forward on making the CAR’s security institutions ethnically representative and regionally balanced. The United Nations can help to facilitate such a dialogue.

Furthermore, over the next two years the United Nations should adopt a support strategy that is structured around key priority objectives, and underpinned by specific policy and programmatic initiatives.

The following key strategic objectives would address in a structured manner what is required on SSR in the CAR:

- Support and facilitate the development of the national security framework, including a credible vetting strategy, so as to build a credible political basis for the transformation of the security sector;
- foster the integration of demobilized combatants of the armed groups into the national defence and security forces on the basis of a political agreement;
- promote and support an enhanced inclusion of marginalized groups, including Muslims in the security institutions;
- strengthen the institutional and operational capacities of the security institutions, with a significant responsibility of the UN for the police and gendarmerie;
- foster democratic accountability of the security sector within the framework of the rule of law;
- promote the affordability and sustainability of SSR processes;
- enhance the effectiveness of nationally-led coordination of international support, including of MINUSCA support, to the national SSR process.

3.1 Politics of SSR

An agreement between relevant stakeholders on a realistic vision for the future of the internal security and defence forces can help to reduce violence in the country, and thereby ensure greater security for the population. Such an agreement needs to draw on the draft National Security Policy, which was agreed under the Transitional Authorities, and it needs to take into account the outcomes of the Bangui Forum, including the Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation and Reconstruction in the CAR, and the agreement with armed groups on the principles of DDRR and integration. The United Nations

can support the Government’s efforts to establish a new national security framework.

In order to address the structural deficits of the security sector architecture, it is essential that the national authorities adopt the draft National Security Policy (NSP) and finalize a national SSR strategy as a matter of priority. The adoption of a new national security framework would yield a newly designed and rebalanced architecture of the security sector, including through a clear delineation of responsibilities of the FACA, the internal security forces, and other uniformed entities. The NSP provides a vision for right-sizing the security sector and ensuring a balanced allocation of the national budget between the FACA and internal security forces.

As an additional priority objective, the United Nations should address the critical and sensitive issue of the integration of a limited number of eligible demobilized combatants of the armed groups into the national defence and security forces. The integration of some combatants of the ex-Séléka is essential for the process of enhancing the ethnic and religious makeup of security institutions, and more importantly as a political incentive for their engagement to disarm. Importantly, however, it should not undermine the objective of building professional security forces.

The strategic objective of *establishing a national security strategic framework and mechanisms for security management* can be attained through some of the elements outlined below:

3.1.1 Ensuring sustained political engagement of the United Nations and international partners so as to foster broader political support for these sensitive reforms in the Government, and so as to engage the President in a high-level discussion on his vision for national security and SSR.

3.1.2 Facilitating (additional) review, (re) validation and eventual adoption

of the draft NSP; creation of a National Security Council and its Secretariat (Secretariat-General for National Security), and to that end undertaking the following:

- Advocating and supporting inclusive national consultations on the NSP as may be determined necessary by the new Government;
- Supporting the future National Security High Council (NSHC)/ *Conseil supérieur de la sécurité nationale* with technical assistance; establishing a Secretariat General for National Security, which will be mandated to prepare, facilitate and record the meetings of the NSHC and ensure the implementation of its decisions;
 - Drafting a law on the establishment of the NSHC, including budgetary provisions.

3.1.3 Encouraging and supporting the development of a national SSR strategy and/or a national security strategy led by the NSHC, and to that end undertaking the following:

- Facilitating a workshop where relevant country experiences from francophone African countries are presented by SSR experts (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Conakry);
- Adopting a mechanism for the pragmatic vetting of serving personnel and candidates for recruitment and integration into the FACA, police and gendarmerie as a key SSR commitment of the national SSR strategy;
- Developing a joint UNDP/MINUS-CA support program, including expert advice, financial and technical assistance.

3.1.4 The strategic objective of *the integration of a limited number of eligible demobilized combatants of the armed groups into the national defence forces and security services* can be attained through some of the following elements:

- Developing an action plan, as part of the political dialogue between the Government and armed groups, which outlines the key legal, political, and technical parameters, as well as a detailed planning methodology for the integration of former combatants;
 - Clarifying the status of FACA deserters who joined the armed groups and providing recommendations on the issue of the 3,437 combatants of the Séléka integrated by presidential decree into the FACA in September 2013.

3.1.5 The strategic objective of *improving the security of the minority and marginalized groups, including the CAR's Muslim citizens*, can be attained by assisting the Government in developing an action plan for the enhanced inclusion of Muslim citizens and other minorities in the governance of the security sector; such a plan could lay out detailed measures to:

- Increase the representation and inclusivity in the security institutions through a policy of targeted recruitment of young Muslims;
- Enhance public security provision in priority areas in the north and north-east through deploying gendarmerie brigades, which are representative of the local communities, and by eventually establishing reformed FACA garrisons, ideally with enabling capabilities (logistics, medical and engineering) to support socio-economic development;
- Enhance the participation of Muslim community leaders in national security policy-making bodies, possibly by setting aside reserved seats in the future National Security Council;
- Decentralize the governance of the security sector, and, where appropriate, establish hybrid security in-

stitutions such as local community security councils.

3.2 Institutional Capacity

Violence can also be reduced in the country through strengthening institutional and operational capacities and enhanced professionalization of the Central African national defence and security forces. The progressive deployment and re-operation-ization of the CAR armed forces to secure the borders, as well as the development of professional and effective national police and gendarmerie, which can over time assume a greater role in maintaining law and order in the capital and beyond, is essential to ensuring stability and security in the rural areas currently held by armed groups once these have been dismantled through a DDRR process. Furthermore, the internal security forces need to undertake the tasks identified in the National Security Policy. Given the fragility of state security institutions, building national capacity will require mentoring officials through the co-location of international experts.

3.2.1 The strategic objective of *fostering the effective functioning, professionalism and internal accountability of security institutions, including internal security institutions and the FACA* can be attained through some of the intermediate objectives outlined below.

3.2.1 (i) Intermediate Objective A: Supporting institutional and capacity strengthening of the internal security services, so that they can effectively provide security, including public order and law enforcement, in Bangui and strategically important provinces of the CAR, by:

- Advocating for the CAR authorities to prioritize the reform and development of internal security services (police and gendarmerie), including through the allocation of a greater share of the national budget, and support for institutional reform and capacity development;
- Reviewing and updating the legal framework, including developing

- new organic laws on police and gendarmerie, with the support of MINUSCA policing legal experts;
- Supporting national institutions in the finalization and implementation of the Police and Gendarmerie development plan, based on co-location and mentoring provided by MINUSCA police officers and civilian experts to the Ministry of Interior, Public Security and Territorial Administration, Directorate General (DG) of the Police and DG of the Gendarmerie;
- Supporting national institutions on the training of existing and the selection, recruitment, vetting and training of at least 500 new police and gendarmerie elements;
- Developing a joint MINUSCA/UNDP support programme, funded by MINUSCA Asset Budget and UNDP core and extra-budgetary funding for infrastructure rehabilitation, equipment and training personnel of the CAR policing services;
 - *Rehabilitation and equipment of police and gendarmerie academy*: estimated cost of \$3million over two years (2016-18);
- Coordinating international support in the provision of training and equipment to ensure alignment with the police development plan and compliance with the sanction regime;
- Rethinking the policing model to clarify the delineation of functional and geographic competencies between the police and gendarmerie;
- Introducing a code of conduct for individual National Police and Gendarmerie officers, and making it available in local languages (including Sango);
- Strengthening internal accountability of policing services by creating a capable Inspection and Oversight Service, under the Ministry of Security, Public Order and Immigration/Emigration, with full judicial competency to investigate

any allegation of misconduct in both police and gendarmerie, and full and permanent access to all their facilities;

- Undertaking feasibility studies for civil emergency services (e.g. fire brigade).

3.2.1 (ii) *Intermediate Objective B*: Establishing defence institutions under democratic civilian control capable of defending the territorial integrity of the CAR and contributing to the extension of state authority outside Bangui, through the following:

- Revising the Roadmap for the reform of the FACA adopted at the outset of the strategic seminar on the reform of the FACA, the *Assises de la défense nationale*, in June 2015;
- The European Union and United Nations developing a joint support plan for the FACA;
- Advocating and supporting the development of a White Paper on Defence and National Security (proposed by EUMAM and EUTM). This White Paper would lay out the strategic functions to be performed by security institutions. It would also outline the financial resources required for the security institutions to execute their roles. This document would finally lay out the model for the armed forces, including the form, size and functions of the army. It would clarify the main functions of the FACA (Developmental / humanitarian / state-building army / protection and intervention);
- Establishing a joint MINUSCA/EUTM/Government coordination mechanism so as to ensure the alignment of defence sector reform processes;
- In support of the Minister of Defence, renewing the military doctrine, and drafting a new Military Programming Law for 2016-2020;
- Formulating an equipment and infrastructure development plan aligned with the new doctrine of a garrison army;

- Formulating a re-operationalization and deployment plan jointly between MINUSCA, the EUTM RCA and other partners;
- Supporting the restructuring of the *État-Major des armées* (EMA) with an appropriate staff model;
- Delivering operational training for up to six battalions (EUTM-RCA);
- Support the deployment of EUTM RCA trained units through mentoring/monitoring (MINUSCA Force and other partners).

It is important to note in relation to these recommendations that development organizations need to provide support for institutional development while understanding well that pushing too hard will end up creating illegitimate institutions. This is why a clear step by step approach that privileges best fit to best practices is absolutely necessary in the CAR. Thinking clearly about innovative intermediary steps in institutional development is essential. It is not only state institutions that are underdeveloped, but private sector institutions and community institutions, as well, and therefore the vision for institutional development should be sensitive to all aspects of societal and economic interactions.

3.3 Democratic Accountability

As outlined in the United Nations SSR Integrated Technical Guidance Notes, “[supporting] democratic governance of the security sector within the framework of the rule of law promotes the understanding that governance related to all persons, institutions, and entities, both public and private, including the State itself, and ensures that these are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and that [they] are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.”⁴⁵ Consolidating democratic governance of the security institutions within the framework of the rule of law is indeed essential to sustainable peace, and for the transformation of the security sector.

3.3.1 As such, a further key strategic objective is that of *fostering an effective democratic governance of the security sector* through the intermediate objectives outlined below.

3.3.1 (i) *Intermediate Objective A: Establishing effective parliamentary oversight of the defence forces and internal security services* through:

- Building the 3As of parliamentarians in oversight of the security sector: Authority, Aptitude, Attitude;⁴⁶
- Capacity building of the Commission for Defence and Security of the National Assembly on exercising constructive effective oversight of security institutions, including through budgeting and appropriation.
- Developing a support program for the Commission for Defence and Security of the National Assembly;
- Capacity building of the administrators and technical staff of the legislature assigned to the Commission for Defence and Security.

3.3.1 (ii) *Intermediate Objective B: Strengthening civilian control of the security institutions* through:

- Encouraging the President and Prime Minister to appoint career civil servants in administrative and policy-making functions in security institutions;
- Developing the individual capacity of civilian administrators and technical specialists of the CAR Government and security institutions through training and mentoring, and by collocating SSR officers in security institutions.

3.3.1 (iii) *Intermediate Objective C: Strengthening oversight capacity of civil society and customary institutions on monitoring of the security institutions* through:

- Facilitating sensitization workshops for the civil society on principles of effective democratic oversight, based on the United Nations

ITGNs on National Ownership, Democratic Governance, Gender, and the UN approach to SSR and peace processes;

- Involving local communities and local leaders in SSR, and in security management through mechanisms such as local security committees led by Prefects or mayors.

3.4 Affordability and Sustainability

As highlighted in the United Nations Integrated Technical Guidance Note on National Ownership of Security Sector Reform, one of the basic elements of an SSR process that is based on national ownership is “a process in which national actors commit, to the extent possible and on a systematic basis, financial resources to the oversight of the reform process. These allocations by the relevant legislative authorities, including to non-state actors, should reflect the security needs and aspiration of all segments of society.”⁴⁷ The national authorities, with the support of MINUSCA, UNDP, the World Bank and the European Union are finalizing a cost assessment in the context of the Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment. The forthcoming National Plan for Recovery and Peacebuilding will provide further costing estimates for the development of security sector institutions. The cost of priority projects for the sub-component defence sector reform is assessed at \$40 million for five years.⁴⁸ The full cost estimates for the implementation of the capacity development plan for the Internal Security Forces is \$195 million for five years.

The first priority on the affordability and sustainability of the security sector is to support the CAR Government in the preparation and implementation of the Security Sector Public Expenditure Review (SSPER), which can inform the policy dialogue on the future national security architecture. The SSPER can also inform the CAR Government and other authorized stakeholders about the nature of the expenditure and of the public sector management of

the security sector, and propose recommendations for aligning the security sector policy framework with available financial resources in a manner designed to ensure fiscal affordability and sustainability. This can be done by:

- Mobilizing and deploying international technical expertise, with financial support from the World Bank and the UN/WB Trust Fund’s grant for SSPER;
- Developing options for stop-gap donor funding for the FACA and ISF for 2016-2020, including the revitalization of the Multi Partner Trust Fund for the ISF.

The second priority is to mobilize resources for funding a severance package and pension plan for security institutions: approximately 700 FACA and 380 police/gendarmerie are due for immediate retirement. The US State Department is currently considering setting aside circa \$US 8 million for severance packages for military personnel eligible for retirement in 2016. However, there is not yet any pledge of funding for the pension of the retired members of the FACA.

3.5 Coordination of international support

International support remains indispensable for the CAR. However, the national coordination of that support needs to be improved significantly to enable the CAR Government to align enhanced impact of international support in line with national priorities. Thus, the fifth and final strategic objective, *of enhancing the effectiveness of nationally-led coordination of international support, including of MINUSCA support, to national SSR process*, can be achieved through the intermediate objectives outlined below.

3.5.1 (i) *Intermediate Objective A: Establishing Government-led coordination mechanisms* by:

- Adopting a National Plan for Recovery and Peacebuilding and

a Mutual Accountability Framework (*Cadre d'engagement mutuel*);

- Establishing a thematic coordination group for SSR managed by the Secretariat of the High Council for National Security with the support of MINUSCA SSRU.

3.5.1 (ii) *Intermediate Objective B*: Building partnerships and a strong coordination mechanism between the United Nations, EU and other donors, and political and security partners in order to build a common political and sectoral dialogue with the Government, based on common messages; avoiding overlap between various donors' interventions and reducing the burden of coordination on the Government; and ensuring very coordinated interventions in terms of support to the security sector. This can be achieved by:

- Establishing coordination mechanisms between international partners at the political and technical

level, chaired by the SRSG, with secretariat functions performed by MINUSCA SSRU;

- Developing and managing Monitoring and Evaluation tools such as synchronization matrix for international support programs;
- Revitalizing the MINUSCA mission-wide SSR Task Force, chaired by the SRSG or DSRSG-P, with secretariat support provided by SSRU;
- Developing a MINUSCA/UNCT SSR support plan aligned with the CAR Government national SSR/development plan once the latter is formulated.

And finally, so as to keep international attention on SSR in the CAR, the Group of Friends of SSR should continue discussing the CAR, follow carefully the progress, and take stock periodically of the challenges, needs and further priorities of the country.

Conclusion

The dialogue on security sector reform in the Central African Republic, which took place from 21-22 June, 2016, in New York was the most high-level conversation held on this topic in a long time. It was instrumental in identifying challenges and priorities on SSR in the CAR. As highlighted in the report, this is not the first time that SSR has been attempted in the country. However, while mindful of the lessons learned from previous efforts, neither the newly elected Government nor the international community can afford to disengage from SSR in the CAR. We are confident that the dialogue on SSR as captured in this report has identified the key issues which the Government and international partners need to address. In this regard, it will be important that the support to SSR is approached with a sense of urgency.

The CAR Government and MINUSCA have a short window of opportunity to deliver on national SSR commitments outlined in the *Cadre d'engagement mutuel* (Framework of Mutual Accountability) and the strategic priorities laid out in the Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan. The Government has demonstrated political will to move forward, but it will be critical to demonstrate measurable progress by the end of 2017 on key areas outlined in this report. At the same time, SSR remains under-funded and the international community is thus best advised to improve its support at this critical juncture. We appeal to all actors who participated in the dialogue to pledge support to the SSR process in the CAR. In this regard, the recommendations of this report would be useful in informing the Brussels donor conference on the key areas requiring SSR support.

ANNEXES

Annex I. Agenda of the High-Level Dialogue



High-level dialogue on building support for key SSR priorities in the Central African Republic

21 June 2016, 10am – 12pm, Conference Room 11 | United Nations Headquarters, New York

AGENDA^a

Implementing Security Council Resolution 2151 in the Central African Republic

10.00 – 10.10 **Mr. Miroslav Lajčák**, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic,
Keynote speaker and Chair of the High-level segment of the dialogue
Moderator: **Mr. Adedeji Ebo**, Chief, Security Sector Reform Unit, Office of Rule of Law
and Security Institutions, DPKO

Progress on SSR as means for preventing relapse into conflict

10.10 – 10.30 *Panel members:*
Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African
Republic for DDR/SSR/National Reconciliation
Mr. El-Ghassim Wane, Assistant-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO
Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, MINUSCA
Ms. Annika Söder, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sweden
Mr. Mario Giro, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Italy

10:30 – 11.00 Moderated question and answer session

^a Please consult the annexes for the date of delivery of the respective speeches.

Priority needs for security sector transformation in the CAR

11.00 – 11.25

Panel members:

Mr. Joseph Yakété, Minister of Defence, CAR

Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR/National Reconciliation

Mr. Magdy Martínez-Solimán, Assistant Secretary-General, Assistant Administrator and Director of the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support, United Nations Development Programme

Mr. Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support

Ms. Erminia Notarangelo, European External Action Service, Head of Division for Central Africa

Mr. Jean-Christophe Carret, Country Manager for the Central African Republic, World Bank

11.25 – 11.50

Moderated question and answer session

Concluding remarks

11.50 – 12.00

H.E. Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic

Annex II. Agenda of the Inter-Agency Senior SSR Practitioners' Workshop



United Nations

Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force

Inter-Agency Senior SSR Practitioners' Workshop

21 June – 24 June 2016

SUMMARY AGENDA

Tuesday, 21 June

- 10.00 – 12.00 **Open meeting of the Group of Friends of SSR: “Dialogue on building support for key SSR priorities in the Central African Republic”, CR-11, United Nations Headquarters, New York**
- 14.00 *Departure to Greentree [bus will depart from First Avenue, corner of 45th street]*
- 15.00 *Arrival at Greentree and check-in*
- 18.00 – 19.00 *Welcome cocktail*
- 19.00 – 20.00 *Dinner*

Wednesday, 22 June

- 07.45 – 08.45 *Breakfast*
- 08.45 *Arrival of day guests from HQ New York*
- 09.00 – 09.30 **Session 1.1: Welcome and introduction**
- 09.30 – 10.45 **Session 1.2: Central African Republic – National security framework, DDR-SSR nexus and Vetting**
Presentation and discussion
- 10.45 – 11.00 *Break*
- 11.00 – 12.30 **Session 1.3: International support to the development of security sector institutions (FACA, Police, Gendarmerie)**
Presentation and discussion
- 12.30 – 14.00 *Lunch*

CONCLUSION OF THE CAR DIALOGUE

14.00 – 15.00	Session 1.4: Elements of a Plan of Action for S/RES/2151
15.00 – 16.30	Session 1.5: Contributions from IASSRTF Entities and Partners
16.30 – 17.00	Conclusions of the first day
18.00 – 19.00	<i>Cocktail</i>
19.00 – 20.00	<i>Dinner</i>
20.00 – 22.00	<i>Social Event</i>

Thursday, 23 June

07.00 – 08.45	<i>Breakfast</i>
09.00 – 10.30	Session 2.1: Public Expenditure Reviews: Concept and rationale from the UN and WB perspective
10.30 – 11.00	<i>Break</i>
11.00 – 12.30	Session 2.2: Lessons from the PER implementation in Somalia and Liberia; implementation in Guinea Bissau and CAR?
12.30 – 14.00	<i>Lunch</i>
14.00 – 16.00	Session 2.3: Voices from the field: DRC, Iraq, SVC and Gender
16.00 – 16.30	Concluding remarks

Friday, 24 June – SSR Senior Advisors Workshop

07.00 – 08.45	<i>Breakfast</i>
09.00 – 09.15	Opening session with Chief SSR
09.15 – 10.00	Session 1: Integration
10.00 – 10.05	<i>Break</i>
10.05 – 11.00	Session 1 (continued)
11.00 – 11.15	<i>Break</i>
11.15 – 12.00	Session 2: The use of assessed budget for project in mission contexts
12.00 – 12.05	<i>Break</i>
12.05 – 13.00	Session 2 (continued)
13.00 – 14.00	<i>Lunch</i>
14.00 – 14.30	CONCLUSION/WRAP-UP OF SSR SENIOR ADVISERS WORKSHOP
14.30 – 15.00	<i>Packing</i>
15.00	<i>Departure Greentree</i>

Annex III. United Nations Group of Friends of SSR Co-Chairs' Statement



Co-Chairs' Statement

High-level Dialogue on building support for key SSR priorities in the Central African Republic

Introduction

The co-chairs of the United Nations Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform (SSR), Slovakia and South Africa, facilitated a dialogue to build support for SSR priorities in the Central African Republic (CAR). Held in cooperation with the United Nations Inter-Agency SSR Task Force, and its Secretariat, the SSR Unit/DPKO, the dialogue provided a unique platform for a high level discussion among and between the Government of CAR and the international community on this important area and contributed to the implementation of S/RES/2151 (2014) that sets out the guiding principles for international assistance to national SSR efforts. The dialogue was organized in two segments. The high-level segment took place on 21 June 2016 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. It brought together high-ranking representatives of the Government of the Central African Republic, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Stabilization Mission to the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), as well as representatives from key partners including the United Nations, European Union, World Bank, African Union and bilateral donors. The expert segment of the dialogue was conducted on 22 June, and provided a useful opportunity to take forward the themes identified at the New York meeting a day earlier, with particular emphasis on the key elements of national ownership and the importance of national responsibility and political consensus in this regard.

The dialogue focused on two priorities. Firstly, speakers reflected on the elements of the national SSR process that are needed to secure lasting peace and prevent a relapse into conflict. Secondly, there was a focus on immediate and long term reform needs pertaining to security sector institutions including the police, gendarmerie, military, and relevant civilian control and oversight bodies. Also the role of local communities and their capacity to meaningfully participate in the provision of security and fulfil their democratic oversight role was noted.

Observations

Throughout the high-level segment of the dialogue on key SSR priorities in the Central African Republic SSR was highlighted as a key tool for preventing relapse into conflict and as such the need for a strategic approach to SSR, consisting of three key elements, was stressed:

1. Put in place a national policy and governance framework for the security sector:

Considering the scope of challenges and needs facing the security sector, a strategic long-term approach is essential for managing the SSR process. In this regard, the SSR policy framework should set out the SSR commitments, with a common understanding that a failure to progressively implement this framework will increase the likelihood of relapse into conflict.

Such a national security policy would include tangible steps towards developing

a viable governance framework for the security sector. Increased accountability of the armed and security forces and the establishment of appropriate mechanisms and tools to exercise oversight by parliament and local communities/civil society will be crucial. To establish a system of democratic governance, it will be important to initiate and sustain consultations on an appropriate formula for decentralisation and regional/local administration of security as means of introducing mechanisms for devolution of power and as means for sustainable extension of state authority beyond Bangui; UN support to SSR in post-conflict environments has demonstrated that the process of separation of powers between political and military leaders, while a precondition for civilian control and oversight, is often a slow and gradual process. Hence, in the immediate aftermath of conflict, leaders of armed groups may view integration as assurance policy and tool to secure immediate participation in the post-conflict political process. To avoid the creation of large and ultimately unsustainable armed forces, dialogue on security sector integration should, from the onset, go beyond military integration and lay the ground for the emergence of security governance throughout the country.

Indicators of progress could include: political accountability for leading a reform process in accordance with agreed objectives and principles, including those agreed during the Bangui Forum; increased representation within armed and internal security forces according to

ethnicity, regional representation, gender and religion; effective decision making within national security coordination and policy making as indicator of political will for SSR, establishment of a dedicated monitoring and evaluation capacity within the coordination structure to enable impact oriented evaluation and enhanced participation of local communities in security sector policy and decision making.

2. Lay the ground for the effective functioning, professionalism and internal accountability of security institutions, in particular the FACA, gendarmerie and police:

Identify and undertake tangible steps towards right-sizing the security sector as a prerequisite for its sustainability and professionalization. Additionally, put in place an appropriate and clear delineation between the roles and responsibilities of the FACA, police and gendarmerie and take visible steps to demonstrate the application of agreed roles. Adopt a code of conduct for uniformed personnel and support its application as means of enhancing trust with citizens and as a mechanism for developing a culture of internal accountability and professionalism. The establishment of Inspector-General functions and empowerment of their offices would be an important step in the right direction. Implement a police development programme with immediate focus on rehabilitating and equipping the police and gendarmerie training institutions.

3. Enhance coordination of international support, including of MINUSCA support, to the national SSR process within a mutual accountability framework (compact):

Key SSR indicators should be included in a mutual accountability framework between the Government and the international community to facilitate allocation of international support to clearly defined national goals. A mechanism for donor

coordination, under national leadership should facilitate coherence of support. As first step the Government needs to articulate needs and define its funding strategy, including from domestic resources.

Indicators of effective coordination of international support may include evidence that the Government engages with donors and partners in a transparent and predictable manner thus building confidence and sustaining international support for its reform programme.

Follow-up action

This High-level Dialogue on building support for key SSR priorities in the Central African Republic has confirmed the importance of creating a dedicated space for exchanging and discussing the most pressing challenges and opportunities for SSR in countries emerging from conflict. For the purpose of contributing to the implementation of immediate SSR priorities as basis for sustaining peace and enabling peace-building and recovery to take place in the Central African Republic, we commit to:

- Present this Co-chairs' Statement to the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission.
- Present this Co-chairs' Statement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for circulation to relevant UN agencies and departments.
- Request that the co-chairs of the high-level dialogue receive a detailed report of the event, including the expert level discussions.
- Encourage that the observations outlined in this document inform the development of a comprehensive support plan for SSR in the Central African Republic to be presented at the upcoming donors' conference in Brussels.
- Convene a discussion of the Group of Friends of SSR to follow up on the status of the recommendations contained herein, to ensure continued support to the SSR process in CAR by the international community.

- In keeping with S/RES/2151 we encourage the Secretary-General to provide comprehensive reporting on SSR implementation, taking into account the specific objectives and indicators discussed, and in particular bring to the attention of the Council any developments that may undermine prospects for their fulfilment, as those may contribute to heightening the risk for relapse into conflict.

Annex IV. Speech of Mr. Joseph Yakété^b, Minister of Defence, Central African Republic, 21 June 2016



**Mr. Joseph Yakété,
Minister of Defence, Central African Republic**

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

21 June 2016 | New York

**Co-Chairs of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform,
Assistant Secretary-General for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Head of MINUSCA,
United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support,
Member State representatives and Experts,
Dear Friends,**

On behalf of the Government of the Central African Republic (CAR), I would like to start by expressing my sincere thanks to all of you who are gathered here today, on behalf of the international community and the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, to assist countries such as the Central African Republic that are undergoing reconstruction in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 2151.

In response to this highly commendable move, I would like to re-iterate, on behalf of the people and Government of the Central African Republic, as well as personally, our deepest gratitude and recognition regarding the decisive contribution by the United Nations and the international community in resolving the crisis in the CAR.

The Government of the CAR is delighted that I have this unique opportunity to

share with you our vision and needs in relation to security sector reform in the CAR.

May I remind you that since September 2014, in response to the upsurge in violence resulting in humanitarian crises, a significant proportion of security services in the Central African Republic are being provided by MINUSCA, although the international forces do not have sufficient personnel to cover the whole territory.

The ageing Central African Armed Forces (FACA) are now concentrated in Bangui, prone to acts of indiscipline given their lack of activity, and devoid of all operational capacity due to the destruction or occupation of facilities, and the lack of equipment and budget. The FACA are currently undergoing restructuring, supported by the European Union Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA), to transform from a projection army to a

garrison army and resume their governing powers, with technical support from the international community. I can assure you that there is a marked improvement in the image and perception of our forces among the population.

Unfortunately, this restructuring is encountering limitations due to the sanctions regime, including arms embargo, to which our country is subject. This is restricting efforts by the Government and international partners to support the FACA.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

As we emerge from crisis, and in anticipation of a potential withdrawal by international forces, a transformation of the national armed forces is essential.

You will therefore understand that it is vital for our country to equip itself with forces

^b This speech was originally delivered in French. This is not an official United Nations translation, and the United Nations does not take responsibility for the accuracy of this translation.

that are professional, representative, regionally balanced and capable of protecting the population and the territory, with a view to a lasting return to peace, crucial for national reconciliation and sustainable development.

At the instigation of His Excellency the President of the Republic, and as expressed in the Prime Minister's general policy statement (validated by the National Assembly on 10 June 2016), four key priorities have been agreed.

The first priority covers organization and operations in relation to defence sector governance. There is a need to modify the form of the armed forces to suit both its structure and organization, thereby allowing better management of the sector and establishing an organic and functional chain of command. The transformation will be dependent on a state budget for ongoing operations and obviously for reconstruction of the army. Unfortunately this budget is currently non-existent.

For this approach, priority will need to be given to introducing a good human resources management policy to ensure that the CAR has a multi-ethnic, young and professional army at all times. This overhaul of the human resources management policy will involve a clean-up of the workforce: retirement, eradication of deserters and lawbreakers, recruitment of young people, and redeployment and integration of ex-combatants specified in the forthcoming national Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation (DDRR) programme.

The success of this priority area will essentially depend on a realistic Defence Policy, a Military Justice Code, a new Military Programming Law and a military doctrine.

The second priority is strengthening operational capacities, with training for person-

nel (especially officers) as a first step. This is a key issue in ensuring that the FACA meets the standards of a professional republican army, with a change of mindsets through education in military approach. The Government, under the future European Union Military Training Mission (EUTM) plan, is specifically responsible for re-establishing units of verified and registered personnel and ensuring their supervision, retraining and future deployment. After standardized training, each unit will be evaluated before being gradually deployed in garrisons within the military regions.

In this context, logistical support and the provision of equipment for the units to be deployed will be essential to sustaining the effort in the long term.

An infrastructure plan will have to take into account the new positioning of the army, with the proviso that soldiers can be accompanied by their families in the garrisons to which they are assigned. This regional deployment will promote security and stability and will be a key factor in the economic development of the region. The work to be carried out on infrastructure will help to improve living and working conditions in the FACA barracks, bases, General Staff and training schools.

The third priority is the deployment of forces, involving regionalization and stationing at garrisons. In close collaboration with MINUSCA, there will be gradual deployments that take into account the security challenges facing our country. It is too early to prioritize these mandates but they will form part of an overall joint process, which will equip regional General Staff with logistical and engineering capacity and a health system for soldiers' families and the local population, and will directly contribute to development of the territory.

The fourth priority relates to resource mobilization.

Defence sector reform requires mobilization and optimization of resources. However, we currently have an army of men without resources, who cannot be trained or deployed. In this regard, there is a need for gradual allocation of resources to enable consistent management of personnel, infrastructure and equipment for training and then for deployment.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is the Government's aspiration and will to re-equip the Central African Republic with an army that is professional, young, republican, at peace with itself, capable of protecting the population and defending territorial integrity against all forms of threats, and above all stopping the country from relapsing into a cycle of violence. Reconstruction of the FACA, in the context of overall security sector reform, must form part of the national reconciliation and social cohesion process.

In view of these challenges, your support is essential in mobilizing the multilateral and bilateral resources needed for coordinated and planned implementation of this reform, long-awaited by the population of the Central African Republic, who wish only to see sustainable peace, which is crucial for development. I would like to appeal for your committed and lasting involvement in helping us to transform our army.

I will close on this hopeful note for my country, trusting that you will not hesitate to provide us with your support.

Thank you.

Annex V. Speech of Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako^c, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation, 21 June 2016



**Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako,
Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic
for DDR/SSR and national reconciliation**

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

21 June 2016 | New York

Co-Chairs of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform,
Assistant Secretary-General for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Head of MINUSCA,
United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support,
Member State representatives,
Experts,
Your Excellences,
Ladies and gentlemen,

Our delegation is delighted to be taking part in this high-level dialogue on security sector reform (SSR) in our country, the Central African Republic. I would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the President of the Republic, Faustin Archange Touadera, his Government and our delegation, to thank the organizers of this meeting and particularly the Slovak Republic, South Africa and the United Nations, for the attention they have afforded us.

This delegation comprises:

- The Minister for National Defence
- The Minister of the Interior, Public Security and Territorial Administration
- The Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Republic, DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation (NR) Coordinator

- The President of the Defence Commission of the National Assembly
- The Counsellor to the President of the Republic on SSR.

Your Excellences, ladies and gentlemen,

Our country has been shaken by numerous political and military crises for more than 10 years, particularly during 2013, which have resulted in serious human rights violations and widespread insecurity throughout the country. All our institutions have been weakened, particularly the security sector and social cohesion, and this has facilitated the trafficking and proliferation of all kinds of arms and the infiltration of mercenaries, forcing the international community to send in foreign forces from

the subregion, and subsequently forces under a UN mandate to help protect the population and the country.

A number of DDR/SSR strategies were attempted in 2003, 2008 and since 2013 with no success, and the cycle of violence and insecurity continues.

Since his election, in a process that was considered free, transparent and democratic, President Touadera has made the restoration of security, peace and national reconciliation a prerequisite to national reconstruction and the resumption of lasting economic and social development.

To achieve these objectives, the President of the Republic decided to address the se-

^c This speech was originally delivered in French. This is not an official United Nations translation, and the United Nations does not take responsibility for the accuracy of this translation.

curity problem by designing a three-pillar architecture (DDR/SSR/NR). The strategic coordination of this is under his authority, while technical coordination lies with the Special Minister-Counsellor, reporting to his Cabinet, who is responsible for harmonizing the three programmes and processes entrusted to Counsellors and establishing satisfactory relationships with the various ministerial departments, organizations and bilateral and multilateral partners supporting the process. This ensures good consistency and complementarity between the great national reconstruction projects.

The President of the Republic affirmed his political vision and direction in his first major speeches, in particular:

- In his speech to the nation following his inauguration
- At the presentation of the flag and installation of new heads of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA)
- To the population of the Bouar hinterland at the launch of the works to rehabilitate the Leclerc military camp
- To the Security Council in New York.

The Head of State believes that the reconstruction of the Central African Armed Forces, based around a global reform of the security sector, must form part of the process of national reconciliation and social cohesion.

During his inaugural speech following his election and inauguration and during several interviews granted to the press, the President of the National Assembly has focused on the attention and support that he will provide to the Government on all issues of security, justice and national reconciliation.

In his keynote address to the National Assembly, which was widely adopted by Assembly Members, the Prime Minister

highlighted the President of the Republic's programme and major directions, particularly with regard to SSR, in line with the draft national security policy currently being approved, and mentioned four of its priority interventions:

- Adapting the structure and organization of the security forces for better sector management and re-establishing an organic and functional chain of command
- Establishing a new vision aimed at moving from a projection army to a garrison army and combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW)
- Producing a doctrine and implementing a defence and security policy
- Making efforts to mobilize more resources and improve their management, not forgetting the mobilization of all principal partners to comply with SSR and support the reforms.

Furthermore, some 10 Ministers, in particular those from the Ministry of Defence and Security, and several national NGOs are involved in SSR actions. The population, scarred by so many recurrent crises, is now impatiently awaiting a return to more effective and professional internal security and defence forces (ISDF). Members of these forces have already demonstrated a positive change in their mentality and behaviour towards the local population.

To use a military expression, all senior officials of the various state institutions and technical departments are now under battle orders to make sure that the new SSR process succeeds, and that the security sector — and more particularly the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), gendarmerie and police — finally and effectively contributes to protecting the population and securing both the territory and its borders.

There is already clear support from the bilateral and multilateral partners, as well as from civil society.

It is the Central African Republic's ardent wish to see the efforts being made by all these institutions — particularly those of the new SSR coordination structure put in place by the Head of State — benefit from technical and financial support that is adequate to the task at hand and which matches the Central African people's multiple expectations (schools, hospitals, agricultural development, etc.). This will enable the whole SSR process to be resumed as soon as possible and bring to fruition the President of the Republic's commitment to taking up the challenge of finally seeing the country's general and sustainable recovery, thus putting an end to the myth of a constant cycle of conflict and violence, through restructured and better-equipped security and defence forces.

Thank you for listening.

Annex VI. Speech of Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 21 June 2016



**H.E. Miroslav Lajčák,
Minister of Foreign & European Affairs of the Slovak Republic**

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

21 June 2016 | New York

Dear Excellencies, Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen,

(1) Introduction & context outline

It is my pleasure to welcome you to this high-level meeting. I believe it will help clarify the key challenges of implementing Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic. It should also lead to the understanding of crucial priorities and overall strategy for the way forward.

I am also delighted to welcome Special Representative of the Secretary General for the Central African Republic and Head of the MINUSCA Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga. I wish to extend to him and his team congratulations on the excellent support to the CAR authorities. I also appreciate his personal commitment to the dialogue today. I am sure we will be able to build on this example as a model for engagement with senior leaders in other contexts.

This event is very timely as the Security Council is considering adopting a new resolution on the mandate of MINUSCA.

(2) Group of Friends of SSR

Before opening the discussion, let me share with you some reflections about the

role of the Group of Friends of SSR in the context of today's meeting.

Since its establishment in 2007, the Group has played an invaluable role in bringing SSR onto the UN agenda. We have held numerous consultations with regional and multilateral-partners including the African Union.

We have set up close working relationships with the Inter-Agency SSR Task Force and its Secretariat, the SSR Unit in DPKO (Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations) as well as the UNDP.

We have developed working modalities of the Group providing adequate representation of the African continent in its structure. We are truly grateful to South Africa and Nigeria for championing SSR at the global and regional level.

(3) Resolution 2151 and its relevance to the SSR dialogue on CAR

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The dialogue today is intended to contribute to the implementation of Resolution 2151 relevant to the Central African Republic. Let me remind you that we held an open high-level meeting of the Group

of Friends of SSR in February 2015. It was dedicated to consolidating priorities for the implementation of Resolution 2151 on SSR. During that discussion we identified key priorities that remain most relevant and should also guide our deliberations today.

So let me highlight three points that I see as the most pertinent to the dialogue on SSR in CAR:

FIRST, we agreed on the relevance of firmly linking SSR to peace and transition processes. In this regard we noted the major role that Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and senior UN leaders can play. By this I mean the effective use of their good offices in support of an on-going political dialogue surrounding SSR.

SECOND, we made the link between SSR and the Agenda 2030. And we stressed the need to better understand what we can do at the earliest stages of stabilization and peace-building to provide the foundation for development.

I am therefore glad that the World Bank is here with us. We will thus be able to consider how to build national capacities for managing public financing of the security sector.

We know that the security sector is an important employer and driver of economic development. It is essential to examine how to extend these benefits beyond the capital to local communities both in terms of security and economic services. These considerations will also be significant in preparations for the donors conference on the Central African Republic. It is planned for November in Brussels.

THIRD, we agreed to effectively implement the Resolution 2151. For that to happen, more needs to be done towards strengthening partnerships among multilateral and bilateral partners. In particular, we agreed to extend and deepen cooperation towards joint assessments, planning and evaluation. We also have to more effectively coordinate our efforts on the ground.

Therefore, I am pleased to see around the table key partners involved in the support to SSR in CAR. I especially mean the African Union and the European Union. And I am particularly happy to note so many representatives from the Central African Republic. It is necessary for them to contribute to this dialogue from their national perspective.

Finally, I hope for this dialogue to provide an additional opportunity to harmonize our common understanding of the challenges CAR is currently facing.

Excellencies, Colleagues,

Let me now open the discussion. I am looking forward to hearing your thoughts and comments.

Thank you for your attention!

Annex VII. Speech of Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA, 21 June 2016



**Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga,
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA**

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

21 June 2016 | New York

National security in the Central African Republic represents an enormous challenge – **if not the main challenge** – to restoring peace and stability in the country. Reforming the national vision of security is certainly at the heart of the political dynamic and one of MINUSCA’s top priorities. **However, reforming the minds before reforming the institutions may prove an even greater challenge.**

This is not a new issue. Repeated failures to address the root cause of the problem over the past three decades have plagued every single attempt to restore trust and a meaningful political dialogue in CAR, gradually leading the country towards violence and chaos.

Addressing issue of national security touches directly on democratic rules and good governance through the distribution of tasks and delineation of responsibilities assigned to each one of the security agencies involved in providing protection not only to the public institutions, but also to the all the communities, irrespective of their origin, religion and traditions, or cultural and political affiliation.

Because of their loose structure, unbalanced ethnic distribution, lack of command, and overall poor management, the CAR armed and internal security forces are a far cry from any form of commonly accepted standards.

In fact they are at the heart of the problem. **As such they must also be for the most part the solution to the problem.** A situation that is even more critical because the judicial system is broken and the penal infrastructure and organization are in a shambles. The whole system is disorganized and deeply fractured.

As such, implementing a **coherent and realistic** SSR strategy represents a key process and powerful enabler in support of MINUSCA mandate.

There is no doubt that the ability of the international community to address this issue is central to our long-term efforts in support of the country’s political and security stabilization.

MESSAGES

For the CAR elected authorities

It is now time to adopt a political vision based on a global approach. In such context, **drastic and sometimes difficult political choices must be made** taking into account the following:

- Security must not be seen as just armed security. It must be seen as a key vector of human development and a tool contributing to economic growth and social advancement;
- The Security Sector Reform process is predicated upon the genuine acceptance by all national stakeholders of the political challenges inherent to the process. This includes demands from various segments of civil society, as well as claims from the armed groups;
- It will be necessary for the Government to take firm political decisions with respect to the phasing out of a number

of personnel currently serving in the security forces who have committed serious crimes. This will be part of the fight against impunity through a formal vetting process aimed at identifying individuals who have committed human rights violations and other crimes.

It is also the time for substantive decisions regarding the CAR armed forces and security budgets. This implies making clear choices in term of the forces' respective format, structures and equipment for the next 5 to 10 years. Before making their decision, the Government officials involved will have to take stock of the projects already ongoing in other sectors of activity (Health, education, public infrastructure, etc...), which are equally important in term of general security countrywide.

This will imply setting financial priorities in view of the gradual launching of restructuring and adjustment programmes that need to be carried out in parallel with the daily operational management of the security forces;

For the international community

The international community must stay the course and avoid reducing or withdrawing its support once the early phase of the SSR preliminary phase is completed. Early with-

drawal of aid and support are among the root causes of the problems CAR is experiencing today.

SSR is coming at a cost and demands substantial financial resources, not limited to the planning phase. RSS activity must be sustained over a significant time span. Our ability to sustain the reform pace in the long haul is one of the key factors of success.

It is crucial that altogether we are able to commit ourselves to the overall SSR process. It is a mainstream programme that needs to be carried out in a joint and effective fashion in full coherence with the other key political, economic, social and humanitarian initiatives, regardless of whether they are unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.

However, it must be made clear to the CAR elected authorities that the SSR process is not a whim but an obligation enshrined in the Security Council mandate vested in MINUSCA. It is essential that all together, we ensure a true appropriation of the process by the CAR Government in order to deliver a better and more effective security apparatus, with clearly defined structures, aims and methods that meet the recognized international standards of ethical leadership, compliance practices and impartiality.

Annex VIII. Speech of Mr. El-Ghassim Wane, Assistant-Secretary-General in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 21 June 2016



**Mr. El Ghassim Wane,
Assistant-Secretary-General in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations**

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

21 June 2016 | New York

Ministers,
Your Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I'm very pleased to welcome you to this important discussion on the priorities and challenges of reforming security institutions in CAR. This discussion is only possible because of the successful elections in the country and, building on the gains of the transition, the committed efforts of President Touadéra and his Government to secure the peace. Therefore, when we talk about priorities for SSR in CAR, we are rightly talking about conditions to prevent a relapse into conflict.

There are three points that I want to make right at the beginning. First, we need to recognize that the expectations of the new Government and the population are exceptionally high. Second, now is the time for the national authorities to move beyond their expressions of commitment to national reconciliation by delivering short-term progress in establishing an inclusive and representative security sector. Third, the envelope of financial support for reforms in CAR, including for SSR, remains inadequate relative to the vast array of challenges facing the country.

From this perspective, what should be our joint approach for the way forward?

As a first step, we need to adopt a common understanding of success for the SSR process in CAR and advance the consultations on identifying key indicators of progress on SSR. Agreed indicators, which could be monitored as part of the proposed framework of mutual accountability between the CAR authorities and the International Community, would benefit the Government of CAR by concentrating the focus on a defined set of priorities and reducing the transaction costs of coordinating incongruent priorities of multiple partners. This would also enhance CAR's ability to attract donor support and would provide a tool for credibly assessing progress.

In sharing for your consideration the potential options for indicators of SSR progress, I wish to emphasize that peacekeeping remains first and foremost a political instrument that has its greatest impact when deployed in support of a political roadmap to inform its exit strategy. This is a key message of the outcomes of the recent Peace Operations Review. In the Central African Republic, a strategic approach to SSR constitutes a key component of the political roadmap, which in the upcoming phase will focus on the sustainable reduction of the presence of the armed groups, and is a central element of MINUSCA's exit strategy.

In this regard, we recognize the importance of a common national vision for SSR, and I note the leading role and responsibility of the CAR Government in facilitating a national dialogue and mechanisms to develop such a vision. As outlined in Security Council Resolution 2151 on SSR, this is both the inalienable right and the highest duty of the CAR Government.

MINUSCA and the partners assembled here today will stand ready to support the development of a national security sector framework that would a) outline immediate needs and approaches required to enhance the effectiveness of its security institutions, and b) clearly articulate the relevant political commitments and strategy for distributing prospective SSR-dividends among all relevant stakeholders. I wish to welcome, in this regard, the forthcoming establishment of the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic, which will play a vital role in the area of DSR.

It is also important to stress that a security sector reform agenda that does not reflect the aspirations of the entire population is unlikely to sustain peace in the long term. We have repeatedly learned the lesson that when deep-rooted grievances are not addressed in an inclusive and structured way, a relapse into conflict is all but certain.

To support CAR on its way towards a better future for all its citizens and prevent a renewed relapse into conflict, some indicators of SSR progress may thus include:

- a. The degree to which the national security sector framework reflects the aspirations of all segments of the population, including the legitimate demands of the armed groups and without prejudice to the legitimacy of the Government;
- b. Degree of progress on developing and promulgating an overall SSR strategy, timelines and costs for implementing the commitments articulated in an agreed security sector framework.
- c. The degree to which the Government of CAR will be able to consult a formula to extend its authority all over the country, including through a gradual transfer of security provision to local communities as long-term strategy for their practical integration into the security sector and State administration more broadly;

- d. Finally, indicators should allow us to evaluate the degree to which the newly trained security forces serve the needs of the population of CAR and are subject to agreed accountability mechanisms both politically and legally.

The cumulative effect of progress on the noted indicators would, in my view, constitute part of a comprehensive approach to the challenge of the armed groups in CAR and would lead to the sustainable reduction of their presence, which is the desired aim for all of us to enable the country to enjoy sustainable development and to reduce the threats against its citizens.

The coming period will be challenging for the new Government, as well as for MINUSCA and its partners. I therefore call on donors and partners present here today to offer their support for peacebuilding and peace-sustainment in CAR.

I thank you for your attention and look forward to the discussion.

Annex IX. Speech of the Minister of Interior^d, Public Security and Territorial Administration of the Central African Republic, as delivered by Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation, 22 June 2016⁴⁹



Statement by the Minister of Interior, Public Security and Territorial Administration

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

21 June 2016 | New York

**Co-Chairs of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform,
Assistant Secretary-General for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Head of MINUSCA,
United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support,
Member State representatives and Experts,
Dear Friends,**

I would like to start by thanking the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform for giving the new authorities of the Central African Republic the opportunity to present, through me, the priorities and needs of the Ministry of Interior, Public Security and Territorial Administration in terms of operational security and transformation.

As we emerge from crisis, the reconstruction of the State and national reconciliation are crucial, while support from the international community is essential.

Restoring state authority throughout the country will be a major challenge, which will involve securing the territory starting with Bangui, and continuing the advances made by the internal security forces in carrying out their daily tasks to serve the population.

Recent years have been marred by violence, which has weakened and fractured the country. State and civil society institutions and bodies have deteriorated significantly. Internal security forces are in a bad state: personnel are in short supply, ageing, badly trained, badly equipped and demoralized. There is a severe lack of basic equipment such as rolling stock and communication devices. The provision of arms and ammunition is subject to authorization by the sanctions committee, thereby slowing or limiting operations. The infrastructure is outdated and substandard. Gaps and weaknesses seriously affect the operational capacity of units. In addition, clarification is needed on the remit of governing powers and jurisdiction for the internal security forces (ISF) to be restored to full effectiveness on the ground.

However, the population is starting to lose its false impression of the internal security forces.

Problems with internal security have many negative consequences, including the rise of often uncontrollable armed groups and self-defence militia, the unregulated circulation of arms, the infringement of the free movement of people and goods, and the plunder of natural resources that the country needs now more than ever.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The internal security forces now need to be simultaneously transformed, restructured and operationalized, in a complementary and coordinated manner, in order to re-instate recognizable coherence, profession-

^d This speech was originally delivered in French. This is not an official United Nations translation, and the United Nations does not take responsibility for the accuracy of this translation.

alism and competence, which are crucial to restoring internal security and ensuring sustainable peace.

This restructuring is based on two prerequisites:

- The concept of integrated forces: self-governance and independent functioning of the police and gendarmerie in terms of human resources, management of infrastructure and equipment, separate budget, operations management and personnel training
- Interoperability: the capacity to work with the other security forces (Defence, Customs, Water and Forest Guards, municipal police) while maintaining distinctive characteristics

The need to restructure police and gendarmerie services is mentioned in a document with national scope under discussion by the authorities of the elected CAR Government, and which was taken up by the Prime Minister on 7 June: the draft National Security Policy (NSP). This document sets out a framework for the national security strategy and provides a benchmark for the security services to develop sufficient human and material resources to place them in the best position to contribute, in the course of their duties, to restoring the rule of law and to combating all forms of criminality and impunity.

Restoring the security of the State, people and property will require: reorganization and restructuring of the ISF to create republican, professional, representative and regionally balanced forces; rehabilitation and (re)construction of infrastructure; strengthening and rationalization of human resources through proper management of the workforce; strengthening of democratic accountability; and ongoing links with the reform of the entire penal system.

His Excellency the President of the Republic has made security a national priority.

The Prime Minister's general policy statement (validated by the National Assembly on 10 June 2016) is clear on this point and identifies the need to validate and implement the NSP; to reorganize and optimize the gendarmerie and police, focusing on complementarity between the two forces; to prioritize the redeployment of the ISF in the provinces; and to run redeployment support programmes funded by technical and financial partners.

At the technical level, the NSP translates into the draft Institutional Capacity and Development Plan for the ISF, drawn up during transition, which aims to facilitate in-depth reform of the Central African Republic internal security system. This five-year plan, valued at \$US 225 million, groups all the priority areas around five themes:

- Revision of the legal and regulatory framework
- More efficient human resource management through recruitment of young people, integration of certain ex-combatants, background checks, retirements and revised conditions for the well-being of personnel and their families
- Strengthening of operational capacity, conduct of operations and training (including training in planning, pre- and in-service training, and specialized training, by trained and skilled instructors)
- Rationalization of logistics, through the provision of realistic resources given the allocated budget and through centralized management
- Ethics and a code of conduct specific to personnel responsible for public security missions to protect the people

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In-depth transformation of the ISF is a real challenge which the Central African Republic wishes to and must address. This

transformation of the internal security services and forces must enable:

- More coherent distribution of tasks between the FACA, which are mainly responsible for defending territorial integrity, and the ISF, which is responsible for internal security for the benefit of the CAR population.
- Better analysis of the number of ISF personnel and resources required in line with the major needs. The role of technical and financial partners and funders is particularly important here, both now and in the long term.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

All citizens have an inalienable right to security.

With the support of the international community, His Excellency the President of the Republic and the Government are committed to restoring to the CAR internal security forces that are capable of protecting people and property at all times, in all locations and against all forms of aggression.

The country has experienced too much violence and rebuilding strong, professional and accountable internal security forces is a priority. Security sector reform is a means to living in a safe and peaceful country, which is crucial for sustainable development and will enable the CAR to once again play an integral part in the alliance of nations.

This reform will not be possible without your support. It is vital that we can count on your help, support and assistance to restore hope, peace and tranquillity to the CAR.

Please be assured of our unwavering commitment, the commitment of the whole population of the "united, dignified and hard-working" CAR, to achieve this.

Thank you for your attention.

Annex X. Speech of Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako^e, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation, 22 June 2016



**Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako,
Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the CAR for DDR/SSR
and National Reconciliation**

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

22 June 2016 | New York

PRESENTATION

- I. BACKGROUND AND CURRENT SITUATION
- II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE FORCES (ISDF)
- III. MAIN CONSTRAINTS
- IV. SSR VISION
- V. SSR OBJECTIVES
- VI. FUTURE ACTION
- VII. ADVOCACY FOR RESOURCE MOBILIZATION
- VIII. CONCLUSION

I. BACKGROUND AND CURRENT SITUATION

The security sector reform (SSR) being implemented since 2009 in the context of the in-depth reform of the Internal Security and Defence Forces (ISDF) aimed at restoring security, building peace and making the ISDF more effective, saw all of its achievements destroyed following the deep crisis into which the CAR fell with the accession to power of the Séléka on 24 March 2013. All the basic infrastructure and equipment of the ISDF and of the Administration was destroyed throughout the national territory, and all existing structures were also fundamentally disrupted.

With the support of the international community, particularly the United Nations, SSR resumed during the transition period from 2014 to March 2016 under the Emergency Programme for Sustainable Recovery (PURD).

The return to constitutional order enabled the democratic election of Faustin Archange Touadera on 14 February 2016 and, since the beginning of April 2016, democratic institutions (Government, National Assembly, etc.) have gradually been established. The President of the Republic and Head of State has now made SSR his number one priority in order to:

- Restore security and build peace and political stability
- Reconcile Central Africans in order to encourage social cohesion
- Reconcile Central Africans with their ISDF
- Create a security environment that is favourable to vigorous economic revival, particularly in rural areas, where 67 per cent of the country's poor live.

The ISDF, which are tasked with ensuring security, territorial integrity and the protection of people and property, are suffering from a number of weaknesses in terms of numbers and material and logistical means.

^e This speech was originally delivered in French. This is not an official United Nations translation, and the United Nations does not take responsibility for the accuracy of this translation.

They are concentrated in Bangui, to the detriment of the hinterland, which is exposed to various forms of aggression, including: political/military groups (Séléka, anti-balaka), the Lord's Resistance Army, zaraguina (bandits), poachers, and massive cross-border transfers of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Other constraints are also notable, including long and porous borders, and the State's very weak capacity to ensure an effective presence in the hinterland.

The judicial and penitentiary administration is suffering from similar problems, which are contributing to a deterioration in the quality of justice services and to impunity.

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ISDF

1. Numbers

- Understaffing in relation to the extent of the task and the vast size of the country
- Mixed conglomerate (militia, ex-loyalists, ex-mutineers, ex-liberators, Séléka) transferred back into the ISDF, without prior planning and without training
- Ageing of the forces (many are beyond the upper age limit).

2. Living conditions

- Deplorable socioeconomic conditions, which are partly the cause of a lack of discipline, non-compliance, racketeering and banditry using service weapons.

3. Concentration of troops in Bangui

III. MAIN CONSTRAINTS

1. Equipment

- Virtually non-existent since Séléka took power in March 2013
- Lack of national policy for equipping the ISDF since independence.

2. Discipline

- Lack of a human resource management policy

- Uncontrolled recruitment
- Insufficient training
- Lack of reception and care services for young recruits
- Lack of understanding of men and regulations by superiors, following uncontrolled recruitment
- Appointments to posts of responsibility and higher ranks without following the statutory provisions
- Weak chain of command
- Lack of definition of respective powers.

3. Working conditions

- Lack of barracks, gendarmeries and police stations
- Failure to apply the official texts that are in force

IV. SSR VISION

Following the 2016 elections, the overriding priority has been the sustainable security and defence of the national territory, which is a republican requirement; this is the number one freedom, according to the Head of State. The army needs to be reformed so that it can become a truly republican, multi-ethnic, apolitical and professional force.

In the short term, elements of the restructured ISDF will need to conduct armed patrols in order to protect the public and take part in tasks to protect and support civilians. This work is necessary for the State to be able to extend its authority over the whole of the national territory.

By 2020, there should be a secure environment capable of stimulating sustainable development and reducing poverty in a democratic and transparent context that is respectful of the rule of law.

The State will need to be capable of undertaking its sovereign duties as the legal provider of lasting security, to the benefit of the people, enabling the free movement of goods and people throughout the national territory and re-establishing justice, human rights protection and the war on impunity.

V. SSR OBJECTIVES

• GENERAL OBJECTIVES

1. ISDF

- Redefine the remit and missions of the different ISDF forces
- Establish a disciplined, depoliticized and professional ISDF
- Substantially change the human landscape of the internal security forces (ISF)
- Provide training in order to provide the forces with a republican base
- Make adequate resources available to the ISF as necessary to respond effectively to threats and aggression
- Comprehensively reform the security sector.

2. Justice

- Define a system of coherent laws known to all
- Define an effective, impartial and responsible judicial system
- Encourage equitable access to justice and the applicability of laws
- Establish a demilitarized and professional prison system under civilian control
 - Guide the prison system towards the reintegration of prisoners
 - Guarantee the respect of international human rights standards
 - Guarantee the independence of the justice system
 - Strengthen the penal system.

3. Democratic control

- Improve parliamentary and judicial control of government actions, particularly with regard to managing the security apparatus and its reform process
- Ensure permanent monitoring of the number of state officials and agents in order to improve control of the total wage bill
- Redeploy administrative staff across the whole of the national territory
- Improve the provision of basic education
- Define and implement a civic education and communication programme on the importance of the role of the ISDF.

4. Customs

- Improve the performance and capacity of the Customs Administration
- Improve the efficiency of the Customs Administration to support the State's different charges.

5. Water and forests

- Make natural resource management effective and transparent
- Protect the environment for more environmental sustainability
- Reduce insecurity in Zones of Hunting Interest and the threats to wildlife
- Improve forest, wildlife and environmental legislation.

6. Intelligence services

- Determine the legal framework and missions of the different intelligence services
- Build the data-collection and analytical capacities of the intelligence services
- Improve the coordination of the intelligence services
- Equip the services with modern resources

VI. FUTURE ACTION

1. ISDF

- Improve ISDF human resource management
- Redefine ISDF territorial reorganization
- Organize ISDF training and exercises
- Revise the legal and regulatory framework governing the organization and functioning of the ISDF
- Make equipment available to the ISF as appropriate to their mission
- Build/reconstruct the necessary infrastructure in the provinces for ISDF deployment
- Draw up and implement a Law on Military Planning
- Provide an administrative system that is adapted to the needs of good governance
- Contribute to re-establishing public confidence in the ISF

- Eliminate illegal barriers throughout the country
- Improve ISDF living conditions
- Establish joint selection committees in each of the country's regions, recruiting on the basis of merit
- Put support in place for the retirement of staff who have reached pensionable age
- Continue and improve training and exercises
- Build/in the short term rehabilitate barracks, gendarmeries, police stations and social housing
- Put the Administrative and Military Regions in contact with each other and share civilian and military skills with a view to creating defence zones
- Equip (including with different uniforms) the ISF with the appropriate resources necessary for their missions
- Redeploy the ISDF effectively
- Create a joint ad hoc commission to review and approve texts (National Security Policy/PNS, ISF Capacity-building and Development Plan/PRCD, Law on Military Planning/LPM and other regulatory texts governing the ISDF, etc.)

2. Justice

- Revise and enact laws
- Rehabilitate/build courts and teams
- Train and professionalize judges
- Train neighbourhood and village Chiefs on the extent of their powers and on basic legal rules
- Build/rehabilitate prisons
- Create a corps of civilian prison officers
- Place social workers in prisons to implement socio-educational activities and conduct vocational training for prisoners with a view to their reintegration, taking gender-related considerations into account.

3. Democratic control

- Promote dialogue, joint training, awareness-raising and civilian/military activities with a view to re-establishing trust between the public and the ISDF
- Systematize the organizational audit of each ministry that has responsibility for the ISDF

- Adopt a regulatory framework with a view to decentralization
- Evaluate and improve the human, material and logistical capacities of the Court of Auditors and adopt a settlement bill at the end of the financial year
- Produce and adopt a law on public accounting
- Pass regulatory texts for the decentralization of commercial courts for each region
- Retrain teaching staff on civic education.

4. Customs

- Adopt specific statutes, implement the new organization chart and allocate senior officials according to their skills, after conducting investigations of character
- Computerize the services, provide them with equipment and materials (radio communication, uniforms, scanner)
- Increase staffing, train staff in specific areas (gold, diamonds, timber, hydrocarbons, precious and rare metals, drugs).

5. Waters and forests

- Organize interministerial meetings aimed at establishing new transhumance and livestock movement corridors from Chad and Sudan
- Install joint control posts and disarm transhumant herders
- Continue training forest guards
- Provide the services with equipment (IT, radio, GPS, compasses, arms)
- Put an end to uncontrolled logging and improve its suppression

6. Intelligence services

- Establish the legal framework and missions of the different intelligence services
- Improve the understanding of information for effective crisis prevention, monitoring of armed terrorist groups and border control (police, gendarmerie, army)
- Train specialist agents for each service
- Coordinate information exchange at the prefecture and central levels
- Build and equip the services.

VII. ADVOCACY FOR RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

ACTION UNDER WAY

- Establishment of a new SSR coordination and steering structure
 - Strategic Committee
 - Technical Committee
 - Technical Support Secretariat
 - Programme implementation pools
- Numerous design studies for the ISDF, from the strategic to the operational level
- Rehabilitation of Kassai camp (FRANCE, LUXEMBOURG, MINUSCA, EUROPEAN UNION)
- Rehabilitation of Leclerc camp in Bouar (MINUSCA)
- Rehabilitation of four gendarmeries in Bangui (EUROPEAN UNION, UNITED NATIONS)
- Rehabilitation of eight police stations in eight districts of Bangui plus the General HQ (UNITED NATIONS, EUROPEAN UNION)

- Construction/rehabilitation of Courts (USA, UNITED NATIONS, EUROPEAN UNION)
- Training of ISDF (EUROPEAN UNION, UNITED NATIONS, USA, FRANCE, MINUSCA, EUMAM)
- Registration and verification of ISDF staff (EUROPEAN UNION, UNITED NATIONS)

VIII. CONCLUSION

SSR is a long and costly process that takes several years. Its success requires the effective involvement of all stakeholders and substantial mobilization of technical and financial resources for its implementation.

The CAR is therefore relying on the support of its partners to help it achieve this delicate process, which is a prerequisite for CAR revival. The components of this are: security, peace, political stability, economic revival and the well-being of the people through poverty reduction and national reconciliation.

Thank you for listening.

Annex XI. Speech of Mr. Joseph Yakété^f, Minister of Defence, Central African Republic, 22 June 2016



**Mr. Joseph Yakété,
Minister of Defence, Central African Republic**

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

22 June 2016 | New York

Introduction

On behalf of the CAR Government, thank you to the Group of Friends of SSR who have come together to help countries undergoing reconstruction in line with United Nations Security Council resolution 2151.

Renewed gratitude to the United Nations for its crucial contribution to resolving the crisis in the CAR.

I. Reminder of the current context

Since September 2014, in response to the upsurge in violence resulting in humanitarian crises, a significant proportion of security services in the Central African Republic are being provided by MINUSCA.

However, the international forces do not have sufficient personnel to cover the whole territory, which is very large and has long porous borders, and to provide full protection and security for people and property.

Security challenges

- Despite signature of the DDRR Agreement in May 2015, persistence of pockets

- of armed groups in some regions, committing abuses against the population
- Widespread illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons (porous borders)
- Damaging effects of the LRA [Lord's Resistance Army] in the east of the country
- Occurrence of transhumance (seasonal migration)
- Increased incidence of poaching, resulting in the destruction of wildlife
- Abuses and community clashes in the three borders region (north-west)
- Plundering of mineral resources in areas occupied by rebel groups

The current state of our forces is as follows:

Serious breakdown in security and defence forces following the series of events experienced by the country, resulting in many weaknesses in the army. FACA concentrated in Bangui and devoid of all operational capacity due to:

- Destruction or occupation of infrastructure
- Lack of equipment
- Sanctions regime, including arms embargo, to which our country is subject, which is restricting efforts by the Government and international partners to support the FACA

- Lack of operating expenses budget, with many problems in relation to salaries
- Men with no resources
- Long-term inactivity, encouraging indiscipline
- Currently undergoing restructuring to resume their governing powers, thanks to technical support from the international community
- Improvement in image and perception among the population (e.g. civil-military activities)

II. SSR vision, defence component

The vision of the President of the Republic, reiterated in the Prime Minister's general policy statement validated by the National Assembly on 10 June, is to construct a republican, professional and multi-ethnic army, capable of fulfilling the following responsibilities entrusted to it by law:

- Defending national territorial integrity, including river and air approaches
- Protecting the population
- Taking part in civil-military activities (development army)
- Supporting the internal security forces when needed and in accordance with the law

^f This speech was originally delivered in French. This is not an official United Nations translation, and the United Nations does not take responsibility for the accuracy of this translation.

SSR will therefore require an army whose form and workforce are suited to the capacity of the CAR State and a clear, competent and well-defined chain of command. In addition, to enable deployment throughout the territory, the FACA will be organized into garrisons.

III. Priorities

To achieve the objectives we have set ourselves, four major priorities have been identified. These are:

- Organization and operations to ensure governance of the defence sector
- Operational capacity-building
- Deployment of forces
- Resource mobilization

First priority: Organization and operations (governance of the defence sector)

- Modify the form of the armed forces to fit the structure and framework, to enable better management of defence
- Establish an organic and functional chain of command
- Specify the form in the new Military Programming Law being prepared
- Modify the form in line with the State budget for ongoing operations and for reconstruction of the army

For this approach, priority will need to be given to introducing a good human resources management policy, to ensure that the CAR has a multi-ethnic, young and professional army at all times.

This overhaul of the human resources management policy will involve a clean-up of the workforce:

- Retirement of personnel who have reached the age limit: this applies to around 750 individuals in the three personnel categories. Rapid implementation of this measure seems possible thanks to \$5 million of funding offered by the United States, on the condition of finding a contractor.
- Eradication of deserters and lawbreakers: this policy decision was not taken by the

various transition governments. This is a sensitive subject but it would only mean applying the military regulations that are still in force.

- Removal of physically unfit personnel.
- A redeployment policy, essential for good management of the workforce, with vocational training suited to the country's economic situation and financial incentive to leave the military.
- A contractualization policy (re-engagement contract).
- New recruitment in order to lower the age of the army and stabilize the grade pyramid. This recruitment will naturally be carried out throughout the country. It will depend on the departure of those leaving the system (retirement) and on the conditions to be met, and will include integration of certain ex-combatants declared eligible by the DDDR programme. In accordance with the criteria specified in the forthcoming national DDDR programme:
 - Reintegration, after verification, of FACA who had joined the various armed rebel groups and who wish to return to the national army
 - Integration of ex-Séléka and anti-balaka who had never belonged to the FACA, in accordance with criteria for recruitment into the national army

The success of this priority area will essentially depend on a realistic Defence Policy, a Military Justice Code, a new Military Programming Law and a military doctrine.

Establishment of an organic and functional chain of command:

- recent appointment of the key military leaders
- implementation by thematic groups of the road map adopted at the National Defence Forum in June 2015, in partnership with EUMAM RCA. In the context of restructuring the Ministry of Defence:

updating and adaptation of basic documents, drafting of the Military Justice Code to be submitted to the National Assembly for adoption before promulgation by the President of the Republic, and drafting of a Defence Policy, military doctrine and new Military Programming Law.

Second priority: Operational capacity-building

- Priority action: training for personnel, especially officers. Key issue in ensuring that the FACA meets the standards of a professional republican army, with a change of mindsets through education in military approach. To this end, EUMAM and MINUSCA/DAC (Development Assistance Committee) have already provided a lot of non-operational training. For example:

- Training in international humanitarian law by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and MINUSCA
- Training for armourers by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in Benin
- Techniques and procedures for General Staff, leadership, ethics and education, human resource management, logistics, management techniques, developing a pool of training officers, etc.

The Government, under the future EUTM plan and in the context of bilateral cooperation, is specifically responsible for re-establishing units of verified and registered personnel and ensuring their supervision, retraining and future deployment. After standardized training, each unit will be evaluated before being gradually deployed in garrisons within the military regions.

Long-term transformation of the national army, battalion by battalion, into a professional army, through training officers to achieve a profound change in mindset, will result in an instrument that serves institutions and the nation.

Verification procedure

First stage: individual registration and biometric identification for all FACA personnel.

Second stage: simplified verification on an individual basis, with the support of MINUSCA and EUMAM, with the aim of excluding individuals who have committed war crimes and human rights violations or who are facing prosecution.

Providing logistics support and equipment to units to be deployed, which is also essential to maintaining effort in the long term (rolling stock, individual and group equipment for campaigns, etc.).

Arms: granting of 142 UNMAS weapons (request to the sanctions committee to partially lift the embargo) and/or supply of weapons through international aid (bilateral cooperation).

Vehicles for tactical transport and command resources, engineering machinery for infrastructure works, response vehicles for fire brigade, etc.

Camp equipment and training resources

- Preparation by thematic groups of a draft concept for supporting the FACA and a catalogue of equipment with a view to re-organizing support for the garrison army
- Identification of the logistical principles required for this transformation, specifying each area of support and the organization of resources at each level

Establishment of an infrastructure plan for the new positioning of the army, with the proviso that soldiers are posted with their families to garrisons. This regional deployment will promote security and stability and will be a key factor in the economic development of the region. The work to be carried out on infrastructure will help improve living and working conditions in the FACA barracks, bases, General Staff and training schools.

Work has already started on the Kassai camp, using European and MINUSCA funding. A rehabilitation programme is being run at the Leclerc camp in Bouar (instruction centre for non-commissioned soldiers and second training centre for EUTM), with support from MINUSCA and mobilizing FACA engineering capacity. In Bangui, there is an urgent need to reclaim the Béal, BSS and RDOT barracks so that FACA battalions can be redeployed.

Third priority: Deployment

Regionalization and stationing in garrisons. In close collaboration with MINUSCA (monitoring in the first instance), there will be gradual deployment, taking into account the security challenges facing our country and also, in the initial years, the extensive need for rehabilitation of infrastructure and of the social and economic environment. This should give our armies the dual capacity to support the population through civil-military actions and to reclaim their governing powers. It is too early to prioritize these mandates; they will form part of an overall process, which will equip regional General Staff with logistical and engineering capacity and provide a health system for the local population, and will directly contribute to development of the territory.

In the current context, the FACA may be assigned the following tasks:

- escorting convoys along and securing Main Supply Road 1
- defending sensitive locations in Bangui
- providing territorial control and intelligence in a well-defined area (Paoua, Bouar, Boda, etc.)
- participating in the African Union Task Force against the LRA in the Obo region, which is under United States control
- controlling the southern border along the Oubangui river, etc.

Fourth priority: Resource mobilization

Defence sector reform requires mobilization and optimization of resources. How-

ever, we currently have an army of men without resources, who cannot be trained or deployed. In this regard, there is a need for gradual allocation of resources to enable consistent management of personnel, infrastructure and equipment for training and then for deployment.

Several urgent actions are needed, such as:

- Funding foodstuffs to revitalize the basic diet already provided at Kassai.
- Providing personnel with identifiable, distinctive combat gear (standard CAR camouflage) to symbolically re-establish the feeling of belonging to an upgraded and revitalized uniformed body, fostering pride and renewed confidence, and also to differentiate legitimate soldiers from those from other factions (armed groups and GAD). Restarting the 12 billion CFA franc project with Groupe Marck from 2012.
- Rehabilitating the nautical resources of the amphibious battalion so it can rapidly ensure, in conjunction with the ISF, surveillance of the Oubangui river and control of the southern border of the country (combating all forms of trafficking and racketeering).
- Conducting an audit of the condition of aircraft at the air base to estimate the costs of rehabilitating the air fleet, with priority given to aircraft with surveillance or intelligence capacity and those for transporting VIPs.

Conclusion

Government aspirations and wishes:

- Establishment of a CAR army that is professional, young, republican, at peace with itself, capable of protecting the population and defending territorial integrity against all forms of threats, and above all stopping the country from relapsing into a cycle of violence
- Inclusion of the reconstruction of the FACA, in the context of overall security sector reform, in the national reconciliation and social cohesion process
- Re-establishment of an intelligence network, drawing on the regional General

Staff, in conjunction with Ministry of Interior resources

- Anticipated outcomes of the reform: regained security, restoration of State authority, protected population, return of sustainable peace crucial for development
- The success of the reform depends on resource mobilization
- Hence the need for multilateral and bilateral support from partners and friends for coordinated and planned implementation of this reform, long-awaited by the CAR population, who wish only to see sustainable peace, which is crucial for development

Annex XII. Speech of Mr. Jean-Christophe Carret^g, Country Manager for the Central African Republic, World Bank, 22 June 2016⁵⁰



**Mr. Jean-Christophe Carret,
Country Manager for the Central African Republic, World Bank**

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

21 June 2016 | New York

Priority needs for security sector reform

1. Security and development

Because of the many conflicts that have marked its history since independence, the Central African Republic is currently one of the poorest countries in the world: 187 out of 188 in the Human Development Index. In reality, this translates as: a concentration of roads three times lower than the average for low-income countries on the (African) continent; a level of access to drinking water and electricity five times lower than the average for the same countries; and a very high percentage (70 per cent) of adolescents and young adults aged 15 to 24 years who have not completed primary education.

One of the reasons for delay in development in the CAR is insecurity, which has made it very difficult, if not impossible, for development agencies such as the one I represent to carry out their work. For example, when we re-engaged with the rest of the international community in 2006 after eight years' absence, we designed a series of projects considered urgent, particularly in the sectors of water and sanitation

in Bangui, road transport and hydro-electric energy. Ten years later, the urban project has only just been completed and the other two are only just starting, thanks in particular to the presence of MINUSCA.

It should be noted that, for this reason, some of our new projects involve MINUSCA, such as the re-opening of the track between Kaga-Bandoro and Ndele and the distribution of temporary positions through the CAR. These projects have been designed in partnership with MINUSCA and other United Nations agencies such as UNOPS.

2. Public finance and the security sector

Due to the general insecurity and in particular the most recent conflict, the CAR Government's tax revenue is low and fell significantly during the most recent crisis: it is currently around 7 per cent of GDP, just over half the level before the crisis and far below the 18 per cent advocated by the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) for its member states.

This tax revenue covers around 60 per cent of the core budget (excluding investment, which is almost nil) of the CAR Government, half of which is allocated to administrative salaries (civilian and security). The remainder is provided by the international community (including France, the European Union, the African Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) in return for public finance reforms, in particular a gradual increase in tax revenue and regulation of the total payroll.

There are around 30,000 public employees in the CAR: 20,000 in the civil service and 10,000 in the internal security forces (army, gendarmerie, and police). Security therefore represents significant expenditure, accounting for a third of the total payroll, or around 16.5 per cent of the budget of the CAR Government. However, the progress made in 2015 through "cleaning up" the file of civil servant salaries, as part of public finance reform, has been almost completely cancelled out by the increase in average salary due to promotions for soldiers, gendarmes and police officers.

^g This speech was originally delivered in French. This is not an official United Nations translation, and the United Nations does not take responsibility for the accuracy of this translation.

It is therefore important, especially for the partners contributing to budgetary support (as money is fungible), to extend the reforms in public finance management to the security sector and to anticipate the impact that a reform of this sector would have on public finance.

3. Security sector public expenditure review

The security sector represents a significant area of expenditure for a country such as the CAR, which has very low tax revenue. It is, however, negligible compared to the economic cost of insecurity mentioned above, even without considering the cost to the international community of successive interventions by peacekeeping forces. There is therefore a priori a strong economic interest, in terms of social well-being, in investing in the security sector in the Central African Republic.

The World Bank's mandate does not allow it to invest in this sector nor even to actively participate in the debate about its reform. However, it does permit funding the reintegration element of Disarmament,

Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation (DDRR) projects, as we are going to do in the Central African Republic, as I announced here last September, and which we are doing in other countries such as Mali and the DRC, to quote only the most recent.

As the success of DDRR is largely linked to security sector reform, we are also very interested in contributing to the discussion by conducting a public expenditure review; this is a procedure we apply regularly in all the countries where we operate, to guide investments in all sectors. A review of this type enables cross-cutting issues to be addressed, such as efficiency of public expenditure, management of the salary file, procurement or accountability.

We have just completed, in conjunction with the United Nations, a security sector public expenditure review in Somalia, which calculates the cost of various reform options and considers the options available to the country given its tax revenue. This is what we propose to do with MINUSCA, the European Union, France and the United States in the Central African Republic.

Notes

- 1 United Nations Security Council resolution 2151 (2014), adopted by the Security Council at its 7161st meeting, on 28 April 2014.
- 2 Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes, United Nations SSR Task Force, 2012.
- 3 Central African Armed Forces.
- 4 United Nations Security Council resolution 2301 (2016), para. 9.
- 5 *President's speech to the Nation after his inauguration (30 March 2016)*; see also, *President's Speech at the Ceremony of the Transfer of Authority of the FACA* (4 June 2016).
- 6 Fuior, Teodora and David Law (2014), "Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic: Chronicles of a Death Foretold," SSR 2.0 Brief – Center for Security Governance, Issue 1, No.1, 1 October.
- 7 United Nations Security Council resolution 2301 (2016), para. 34.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 For a good overview of the turbulent history of the CAR, see Tatiana Carayannis and Louisa Lombard's edited volume *Making Sense of the Central African Republic* (2015).
- 10 See "Central African Republic profile – Timeline" available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13150044>.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Arieff, Alexis and Thomas Husted (2015), CRS Report: *Crisis in the Central African Republic*, August 17.
- 13 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Site. See site: <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/central-african-republic/2015/internal-displacement-in-central-african-republic> [accessed on 1 October 2016]; according to OCHA, the number of IDPs in October 2016 is 384,884, which is circa 16,000 more than in June 2016. For updated information on IDPs, see the following website: <http://www.unocha.org/car>.
- 14 Copley, Amy and Amadou Sy (2015), "Africa in Focus: Five Takeaways from the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation in the Central African Republic," Brookings Institution, May 15.
- 15 See the following website for up-to-date date on the people in need in the CAR: <http://www.unocha.org/car> [Accessed on 1 October 2016].
- 16 United Nations Development Programme (2015), Human Development Index.
- 17 See the following website: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/centralafricanrepublic/overview>.
- 18 See the following website: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/central-african-republic>.
- 19 See the following website: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/centralafricanrepublic/overview>.
- 20 O'Toole, Thomas E. (2016), "Central African Republic" in Encyclopaedia Britannica; see the following website: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-African-Republic/Economy>.
- 21 De Vries, Lotje and Tim Glawion (2015), "Speculating on Crisis: The Progressive Disintegration of the Central African Republic's Political Economy," *Conflict Research Unit Report* of Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, March, p. 42
- 22 Arieff and Husted (2015), *CRS Report: Crisis in the Central African Republic*, August 17, p. 6
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Ibid.; on the United Nations sanctions monitor's reporting, see *Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic*, October 29, 2014, U.N. doc. S/2014/762.
- 25 Arieff and Husted (2015), p. 6.
- 26 Enough Project, *Warlord Business: CAR's Violent Armed Groups and their Criminal Operations for Profit and Power*, June 2015; cited in Arieff and Husted (2015), p. 7.
- 27 International Crisis Group (2015), *The Central African Crisis: From Predation to Stabilization*, Appendix B.
- 28 Dhukan, Nathalia (2016), "The Central African Republic crisis – Literature review," GSDRC, March.
- 29 Enough Project, *Behind the Headlines: Drivers of Violence in the Central African Republic*, May 2014; cited in Arieff and Husted (2015), p. 7.
- 30 For more information on the involvement in the past of both the state itself and armed groups in the CAR's economic woes, see the International Crisis Group's (ICG) Africa Report No. 219 entitled *The Central African Crisis: From Predation to Stabilization* of 17 June 2014, and also the ICG's Africa Report No. 230 entitled *Central African Republic: The Roots of Political Violence*, of 21 September 2015.
- 31 Arieff and Husted (2015), p. 7.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 For more on the structure of the security sector, see the *Report of the Joint Security Sector Reform (SSR) Assessment Mission to the Central African Republic*, May 2014. Available at: <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Policy-and-Research-Papers/Report-of-the-Joint-Security-Sector-Reform-Assessment-Mission-to-the-Central-African-Republic> [Accessed 1 October 2016].
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 United Nations Security Council resolution 2217 (2015), para. 33.
- 36 United Nations Security Council resolution 2301 (2016), para 34.
- 37 Ibid. The text in the text box is a direct citation of the language of the resolution.
- 38 Copley, Amy and Amadou Sy (2015), "Africa in Focus: Five Takeaways from the Bangui Forum on National

Reconciliation in the Central African Republic”, Brookings Institution, May 15.

- 39 Responsibility for supporting the reform of the defence sector rests with the new EU Training Mission (EUTM RCA), which was deployed in mid-July 2016 with the mandate to provide strategic advice to the CAR Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, to educate non-commissioned officers and officers, and also to train up to four FACA battalions.
- 40 PNDDRR stands for “Programme national de désarmement, démobilisation, réintégration et rapatriement” [National Programme on Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation].
- 41 *President’s Speech at the Ceremony of the Transfer of Authority of the FACA* (4 June 2016).
- 42 The constitution cited here was adopted on 14 December 2015 by the transitional government and signed by Alexandre-Ferdinand Nguendet, President of the National Transitional Council.
- 43 National Defence Forum, 18 June 2015, Bangui.
- 44 United Nations Security Council resolution 2301 (2016), para 9.
- 45 United Nations Integrated Technical Guidance Note on Democratic Governance of the Security Sector, 2012.
- 46 For the 3As concept, see Adedeji Ebo and Boubacar N’diaye (eds.), 2008, *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in West Africa: Opportunities and Challenges*, Geneva: DCAF.
- 47 United Nations Integrated Technical Guidance Note on National Ownership of Security Sector Reform, 2012.
- 48 Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment for CAR, 2016.
- 49 This speech was originally scheduled to be delivered on 21 June 2016.
- 50 This speech was originally scheduled to be delivered on 21 June 2016.



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